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We dedicate this book to Andrew Graham-Yooll
Very shortly before this book was published, we learned that our friend Andrew 
Graham-Yooll had died. Andrew was a big part of this project: he participated 
in the production, writing and editing process.
Andrew was a great journalist, historian, translator and poet, but above all, 
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Preface
Guillermo Mira and Fernando Pedrosa
Almost forty years after the events analysed in this book, the causes and 
consequences of the military conflict between Argentina and the United 
Kingdom in 1982 still reverberate in a sea of feverish memories and oblivions. 
What is certain is that the conflict around the Falklands–Malvinas survives 
and, in the words of Bernard McGuirk (a contributor to this volume), remains 
unfinished business.
Every aspect of the archipelago that makes up the Falkland–Malvinas 
Islands (including their very name) is mired in complexity, controversy and 
antagonism. Despite this reality, many of those who passionately discuss the 
various political points that characterise the conflict between Argentina and 
the United Kingdom insist upon the immovable certainties behind their 
arguments and claims.
For this reason, among the little that can be affirmed with a degree of 
consensus is the irrefutable fact that the archipelago is located in the South 
Atlantic Ocean, that it is made up of more than one hundred islands, that 
they cover a total of 11,700 square kilometres, and that they are located just 
over 500 kilometres off the Argentine coast and 13,000 kilometres from Great 
Britain. Two large islands stand out from this group, and they lie just under 15 
kilometres apart. 
Everything else seems to be open to debate – even the Islands’ geological 
origin, given that relatively recent scientific findings affirm that, in fact, they 
originate from Gondwana, which was one of the two continental blocks that 
existed prior to the formation of Panagea. Specifically, the islands separated 
from what we know today as southern Africa. The advance of glaciation caused 
that rupture and the islands’ subsequent movement to where they are today. 
Therefore, at least in that sense, they have nothing to do geologically with 
Patagonia, as was believed for a long time.
Fortunately, the origin of this book is much simpler and easier to locate in 
time and space. It grew out of a work of reflection and study on recent Latin 
American history that we have been developing with research teams from the 
University of Salamanca and Buenos Aires. We have been joined by researchers 
from other institutions and countries, many of whom are an important part 
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of this work, as authors and for their contribution in the tasks of editing, 
translation and publication.
The direct antecedent of this book is a work called Extendiendo los límites: 
Nuevas agendas en historia reciente [Extending the Limits: New Agendas in Recent 
History] (Mira and Pedrosa, 2016), where we proposed the need to re-evaluate 
the field of recent history as one with exponential growth, but whose success 
produced its premature exhaustion. In that book we pointed out an issue that 
was little debated then, but today appears more clearly:
Recent history will then face the test of addressing these processes no 
longer from the margins (as initially [happened], when the dominant 
academic history denied it), but from a position of power … The 
overarching question would be: can recent history … survive a change in 
the voice of the state and its agencies?
This question came to replace one aspect that had been surprisingly 
understudied: the role of the national state as a producer and legitimiser of 
visions of the past and, conversely, its role as suppressor of other voices.
The aforementioned book, which can be taken as a precedent of the one 
presented here, not only was not positioned within a closed or single discourse, 
but also offered a range of issues that sought to stretch the boundaries of recent 
history. This book continues that trajectory but changes the strategy: it is no 
longer about presenting multiple problems and approaches to stimulate new 
questions and make disciplinary limits more flexible; here we restrict ourselves 
to a single subject, but we also offer multiple approaches for new reflection. 
This book is about the conflict over the Falkland–Malvinas Islands, and 
it is particularly focused on the War and its aftermath, analysing it from 
diverse perspectives, and in that process bringing together Spanish, British 
and Argentine specialists and researchers. It aims to put together a choral, 
heterogeneous and diverse work, but at the same time, a reflective one, so that 
it appeals to rationality and, above all, to critical thinking within a sinuous 
and problematic terrain. Consequently, it eschews both the mythification of 
bellicosity and nationalistic thinking; but neither is it a merely descriptive essay 
of dates and events in search of an impossible and unproductive objectivity.
This book combines approaches from history, political science, sociology 
and cultural studies, defined in a broad sense. The intention that moved us was 
to make available to the English-speaking public in general (and the British 
one in particular) different perspectives, which intersect and dialogue between 
them, away from tired and barren roads and the focus on exceptionalism that 
has characterised some historiographical approaches to the 1982 conflict. 
Many people have accompanied us on this path. In addition to the 
contributors, we would like to express our gratitude to those who, over many 
years, have made possible a frank and stimulating dialogue between the ‘two 
shores’: Linda Newson, Maxine Molyneux, Catherine Davies, Catherine Boyle, 
Christine Anderson, Catriona McAllister, Bernard McGuirk, Stephen Hart, 
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Julio Cazzasa and Francisco Panizza, who, for many reasons and in many 
circumstances, have been key actors. Their reflections, advice and friendship 
have helped us complete the long emotional and intellectual journey that 
began on 2 April 1982 – amid disbelief, fear and indignation, and that has 
brought us this far. Special thanks to Catriona McAllister for her assistance in 
translating chapters originally written in Spanish.
The chapters in this book
This work begins with a text written by the compilers, Guillermo Mira and 
Fernando Pedrosa, who offer a series of critical reflections on academic and 
cultural approaches to the Falklands–Malvinas War. To carry this out, they 
present a composite historicisation that reveals that the War and everything 
that surrounded it are not only a problem of recent history, but that their roots 
date back to the construction of the Argentine state and nation. They propose 
a way to read the various productions on the subject where the organising axis 
is, rather than format or language, the presence of the state in search of greater 
legitimacy to increase its control over a conflictive and vital society.
María José Bruña presents the Falklands–Malvinas War as one of the most 
revealing examples of biopolitical control in recent history. For her, the War was 
a decision taken by two governments who knew that hundreds of young men 
were sent to their certain death. That is why Bruña defines it as a ‘biopolitical 
strategy’ for these governments to perpetuate themselves in power. Using 
Todorov’s conceptualisations, the author analyses the testimony of a Falklands–
Malvinas War veteran, which allows her to explore various forms of resistance 
by the soldiers, such as laughter, fraternity and imagination confronting the 
biopolitical control of power.
Silvina Jensen explores the impact of the War on Argentine exiles. They 
are men and women who for years – far from their country – had laboriously 
forged a unity of action and discourse with the sole purpose of denouncing 
and repudiating the military dictatorship that had usurped power in Argentina. 
From the margins, the author addresses a controversial issue: the popular fervour 
in Argentina during the decisive days that led to the War. During its course, 
from a visceral hostility against the United Kingdom emerged a widespread 
adherence to the performance of the dictatorship in the ‘Reconquista’ of the 
Islands.
Fernando Pedrosa’s chapter presents the characterisation of the positions 
adopted by the European and Latin American political parties, many of which 
were members of the Socialist International (SI). Afterwards, he delves more 
deeply into the different visions of the Anglo-Argentine conflict, evaluating 
the way in which it influenced inter-party relations, the social democrats’ 
transnational organisational strategies, and regional politics in general. This 
allows him to create a map of the transnational political actions taken, which 
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is quite different from the one usually presented in the specialised literature 
on the subject, mainly arising from the perspective of the parties as the main 
characters in the political processes and on the international stage of the time. 
Furthermore, this approach allows us to observe the more fluid and ambiguous 
actions taken by the different left-wing organisations that were far from being 
a collective, as they were characterised by rigid and inflexible strategies.
Upon the recognition of a troubled relation between the defeat of Argentina’s 
military dictatorship in the War and the restoration of democracy in the country, 
Guillermo Mira undertakes a revision of the most influential theories about 
transitions to democracy in Latin America, and points out their controversial 
aspects. Focusing on the Argentine case, he offers an explanation of why the 
South Atlantic War not only triggered a political earthquake that would force 
the Argentine military to abandon their claims to continue governing (while 
giving a boost to the radical transformation that Margaret Thatcher was leading 
in the United Kingdom), but that it also had profound repercussions at the 
regional and global levels.
By 2006, Julieta Vitullo – author of a subsequent chapter – was finishing 
her doctoral thesis, convinced that fiction had ‘achieved the most complex 
answers to the problems and questions that the War poses’ (Vitullo, 2012, 
p. 16). Before concluding her in-depth investigation, Vitullo decided to visit 
the Falklands–Malvinas. By chance, she had the opportunity of meeting two 
veterans who, after twenty-five years, were returning to the battlefields that 
had marked their lives. The researcher’s improvised camera became a witness 
to the revived experience of those conscripts, now mature men. Following her 
unexpected guides, Vitullo recorded ten hours of images.
The chapters of Julieta Vitullo and Edgardo Dieleke reconstruct the winding 
path that led to the documentary The Exact Shape of the Islands, in which a 
literature student is involved in the plot of the very narratives she analyses, 
while interacting with the central actors of the tragedy. This factor allows her to 
develop a warm flow of empathy towards the protagonists and victims of both 
sides. She also develops a renewed sensitivity towards the setting where these 
events took place.
In this regard, the notes taken by Edgardo Dieleke, which are halfway 
between a travel diary and filming notes, allow us to access to the aesthetic, 
physical and emotional dimensions of the Falklands–Malvinas: colourful 
islands, with beaches, hills and ravines of melancholic beauty; the hospitality 
of the locals whose lives were changed by the War; the memory in the islands’ 
music that did not get to become the film’s soundtrack because its author was 
afraid of hurting the sensibility of the community to which it belongs.
Joanna Page’s chapter delves into one of the war’s thorniest questions: ‘There 
is a sequence that is often repeated in films about the Malvinas: the archival 
footage of the moment at which Galtieri announces the invasion on 2 April 
1982 to an overflowing Plaza de Mayo. The news is met with an ovation by 
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the exultant thousands gathered below. How might we explain such a ringing 
endorsement of a bloody regime in a square that had, only three days earlier, 
witnessed a mass demonstration against the dictatorship?’ Page presents and 
analyses two documentaries by Julio Cardoso. She postulates that his films 
provide an alternative point of view on the subject, regarding how it had been 
treated in the years of the transition. The author shows that Cardoso rejects 
the idea of the 1982 War as a fact that breaks in suddenly and nonsensically 
and, on the contrary, she historicises the event until it is presented as another 
milestone in the history of an Argentine nationalism that comes from the days 
of yore. 
Approaching a similar question, but this time from the field of literary 
fiction, the chapter by Catriona McAllister also departs from the images of 
General Galtieri on the balcony of the Casa Rosada, cheered on by a euphoric 
crowd. She reflects on discourses of national identity in Argentina, focusing on 
the relationship between the military and patriotic celebration, both before and 
after the dictatorship. In order to do so, she analyses several texts by the writer 
Martín Kohan and focuses particularly on his novel Ciencias morales [School 
for Patriots, 2007], where he reflects on patriotic education with the 1982 
conflict as a backdrop.
Returning to these questions from a pedagogical perspective, Matthew 
Benwell and Alejandro Gasel consider the ways in which the issue of the 
Falklands–Malvinas is currently being taught in secondary schools in the city 
of Río Gallegos, capital of the province of Santa Cruz in the deep south of 
the Argentine Patagonia. This work is based on interviews with high school 
teachers and educational officials who work at the provincial and national 
level in Argentina. The authors highlight the potential and relevance of the 
topic based on the place assigned to the Falkland–Malvinas Islands as an icon 
of the ‘territorial nationalism’ incorporated into school textbooks since the 
second half of the 20th century, which is based on increased state control of 
the national curriculum.
The chapter by Cara Levey and Daniel Ozarow weighs in on the immediate 
and long-term consequences of the referendum that took place in March of 
2013 on whether the Falklands–Malvinas should remain a British Overseas 
Territory. The authors offer some ideas about what happened next, in 
terms of its diplomatic and political consequences. They consider that the 
referendum and its consequences represented a missed opportunity for the two 
governments to engage in a sincere dialogue, and they argue that despite the 
often confrontational rhetoric, Argentina and the United Kingdom share a 
common ground and, to some extent, a similar vision for the future of the 
Islanders.
In his chronology and updating of the political and diplomatic milestones 
that have marked the dispute over the Falklands–Malvinas, Andrew Graham-
Yooll advises that new directions should be undertaken in the treatment that 
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the dispute has received by successive authorities in Argentina and the United 
Kingdom. In a sometimes provocative tone, he censures the language of tension 
and insult against the adversary, and advises replacing it with diplomacy and 
moderation, in what he considers to have been a fruitless dialogue for too long. 
Bernard McGuirk is a literary and cultural critic, and author of the 
landmark study Falklands–Malvinas: An Unfinished Business (2007). In his role 
as president of the International Consortium for the Study of Post-Conflict 
Societies, he has worked with people other than just politicians and diplomats 
in both the United Kingdom and Argentina. His text will not be easy to read 
for those seeking ineluctable truths, spiced as it is with critical theoretical 
analysis as well as an ever up-to-the-minute commentary on the peddled 
position-taking of the nationalists, pedants, bigots, and jingoists whose 
interventions abound whenever the troubled terms ‘Falklands’ or ‘Malvinas’ 
are raised, inevitably triggering – or being triggered by – notoriously vested 
interests. Iconoclasm is the keynote of McGuirk’s approach to what he shows 
to be, sadly, the most pressing ‘unfinished business’ of any – if not all – the 
attempts at entente cordiale. 
In the final chapter, Christine Anderson and María Osuna make available to 
scholars and the general public documentation about the Falklands–Malvinas 
War preserved in dependencies of the governments involved and other 
institutions that have contemporary sources on the conflict. In order to do 
this, the authors have followed the Sources for History scheme, developed by the 
University of Chicago (2010). Having documentary material that conserves the 
recent past of the region is crucial to resolving the conflict through diplomatic 
channels. Following the spirit in which this contribution was written, we 
highlight that it is a document under construction, which will need constant 
review and the inclusion of the sources that will be made available depending 
on the times of access to the repositories of the respective countries.
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Introduction 
State, national identity and power: a 
historical tour in search of the causes 
of the Falklands–Malvinas War
Guillermo Mira and Fernando Pedrosa
The state is a theoretical problem and an uncomfortable actor because often its voice is loudly amplified but not always clear or direct. This ambiguity in the actions and discourse of the state can cloud its 
presence, and filter its real interests and objectives. There, in unravelling that 
complex map of interests, actors, actions and strategies, lies the work of social 
scientists.
Most ideological traditions have issued warnings on this issue, foregrounding 
the problem of domination and the construction of the legitimacy that sustains 
the claim of state power. This is why it is striking that in most of the intellectual 
discussions in Argentina over recent decades, there is no explicit theoretical 
interest in the evident presence of the state, nor any methodological provision 
to warn of its attempts to impose a particular narrative.
The discourse about the past is a key arena in which the state can seek to 
consolidate its dominance. To do this, it has at its disposal an immense arsenal 
to influence discourse and identity narratives in civil society. It is where the 
‘fight for history’ occurs, because it works as a basic tool in the construction of 
national identity.
In Argentina, the predominant strategies of those who have led the state 
– or tried to do so – are closer to the ideas of Carl Schmidt than to those of 
John Locke.1 The influence of military thought, revisionism and populism have 
shaped a type of political and intellectual activity where the objective is not 
so much to question the state and its representations or identify its objectives 
and strategies, but rather to impose one’s own discourse and triumph over the 
voices that oppose it.
Paradoxically, the Argentine state (the same one that initiated the war and 
committed the disappearances) has managed to become the object of desire not 
1 Possibly the most appropriate term is that of ‘Neoschmittianism’ (Paredes Goicochea, 2018).
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only of political and economic corporations, and workers and trade unions, but 
also of academics, intellectuals and specialists who have moved between giving 
in to the temptation of emotions and ideologies – where nationalism played a 
key role – or maintaining the scientific criteria in academic production.
This topic is more pressing in societies whose identities have been created 
by the state, and when one addresses issues that imply the legitimising role of 
that domination device. Even more so in Argentina, where the state occupies 
a predominant place both ideologically and for its ability to mobilise material 
resources in social life.
This is where the issue of national identity, nationalism and socially shared 
values  becomes more important than even the material or institutional 
resources. That is why nationalism should not be challenged as something 
abstract, but rather as the use of the nation’s symbols in the discourse, and in 
everyday concrete political practice (Guber, 2007).
Argentinity as an instrument of the state
We conceive the national identity of Argentina (the Argentinity, adopting García 
Fanlo’s proposal (2010)) as an artificial phenomenon, that is, created by the 
state, but at the same time it is dynamic, changes over time, and incorporates 
new actors and imaginaries to give renewed answers to the demands and 
challenges that it receives from civil society.
At the same time that it is changing, it also maintains nodal issues that are 
reiterated diachronically, and that historically define the identity of personality. 
Territorial nationalism, the homeland as a unit, and militarism occupy a crucial 
place in this network. Argentinity is then understood as a new identity that 
ensures the governability of society. 
To make the Argentines governable, that is, fully adapted to the particular 
conditions of the capitalist order, with its social relations of power, 
domination and exploitation. And every time it seemed – in the 19th and 
20th centuries – to achieve the goal, the social structure was modified as 
well as the particular forms of capitalism in reciprocal interrelation. Once 
again the problem reappeared ... restarting the need to invent and fabricate 
a ‘new Argentine’ and a ‘new Argentina’ which, this time, would be the 
definitive ones (García Fanlo, 2010, p. 26).
The Falklands–Malvinas War brought to its climax the possibility of appealing 
to nationalism to unite the population’s identity, in order to divert it from its 
internal conflicts and corporative struggles. But that story did not start there. 
Iglesias (2012) locates some of the causes of the 1982 Malvinas–Falklands 
War in the militarism that Argentine politics adopted from 1930, since both 
military and Peronist governments imposed different versions of nationalism 
as a substitute for citizenship.
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But there are also other specific ideological elements of the Malvinas cause; 
among them: the idea that geography must impose its reasons over history 
… the principle according to which the central actors of the law are the 
states and not the individuals, whose destiny must be subordinated; and 
the idea that the main problem of Argentina is having been sacked by 
foreign powers … Each and every one of these ideas – evermore further 
from reality – are evoked directly or indirectly when it is proclaimed that 
‘The Malvinas are Argentine’ (Iglesias, 2012, p. 12).
In the words of Guber (2000, p. 8), in the Falklands storytelling, ‘the 
Argentines not only remember their rights but also they Argentinise the islands 
by Malvinising their Argentinity’. Thus, in 1982 the state managed (although 
briefly because of the defeat) to place society neatly in its orbit.
Below we offer a brief historicisation of this construction of Argentine 
national identity by focusing on the Falkland–Malvinas Islands. This answers 
to the fact that we consider the war and everything that surrounded it not as a 
problem just of recent history; on the contrary, it must be approached through 
contemporary Argentine history in a continuous way, from the same social and 
political processes that gave rise to the construction of the state and the nation 
in the mid 19th century.
Argentinity as a project of social governability
In Argentina, the state apparatus had proved to be very effective in tackling 
its multiple challenges – and challengers – during the second half of the 
19th century. By that point, it had managed to build a national discourse in 
a sparsely inhabited and heterogeneous territory, predominantly by military 
action. The Sarmientine education (in reference to President Domingo F. 
Sarmiento), compulsory military service, the idea of  ‘to govern is to populate’, 
and the conformation of a national army were some of the axes around which 
the national structuring of the state took place (García Fanlo, 2010).
Military action occupied a key role in this strategy because it was necessary 
to overcome provincial warlords and secure the borders against the Indians 
first and, after that, in the War of Paraguay. At the same time, the continuous 
and transcendent presence of the military in the process of emergence, 
independence and organisation had assured them a relevant place in the then-
young country. In this narrative, glory was in the battlefields and betrayals were 
common between politicians and civilians.
Between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, a huge 
social transformation was brewing as a result of the arrival of millions of foreign 
immigrants, a phenomenon that structurally remodelled Argentine society and 
the way in which it saw itself (Romero, 2017).2
2 ‘The transplant had been successful, but the transplanted subjects did not seem to favour the 
regeneration of the Argentine race or adapt docilely, as a work force, to the conditions of the 
Argentine capitalism. The immigrants were not the expected Anglo-Saxons ... and, at the same 
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The project of a country designed for ‘the Argentine desert’ (Halperín 
Donghi, 2005a) soon became out-dated and the state had to resort to new 
strategies.3 The debates and doubts about the celebrations of the centenary of 
independence, in 1910, showed a society full of uncertainties, concerned for 
the future and increasingly violent. But this had begun before the celebration.
In 1890 there were already two positions before that country in rapid 
transformation and the threat that loomed over the precarious ‘national being’. 
The first of them amalgamated various ideas that coincided with a more 
contractualistic vision, with a positive view of the foreigners; it trusted that 
their contributions to the identity and to the country would be better observed 
over time.
The opposite position – the one that finally triumphed – posed a nationalist 
view that demanded the urgency of policies to homogenise the immigrant 
population behind a conception of essentialist and exclusionary Argentinity 
(Bertoni, 1992). The triumph of nationalist thought (at the same time as the 
nationalist ideology triumphed in Europe) had very important implications 
because it focused on the past – an idealised past – instead of on the possibility 
of articulating a common future.
At this moment of change, the use of patriotic education and its efficient 
‘Argentines-building machine’ is found. Confidence in education, a natural 
idea of positivism, resulted in an institutional effort of great magnitude that 
sought to generate a change in the newly arrived foreigners, i.e. to Argentinise 
them, thus producing a new Argentine subject from the ‘melting pot of races’ 
(García Fanlo, 2010, p. 28).
In addition to the new gaucho ideal (which claimed the figure of Martín 
Fierro as a model of the ‘Argentine’), other issues were reinforced as ingredients 
of Argentina: the struggle for independence, the military hero and father of the 
country, and the territory as the axis of the nation were some of the pillars that 
sustained this renewed nationalising ideal.
Compulsory military service also played a fundamental role in this strategy, 
since it established an entry point, as a rite of passage to the world of male 
adulthood ‘through the inculcation of a warrior moral and, at the same time … 
the configuration of the senses of belonging – and exclusion – to the Argentine 
nation’(Garaño, 2013, pp. 124, 125).
Argentina was built, then and since its inception, as a form of domination 
over a vibrant but heterogeneous society that had in its very formation the 
time, they introduced in the country ideologies strange to the national being, and contrary to 
the capitalist social order; they were not laborious, docile and liberal masses, but revolutionary 
anarchists’ (García Fanlo, 2010, p. 18).
3 ‘The 1.8 million inhabitants of 1869 became 7.8 million in 1914 … Two out of every three 
inhabitants of the city were foreigners in 1895, and in 1914 … still half of the city  population 
was foreign’ (Romero, 2017, p. 31).
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challenges that characterised the popular European sectors of the time (García 
Fanlo, 2010).
In 1916, Hipólito Yrigoyen, the first democratic president, assumed the 
presidency. He had legitimised his leadership using a programme based on the 
idea of ‘the national cause’, construed in absolute terms. This first government 
that emerged from unrestricted suffrage began a process of social inclusion of 
new sectors – the middle classes – through the control of the state. Although 
it opened up new perspectives and included modern visions, it was also based 
on conservative ideas, especially with regard to how nationality should be 
integrated. ‘Yrigoyen joined those who – setting a distance from the dominant 
cosmopolitanism – found that identity in the common Hispanic roots’ 
(Romero, 2017, p. 55).
In the context of the crisis of liberalism in the world, and the growing 
hysteria aroused by the communist threat, the ‘time of the sword’, as a way 
out of the disorder, had summoned various political groups such as socialists, 
fundamentalist Catholics and nationalists. All of them came together in 
criticism of liberal democracy and formed a common space where it was 
difficult to distinguish between left and right.
These circumstances stimulated the appearance of the first revisionist 
authors, whose common position resulted in the historical recovery of the 
figure of Juan Manuel de Rosas.4 However, this first group of intellectuals 
(which included, among others, Adolfo Saldías and Ernesto Quesada) was 
more linked to historiography than to politics.
On 6 September 1930, the first coup in Argentina’s history took place, and 
ended the second government of Yrigoyen (1928–30). The military officers 
who assumed power were strongly influenced by the model of the German 
army of the time, and built an image of the armed forces that transcended 
the brief presidency of General José Uriburu (1930–2). In this regard, it is 
important to underline two main aspects. The first is the return to militarism 
(which had already begun in the previous period) as a positive value against 
democratic ‘disorder’.5 The second came with the legalisation of the coup d’état 
by the Supreme Court, which legitimised the claim of the military that the 
country, and the national cause, were above the law.
4 Juan Manuel de Rosas (1793–1877) was the governor of the province of Buenos Aires from 
1829 to 1832 and from 1835 to 1852, before the national state could establish its rule over 
the territory now known as Argentina. From there he built an anti-liberal and nationalist 
image – that was subsequently amplified by the different revisionisms – starting with an armed 
confrontation with France and the United Kingdom. His adversaries made of him the model 
of a tyrant because he concentrated all the power in his hands, and used the para-police to 
attack his political rivals.
5 ‘[The soldiers] are the only ones who put the defense of the country and nationality above all 
things, including the law and military regulations … The soldiers are the only ones able to 
objectively define when, how and why the country is in danger, and ... they can save it. The 
armed forces are healthy, immaculate, incorruptible, unable to do anything contrary to the 
national interest’ (García Fanlo, 2007, p. 4).
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The opposition to liberalism occurred in a framework of Hispanic vindication 
and strong criticism of the United States, in response to its expansionism after 
the war of 1898 against Spain. In this scenario, the rejection of the British 
occupation of the Falklands–Malvinas was common ground for groups that 
shared no other cause, as illustrated by books published in 1934 by the socialist 
leader Alfredo Palacios and the nationalists Julio and Rodolfo Irazusta.
Perhaps the most important innovation of these revisionists proved to be the 
connection between history and politics that, according to Halperín Donghi 
(2005b), was the key to their success in broad sectors of public opinion. The 
presence of anti-liberalism and the heterogeneity of the intellectual groups 
within the various political parties characterised the political debate until the 
mid 20th century, but mainly on the issue of what position should be taken in 
the Second World War.
This issue was a crucial boost for the second coup, which occurred in 
1943 and rested upon the decision of the armed forces not to declare war on 
Germany. The country declared war only a few moments before the end of 
the conflict. The nationalist stream and Catholic fundamentalism marked the 
tone: ‘authoritarian, anti-liberal and messianic, obsessed with the foundation 
of a new social order and avoiding the chaos of communism’ (Romero, 2017, 
p. 137). It was from then that Juan Domingo Perón started to take his first 
political positions, up until his triumph in the presidential race of 1946.
With the democratic arrival of Perón to the government in 1946, changes 
and continuities occurred in the idea of ‘the national’. Continuity is visible, in 
the first place, in that the military leadership was maintained, although renewed, 
and now embodied in the figure of the new president. Second, the intellectual 
presence of nationalism and Catholicism continued as agglutinating axes of 
the state discourse. Third, the United Kingdom, along with the United States, 
continued to occupy a central place in the nationalist rhetoric’s criticism. 
Fourth, the process of social inclusion was executed, as before with Yrigoyen 
and the middle classes, with the control of the state and with a strong appeal 
to the idea of ‘the national’.
There were other relevant changes too. Peronism led to a mutation in the 
idea of  Argentinity. The first thing that should be stressed is the appeal to 
the people and the state as a single element. The image of the leader on the 
balcony and the people in the square as the staging of that act became iconic 
of 20th-century Argentine politics and, not coincidentally, was present on 2 
April 1982.
The people as a key actor have two facets. First, the real one: mobilised 
and organised from the workers’ unions and state leadership. The people in the 
square are the protagonist of the story, as a complement and sustenance of the 
leader on the balcony of the government house. In the second facet, the people 
are also a rhetorical element: the continuity of the Yrigoyenist idea of the nation 
embodied in the popular will. Thus, democracy became a mere plebiscitary 
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action of the leader, that together with popular mobilisation, replaced the 
republican elements of the political regime (Romero, 2017).
The law lies below the will of a homogeneous people that, at the same time, 
embody the homeland. With this operation, Peronism turned the people 
into the axis of sovereignty and nationalism detached itself from the merely 
territorial. Although the Falklands–Malvinas do not occupy a central place in 
this story, they are integrated into the nationalist discourse because they are 
functional to it with the idea of  usurpation.
This lack of centrality of the Falklands–Malvinas in the nationalism of the 
first stage of Peronism stimulated a dialogue around the Islands. Then the 
Argentine government put forward their only Argentine proposal outside 
the diplomatic claim in place since 1883. In 1953, on the occasion of the 
coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, the Peronist government sent a mission 
headed by the senate president (who later became the nation’s vice-president), 
Alberto Tesaire, in order to offer to buy the Falkland Islands from the United 
Kingdom as the state had done with the railroads.
After conversations at the highest level, the Argentine proposal was rejected 
by Winston Churchill’s government (Bosoer, 2013). The decision took into 
account the negative repercussions that it would bring to the then prime 
minister. The British argument was based on the fact that the inhabitants of 
the Islands were British, which shows that from that moment this issue was 
already a central axis of British policy towards the Islands.
In 1955 there was another coup in Argentina that ended the Peronist 
experiment, but that could not resolve the real and latent conflicts in the 
country. The years after the fall of Perón’s government were unstable, confusing, 
lacking an agreed political path and, above all, with a growing increase in 
political violence. Portantiero (1973) called these years between 1955 and 1966 
‘a hegemonic draw’. He did so taking into account the number of governments 
and economic projects that took place in this period, the conflicts between 
groups and the constant changes in state policies.
Even the democratic governments were unable to generate long-term 
political agreements, as was seen with the weak radical presidents Arturo 
Frondizi (1958–62) and Arturo Illia (1963–6). In terms of the conflict over the 
Islands, these governments maintained an ambiguous nationalist republicanism 
that did not change the dominant trends.
Internationally there was some movement. By the mid 1960s, the United 
Nations General Assembly was very active in matters of decolonisation, 
approving Resolution 1514 of 1960 with a more global meaning, and 
Resolution 2065 of 1965, specifically dedicated to the Falklands–Malvinas 
issue. This was read by the Argentine governments (and is still considered 
today) as a diplomatic victory although, in short, it summoned both parties to 
enter into rapid negotiations.
REVISITING THE FALKLANDS–MALVINAS QUESTION8
In Argentina, the second half of the 1960s marked a resurgence of political 
violence in the context of a zeitgeist that fed on the strong hegemonic crisis 
affecting the United States (Halliday, 1986). At the same time, an explosion 
of social challenges of varying importance and form made its way around 
the world. The Vietnam War and the communist overturning of the Cuban 
revolution led Latin American armed forces to consolidate a repressive scheme 
in their links with society. In that context, the first guerrilla groups appeared 
in Argentina.
This coincided with a change in military doctrine, that went from being 
linked to national autonomy and the external enemy, to what is known as 
the ‘national security doctrine’ (Leal Buitrago, 2003). The new military 
objective was to guarantee security within the country’s borders and, therefore, 
the ‘anti-subversive war’ became the new problematic axis pointed to by the 
Latin American armed forces (Portantiero, 1973). With the military in power, 
sovereignty was once again linked to territory and, therefore, the Falklands–
Malvinas issue occupied a much more important place in public discourse. 
‘Malvinas’ (in military governments) and ‘people’ (with Peronism), each one 
as a substitute for the other, were alternately occupying the centre of the state’s 
nationalist discourse, stimulated by the cyclical instability of the country’s 
political regime.
During those years, the so-called ‘Operativo Cóndor’ was carried out, 
whereby about twenty Peronist militants hijacked a plane of Aerolíneas 
Argentinas in flight and diverted it to the Falkland–Malvinas Islands. Once 
there, they raised a series of Argentine flags and took the chief of police of the 
Islands and the head of the English Infantry hostage before surrendering to the 
British authorities. The members of the group came from nationalist factions 
of Peronism that, over the course of the 1970s, were incorporated indistinctly 
to the different left and right groups into which the Peronism of the time was 
divided.
Radicalised groups, including armed factions within Peronism, resumed 
the Falklands–Malvinas issue, which they approached from the same logic of 
territorialistic nationalism, but also from anti-imperialism. In this context, a 
violent action to recover what historically ‘belonged to us’ did not seem so 
outrageous. This notion reached its paroxysm in 1982, when during the war 
against the United Kingdom, the Montoneros (an armed organisation with 
Peronist roots), even having been decimated by the illegal repression and 
exile, offered the military government a truce to go fight together with their 
executioners in the Islands.
As a sign of the contradictions of the state in general, and Argentina in 
particular, in 1971, while Argentine nationalism was ‘remalvinised’, Argentina 
and Chile agreed to the United Kingdom’s being the arbitrator in the dispute 
over the Beagle Channel that had been dragging on since the late 19th century 
(Infante, 1979).
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During the 1970s, Argentine society experienced, in different ways, a climate 
of permanent violence and confrontation. This was not only because of the 
state repression already present under the Peronist government (Franco, 2012), 
or the clashes between military, paramilitary and guerrilla groups. Violence as 
an instrument had been naturalised in the everyday relations of a majority of 
the population, which did not participate in political activism, and much less 
in ideological extremism (Carassai, 2013).
This contributed to the creation of conditions for the revaluation of the 
discourse of order (also associated with violence) proposed by the 1976 military 
coup (Romero, 2017). The bellicosity of the military turned to the internal 
level, but also to the external one. In 1978, the dictatorship led the country to 
the brink of war with Chile by rejecting the arbitration convened in 1971 and 
delivered to the parties in 1977. As already mentioned, the arbitral task had 
been assigned to the United Kingdom, although the final opinion was drafted 
by an international tribunal. The mediation of Pope John Paul II managed to 
prevent direct confrontation.
In the conflict with Chile, it was already observed that much of the problem 
on the Argentine side was the bureaucratic and complex way that the Argentine 
military junta made its decisions (Villar, 2014). As claimed above, the field of 
recent history found certain limits to progress on these roads because it turned 
sharply towards memory studies and generally had no major dialogues with 
international relations or political science (Mira and Pedrosa, 2016).
The ‘war that was not’ is an indispensable step towards understanding the 
war that did take place. And possibly at this point the works of historians 
on the Falklands–Malvinas require greater dialogue with other disciplines that 
have analysed this subject more extensively.6
In 1982, war itself unfolded, with the consequences we all know. The 
Argentine military defeat caused the regime to fall, and later the dissemination 
of the backroom of the organisation of the war and the issue of human rights 
violations became the centre of the political scene. Defeat in the war caused 
the conflict around the Falklands–Malvinas to rise to the level of an irreversible 
and permanent cause. With the arrival of a new democratic shift, new and 
diverse voices of civil society began to take the floor.
The post-war years
The arrival of Raúl Alfonsín of the Radical Civic Union to the presidency 
in 1983 was a moment of rupture with the past but also, as happens in 
any historical process, of continuities with what had come before. Alfonsín 
6 It would be interesting to include in the research agenda the different social and political 
repercussions of the conflicts around the Falklands–Malvinas and the Beagle Channel. The 
dispute with Chile over the issue of the Beagle was not recurrent in the intellectual or political 
environments; neither had it had much social impact, despite the constant disputes originated 
in the area in which both countries were involved (Valenzuela Ugarte and García Toso, 2008). 
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decided to subsume the Falklands–Malvinas policies to the general strategy of 
diminishing military power. In that field, he had to be guided by the relations 
of forces that he maintained at each juncture. Alfonsín took advantage of the 
discrediting of territorialistic nationalism to confront it and deactivate through 
a referendum one of the urgent problems that kept the military in a warring 
state: the dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel that had almost led both 
countries to war in 1978 (Miguez, 2018). 
However, the task was not unambiguous, and abroad the radical government 
issued confusing signals. Alfonsín did not declare the cessation of hostilities 
in the Falklands–Malvinas, and that implied – at least theoretically, and as a 
warning to the British – that the conflict over the Islands could be restarted. 
In that context, Alfonsín did not yield to the pressure of the western powers 
and refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, known as the 
Tlatelolco Treaty. At the same time, the Cóndor II programme continued (it 
had been initiated immediately after the defeat by the military government) 
for the development of a missile capable of reaching the Islands. The air force 
(like many others) did not feel defeated and raised the old military autarchy 
principle for possible future war events.
Alfonsín did not maintain good relations with the United States or the 
United Kingdom. This ended up feeding the image of distrust that already 
existed among the Western powers about the country as an international actor. 
This could not be read in any other way than under the lens of the Falklands–
Malvinas War.
In 1989, the first constitutional handover under normal conditions since 
1928 took place. The new president, the Peronist Carlos Menem, enacted 
neoliberal policies and established an alliance with the United States. The 
normalisation of relations with the Western powers was one of the key points 
in the change of government (Romero, 2017).
Menem decreed the cessation of hostilities (seven years after the surrender 
of the Argentine authorities in the Falklands–Malvinas) and re-established 
the diplomatic relationship with the United Kingdom. In this context, 
a ‘sovereignty safeguard clause’ was agreed (known as the umbrella clause), 
to separate issues relating to the sovereignty of others which both countries 
intended to move forward, such as fishing and oil extraction. For the first time, 
government policy was to try to improve relations between Argentines with the 
people who were one of the main sources of contention after 1982 (Palermo, 
2007; Niebieskikwiat, 2014). In 1995, Argentina finally signed the accession 
to the Tlatelolco treaty and abandoned its membership in the group of non-
aligned countries. For all this, it was accepted as an extra-NATO ally, which 
incorporated the country into a defensive alliance of a military type that also 
included the United Kingdom.
Nostalgic sectors of the military regime accused the governments of the 
transition as having a policy of  ‘demalvinisation’ – a synonym for de militarisation 
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– and that they were using it to survive (in the case of the Alfonsín government) 
and to consolidate their leadership (in the case of Carlos Menem). However, 
together with the differences maintained by the governments of Alfonsín and 
Menem, nationalist and territorialistic views continued to dominate public 
policy, especially in the field of education and culture, with the addition that 
the political and social elites had not yet accepted responsibility for the war.
Although there is still debate about whether it is possible to separate the 
military dictatorship from the Falklands–Malvinas War, that discussion made 
no sense for Alfonsín and Menem, since the armed forces, the dictatorship, 
human rights and the war were all part of an indissoluble whole, and a problem 
to solve if the new political regime was to be consolidated.
At the end of his term in 1999, Menem was replaced by the radical 
Fernando De la Rúa, who led a government characterised by weakness and lack 
of leadership. With regard to the Falklands–Malvinas, De la Rúa contributed 
little, but due to pressures from different directions (the armed forces and the 
veterans, among them), 2 April was re-enacted as a national holiday, when 
the country commemorates the capture of the Islands, quite the opposite of 
what Alfonsín had sought when he repealed the same holiday imposed by the 
military government.
The 2001 crisis marked a before and after in Argentina; the state seemed 
to have lost control of the situation, but the interim government of Peronist 
Eduardo Duhalde (2002–3) generated the necessary conditions that led to 
a certain institutional normalisation. His chosen successor, Néstor Kirchner 
(2003–7), benefited from an economic recovery that brought an unexpected 
and immense boom in the price of agricultural commodities. However, he 
had to gain his own political power, which he built by strongly appealing to a 
particular narrative about the recent past (Romero, 2017). 
The Kirchnerist state and its historical discourse
Almost two decades after the 1982 war, a decade of thawing Anglo–Argentine 
relations, and the end of an economic and political crisis, the Falkland–
Malvinas Islands were not on the list of priorities of Argentine society or its 
ruling class. However, they were still an effective instrument in the hands of the 
state, as a device of unification and mobilisation of society, especially at a time 
when it had to rebuild its political legitimacy and had the material resources 
to carry this out.
The Kirchnerista governments looked back to the 1960s and 1970s to 
present themselves as those who had brought about the process of social change 
that took place in those years (Bermúdez, 2015). That is why Néstor Kirchner’s 
government included the Falklands–Malvinas War in its narrative about 
human rights violations committed in the years of the military government. 
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This policy continued and was accentuated by the governments of his wife, 
Cristina Fernández (2007–15).
Kirchnerismo inaugurated a new stage that took the old historical claim of 
war as heroic deed, but tried to separate it from the dictatorship.7 To this end, 
it threw the full weight of the state behind the creation of spaces dedicated 
to speeches, images and content about the war. In addition, it found in the 
nationalist appeal of the bicentennial of the May Revolution of 1810 an event 
that once again united the right and left behind the national flag.
The Argentine state acted decisively to position this new narrative, and it 
did so with an important range of economic, media and institutional resources. 
Thus, an alliance was consolidated between important academic and cultural 
sectors and the generous system of state financing, which produced a boom in 
productions of all kinds on the subject of the memory of what happened in the 
years prior to 1983, and immediately after.
The new interpretation of the Falklands–Malvinas heroic deed suggested 
that, although the war had meant continuity with the repressive model of the 
state since 1976, at the same time there was a historical imperative that led to 
the separation of the issue of sovereignty from those who had initiated the war. 
At the same time, there was an association between the soldiers conscripted 
with the young victims of the repression of the dictatorship.
The historiographical operation was once again supported by familiar 
reference points of nationalist discourse: Argentina’s indisputable sovereignty, 
her victimisation by imperial powers, the betrayal of the military, and appeals 
to what the war could have been in other political circumstances. Argentina 
repeated its history once more.
In the next section we propose to read the academic and cultural production 
about the Falklands–Malvinas that tries to build an identity discourse whose 
purpose is to consolidate and legitimise a powerful device of state domination.
The post-war period and the social sciences
There are a large number of academic and cultural productions on the war that 
began on 2 April 1982, bolstered by state initiatives that promoted the subject 
from 2003 onwards and, even more importantly, the thirtieth anniversary of 
the war in 2012.
This happened not only in the academic sphere, but in other areas too, such 
as biography, journalism, essays, military technology and of course the fictional 
record in its various written or audio-visual formats. This large corpus includes 
all kinds of approaches, methods, devices and speeches. The need to give order 
to them led specialists to propose different clusters that would allow for some 
preliminary conclusions on what was produced, and evaluate trends.
7 To deepen awareness of the policies on the Falklands–Malvinas at this stage, see Perochena 
(2016).
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Federico Lorenz (2011) divides this corpus into four groups, while pointing 
out that they not only oppose each other, but also overlap. The first of these 
is the ‘patriotic group’, which foregrounds the national cause, the unity of 
the Argentine people and does not consider the characteristics of the military 
government that carried out the war as being important. The second is the 
‘victimising narrative’, which is placed at the time of the democratic transition, 
and which is read as being part of ‘the self-exculpatory vision that society 
sought to build on itself ’ (Lorenz, 2011, p. 51). The third group incorporates 
the speeches produced from the redefinition of the role of the combatant made 
by the first associations of veterans, as well as from the characterisation of the 
war as part of the Latin American anti-imperialist struggle. Finally, the fourth 
group brings together works dedicated to military history, whether technical 
or linked to diplomacy and the explanation and description of war chronicles.
Another of the specialists recognised in the subject, Rosana Guber (2017), 
reduces the corpus to three different groups. The first is based on what she calls 
the political and military history of the archipelago; the second concerns those 
who address the impact of the Falklands–Malvinas issue in relation to national 
culture and politics; and the third, and most recent, is based on the studies of 
human action on nature in the South Atlantic.
Another original classification proposal is that offered by María Elena 
Molina (2008), who groups the production on the Falklands–Malvinas into 
two sets, the triumphant version and the mournful version. She states, as 
Lorenz does, that these two modes do not necessarily oppose each other, but 
intersect. Molina then proposes the space of literature and fiction as the one 
that truly manages to speak, ask questions and self-criticise about the facts 
surrounding the 1982 war.
To raise a discussion that addresses the role of the state as a producer of 
social discourse, we propose to group the written production into three large 
and heterogeneous groups.
The statist set
The first of these is the ‘statist’ one, which includes the productions that 
fluidly accompanied the voice of the state throughout the 19th, 20th and 21st 
centuries. Given the abundance of existing texts in that sense, we can subdivide 
it into two large streams: the sovereigntist one, and that of the new epic.
The sovereigntist stream describes the works that are directly or indirectly 
vehicles of reaffirmation of the assumptions that historically sustained 
the Argentine claims. This is a heterogeneous subgroup but not necessarily 
militaristic or supportive of the government that produced the war. It includes 
traditional views, those of the technocrats, diplomats, journalists and academics 
that, in different ways, see the issue of sovereignty and the Argentine claim as 
central axes (e.g. Kohen and Rodríguez, 2015).
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The new epic can be identified from the late 20th century onwards, with 
approaches, methods and problems linked to the social sciences, including 
issues going beyond mere sovereignty over the Islands. The predominant trends 
in this group go hand in hand with the official voice of each moment. In 
the 1980s, these productions were linked, for example, to the victimisation of 
conscripts, and since 2003, they have been directly related to the attempts to 
remove the military government from the scene of the war, in order to renew 
the identity pact of Argentinity with the Falklands–Malvinas issue.
Unlike the first subgroup, these works do not provide a detailed exploration 
of matters related to sovereignty. However, a strong Argentine claim is made 
relating to an anti-imperialist or anti-colonial discourse. Another contrast 
is observed with the classic revisionist studies, since these place the conflict 
over the Falklands–Malvinas in a timeline that extends from the 19th century 
onwards. For the statist studies linked to the more current visions in the social 
sciences, the war is included in the mainstream of recent history, and inside the 
issue of human rights violations and state terrorism.
The emphasis is on the protagonists, their memories, biographies and an 
analysis that recreates an epic story without crediting the military. Lorenz is the 
historian who expresses this position most fully.8 Author of an extensive and 
varied body of work, Lorenz removes the assumptions of sovereigntist literature, 
while reinforcing (even in his role as a novelist) the Argentine government’s 
central axes of speech since 2003, that is, communicating a connection to the 
political situation and the political actors of the 1970s.
The characterisation proposed by this typology is somewhat broad given the 
diversity of productions that are grouped together – approaches which range 
from military studies to work that assimilates conscripts with those disappeared 
under military repression. However these approaches are historicised in the 
long term (and not in the chronological limits of recent history), a common 
matrix can be identified. All occupy the space enabled, and also limited by, 
the state itself and society. They are ‘acceptable’ modes of speech, which have 
conditions of social audibility, in an arena where being heard is difficult. For 
this reason, it is important to highlight those discourses that challenge the 
official versions of events.
The challengers
The second group in which we propose to organise cultural production on 
the Falklands–Malvinas and the war is the smallest: the works that oppose 
the state’s discourse and question the core of the nationalist narrative in all its 
forms and stages. This heterogeneous group includes contemporary anti-war 
activism from exile, such as that carried out by Néstor Perlonger and León 
8 Although their approaches sometimes dabble in classical nationalist discourse, e.g. ‘10 
questions to explain Malvinas to children’, Supplement 12, Diario Página 12, 3 April 2009.
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Rozitchner.9 It also includes the work of critics such as Beatriz Sarlo and Carlos 
Altamirano, writing in the magazine Punto de Vista. There are also the works 
or public interventions of those who manifested their opposition as best they 
could from within the country, such as Juan José Sebreli or Jorge Luis Borges, 
who allegedly called for the Islands to be given to Bolivia ‘so it has access to 
the sea’.
Perlongher may have been the first, at the time the war was taking place, to 
express lucidly that behind the military adventure was the state and a nationalist 
call that neither the right nor the left – he admitted bitterly – could ignore. At 
the same time, he belittled the disputed Islands as ‘unhealthy islets’ (1982) and 
lamented that the military had carried to the Islands the state of exception of 
the Continent. Perlongher, finally, decides to do what a national cause hates 
most: ridicule it.
In the midst of such folly, the most elegant way out is humour: if Borges 
recommended giving the Islands to Bolivia, thus giving it an exit to the 
sea, it could also be proclaimed: all the power of Lady Di or the Vatican to 
the Falklands/Malvinas so that the ridiculous power that a suicidal chorus 
legitimises is exposed. As someone sensibly proposed, before defending the 
occupation of the Falklands/Malvinas, the inoccupation of Argentina by 
the self-styled Argentine army should be postulated (Perlongher, 1982).
By the post-war period and with elaborate arguments and a systematic study, 
the work of Vicente Palermo (2007) is the biggest challenge to the ‘Malvinising’ 
discourse of the Argentine state, and to the construction of its nationalist 
appeal linked to the territory. According to Palermo, ‘Malvinas’ is included in 
this discursive configuration, which includes a national identity linked to loss, 
victimhood, a ‘meek and calm’ nature, and a wait that ends when the patience 
of the ‘noble Argentine people’ runs out.
The war, then, would be the direct result of this territorial configuration 
of national identity rather than ambition or a whim. Palermo is possibly the 
Argentine intellectual who has most reflected on the subject, and who has done 
so regularly over time, discussing the most widespread assumptions about the 
‘Falklands/Malvinas cause’, whether factual (the relationship with the Islanders) 
or counterfactual (‘if it were not for the war the Falklands/Malvinas would be 
Argentine’).
Rosana Guber, another recognised researcher in this field, has also challenged 
the nationalist discourse of the 1980s and 1990s (Guber, 2000), but at the 
same time, and unlike the authors of the statist group, she has carried out 
investigations that call into question the versions proposed by the Argentine 
state from 2003 onwards. In her study of air force pilots in the war, Guber 
challenges the notions of the ‘repressive military’ or ‘Falklands–Malvinas hero’:
9 See Rozitchner (2015). To reconstruct some of the debates on Perlongher’s ideas, see Svetliza 
(2017). To delve into issues of exile and debates about war, see Silvina Jensen’s chapter in this 
book.
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Why can’t I live with complexity, accept that there was a force that did 
things well, that performed well above what could have been expected 
according to their experience and military resources? Why can’t I 
understand that human beings are capable of both and many more in 
between? I don’t care if what I research is simplified as laudatory or pro-
military ... Because of this idea of  risk, there is almost no research on the 
military world in Latin America ... But if one accepts that human beings 
and societies are complex, one can dare to understand who we are, and of 
what we were and are capable of. The soldier is a human being, it is good 
to remember. He has successes, makes mistakes, and he behaves with a 
logic with which I can communicate.10
Guber (2013) also advanced the theme of camaraderie between British and 
Argentine soldiers, an issue that breaks the first line of division of perpetual 
combat between essential enemies. But the most challenging aspect of Guber’s 
work is her refusal to assimilate the situation on the Islands with the state 
terrorism that had been applied in the country since 1976:
This idea of  the extension of state terrorism is based on the emblematic 
figure of the conscript soldier dragged to the battlefield without training 
or necessary equipment and as an object of constraints ... The logistics, 
hunger, cold, are inherent deprivations of war. Were those failures made 
on purpose against the soldier as a civilian? … When you go to war, 
that passage is not clear. There were abuses of authority, but there were 
superiors who submitted to the same conditions as their soldiers. The 
image of the military officer, that the only thing he knows how to do 
is to repress innocent people, that that is why he goes to the Falklands/
Malvinas, and does the same with the civilians under the flag, is a cartoon. 
You cannot spend your time torturing a soldier because ... the enemy is 
coming.11
Following a similar line, the book by Fernando Iglesias (2012) is heir to the 
thoughts of David Held and Ulrich Beck. Iglesias is categorical: the idea that 
‘the Falklands/Malvinas are Argentine’ is inapplicable without violating the 
basic principle on which Argentina was founded: the self-determination of 
the people. Iglesias goes so far as to question whether the national goal of 
recovering the Falklands–Malvinas is compatible with international law and 
human rights, in open reference to the situation of the thousands of people 
that live there. At the same time, his work may be considered one of the few 
questioning perspectives, deriving as it does from a sociology of globalization, 
which indicates the folly of nationalism and the use of the Falklands–Malvinas 
by the powers that be to ‘deploy a huge smokescreen – a fog blanket – usable at 
any time’ (Iglesias, 2012, p. 127).
The journalist Natasha Niebieskikwiat’s book (2014) can also be included 
in the group of texts and interventions that challenge the state narrative. She 
10 Interview with Rosana Guber, 13 April 2014, http://www.infonews.com.
11 Interview with Rosana Guber, 13 April 2014, http://www.infonews.com.
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offered the first study of life on the Islands, which she prepared after her many 
trips there. The inhabitants of the Islands themselves have often been neglected 
in the literature, as if they were absent or irrelevant to the conflict or the future 
of the archipelago. Indeed, they are still referred to by the derogatory term 
‘Kelpers’.12 By contrast, Niebieskikwiat’s approach sees them as protagonists 
and incorporates them into the historical narrative, humanising them. This 
breaks with the idea that the Islanders exist only as a direct consequence of the 
British presence, and argues that the works included in the statist group, in its 
two variants, have maintained a stereotyped and ignorant perspective.
This group of works on Malvinas should also include the document 
presented in 2012 by a group of well-known intellectuals, academics and 
journalists, entitled Malvinas, una visión alternativa [Malvinas, an alternative 
vision], which engaged with debates held during the commemoration of 30 
years since the 1982 confrontation.13 It was the first time that a group of 
prominent citizens had called openly for a reconsideration of the degree to 
which society as a whole was linked to the Islands, and had raised challenging 
alternatives to those traditional views that were based on some kind of epic. 
In publishing their piece, they were entering into a discourse that had until 
then been occupied exclusively by the revisionists or by the official post-2003 
discourses mentioned above.
The signatories carried (and still carry) a lot of weight in the social and 
intellectual life of Argentina. This gave the manifesto a qualitatively different 
dimension and impact from those of other interventions. And by examining 
the link between the Islanders and Argentine society, they were addressing how 
to begin to solve the dispute, and to change the political culture on the issue 
that had predominated since the 19th century. Their provocative proposal 
opened up the conversation to the inhabitants of the Islands, accepting their 
right to self-determination.
Crucially, the document underlined the repeated tendency in the different 
statist visions to minimise the importance of Argentina’s having initiated 
the invasion and then, later, having misunderstood the consequences of the 
invasion, especially internationally. It also criticised the Kirchnerista government 
for its contradictory demand to open a negotiation that included the issue of 
sovereignty while announcing that Argentine sovereignty was non-negotiable.14 
12 ‘The name kelper refers to the algae that grow on the Falklands/Malvinas coast (kelp), which 
are useless and annoying. For that reason, ‘kelper’ connotes a devalued identity’ (Ehrmantraut, 
2012, p. 7).
13 Among the signatories are Beatriz Sarlo, Santiago Kovadloff, Manuel Antín, Juan José Sebreli, 
Marcos Aguinis, Jorge Lanata, Graciela Fernández Meijide, Fernando Iglesias, Emilio de Ípola, 
Pepe Eliaschev, Roberto Gargarella, Marcos Novaro, Vicente Palermo, Luis Alberto Romero, 
Jorge E. Torlasco, Hugo Vezzetti and Osvaldo Guariglia, among others.
14 The constitution says ‘respect [the Islanders’] way of life’, and that they should not be subjected 
to ‘a sovereignty, a citizenship and a government they do not want’, which was used to support 
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This document was heavily criticised, by right and left, and even by senior 
government officials of the time. It could not have been otherwise. The 
argument that there ought to be a reassessment of the Islanders’ situation, and 
that they ought to be granted the right to self-determination, was put down to 
a ‘lack of patriotism’. This period saw the peak of the debate, but it is reasonable 
to assume that the 40th anniversary will revive the discussion.
Audio-visual and literary discourse
In addition to written texts, cultural production in other languages  and formats 
should be noted. Audio-visual or literary discourse represents the possibility of 
saying what cannot be expressed otherwise, although even in that arena the 
state can set limits on what can be said. These texts we consider loosely to be 
a third group, which might include fiction or audio-visual work that appeared 
after the war. It is an area that has received plenty of academic attention (e.g., 
López and Rodríguez, 2009; Vitullo, 2012; Varela, 2016; Molina, 2018; 
Fernández Ameghino, 2019) and it is not our intention to make an exhaustive 
review, nor delve too deeply into the content of the work.15 
Because this type of work is produced in a variety of languages, it is not 
as easily grouped into a single category, as we have been proposing for the 
previous types. Nonetheless, it is possible to analyse some aspects of these 
works and then characterise them according to what kind of discourse they 
offer, and in what part of the debate they can be incorporated. In some cases, 
the relationship they maintain with the state and social conditions of audibility 
are key.
Post-2003, when the Néstor Kirchner government came to power, it had 
to renew the type of discourse that sustained its leadership claims, and this 
change extended to art and culture. While there were still links to the old 
nationalist and/or warlike paradigms,16 cultural production relating to the 
Falklands–Malvinas now also confronted the traditional nationalist view from 
an anti-military perspective:
Literature on the Falklands/Malvinas is relatively scarce and little-read. 
To some extent, this fact is explained by how sensitive Argentine society 
continues to be regarding this issue. If during the nineties the cause of the 
Falklands/Malvinas seemed almost forgotten, today it has come back with 
more strength. The idea of a  just, but poorly managed, war is an idea still 
in force today (Molina, 2008, p. 1).
demands for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom and its military base, while all the time 
asserting the sovereignty of Argentina.
15 The work of Luz Souto (2018) could also be included in this list, since it proposed a 
categorisation of literary production based on generations of authors. It is related to one of the 
issues (post-memory) we tackle in our previous book (Mira and Pedrosa, 2016).
16 E.g., García Quiroga (2010).
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The new state storytelling of the Falklands–Malvinas stimulated cultural and 
artistic production to expand enthusiastically, but conservatively, because it 
was engaged in dismantling a discursive paradigm that had changed little for 
centuries.
Writers such as Martín Kohan, Patricia Ratto, Fabiana Daversa, Patricio 
Pron or Federico Lorenz,17 among others, questioned and disarticulated the 
official story – one that was simply anachronistic and no longer had coercive 
power or great social legitimacy.18 At the same time, they legitimised the new 
state narrative, which was recharged with nationalist rhetoric, although in a 
different sense from the previously.19 
Reiterating the statement at the beginning of this section, the corpus to be 
covered is very broad, and it is not our intention to make a complete study, but 
rather, by mediating through the selection of some examples, set trends that 
allow some reflection.
Uncomfortable fiction
There are works that have managed to take the war and its protagonists to 
places where it has been difficult for non-fiction to go. The ‘deserters, rogues, 
imposters’ appear (Souto, 2018, p. 129), as do the inhabitants of the islands 
and human rights abuses.
Los pichiciegos [Malvinas Requiem] by Rodolfo Fogwill; Las islas [The 
Islands] by Carlos Gamerro; the work of Rodrigo Fresán; some works by Daniel 
Guebel; La construcción [The Construction] by Carlos Godoy; and Kelper, by 
Raúl Vieytes, approach the issue from a range of different perspectives.20 El 
desertor [The Deserter] by Marcelo Eckhardt and Latas de cerveza en el Río de 
la Plata [Beer Cans in the Rio de la Plata] by Jorge Stamadianos must also be 
mentioned, since they deal with a figure that is not well-drawn in the non-
fiction – that of the deserter. This is important to the particular discussion 
in this book since as Vitullo (2006, p. 34) states, the deserter refuses to be 
subjected to the biopolitical control of the state and rejects its paternalistic 
dominance.
17 In the case of Lorenz (2012), his fiction completes a complex historical operation that unites 
the political violence of the 1970s with the Falklands–Malvinas story. Even in his 2017 novel 
which was not specifically dedicated to the Falklands–Malvinas issue, he takes a condescending 
look at the armed struggle.
18 Pron refers to his work as ‘a symbolic continuation of the Falklands/Malvinas War’. This 
‘untimely’ critic sought to desecrate a war that, by the time he was editing his novel, had 
already been re-sacralised in other arenas (interview with Patricio Pron, Infobae newspaper, 8 
February 2015).
19 This includes children’s literature. A book by Claudio Javier Garbolino and Antonella 
Garbolino Mejía (2013) was marketed as the first children’s story about the Falklands–
Malvinas conflict.
20 On the Pichiciegos see Bruña (2016). On the work of Gamerro, see Lardone (2012). On 
Guebel, see Ehrmantraut (2016). On Eckhardt, see Vitullo (2006).
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Possibly the most important weapon in these works has been to strip the 
Falklands–Malvinas War of its solemnity and, through this simple operation, 
desacralise ‘Argentinity’, and uncover it as a farce of power. To leave the king 
naked. To leave the king without his heroic deed.
Cinematographic language
This dichotomy between legitimising views of the state narrative, and those 
that open alternative paths, is much more complex to observe in the cinema, 
where we find a great diversity of possibilities associated with the characteristics 
of cinematic language. On the other hand, not all cinematic contributions can 
be considered part of the fiction genre, as some works have a documentary 
style based on research and interviews and maintain the truth of what they 
postulate.21 
A certain continuity can be seen between some key cinematic works and the 
official state discourse of the period. Los chicos de la guerra [The Boys who went 
to War] by Bebe Kamín (1984) is undoubtedly the most iconic representation 
of the narrative at the time of the transition to democracy, along with the 
minutes he dedicates to the Falklands–Malvinas issue in La República perdida 
2 [The Lost Republic 2], directed by Miguel Pérez (1986), and La deuda 
interna [The Internal Debt], by Miguel Pereira (1988). In this line, there are 
many other productions, for example Guarisove, los olvidados [Guarisove, the 
Forgotten Ones] by Bruno Stagnaro, Hundan al Belgrano [Sink the Belgrano] 
by Federico Urioste (1996), and El visitante [The Visitor] by Javier Olivera 
(1998).
But there are other films that do not coincide exactly with the predominant 
post-1983 discourse. Examples are: Malvinas, historia de traiciones [Malvinas, 
a Story of Betrayal] by Jorge Denti (1984), which is located in the classic 
revisionist discourse of anti-colonialism, and Malvinas, Alerta Roja [Malvinas, 
Red Alert] by Eduardo Alertondo, a film that premiered in 1985 with a 
strikingly military tone, in an era when, although some solidarity with the 
military persisted, the majoritarian discourse adhered to anti-military views.
The most recent official discourse was observed in the successful film 
IIluminados por el fuego [Illuminated by Fire], released in 2005, and financed 
by an important series of Argentine public institutions. Its director was a senior 
government official. Another film, Desobediencia debida [Due Disobedience], a 
documentary by Victoria Reale (2010), could be placed in the same category. 
Its main character is the only British prisoner of the Argentine troops, it is 
21 There are documentaries such as Crazy about the Flag (2005), by Julio Cardoso, which 
demonstrates the breakdown of the famed Argentine national unity on the subject of the 
Falklands–Malvinas, although it was not what the film set out to show. 
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clearly located in the state discourse of the time, and was also state-funded.22 
Through the metaphor, the director discusses the law of ‘due obedience’ that 
sought to limit military responsibility in the illegal repressions (Romero, 2017).
From another perspective, Cartas a Malvinas [Letters to Malvinas] (2006) 
and Soldado argentino solo conocido por Dios [Argentine Soldier Known Only 
by God] (2016) by Rodrigo Fernández Engler, sit in opposition to official 
discourse but closer to traditional nationalist visions. They go against the 
narrative according to which the young soldiers are seen as victims of the 
Argentine military:
I do not say that it did not exist, but I filmed a tribute to the Falklands–
Malvinas heroes. I leave aside the political and ideological issues, the 
process [of national reorganisation], and Galtieri, because I ask, ‘What did 
an 18 year-old soldier have to do with Galtieri?’ Most of the soldiers felt 
what they were doing. I address the patriotism and companionship of that 
story.23 
Other films have repeated the aforementioned strategy of stripping away 
solemnity from the matter, or shining a light on other behaviours and actors as 
a way of leaving room for critical reflection. For example, we could mention the 
almost avant-garde experimentation of Teatro de Guerra [Theatre of War], by 
Lola Arias, the brutal political incorrectness of Fuckland by José Luis Márquez, 
or the film that embodies the humanity of pain in Argentines and islanders 
alike – La forma exacta de las islas [The Exact Shape of the Islands] by Daniel 
Casabé and Edgardo Dieleke.
Those issues that have been explored in some detail in the public sphere 
and civil society seem to have less room to develop in fiction. For example, the 
human rights violations perpetrated by the dictatorship after 1976 have had 
few portrayals in fiction, perhaps because it has been more difficult to place the 
topic on the plane of the absurd, of the critical or satirical gaze.24
This snapshot reviews issues not explored widely until now, for example, the 
extent of state influence in different genres, seen in the fact that there are more 
works challenging the state narrative in the field of cultural production than 
in essays or academic works. This could be due to the fact that the state set the 
limits (conditions of audibility) on what could be discussed in public sphere. 
If this were so, culture would be an overlapping way of treating these issues, by 
escaping formal and informal coercions. Cultural production would be staking 
a claim to be the space where civil society examines issues that are occluded by 
22 There are several studies of the British in Argentine cinema on the Falklands–Malvinas 
(Fernández Ameghino, 2018).
23 La Voz (Córdoba), 7 June 2016.
24 ‘Julieta Vitullo, on the other hand, affirms that “Malvinas is a malaise in the national 
conscience, that seems to be unable to be faced by the political discourse, but literature does”’ 
(Souto, 2018, p. 110).
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the state, and the works produced can open up conversation and reflection on 
what is less easy to present in all its crude reality.
Falklands–Malvinas, an experience without learning?
Victory and defeat are circumstantial. 
The essential and atrocious is war.
Jorge Luis Borges
A diachronic review of Argentine history based on the contention around 
the Falklands–Malvinas offers a variety of perspectives for a critical analysis 
of the future of this issue. But a systematic approach from the social sciences 
must resist the temptation to blame only the enemy of the day, avoid empathy 
with the immediate interests of the state, and place itself in the uncomfortable 
position of speaking truth to power. This is why we must examine the 
Falklands–Malvinas issue from beginning of the national narrative onwards if 
we are to address a broader context than that of the war. The war was the result 
of that process, not its genesis.
That is why our first strategy was to offer a concise historicisation exceeding 
the limits of the field of recent history. We did this without putting the focus 
on the war or dictatorship, because this would reduce ‘history’ merely to what 
happened during the 1970s and 1980s. Instead, we took the methodological 
decision to broaden the spectrum of analysis: to examine the war in the context 
of the sustained actions of the Argentine state since its consolidation as such.
This meant studying the Falklands–Malvinas as more than a mere diplomatic 
conflict, but rather as part of a state strategy to sustain a narrative of national 
identity. In various ways, and particularly during the war of 1982, the idea of a 
national identity for Argentina served as a useful device against a heterogeneous 
society that had traditionally reacted against attempts at discipline.
This mechanism worked in its territorial form (typical of military 
governments) or in its national and popular form, embodied in the sovereignty 
of a uniform people led by the state (characteristic of Peronist governments). 
Both tactics placed the state and the country above the law. Both versions 
rejected the pluralistic and heterogeneous society articulated by respect and 
obedience to the National Constitution. Both traditions militarised the public 
account and turned Argentina into a victim of external threats and looting, 
sometimes by foreigners (the British or the Communists), and sometimes by 
their ‘perfidious local agents’.
The Falklands–Malvinas Islands, especially since the mid 1930s, were, 
for one side as well as for the other, the empirical proof of that story. A 
misadventure along with others, such as the defeat in the Battle of Vuelta de 
Obligado, the deaths of Manuel Dorrego and Facundo Quiroga, the betrayal 
that expelled Rosas from the government and sent him into exile, the Roca-
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Runciman Agreement, the coups against popular leaders, or the handover of oil 
to foreign capital during the Arturo Frondizi government.
But the Falklands–Malvinas, unlike the aforementioned episodes, was the 
only cause that remained stable in the centre of the national narrative. The ‘fact’ 
of the ‘usurpation’ of the homeland taught to children in school was reinforced 
in adulthood by governmental, political and cultural appeals of different kinds. 
A large part of the problem lies within this process: how we, as Argentines, 
believe that we act, and how the rest of the world interprets our actions.
The traditional nationalist narrative presented Argentines as responding to 
the ‘usurpation’ in a patient, peaceful and patriotic way. In spite of ongoing 
political conflict, Argentines could put aside their internal differences when 
defending the interests of the homeland. However, if they failed in their 
objective of incorporating the unredeemed territory into the national soil – and 
in the face of humiliation upon humiliation – Argentines would lose patience. 
And if that happened, their reaction would be fully justified. That day arrived 
on 2 April 1982.
Precisely because of this, after 1982, in some quarters the war was 
considered a minor event that followed activity to solve the problem, and 
‘so much pacifism and patience’. Argentina acted as though the enemy had 
begun the fight. Nothing would be an obstacle to the national cause – not even 
international law.
However, as observed in this chapter, Argentine state policy was far from 
pacifist. In addition, the succession of contrasting strategies in different 
political cycles (and incidents such as ‘Operativo Cóndor’ in the 1960s) 
prevented Argentina from cultivating a reputation as a reliable interlocutor. 
These factors also undermined any attempt to solve the problem through the 
kind of dialogue which might offer or demand long-term commitments.
Explanations for the war range from the anecdotal (‘the drunken general’); 
the counterfactual (‘what would have happened if ...’); to those that blame 
international betrayal (by the United Nations or the United States); those that 
hold society responsible; and those that place the war in the context of a game 
of political survival or the poor decisions of the military government. But all 
we can do is unravel the historical conditions that allowed the events to occur. 
A critical study allows us to question and understand these conditions to try to 
circumvent the possibility of history repeating itself.
After the war, the tone of most reflections on the Falklands–Malvinas did 
not change, although the Argentine defeat ended some of the approaches 
conceived before 1982. In particular, it severely damaged the narrative of the 
national militarist epic. Meanwhile, the state concentrated on the renewal 
of the integrative capacity of the Falklands–Malvinas myth, and the voices 
engaging with the issue once again fell into line with state interests, and with 
the recreation of the damaged idea of A rgentinity. Few chose to deviate from 
this. The adverse outcome of the war was key to the (re)construction of the 
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narrative. Indeed, a victory could not have aided the process of recycling and 
maintaining a self-image based on the melancholic idea of  defeated moral 
champions.
Faced with this, Vicente Palermo (a challenger to the dominant discourse), 
called the post-war period a lost opportunity – as was the case in post-war 
Europe – to renounce territorialistic nationalism and replace it with a republican 
patriotism that would allow the construction of a different path from the one 
chosen by the state since the 19th century.
Meanwhile, Federico Lorenz (in line with the renewed official discourse) 
preferred to believe that the discomfort of society in the post-war period was 
not attributable to military defeat, but to a sudden awareness of the dictatorship 
and its illegal repression. This intellectual operation is what enabled the state’s 
strategy after 2003 to separate one from the other, to incorporate ‘the heroic 
deed’ into the new historical narrative without paying the price of being 
associated with the military that carried it out. But this manoeuvre obscures 
the fact society’s reaction was exactly the opposite: it was defeat, more than 
anything else, that was intolerable. The unforgivable thing was losing the war.
This chapter argues that Palermo’s ‘lost opportunity’ would be better 
located after 1990 or around 2001, rather than in the years of the Alfonsinist 
transition. The Falklands–Malvinas in the immediate post-war period were at 
the centre of the political situation, whether the Alfonsín government liked it 
or not. ‘Malvinas’ had been a synonym for war since 1982, and when Alfonsín 
assumed the presidency, not two years had gone by since the surrender of the 
Argentine troops.
By 1983, the Falklands–Malvinas were more than the centre of a state 
strategy to provoke nationalist feeling in society. They were a symbol of the 
dead, the ex-combatants, the military defending itself, the attack on democracy, 
the political elites that made the military a constant in the state apparatus, the 
stories of mistreatment and heroism, the demands of society for punishment, 
and the presence of nationalism in education and, of course, in popular 
culture. ‘Malvinas’ was the football game against England in the 1986 World 
Cup, the counter-facts at family tables and bars, and in film and literature. 
The war carried on in other ways, in order to achieve, even in fiction or sport, 
a restoration of a certain balance and national pride in the face of unexpected 
and dishonourable defeat.
Within the framework of the structural weakness of the Radical government 
led by Alfonsín, standing alone politically, and facing many challenges, it was 
not possible to do anything as profound as changing the course of the country’s 
sense of self. Neither was there in the Radical party any deep conviction about 
what to do about the issue. Alfonsín’s policies were ambiguous and subject to 
his bargaining power with the military establishment and opposition politics.
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The political and economic conditions to produce changes were present from 
1990 (especially in 1994, during the constitutional reform process). However, 
Menem’s policy (especially in his second term) also remained ambiguous, 
despite efforts by his foreign minister to improve the country’s image in the eyes 
of the islanders and the ‘carnal alliance’ with the United States. Once Menem 
consolidated his power, what prevailed were the strategies that sustained his 
leadership above anything else and then, a tendency to systemic corruption.
In 2003, Peronism had another opportunity. The 2001 crisis allowed Néstor 
Kirchner’s government, mounted on economic recovery and a progressive 
discourse, to generate long-lasting changes in the state discourse. But he chose 
to repeat the existing path. What had to be avoided was not the recreation of 
the conditions that could reiterate the deceptive act, but the prevention of the 
political adversary handling the state. Even the Falklands–Malvinas War was to 
be justified, as if it were the ‘good’ people who carried it out. The important 
thing was to take the state, not to change its strategy. Thus, it was possible to 
separate the heroic deed from those who had led the war.
Despite these measures, resources and the intellectual and cultural support 
that the state received, its objective was difficult to achieve. It was not possible 
to separate the dictatorship from ‘the heroic deed’. The only way is to give 
up the idea of the heroic  deed. But without that, there is nothing left but a 
dictatorship acting desperately, steeped in decades of nationalist rhetoric.
Conclusions and points for further reflection
The British bombing of Buenos Aires in 1982 exists only in the imagination 
and in the famous songs of popular musicians. The real ‘bombs’ arrived in 
the 1990s, dropped by international terrorism, enlarging the list of deaths. 
Argentina was once again participating in a war, but this time following the 
United States’ lead against Iraq.
In 1982 the Argentine government did not understand the cost of 
splitting from the Western world and confronting its two largest pillars. In 
1990, another Argentine government did not understand the costs of getting 
involved in a distant war, following an automatic alignment with the same 
powers that it had challenged in 1982. Both contradictory moments are united 
by a misunderstanding of the global reality, and by an intellectual deficiency of 
the elites to understand the contemporary development of the world.
In the case of the Falklands–Malvinas, this misunderstanding grew out of a 
false and repeated image, and one which was only accepted within Argentina: 
the idea of  a patient, continuous and peaceful claim. The islanders themselves, 
or ‘Kelpers’, as the Argentines persist in calling them, are subjects who do not 
count or matter. While much of the British diplomatic triumph was based on 
questioning the future of the islands’ population, for the Argentine state, that 
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population simply did not exist. Or, in the words of the highest authority in 
the country, ‘they are squatters’.25 
This was the case for the academic and cultural world, too. Even from the 
1990s, when the discourse of otherness was established in the social sciences, 
academia preferred to build an other acceptable for the narrative or for the 
reality that the country was living in. The other was linked to gender issues, 
the native peoples and economic outsiders. These were acceptable others. But 
the islanders were, possibly, the true other, the other that calls into question 
our own identity. 
The war changed everything. It brought about the end of the dictatorship; 
there was a public outcry over human rights violations, and an economic and 
social crisis that obscured the ways in which the armed forces had tried to 
legitimise their intervention in politics. From 1983, it was clear that the army 
could no longer claim to rule, impose order, or even defend the homeland. 
Thus the longest and most unprecedented period of democracy in the country’s 
history was inaugurated. Everything changed with the war. Everything changed, 
except for the conditions that led us to it.
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1. Resisting bio-power: ‘laughter’, ‘fraternity’ 
and ‘imagination’ under dictatorship 
and the Malvinas–Falklands War
María José Bruña Bragado
Moreover, while the results of men’s actions are beyond the actors’ control, 
violence harbors within itself an additional element of arbitrariness; 
nowhere does Fortuna, good or ill luck, play a more fateful role in human 
affairs than on the battlefield; and this intrusion of the utterly unexpected 
does not disappear when people call it a ‘Random Event’ and find it 
scientifically suspect (Arendt, 1970, p. 4). 
However little sense there may be in trying to specify why I, rather than 
thousands of others, managed to survive the test, I believe that it was really 
due to Lorenzo that I am alive today; and not so much for his material aid, 
as for his having constantly reminded me by his presence, by his natural 
and plain manner of being good, that there still existed a just world outside 
of our own, something and someone still pure and whole, not corrupt, 
not savage, extraneous to hatred and terror; something difficult to define, 
a remote possibility of good, but for which it was worth surviving […] 
Thanks to Lorenzo, I managed not to forget that I myself was a man (Levi, 
1959, p. 142). 
Il est banal de dire que nous n’existons jamais au singulier. Nous sommes 
entourés d’êtres et de choses avec lesquels nous entretenons des relations. 
Par la vue, par le toucher, par la sympathie, par le travail en commun, nous 
sommes avec les autres. Toutes ces relations sont transitives. Je touche un 
objet, je vois l’autre, mais je ne suis pas l’autre (Lévinas, 2001, p. 21).
[It is banal to say that we never exist in the singular. We are surrounded 
by beings and things with which we cultivate relationships. Through 
sight, touch, sympathy, by work in common, we are with others. All these 
relations are transitive. I touch an object, I see the other, but I am not the 
other.]1
1 All translations from the Spanish and the French are the author’s own.
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Bio-power, the normalisation of violence and fortunate ethics
Los centros de poder se definen por lo que les escapa o por su impotencia, 
mucho más que por su zona de potencia (Deleuze and Guattari, 2006, p. 263).
[Power centres are defined much more by what escapes them or by their 
impotence than by their zones of power.]
[…] hoy que el capitalismo avanzado sostiene su dominación en una 
completa espectacularización de la historia, historizar el espectáculo nos 
situará en una mejor posición en la lucha contra él (Peris Blanes, 2005, p. 
16).
[Currently, late capitalism sustains its dominance by completely 
spectacularising history; therefore, historicising spectacle would enable us 
to situate ourselves in a much better position to fight against it.]
Bio-power
In his ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ Walter Benjamin declares that our concept of history must be grounded in a key idea that is difficult to grasp: that we live in a perpetual ‘state of exception’. Decades later, in 
a formulation indebted to Benjamin, Michel Foucault coined a concept that 
would become fundamental to thought about the frightening 20th century 
– so violent, just as the centuries that preceded and will follow it, as Arendt 
would say, since violence is intrinsic to being and to society and always makes 
an appearance where power staggers. This notion was further developed by 
philosophers such as Giorgio Agamben and Peter Sloterdijk, among others, into 
the concept of ‘bio-politics’. In the modern era, ‘bio-politics’ means the absolute 
instrumentalisation of natural life by political power (Foucault, 1978, p. 173). 
‘Bio-politics’ can thus be defined as the absolute political administration of life, 
the intervention or calculated intrusion by power-knowledge into every aspect 
of human life. In this regard, in the first volume of his trilogy Homo Sacer. Il 
potere sovrano e la nuda vita (1995), Agamben argues that the current paradigm 
of global expansion is the extreme application of ‘bio-politics’, namely, the 
concentration camp. At the centre of Quel che resta di Auschwitz. L’archivio e 
il testimone. Homo sacer III (1998) Agamben posits man not as a subject but 
as a living body and delivers a study of the space where this living body exists, 
which is simultaneously outside and within the juridical. In Archive and Witness 
(1995), the third volume of his work, he argues that the extreme situation 
undergone by human beings in concentration camps implies the inevitable 
revision of all ethical referents and parameters that are valid until the moment 
in which the extreme situation occurs; it also includes an interrogation of one’s 
own moral compass. Along the lines of Agamben, both Tzvetan Todorov and 
Sloterdijk, distance themselves from Jürgen Habermas’s utopian approach, 
embodied by his ‘discursive ethics’, while they underscore the importance of 
interrogating one’s own moral ethics as they are understood at the moment in 
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which the extreme situation happens. Moreover, from a philosophical point of 
view they posit the evident failure of post-war humanism and, from a political 
point of view, of contemporary neoliberal democracies. 
According to Todorov, in the case of concentration camps and war conflicts, 
or even in instances of the genocidal wars that keep tearing up our present – 
for example, in Iraq or Syria – testimony, which at this juncture would replace 
art and imagination, can help in the task of remembering horror, speaking out 
against barbarity, pondering the grounds for evil. Obtaining answers would 
be a whole other matter; and yet testimony has proven to fail in avoiding its 
historical repetition:  
Good and evil are both part of our potentialities. The hope for reaching a 
definite state free of all evil is a vain hope, neither war, nor executions nor 
prison suffice. […] The memory of the past could help us in this enterprise 
of taming evil, on the condition that we keep in mind that good and evil 
flow from the same source and that in the world’s best narratives they are 
not nearly divided (Todorov, 2009, p. 29).
Furthermore, Jaume Peris Blanes, in his essential essay about the repressive 
logics of the 20th century, La imposible voz. Memoria y representación de los 
campos de concentración en Chile: la posición del testigo [The Impossible Voice. 
Memory and Representation in Chile’s Concentration Camps: The Witness’s 
Position] (2005), begins by laying out the concepts of ‘state of exception’, ‘bio-
politics’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘concentration camp’ in order to consider and to 
interrogate the notion of the ‘ethics of the witness’ as a legitimate and true 
strategy for resisting bio-power under military dictatorships in the Southern 
Cone, specifically, in Pinochet’s Chile. Walter Benjamin, Paul de Man, Jacques 
Derrida (and, later on, also Beatriz Sarlo) would note that the holes and gaps 
inherent in testimonial in the first person, which is an ethical discourse from 
a powerless position (also noted by Todorov), constitute the sole possibility of 
reconstructing social memory, although in every case testimony has proven 
to be unable to eradicate the recurrent presence of evil in history. Thus, 
Levi’s (1947) or Semprún’s (1963) testimonies about National Socialism’s 
concentration camps and, more recently, testimonials by Hernán Valdés (1974) 
or Pilar Calveiro (1998) about Chilean or Argentine concentration camps are 
remarkable exercises in trauma recovery through writing and enunciation; 
and in some instances demonstrate the impotence of being unable to utter 
speech, of unsayability.2 In the case of Calveiro, her testimony is a theoretically 
illuminating exercise in contestation addressed to bio-power:
What Calveiro makes out of her experience is original with regards to 
bearing witness. She affirms what the victim thinks, even when she is at the 
point of madness. She affirms that the victim ceases being a victim because 
2 To the point that the relationship between the living and the speaking is characterised by being 
incomparable. The same goes for the processes of subjectivisation and de-subjectivisation, 
which can never coincide (Peris Blanes, 2005, p. 119).
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she thinks. She renounces the autobiographical dimension because she 
wants to write and understand the experience she has undergone in much 
wider terms (Sarlo, 2005, p. 122). 
Thus memory, as Reyes Mate (2012) affirms, is one of the most decisive 
categories of our time; and yet it is also amongst the most slippery, because in 
contrast to concepts such as ‘citizenship’, ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ or ‘equality’ 
memory it is still in the making, being configured and built. A critical gaze 
on a totalitarian past may be, aside from healing, subversive, but we have only 
come to learn this.
The normalisation of violence
Traditional Christian or Enlightenment humanism does not constitute a 
solution to the violence intrinsic to totalitarian projects and to the western 
liberal democracies which allegedly oppose them and which have subjected 
us to living under a disquieting and permanent state of exception. Moreover, 
as Sloterdijk attests, it is hopeless to hold on to humanism as a civilising, 
‘taming’, ‘appeasing’, ‘domesticating’ tool in the face of brutality and violence: 
‘Concentration camp and society belong to each other, as they are inexplicable 
one without the other. They reflect and reproduce one another’ (Calveiro, 
1998, p. 159).
In this regard, a reflection upon how the rhetoric of the necessity of violence 
was shamelessly wielded by the military dictatorships in the Southern Cone 
in order to impose the neoliberal model sheds light on how its excesses were 
carefully separated from the political and ethical domains:
In public discourses from that era, violence is posited as a necessary 
element to implement the neo-liberal (modern, in military rhetoric) 
model, whose implementation within the parliamentary system faced 
enormous resistance – especially in the case of Chile. This made difficult 
the consolidation of market and spectacle as axes for the articulation of 
social realities. Because of this, we could infer that, first, modernising the 
State’s apparatuses for repression by articulating them around management 
and bureaucratisation enabled the disconnection between the application 
of violence and political or ethical decisions, such as Bauman argues was 
the case in the Nazis’ concentration camp system (Peris Blanes, 2005, p. 
49).
Only after accepting that there is no malignant potential or ‘radical evil’ (Kant) 
as such, but rather a ‘bureaucratised and official barbarism’ (Adorno) as well as 
an intolerable, ubiquitous, trans-historical and universal ‘banal evil’ (Arendt) at 
the heart of bio-power, can and must we tell, narrate it in a complex, polyhedral 
way that is neither Manichean nor naïve. The ‘terrorising normality’, the 
mediocrity and banality intrinsic to evil, the ‘inhuman’ within the ‘human’ 
(Todorov, 2004) displayed in the Nazi concentration camps and under the 
Southern Cone dictatorships are difficult to assimilate. This is also the case 
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in the Malvinas–Falkland Islands War, which is one of the most revealing 
examples of bio-political control in recent history:
Acts of this kind, which seem exceptional, are perfectly ingrained in 
society’s everyday life; this is why they are possible. They are linked to an 
admitted ‘normalcy’. This is what is ‘normal’ in obedience, in absolute, 
final and arbitrary power, the normalcy of punishment, of disappearance 
(Calveiro, 2008, p. 147).3
In sum, to restore humanism implies confessing its impotence in the face 
of the violent acts of ‘bio-political’ power;4 and only by understanding its 
complex internal dynamics shall we be able, first, to narrate the conditions and 
circumstances that allow the degradation of human beings. Second, through 
narration – in which we could have played the part of either the victim or the 
victimiser – we shall be empowered to find personal atonement and a certain 
ethical space. Only at the moment in which we are able to accept violence as an 
atrocious yet inevitable component of our societies shall we be able to activate 
resistance. Only? As we shall see, confronting the multiple tentacles of bio-
power, one of which is the normalisation of horror, can only take place from 
consciousness and by exercising an ‘ethics of testimony’.5
3 In the same sense, Rodolfo Fogwill affirms in his essay ‘El doctor Cormillot y la gran 
máquina de adelgazar conciencias’ [Doctor Cormillot and the great machine for thinning-
out consciences], first published in El Porteño in February 1984: ‘We were human: human 
just like the torturers. Because amongst the torturers there were kind, educated, order-loving, 
peace-loving people, people who were able to appreciate the beauty of the bodies of race 
horses. There were even remorseful torturers! Human! Because torturers are as human as 
collaborationists, and like them, they also have access to the human gifts of happiness, of the 
smile, sadness and regret. And yet, what kind of regret? The only valid regret is that which 
binds them not to carry out the same faults ever again’ (Fogwill, 2008, p. 60).
4 ‘Let God decide according to his will, I told myself. I am going to read the Greeks’, affirms 
Urrutia-Lacroix, the sinister and erudite main character in Roberto Bolaño’s novel Nocturno 
de Chile [Chile by Night (2000)] at a moment of extreme historical urgency, at the moment in 
which bio-power will show itself with all its might in Chile. A masterly passage that mingles 
high culture and barbarity follows this statement: ‘I also read Demosthenes and Menander 
and Aristotle and Plato (who is always fruitful), there were strikes and a colonel in an 
armoured regiment that tried to stage a coup and a cameraman died filming his own death and 
then Allende’s naval aide was killed; and there were turmoil and bad words, Chileans cursed, 
painted on the walls and then almost half a million people marched in support of Allende; and 
then came the putsch, the uprising, the military coup, La Moneda was bombarded; and when 
the bombing stopped, the president killed himself and then it was all over. I stood still, with a 
finger on the page I was reading, and I thought: It is peaceful now’ (Bolaño, 2000, pp. 97–9). 
Complicity between culture and horror is manifest; and this is how we can observe the failure 
of any humanist attempt to mould violence. 
5 Calveiro recalls that the tortured drank together with the torturers in Argentine concentration 
camps, that they listened to soccer games side by side on the radio, and that they played cards 
with them after having been subjected to rape and other unimaginable abuses. This is an 
example of an instance of the normalisation of violence, as horror is rendered quotidian. The 
last part of Roberto Bolaño’s novel Chile by Night (2000) shows this with clairvoyance when 
guests to María Canales’ literary soirées discover that the cellar is, in fact, a torture site: ‘I asked 
the following question: Why was it that one of the guests, as he got lost, came across that poor 
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‘An ethics of fortune’
If there is one virtue of human beings which deserves to be spoken about 
in a philosophical way, it is above all this: that people are not forced into 
political theme parks but, rather, put themselves there. Humans are self-
fencing, self-shepherding creatures. Wherever they live, they create parks 
around themselves.6
In the face of everyday horror there is another indispensable notion that can 
be rescued from Reyes Mate’s articles: the ‘ethics of fortune’, whose essence 
and projection escape all means of control, whose arbitrariness and hazardous 
gestures situate us, without even taking action, on one side or the other. In 
the extermination camps some were lucky enough not only to live but, more 
importantly, to catch a glimpse of humanity in atrocious conditions. As a matter 
of fact, this is why they lived: they lived to attest to the ‘remote possibility of 
goodness’ beyond ‘fear and hatred’, which Primo Levi evokes when he refers 
to Lorenzo in the opening quotation of this essay, a passage also mentioned by 
Jorge Semprún when he refers to his Muslim Doppelgänger whose place he will 
be taking, or when he discusses how an unknown young Russian man saved his 
life out of sheer goodness, without expecting anything in return:
In any case, the young Russian took upon his shoulder the stone that the 
SS officer had given me and that was much too heavy for me to carry. 
Taking advantage of an unexpected moment of neglect by the sadistic 
sergeant, he left me his stone, which was much lighter than mine. With 
that gesture, I was able to complete a task that could have been fatal for 
me.
An uncalled-for and completely gratuitous gesture. He neither knew 
me, nor would he ever see me again. We were equal in our absolute lack 
of power: anonymous, impotent countryside plebs. A gesture of pure 
goodness, that is, almost supernatural. Or, what is the same thing, an 
example of the radical freedom to do good which is inherent to human 
nature (Semprún, 1995, p. 61).
What interests me in that capacity to feel, to attest through the other a 
certain degree of what has been deemed human, pure or good in the midst of 
desolation, violence and horror, is to rescue ‘fraternity’ in death or ‘fraternal 
death’. The latter, according to Semprún, is that solidarity within powerlessness 
which is erected in the form of resistance that exhales a breath full of life. He 
who witnesses a gratuitous gesture of pure giving, generosity, empathy and 
man? The answer was simple: because habit relaxes precautions, as routine shades all horror’ 
(Bolaño, 2000, p. 142).
6 ‘Si existe una dignidad del hombre que merezca ser articulada en palabras con conciencia 
filosófica, ello es debido a que los hombres no sólo son sostenidos en los parques temáticos 
políticos, sino que se autosostienen ellos mismos ahí dentro. Los hombres son seres que se 
cuidan y se protegen por sí mismos y, vivan donde vivan, generan alrededor suyo el entorno 
de un parque’ (Sloterdijk, 2009, p. 25). 
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charity from his fellow prisoner is enabled to believe in humanity afterwards 
and to survive. By contrast, those spared from the illusion of believing in the 
other, lacking ethical relief, frequently succumb to bio-power. Solidarity or 
rather ‘care’ within ‘everyday virtues’, as Todorov put it (2004), is a powerful 
means of resisting and surviving in the extreme conditions of adversity in bare 
life:
An extremely important aspect of life in the concentration camps is what 
Todorov calls ‘everyday virtues’. These imply individual actions that 
reject the concentrational order to benefit one or more persons: always 
particular subjects, and not for the sake of abstract ideas. Everyday virtues 
were not practised in great public acts but as part of everyday life; they are 
imperceptible except to those who benefit from them and imply profound 
commitment, even to the point that sometimes the life of whoever 
executes them is at stake. Because they are ‘imperceptible’, there are fewer 
testimonials about them than about heroic acts (Calveiro, 1998, p. 132).
In what follows, I shall carry out a risky theoretical displacement – one I 
consider necessary in order to be able to observe the ‘everyday virtues’ that 
make up life in concentration camps – onto another significant example of 
recent bio-political rule which is frequently ignored due to the relative degree of 
identity dispossession and de-subjectivisation: the Malvinas–Falkland Islands 
War. In this conflict, as we shall see, innumerable gestures of fraternity or ‘care’ 
amongst the soldiers took place in order that they might protect themselves 
from total internal violence upon the body, the mind and the spirit.
Malvinas–Falklands and ‘everyday virtues’
Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it 
ends in power’s disappearance.
Argentina’s defeat in the Malvinas–Falklands War on 14 June 1982 closed a 
long cycle of violence in that country – although it inaugurated another cycle 
of violence of the socio-economic kind7 – and contributed to the demise of the 
dictatorship. In other words, it opened up the possibility of democracy. Thus, 
at a moment at which continental economic recession was imminent, the 
military regime, facing growing popular obliviousness, made a last, desperate 
attempt to keep authority through going to war, but this ended in the call for 
elections. During the months prior to the invasion, there was no talk of illegal 
repression, disappearances or human rights abuses but of inflation, dollar and 
interest rates and the growth in the external debt.
To wage the Malvinas–Falklands War was a conscious decision taken by two 
governments, the British and the Argentine, who knew that they were sending 
hundreds of young men to a likely death; in that regard, it was a ‘biopolitical’ 
7 For a detailed conceptualisation about the role of violence in Argentine politics of the second 
half of the 20th century, see Mira Delli-Zotti (2009).
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strategy designed to hold onto power. In the case of Argentina it failed. Power 
was inevitably subsumed into even more violence; and it was inevitably made 
to disappear by the violence itself.
What is particular to the Malvinas–Falklands conflict is that it is still in 
a ‘grey zone’ of interpretation, since, although ‘la Guerra fue llevada a cabo 
por un gobierno dictatorial, represivo y genocida, ningún evento de la historia 
moderna argentina dio lugar a semejante consenso cívico-militar basado en 
la pertenencia nacional’ (Vitullo, 2012, p. 12).8 Furthermore, consensus was 
not only national but continental, as the sovereigntist cause was embraced 
throughout Latin America – except by Pinochet’s Chile. As Verbitsky points 
out (2002), both military and montonero discourses started from opposing 
analyses but coincided in their conclusion that the war was legitimate, be it 
from the point of view of a spurious nationalism or from an anti-colonialist 
perspective; and always counted on decisive support from the Argentine elite. 
This controversial moment although stemming from diverging motivations 
and opposed ideological compasses, made possible unanimous support for the 
Malvinas–Falklands War, its ultimate invisibilisation or interested banishment 
and, finally, an opportunistic sovereigntist instrumentalisation in external 
commemorations and official homages. Even decades later, in a very different 
world from the world which made possible this bellicose scenario, it is still 
contended that it was a ‘just war’, supported by nationalist arguments.9 When 
the time comes to adduce the ‘just cause’ as a consensual argument, the 
indissoluble link between war and dictatorial repression is subtly erased, while 
the thorny question of placing the war in the context of anti-imperialism or 
sovereigntism is avoided.
A second interesting aspect of the shameful and ‘minor’ character of the war 
when compared to the previous systematic disappearances and massive torture 
in concentration camps arises from the barbarity and military repression of the 
‘dirty war’ that the conflict itself brought to light. The Malvinas–Falklands War 
draws a complex panorama because its fighters – those who died as well as the 
survivors – are subject to a double theoretical marginality; in this sense, they 
do not cease to be subalterns of subalternity, the latter being the victims of the 
Argentine military dictatorship.
8 ‘The war was waged by a dictatorial, repressive and criminal government, no event in the 
history of Argentina gave place to such civic-military consensus based on national belonging 
[…] In Argentina, all members of the political class, from the right to the left, supported 
the war and enthusiastically buttressed the armed forces’ performance in defence of national 
sovereignty. […] in the Falklands adventure, not only military men were burned, but also a 
greater part of the political leaders’ credibility was consumed’ (Mira Delli-Zotti, 2009, p. 6).
9 See, for example, the last section of the soldier Edgardo Esteban’s testimonial Iluminados por 
el fuego [Illuminated by Fire] (2012, [1993]): ‘I think that this war placed us even further from 
our dream: that the Islands be Argentinian again. We know that they belong to us, but we 
must understand that there are people like us with whom we must learn to share. […] I feel 
that the soldiers who fought, we have, above anyone else, a right and a sentiment: that these 
Islands are ours’ (p. 279).
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This tension can be explained by the fact that, at the beginning of the 1980s, 
Argentine society had been rendered insensitive to human rights abuses, to 
notions such as ‘violence’, ‘disappearance’, or ‘death’ articulated around young 
people. It was a society that was anaesthetised and could hardly feel any more 
pain, although it slowly came to recognise continuity between the crimes 
committed by the military – the theft of new-borns, murders, kidnapping and 
torture – and the Falkland Islands War. However, this fact neither exculpates 
nor redeems Argentine society of a certain responsibility, through either action 
or omission.10 The gravity of the occurrences in recent Argentine history would 
then provoke the omnipresence of the first subalterns and would shadow 
‘los chicos de la guerra’ [the war kids], reducing them to ‘second category 
subalterns’ in a first moment of information saturation. Their experience was 
not considered a priority. Afterwards, in the final phase of the explosion of 
memorials, ex-combatants would remain in the testimonial back rooms due 
to lack of homogeneity in their discourse, by the amalgamation of partial 
memories, politicised and struggling amongst themselves.
These two specific paradoxes – consensus about the need for war; relegation 
of the victims – traverse the Malvinas–Falkland Islands War. In this context, 
the ‘ethics of the witness’ provide relief at the individual level. However, this 
is not enough because, as stated above, there is great confusion amongst 
the survivors, who, in most cases, are incapable of distancing themselves 
theoretically or embarking upon critical reflection and have thus succumbed 
to official versions and an easy nationalism. Bio-power has dispossessed them 
of their identity, experience, discourse and sometimes of their lives until they 
have been transformed from subjects into ambivalent bodies that may discern 
but are unable to explain the reasons for their suffering. Agamben describes 
the specific modality of bio-power in the 20th century in terms of forcing 
to survive: separating the verbal from lived experience, living from speaking 
beings, bio-power allows the living to survive as the remnant of the speaker: 
‘What constitutes the decisive contribution of bio-power to our times is neither 
life nor death, but the production of malleable and virtually infinite survival’ 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 163). 
Catharsis implies verbalising horror and speaking out extreme evil by bearing 
witness. It presupposes a subjective locutionary act, at least, by the remnants 
of that subjectivity. This act is, however, always incomplete, precarious and 
bordering on stammering. Different modalities, lines of flight and gazes are 
incorporated into the experience of the past from which the speaker can heal 
10 In Chile by Night, Bolaño demands an explanation from the whole country; he asks for 
answers and accountability from the Church, intellectuals and civil society for Pinochet’s 
crimes. We cannot simply cover up horror, as happens to Urrutia-Lacroix, the main character 
in the novel: ‘Chile, Chile. How could you have changed so much? Who would?, perched on 
his open window, looking at the faraway glare in Santiago. What have they done to you? Have 
Chileans gone mad? Are you going to become something else? Are you a monster that nobody 
will recognise?’ (p. 96).
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by repulsing them, resisting bio-power. Parting from Lévinas’s assertion that we 
do not live in the singular, ‘solidarity’ – mentioned above as ‘fraternity’ or ‘care’ 
– and a sense of humour remind us that, at a juncture of extreme violence, 
purity and goodness are also inherent in human beings, that evasion through 
aesthetics is possible. In what Todorov calls ‘activities of the spirit’, we are also 
reminded that we are something more than ‘bare bodies’.11
Indeed, in Facing the Extreme. Moral Life in the Concentration Camps (1996) 
Todorov highlights a series of concepts with which he works and which are 
partly recuperated by Calveiro as social typologies built upon the reconstruction 
of everyday life that is present in the testimonials. He begins by classifying 
virtues as either ‘heroic’ or ‘quotidian’. ‘Heroic virtues’ belong to the order of 
exception as they are produced at specific historical moments and are part of 
public life. ‘Quotidian virtues’, in turn, are imperceptible and invisibilised by 
their everyday occurrence in the midst of barbarity. Todorov points out three 
kinds of virtue which are present in the everyday lives and extreme experiences 
of concentration camps: ‘dignity’, ‘care’ and ‘aesthetics or activities of the spirit’. 
We believe that holding onto subjectivity, fraternity and imagination, or to the 
aesthetic of bodies which are rendered transparent by evil, appears also, with 
overwhelming frequency, in testimonials and narratives about the war in the 
Falkland Islands. The three virtues were a means of resistance and survival in 
a bellicose conflict that shut down military dictatorship in Argentina. In what 
follows I shall examine how this plays out in Iluminados por el fuego [Illuminated 
by Fire], one of the best-known testimonies of the Malvinas–Falklands War.
Laughter, fraternity and imagination in Iluminados por el 
fuego
La risa aparece en muchos de los relatos y confirma la persistencia, la 
tozudez de lo humano para protegerse y subsistir (Calveiro, 1998, p. 23).
[Laughter appears in many of the narrations and confirms the persistence, 
the stubbornness of what is human in order to protect oneself so as to be 
able to survive. […] Work, play and laughter were the ways in which the 
threatened subject defended herself.]
Given the absence of the deadly wind and lying furtively under the sun, it 
became possible to forget, to think about something else. […] One could 
tell oneself that after the roll call we had before us, just as every Sunday, a 
few hours of life left: a substantial portion of time that would not belong 
to the SS. One could close one’s eyes under the sun, imagining how to fill 
up that available time, that weekly miracle. There was not a lot to choose 
from, as limits were evidently strict. […] Although with a very narrow 
11 Calveiro considers that suicide, hallucination that borders on madness, literal escape or 
deception are all legitimate mechanisms for escaping total power (1998). These options are 
present in several moments and repeated continuously in this book.
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margin, it was possible to choose something exceptional, exclusive to 
Sunday afternoons, which was real. For example, there was the possibility 
of deciding to nap […] or of exchanging signals, a few words, news from 
the world, fraternal gestures, a smile, a machorka butt, fragments of poems 
(Semprún, 2001, 16–17).
El humor era el único antídoto contra el miedo (Esteban, 2004, p. 34).
[Humour was the only antidote against fear.]
As is evident, thus far I have been interested in highlighting, from the point of 
view of bio-politics, the inextricability of the Argentine military dictatorship 
from the Malvinas–Falkland Islands War that ended it. As I have pointed 
out, the similarities between the procedures of extermination, silencing and 
the long subsequent mourning – not in vain were the military officials the 
same and the Malvinas–Falklands War was an exercise in state violence that 
remains unpunished, and the war is either the corollary or the end of the 
disappearances and systemic torture in Argentina. Moreover, thoughtlessness 
towards and the abandonment of the disappeared, survivors and their families 
had been neglected until recently from legal and also socio-political and ethical 
perspectives. This abandonment is identical to that suffered by the victims of 
war who lost their lives and to the ex-combatants who survived – or ‘overdied’, 
as former combatant Caso Rosendi put it in poetic and Gelmanian terms in 
2009.12 Bio-political techniques towards what Calveiro calls the ‘threatened 
subject’ are the same: ‘But were we not / Were we not born in the country 
/ Where electric shock devices / Were placed over pregnant bellies?’ (Caso 
Rosendi, 2009, p. 39). Life was not lost in all cases in concentration camps or 
in the Malvinas–Falklands, but that remnant which stays is often an ambiguous 
voiceless remnant which borders on suicide and madness, which carries a 
trauma which it is almost impossible to leave behind. In that sense, survivors 
had the privilege of catching a glimpse of the ‘human’, that hidden goodness 
mentioned by Levi or Semprún which emerges in the midst of pain, hunger 
and fear – be it in the form of care, fraternity or imagination – boldly resisting, 
thanks to that ethical fortune, the de-humanising and de-subjectivising 
strategies of bio-power.13
For Todorov, dignity ‘does not mean anything other than an individual’s 
capacity to maintain himself as a subject with will. This simple fact keeps him 
at the heart of the human species’ (Todorov, 1997, p. 24). The ‘threatened 
12 ‘We have come to learn this / We who have overdied / We know very well that behind silence 
/ Comes another, atoning silence / It will always be like that’ (‘Después del horror’ [After the 
Horror], in Caso Rosendi, 2009, p. 105).
13 ‘Everyday life, friendships forged before the imminence of death are not arbitrary, 
transcendental choices and the possibility of laughter, even under such conditions, the 
impressions left by a countryside and an inhospitable landscape, beautiful and yet transformed 
by war, just like when the Sea Harriers discharge their bombs from the sky, or when the 
remains of bleeding seagulls are mixed up with a crushed Pucará’ (Mesa Gancedo, 2009, p. 
12). 
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subject’ may voluntarily choose, for example, laughter as a means to escape the 
most adverse conditions. Humour brings about illusion, energy and optimism 
– sometimes bleeding mockery of the other oppressor – in the midst of death; 
it enables the welding of a strengthening and protecting shield against the 
victimiser. Many of the survivors’ testimonies gathered by Pilar Calveiro attest 
to this; humour is also continuously present in narratives about the Malvinas–
Falklands War: ‘Happily without a worry / I trotted towards the trench / The 
helmet was dancing / A fox-trot above my head’ (Caso Rosendi, 2009, p. 49). 
When one reads the testimonies, it is surprising how life is always stronger 
than death: ‘Because most of the dead in the concentration camps […] died of 
exhaustion, of the sudden impossibility of overcoming an increased tiredness of 
living, they died from dejection, from the slow destruction of all their energy 
and reserves of hope’ (Semprún, 2001, p. 157).
Laughter is closely tied to vitality and intelligence and is thus one of the 
antidotes against dejection, loss of hope, standardisation and the extermination 
of the subject’s spirits; it is a line of flight to resist horror and violence inscribed 
in the body; and, finally, it helps to retain life and individuality. It is one of 
the will’s most important resources, in order not to become de-subjectified or 
to die. 
Besides ‘dignity’, within which I have highlighted laughter as one of the 
most efficient ways to show the will to live, Todorov mentions a second 
everyday virtue: ‘care’. ‘Care’ is notably different from ‘solidarity’ because ‘care’ 
is not practised within a group, nor is it a communal act but rather a gesture 
of voluntary love or empathy towards another individual, towards a loved one, 
what I have designated the ‘ethics of fortune’. The other is thus remembered by 
its remnants of goodness:
So the secret of philosophy may not be to know oneself, nor to know 
where one is going; not to dream oneself, but to dream what others dream; 
not to believe oneself, but rather to believe in those who do believe. […] 
How much more human to place one’s fate, one’s desire and one’s will in 
the hands of someone else. The result? A circulation of responsibility, a 
declination of wills, and a continual transferring of forms (Baudrillard, 
1993, pp. 164–5).
However, following Semprún, and re-echoing Lévinas, I prefer to use the 
term ‘fraternity’ as opposed to ‘care’ because its semantics feel more luminous, 
affective and balanced, in the sense that such a gesture may always be reciprocal: 
‘Il est banal de dire que nous n’existons jamais au singulier. Nous sommes 
entourés d’êtres et de choses avec lesquels nous entretenons des relations. Par la 
vue, par le toucher, par la sympathie, par le travail en commun, nous sommes 
avec les autres. Toutes ces relations sont transitives. Je touche un objet, je vois 
l’autre, mais je ne suis pas l’autre’ (Lévinas, 2001, p. 21).
The last of Todorov’s ‘everyday virtues’ is what he calls ‘activities of the spirit’ 
and is related to fleeing by means of the imagination, dreaming, knowledge or 
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aesthetic experience (this is reflected accurately in the quotation from Semprún 
at the beginning of this section). To sum up: in order to survive bare life, the 
extreme experience, Todorov sketches an ethics of the I with the I, of the I with 
the you, and of the I with the them. 
The soldier Edgardo Esteban’s testimony entitled Iluminados por el fuego. 
Confesiones de un soldado que combatió en Malvinas [Illuminated by fire. 
Confessions of a soldier who fought the Malvinas–Falkland Islands War] was 
first published in 1993 and was filmed by Tristan Bauer in 2005. Both works 
contributed to making visible the neglect and forgetfulness to which the 
combatants in the Malvinas–Falkland Islands War had been subjected. Beyond 
problematic ideological, textual and epic interpretations of the text that render 
this subject matter extremely delicate due to concessions bestowed on historical 
and nationalist (especially the latter) conceptions of the Islands within such 
interpretations, I am interested in highlighting the function that laughter, 
fraternity and imagination fulfil as forms of resistance. In this regard, Esteban’s 
testimony offers innumerable paradigmatic examples.
Laughter
Humour, that release of tension by means of laughter, joke, play or song, 
appears in various forms in Esteban’s narrative in various instances. For the 
reader, it feels anticlimactic, as I find myself before a scene, in the midst of the 
urgency of a war conflict, in which a radio is either broken or transmits false 
news; and yet a ludic atmosphere predominates that relaxes, releases, relieves 
for an instant: 
We were absolutely almost all turned on. Each played his part and those 
unaware (or who perhaps did not dare to know) listened uninterruptedly 
or accompanied the rest with their palms or by banging jars with knives 
and forks in a disorderly way. We were happy and no one would hamper 
our happiness. […]
– Che, che, stop! – Interrupted Sergio, who enjoyed neither singing nor 
listening to others sing. Cut out your Charly García; help fix this radio so 
we can listen to something from Buenos Aires. […]
– I would like to know what is said about us prisoners in Buenos Aires. Do 
you understand me, you blockhead? Or do you think that Charly García’s 
songs will save me? (Esteban, 2004, p. 121).14
Another humorous instance, in this case scatological, appears when Esteban 
describes recovering a piece of dirty underwear which another soldier had 
stolen from him during the war. The theft also supposes recovering dignity 
14 In the same vein, there is Caso Rosendi’s poem ‘Moment’: ‘Lying on a great rock / We drink 
scotch ale / I have no idea where he got it / Soldier Villanueva / It is dusk and the only radio / 
In the Islands is playing Let it be / We drink and laugh /because while on the continent / The 
only thing exploding is national rock / And Charly asks that Buenos Aires not be bombarded 
/ Here the military plays the Beatles!’ (2009, p. 29).
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– and identity – which are implicit in the care of the self, through hygiene. 
Moreover, the tone in which the anecdote is told again vindicates a certain 
human background, smiling in the middle of hardship, in the midst of showers 
that are compared to Nazi torture chambers:
I went inside the shower, I barely washed myself and I was the first one out 
to get dressed. ‘Hey, soldier. You are the dirtiest of all’, he told me, when 
he noticed how fast I had finished washing up. Then he began to goof 
around and I did the same and started examining our mates’ underwear. 
The best I could find was a completely soiled pair. They were shat, but 
healthily; there were others that were so clean that they had huge holes 
in them, or were unravelled. I opted for the dirty pair and I put them on. 
[…]
We both laughed at our deed while staring at those showers that were not 
showers. They seemed like Nazi torture chambers (Esteban, 2004, p. 74).15
Indeed, even in the most tragic circumstances human beings are capable 
of smiling, laughing, especially in fraternity. In her essay, Calveiro recovers 
the voice of Geuna, a tortured woman from one of the concentration camps 
during the dictatorship. Geuna is absolutely astonished by her own resilience, 
by her own unknown, intimate capacity to oppose mechanical violence and 
horror with laughter. I find her words especially revealing in this regard:
Geuna says: ‘[…] The human capacity to recover is absolutely astounding. 
Shaking with fear, waiting for a bus that may take you to your death, 
and yet laughing. […] As we laughed on Christmas Day, or when the 
Boca Juniors won the metropolitan championship: these were instances 
in which life would sneak inside La Perla through a neglected crack 
and then transform the concentration camp into an ephemeral, precise, 
instantaneous party. Because life is always much more powerful than death. 
Laughter is one of the most efficient means of resistance man has because 
it reaffirms life in a situation in which men are expected to surrender 
themselves to death without any struggle (Calveiro, 2004, p. 116).
Of course, this capacity to recover is, up to a certain point, willed by the 
threatened subject and yet this attitude appears more often than we expect it or 
are able to admit – perhaps we feel that a certain solemnity is a more politically 
correct attitude in the face of evil and yet perhaps it is less effective. In that 
sense, canonical works about the Malvinas–Falklands such as Fogwill’s Los 
pichiciegos [The Armadillos] (1983) or Carlos Gamerro’s Las islas [The Islands] 
(1998) and, more recently, Federico Lorenz’s Montoneros o la ballena blanca 
15 Examples of scatological humour are innumerable in this testimony. Let us look at another 
one: ‘We have not won the war, but we shat over the whole island […] Although on second 
thoughts – Sergio went on – we Argentinians are such forros [ass holes] that we fertilised the 
island so that they can take advantage of it. Well, if this were the case I hope that they at least 
invite us to come on vacation. – ‘On vacation?’, I asked him. – I am never coming back even 
if they give me the ticket and the lodgings for free, even if they brought a British blonde for 
me to keep me company at night’ (Esteban, 2004, p. 72). 
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[Montoneros or the White Whale] (2012) operate as meta-fictions that carry out 
the humorous critical ‘historicisation of spectacle’ of the Malvinas–Falklands 
War by means of pastiche, parody and laughter, which in many cases border on 
black humour, the absurd and delirious. The narratives constitute montonero 
counteroffensives narrated with a touch of humour: Montoneros o la ballena 
blanca; conversational joking from inside the pichicera [a kind of subterranean 
cave] – Los pichiciegos; fantastic science-fiction narratives grounded on historical 
facts –Las islas. These three novels, along with Rodrigo Fresán’s two splendid 
short stories ‘La soberanía nacional’ [National sovereignty] and ‘El aprendiz 
de brujo’ [The witch apprentice] which are included in his Historia argentina 
[Argentinian History] (1992), collections of poems such as Soldados (2009) by 
Caso Rosendi and other testimonies such as Esteban’s or even Historia de los 
años sin piel [History of the Skinless Years] (2010) by veteran García Quiroga 
– the analysis of which I leave for another essay – show laughter as a survival 
strategy. In fact, all literary genres may use humour; and they do so in order to 
influence the maintenance of dignity, to survive and to enable the narration of 
the experience afterwards.
But to return to Iluminados por el fuego [Illuminated by Fire], there is 
another eloquent episode when, just as the war has come to an end, soldiers 
enthusiastically begin a soccer game as if nothing had happened. The two teams 
reproduce and rewrite the conflict they have just lost with humour and agree on 
two ideas: on the one hand, defeat has not eliminated the nationalist impulse 
although it has become demystified and degraded: having been defeated only 
reaffirms the idea that also within a democracy we live in a permanent state of 
exception (Esteban, 2004, p. 70). On the other hand, the first person, that is, 
the soldier Esteban, humorously affirms when offered Kelpers’16 food scraps 
while the others are playing soccer: ‘Let’s see if I could still die poisoned, just 
now when I have saved myself from the Gurkhas’ (Esteban, 2004, p. 71).
Thus, notions and concepts that are allegedly straight, solemn and 
indisputable, such as ‘national identity’, ‘life’ or ‘sovereignty’, or the idea that 
it is legitimate to occupy the Islands, are questioned and deeply degraded and 
exaggerated through parody, albeit temporarily, This occurs in Iluminados por 
el fuego [Illuminated by fire] when the author, in a final twist in his text, affirms 
that the Islands will one day be Argentine again. When fear, cold, hunger and 
the pain undergone are sieved through laughter, their sense changes and they 
thus acquire a new dimension. Laughter is a means of resistance. In short, 
laughter is a demystifying tool – nuanced towards either parody or irony – 
which questions the establishment and emancipates. In that sense, laughter is 
revolutionary: ‘We had not yet completely lined up when Lieutenant-Colonel 
Quevedo showed up, followed by the big guns; and without ceremony told us 
about the surrender. […] We kept on fucking around and making our usual 
16 ‘Kelper’ is the name given to people from the Malvinas–Falkland Islands. 
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jokes as if nothing had happened, as if not wanting to acknowledge that truth, 
that sad truth’ (Esteban, 2004, p. 58).
Fraternity 
With regards to fraternity there is also much to say about Iluminados por el fuego 
[Illuminated by Fire]. Julieta Vitullo has written an indispensable work about 
fictional representations of the Malvinas–Falklands War;17 and in a chapter 
in this volume18 she mentions two figures or symbolic representations from 
the Malvinas–Falkland Islands War: the cowardly commander and the soldier 
who dies in the arms of his fellow soldier: that is, the cruel officer who abuses 
his subalterns and the loyal comrade who resists, embraces and accompanies 
the other in his death. The validation of that fraternity or comradeship, that 
humanity beyond the supposed heroism inherent in the gesture or in the 
idealisation with which memory adorns the gesture – such validation ends up 
being inevitable, in the same way arrogance, fear and cruelty are validated. The 
two faces of the human show themselves in extreme circumstances.
In that regard, we must consider the unity and solidarity demonstrated by 
the main characters in Iluminados por el fuego in the face of the aberrations and 
perverse military authorities. Second Lieutenant Gilbert humiliates them and 
shows an extreme degree of inhumanity, arrogance towards his subalterns. Let 
us remember that the officers who governed Argentina during the dictatorship 
were the same as those who led the Malvinas–Falklands War; and thus they 
translated the tactics they had used in the concentration camps and other 
counter-insurgent techniques to the war, but with the same soldiers: there are 
innumerable ex-combatant testimonies that narrate torture practices such as 
estaqueamiento and other humiliation by high-ranking officers during the war. 
Before bio-political control of the body and the spirit, the means to resist can 
be empathy, unity, fraternal friendship, beyond voluntary maintenance of one’s 
own dignity:
– You are piece of crap, a coward, piece of shit of a soldier and of a 
person. Guys like you ought to be executed. Who do you think you are 
to oppose my orders, you rotten soldier? You are junk and were always 
useless; you should have been blown away by the English. […] It was very 
ugly to confirm that they ignored all that and that they were capable of 
forcing me to risk my own life just for a few cassettes, a holster, a helmet 
and a recorder for them. That is when I noticed where their values were. 
[…] They kept on insulting me in front my mates, while I ran away, 
humiliated. But deep inside I felt triumphant because I had dared to speak 
back to them as if I was their equal; it was them who had lost. They had 
displayed all their misery and insensibility […] even the soldiers were 
17 Islas imaginadas. La Guerra de Malvinas en la literature y cine argentinos [Imagined islands. The 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands War in Argentinian literature and film] (2012).
18 See J. Vitullo, ‘The Malvinas journey: harsh landscapes, rough writing, raw footage’, in this 
volume. 
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surprised by what was going on. Luckily, I ran into Sergio Sivoldi: he was 
gathering a group of soldiers who were getting ready to withdraw. There 
were about fifteen. – Come, come, stay here – Sergio advised. – If you are 
able to flee them, they will send you with us (Esteban, 2004, pp. 25–6).19
Another representative moment of mutual help, of that capacity to 
place oneself before the other and resist, takes place, like an explosion and 
instinctively, in the midst of battle:
Two soldiers were bringing a fellow who had been wounded in the leg; he 
was bleeding and screaming in the midst of non-stop explosions. I stood 
there as if I were hypnotised watching them approach. I lingered hoping 
to be able to help them; it would be easier if done by three persons. I saw 
them trot clumsily over the irregular and muddy terrain. In a second, they 
got hit by a projectile. Instinctively, I covered my eyes with my hands and 
seconds later I was not able to see anything moving in the direction where 
I last had seen them. My blood froze and my willingness to help someone 
evaporated (Esteban, 2004, p. 30).
Further in the text, there is a lucid conversation amongst soldiers that reveals 
that need to resist with those flashes of humanity, dignity and fraternity. Sergio, 
outraged by the number of soldiers fallen in combat, manifests his intention 
to visit every home to tell parents how their sons had died. This wish or will to 
leave a trace of each victim is a sublime gesture of fraternity:
– Yes, I know, while protected under a roof, soldiers keep on dying – 
Sergio insisted – And who will tell their parents that their sons died for the 
Fatherland? […] Yes, you are right – Sergio answered with the same rage. 
– But if I manage to survive this whore of a war, I will be visiting all their 
homes and if something happens to you, you must do the same: go tell my 
folks what the last moments of my life were like (Esteban, 2004, p. 32).
One of the scenes in the conflict that leaves a deep impression on the soldier 
Esteban has to do with ethical fortune and with chance, as his life was saved 
because he did not occupy his post one night. The soldier who did, Vallejos, 
died in his place:
I was extremely touched by his death, I was more touched by it than by the 
fact that I was alive, visiting him in his definite resting place. […] In a way, 
Vallejos had covered him [Burgos] with his own body; and while we were 
walking we were talking about his destiny: he had died the night before the 
last night of the war. […] Thus I told them that Vallejos would be keeping 
guard instead of me and Burgos said yes, that he knew because Vallejos 
was angry with me. It seemed that my mate’s destiny would have been to 
remain on the Islands. But one is never sure of those things […] (Esteban, 
2004, pp. 60–69).
19 Another fragment about friendship is the following: ‘Even though we were not together all 
the time, because we held different posts and carried out different missions, every time we got 
together we had a lot of fun, in spite of the bad times every one of us was undergoing. We were 
friends and we were relieved to realise that all four us were still alive’ (Esteban, 2004, p. 33). 
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With Vallejos, there was no chance of fraternity, care or solidarity. On the 
contrary, Esteban’s life is saved by a fortuitous act of fraternity – one associated 
with caprice or intuition – which keeps him alive but feeling guilty, traumatised:
And yet before a mate’s fresh grave, things acquired a dimension that 
dragged us directly to nonsense. In a way I tried to speak to Vallejos. 
Would he listen to me? Intimately, I tried to ask him to forgive me for 
being alive; to forgive me for bothering him with all these absurd things 
that hung around my head and that I needed to tell him. Because at 
that moment, everything was getting mixed up: without a doubt, I was 
speaking to him, while at the same time, I was speaking with death, with 
life, with my own life. Through his death, I was speaking with my life. 
With that life of mine that I barely understood, but that was the only 
thing that I had to be able to keep on (Esteban, 2004, p. 62).
Fear, hunger, thirst, cold, sexual desire, pain: the soldiers in the Malvinas–
Falklands are reduced to bare life and only have humour and fraternity to 
combat these sensations,20 but this is not always possible: ‘If in order to win a 
war a “bullet proof” group spirit is needed, along with great reserves of energy, 
I was sure that we, at this point, were lacking all of that. We had reached the 
limits of our strength. We had given away everything we had, and there we 
were, tired, broken and hungry’ (Esteban, 2004, p. 34).
Imagination
In Iluminados por el fuego [Illuminated by Fire] there is a moment in which we 
can observe how humour in resisting the hardships of war co-exists with the 
third line of ‘everyday virtues’ that Todorov mentions: ‘aesthetics’ or ‘spiritual 
activities’. This becomes evident in the passage in which the soldier Esteban 
reads a fragment of Carlos Castañeda’s Las enseñanzas de Don Juan [Don Juan’s 
Teachings]. In a nocturnal and cathartic communal reading, his mates display 
two attitudes: attentive listening to what constitutes fear and how it can help 
to endure violence and identity dispossession during a war – personified in 
Sergio the soldier, a friend of the protagonist; and, second, making fun or 
escaping through humour – represented by the soldier Reta. Let us look at both 
positions as captured in this extract:
Since I got here, I had been thinking about a written piece of paper I had 
in my bag. I did not want to fall asleep without having read it first and I 
told Sergio about it. […]
I brought it here because it is very good. Do you understand? – I tell him.
– Yes, yes. Now I understand. All right, keep going – he tells me. – What 
was that thing about fear? Read that thing about fear, something that I can 
spare. […]
20 ‘Climbing hills up and down / until reaching soldier Sañisky / He embraced him / Put 
between his hands / My Marlboro packet / This is yours – he told him – / This is all I have / 
And we committed ourselves to smoking’ (‘Brindis’ [Toast], in Caso Rosendi, 2009, p. 103).
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We all fell silent. There were other soldiers that came by to listen. I felt a 
bit ridiculous, but also proud. It was the first time that I was able to share 
with someone those typed pages that had helped me so much, when I was 
not yet a soldier. […]
– What I need is a young girl. A young girl! – They screamed while others 
laughed and another one said: Tomorrow I’ll get you a penguin to heat up 
your bed.
But I kept on reading. […] ‘Man feels that nothing is hidden. And this 
is how he has found his second enemy: Clarity! Mental clarity, so hard to 
obtain, disperses fear, but it is also blind.’
– That, that – Reta interrupted again – some clarity is what is lacking here 
because this stupid lantern is not bright enough. Don’t you think, Esteban? 
(Esteban, 2004, pp. 108–11).
Todorov’s ‘spiritual activities’ can be evasion or flight through literature or 
art, also observed clearly in Semprún, as according to Calveiro memorising 
Federico Gárcia Lorca’s Romancero gitano [The Gypsy Ballad] poems allowed 
him to go beyond the camps in his mind through reading and hallucination. 
Therefore, imagination may be erected and it can constitute, without the aid of 
aesthetics, a means of holding on: memories become an inexhaustible resource 
with which to face annihilation and the loss of subjectivity: ‘The watches were 
of course taken in pairs, but that night, due to a tactical issue, they left me to 
my own devices; so I stayed again with my cold, with my fear, but also with my 
memories, which never abandoned me: they could accompany me ceaselessly 
to any possible end’ (Esteban, 2004, p. 63).21
These strategies, although neither always successful nor fruitful nor possible 
– it is not only the will that appropriate them, as we have seen – are definitely 
indispensable lines of flight in the face of the dimensions of absolute power: 
both in concentration camps during the Argentine military dictatorship and 
in the Malvinas–Falklands War. Thus, in all of those world narratives, pain, 
violence and forgetting are accompanied by humour, fraternity and dreaming. 
They constitute those everyday dichotomies, that of life and death; and in 
the last instance, they are a way of vindicating the needs of a multi-focal, 
polyhedral, complex, precarious and fragile memory. Together, they make up 
unexpected ‘everyday virtues’ in the remnants of beauty in the midst of the 
inhospitable, cruel and arbitrary embedded in human horror.
21 The poem by Caso Rosendi whose title corresponds to the Gaelic etymology of Malvinas–
Falklands – ‘Maol-Mhin’ – is along these lines, as it posits beauty as a flight from death: ‘It was 
terribly beautiful / Looking in the middle of bombardment / The softness with which they fell 
/ The snowflakes’ (Caso Rosendi, 2009, p. 47).
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2. Exile, the Malvinas War and human rights*
Silvina Jensen
In Historia reciente: Perspectivas y desafíos de un campo en construcción, Marina Franco and Florencia Levín signal one of the most pertinent challenges for researchers working on the Malvinas today: the need to develop conceptual 
precision (2007, p. 58). Through precision, they argue, we might free our 
analytical categories from both their status as value judgements and from the 
powerful connotations generated by the protagonists of a recent conflict-filled 
past, in the hope that research might avoid reproducing the political battles 
that these categories entail.
Uniting the Malvinas and human rights as a means of delving into the 
question of exile is far from an obvious enterprise, however. Prior to April 
1982, or rather before 1 May of that year, the symbolic connotations of the 
Malvinas were recognisable to all Argentines – including those who lived in 
other countries as a result of the political violence between 1974 and 1983. The 
Islands were a geographical territory upon which were projected nationalist 
feelings and national values; and the Malvinas therefore also represented a 
‘patriotic cause’, the claim to a land snatched from national sovereignty more 
than a century ago – a fact which stirred up, to differing degrees, the patriotic 
feelings of civil society and the military. The Islands were also a ‘symbol’ through 
which ‘los argentinos sintetizaban diversos sentidos, a menudo opuestos, de su 
argentinidad’ [Argentines synthesised different, and often opposing, definitions 
of their ‘Argentineness’] (Guber, 2001).1 After the ‘recovery’ of the Islands on 
2 April, resulting in an international armed conflict, the Malvinas became 
associated with the war, a war whose origin lay in the landing on the South 
Georgia Islands ordered by the third military junta (composed of Leopoldo F. 
Galtieri, Isaac Anaya and Basilio Lami Dozo). Only days before the landing, 
the junta had suppressed a mass demonstration called by the CGT (General 
* The interviews used in this article are part of the field work of the author’s doctoral thesis, 
‘Suspendidos de la historia/Exiliados de la memoria: El caso de los argentinos desterrados en 
Cataluña (1976– )’ (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 2004). Available at http://www.
tdx.cesca.es/TDX-1024105-231137 (ISBN B-6634-2005/84-689-0953-X). Interviewees’ 
real names are not used, in order to protect their anonymity. 
1 See also Lorenz (2006) and Palermo (2007).
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Confederation of Labour) under the slogan ‘Bread, Peace and Work’: a violent 
repression of civil society.
These (distinct yet overlapping) layers of meaning surrounding the Malvinas, 
layers that became increasingly confused throughout the hostilities and were 
often impossible to consider together without creating contradictions, played a 
central role in the debates of those in exile in Mexico, Spain and France.
The notion of human rights is no more easily definable, particularly in terms 
of its conception in the 1970s and 1980s. It is true that, in the period of the 
terrorist state in Argentina, the denunciation of the dictatorship centred on ideas 
drawn from discourses of human rights, understood to mean the defence of life, 
liberty and physical integrity. It would not be misleading to claim, alongside 
protagonists of the diaspora such as Jorge Bernetti and Mempo Giardinelli 
(2003), or researchers studying the exiled communities such as Marina Franco 
(2008) and Pablo Yankelevich (2002), that the fight for human rights was the 
fundamental cause of the exile communities from Sweden to Brazil and from 
Mexico to Australia. However, the Argentine diaspora had to undergo a long 
process in order to form this identity of human rights campaigners, following 
the collapse of the revolutionary frameworks to which many of those in exile 
had subscribed. As a result, over the course of almost eight years of exile, the 
same questions were debated in the geographically disparate exile communities: 
who were human rights for? What was their scope? Was it the same to defend 
human rights within Argentina and in exile? Were human rights an absolute 
ethical value, a pipe dream or a philosophical abstraction; or were they in fact 
a historical category linked to class struggle and the particular configuration of 
the conflict between social groups throughout Argentine history?2
During the visit of the IACHR (Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights)3 to Argentina, the periodical Criterio (13 September 1979) had 
highlighted that the subject of human rights was ‘polemical’, ‘ambiguous’ and 
‘ambivalent’; during the Malvinas War, this ambiguity and polemic intensified 
among both the opposition in Argentina and in exile.
Carlos Gabetta (1983, p. 15) argues that the South Atlantic conflict 
represented an ‘earthquake’ that shook the foundations of the exile community, 
fracturing associations, multiplying disputes and shifting the main public 
focus of the diaspora towards the unmasking of the repressive nature of the 
military junta, whose thousands of victims had been killed, disappeared, taken 
as political prisoners or forced into exile. Taking this hypothesis as its starting 
point, this chapter seeks to problematise the relationship between the Malvinas 
War and human rights, attempting to explain to what extent Argentina’s 
‘recovery’ of the Islands interacted with the exiles’ identity as human rights 
2 A particularly in-depth analytical perspective can be found in the polemical debate between 
Luis Bruschtein and Héctor Schmucler published in Controversia (Mexico) from the end of 
1979 to early 1980. For a detailed analysis see Jensen (2010).
3 Known in Spanish as the CIDH: Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. 
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campaigners, particularly in terms of the exiles’ varying political backgrounds, 
strategies of resistance to the dictatorship and attitudes towards the war.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first attempts to provide a brief 
overview of the positions that the political and humanitarian exile organisations 
adopted towards the ‘recovery’ and the war, attempting to highlight the ideas 
that dominated this hugely complex conflict. The second explores some of 
the debates surrounding the idea of human rights that took place in exile 
during the conflict between Argentina and the UK. My analysis examines how 
the Malvinas conflict can be considered to have been a humanitarian ‘test’ 
(Goligorsky, 1983) for the exiles, exploring some of the most stimulating 
polemics on the topic, including Mexico’s Socialist Discussion Group (Grupo 
de Discusión Socialista) versus León Rozitchner (Venezuela); and, particularly, 
Eduardo Goligorsky versus Abel Posse and Hugo Chumbita (Spain). This 
section aims to analyse questions that the exiles had been debating since 1976, 
from the start of their fight against the dictatorship. These questions were 
raised each time the exiles considered the best means of garnering international 
solidarity, a difficult enterprise in the face of Argentina’s immensely complex 
political map (confused by both the perplexing identities of the nation’s political 
parties and the characteristics of Argentina’s political history in the lead-up to 
the coup). They also came to the fore in attempts to define the public profile of 
the exile associations and when the exiles considered their own militant past as 
members of revolutionary movements.
In summary, this chapter aims to establish to what extent the Malvinas War 
forced the exiles to revisit subjects such as the use of violence for political aims, 
the justness of war, the meaning of sacrificing life and liberty, the definition of 
freedom and democracy, the viability of bringing the perpetrators of abuses to 
trial, the fight against impunity and the battle for memory. Each one of this 
vast array of questions drew attention to and/or created a crisis (or at least 
tension) within the exiles’ relationship with human rights.
Exile associations and the Malvinas conflict
In describing the reactions of Argentines based in Madrid to the ‘occupation’ of 
the Malvinas, Rafael Flores4 highlighted that between the unease, amazement 
and anger of some and the confidence of others, the dominant response was 
confusion (Flores, 1982, pp. 36–7). In Stockholm, an ex-militant of the 
PRT-ERP5 in Bahía Blanca, Jaime Naifleish, identified ‘ideas y sentimientos 
encontrados’ [opposing ideas and feelings] among the expatriates, which both 
4 Flores was a militant in the Resistencia Libertaria (Libertarian Resistance) and General 
Secretary of the Rubber Workers Union in Córdoba before the dictatorship. He was exiled in 
Madrid.
5 The PRT-ERP was a guerrilla group formed of factions from the Partido Revolucionario de 
los Trabajadores [Workers’ Revolutionary Party] and the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo 
[People’s Revolutionary Army].
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resisted clear-cut definitions and exposed the complexity of differing positions 
where, days before, agreement had (erroneously) appeared to reign (Naifleisch, 
1982).
Beyond the different national contexts,6 among the organised exile groups 
– whether connected to a political party, working across these divides or with a 
humanitarian focus – three dominant positions towards the Argentine–British 
conflict emerged. There were those who declared themselves completely, 
and almost acritically, in favour of the ‘recovery’; those who opposed it and 
even hoped that the UK would attack Buenos Aires; and the majority of 
those in exile, who avoided extremes and attempted to reconcile a continued 
denunciation of the dictatorship and the continued assertion of Argentina’s 
claim over the Islands, with differing emphasis on the one or the other of these 
two factors of the equation.
The diversity of positions resulted from a large number of factors, including 
each person’s political identity prior to exile; whether they belonged to 
organisations of the diaspora; their perspective on the dictatorship; their 
personal views on Britain and its imperialist stance; their acceptance or 
rejection of war as a means of resolving territorial disputes; the behaviour 
of the dominant political forces to which the exile was connected in their 
country of residence; their consideration of the political timing of the event, 
etc. This variety of factors and their idiosyncratic combinations resulted in a 
political map filled with nuances and ambiguities, revealing the acute tension 
experienced by the exiles between April and June of 1982 and leading many 
political and social commentators in the host countries to note how the 
Argentine communities had been ‘shaken up’, bringing former enemies into 
the same band. Marcel Niedergang, a columnist for Le Monde, claimed that 
the ‘Malvinas cause’ had placed the Argentine opposition, both in exile and 
at home, on the side of the military (Niedergang, 1982).7 Meanwhile, the 
reporter in Buenos Aires for Barcelona’s La Vanguardia, Lluís Foix, explained 
that the question of the Islands’ ‘recovery’ had produced an unprecedented 
level of political unity among Argentines, to the point that opponents of the 
dictatorship not only proclaimed that ‘¡por primera vez me gustan las botas!’ 
[I like [military] boots for the first time], but that ‘queues of volunteers’ were 
crowding outside the Ministry for Foreign Affairs asking to be recruited to 
defend the island territory. The philosopher Fernando Savater also described 
6 For the differences between the exile communities in France, Mexico and Spain see Franco, 
2008, pp. 289–312.
7 An Argentine poet exiled in Barcelona described an experience he had in Casa Argentina, 
where a fellow Argentine rose to his feet in a meeting and said: ‘Mi hermano está condenado 
y me escribe desde la cárcel pidiendo que todos los argentinos se unan a la lucha contra 
Inglaterra. ¡Hay que ir de voluntarios! ¡El país lo necesita!’ [My brother is being held captive 
and he writes to me from prison asking that all Argentines join the fight against Britain. We 
should all sign up! Our country needs us!] (Interview with L. L., Barcelona, 12 December 
1996).
EXILE, THE MALVINAS WAR AND HUMAN RIGHTS 57
Argentina’s situation as ‘un enigma en estado puro’ [a perfect enigma], leaving 
the uninitiated open-mouthed at the way that ‘el honor patrio y su hermana 
doña dignidad nacional’ [patriotic honour and his sister national dignity] 
could unite dictator and victim in ‘un mismo espasmo de amor ante unos 
mendrugos de granito roídos por el Atlántico’ [a spasm of passion over some 
scraps of granite battered by the Atlantic] (Acotto, 1982).
Whilst for the European left – and for some members of the Argentine exile8 
– this represented losing sight of who the enemy was, obfuscating the ability to 
identify those on the side of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ (Soto, 1982), for a large proportion 
of the diaspora the situation was significantly more complex. For them, clear, 
problem-free definitions were impossible, at least during the conflict itself. This 
was particularly due to Argentina’s internal political situation, which many in 
the diaspora were describing as the ‘crisis’ or ‘decline’ of the military regime, 
seen as paving the way for democracy.
By way of illustration, my discussion below considers the positions of some 
of the most important exiles and exile associations in Sweden, France, Spain 
and Mexico, examining their descriptions of the enterprise launched by the 
junta on 2 May and the nuances, emphases, tensions and ambiguities in their 
public actions and declarations, first in relation to the ‘recovery’ and then 
during the war itself.
A revolutionary Marxist group in Paris defined Malvinas as ‘la expresión 
absurda y criminal’ [the absurd, criminal expression] of two States in deep 
crisis. They denied the war’s status as an anti-colonial struggle for liberation, 
and described it as a conflict ‘inventado por la dictadura, […] usado por el 
imperialismo británico también en crisis’ [invented by the dictatorship and 
exploited by the imperialist British, who are also in crisis] (Divergencia, 1982). 
Similarly, a socialist militant from the Casa Argentina a Catalunya labelled 
the Malvinas a ‘curse’, a ‘caricature’ and another ‘trick’ of the dictators who 
manipulated the Argentines’ weakness for all things national(ist) in order to 
remain in power. But were the exiles in Paris and militants in Barcelona saying 
the same thing? Not really, or at least not fully. R. E. felt that there was ‘nothing 
to defend’: ‘A mí, las Malvinas, la idea de defender las Malvinas, no me iba a 
hacer poner en peligro ni un solo brazo de un joven argentino’ [Personally, the 
Malvinas, the idea of defending the Malvinas, was not going to make me put 
even one limb of a young Argentine at risk].9 In contrast, Luis Alonso and 
Ángel Fanjul from the Paris Marxist group separated out Argentina’s rights to 
8 In his testimony, R. E. stated: ‘Los catalanes no estaban acostumbrados a tanta versatilidad. 
Nadie podía comprender el apoyo popular a la toma del archipiélago, después del acto 
fantástico de la Plaza de Mayo de dos días antes y de la represión terrible ... los periodistas 
catalanes estaban como locos’ [Catalans were not used to such versatility. Nobody could 
understand the popular support for the seizing of the archipelago after the unbelievable 
demonstration in the Plaza de Mayo two days before and the terrible repression. […] The 
Catalan press were going crazy] (Interview, 20 January 1997).
9 Interview with R. E., Barcelona, 20 January 1997.
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the Malvinas and the demagogic, opportunist manoeuvring of the dictatorship 
(Divergencia, 1982).
On the non-Peronist Left, a human rights activist from Barcelona also 
recognised the ‘invented’ nature of ‘lo de Malvinas’ [the Malvinas matter]. In 
her view, the military ‘[se lo] habían sacado de la manga para unir y sacar el 
patriotismo’ [had pulled it out of their sleeve to bring people together and stir 
up their patriotism]. Her opposition to the ‘cause’ and the war was founded 
on its dual condition as a ‘patriotic cause’ or, more precisely, its jingoism and 
territorialism. As M. D. stated:
Yo soy marxista y los pueblos no nos metemos en esas guerras, guerras 
territoriales. Yo no soy patriota. Estoy en contra de los patriotismos. Me 
parecen mezquinos, engañosos. Yo soy trabajadora. Tengo consciencia que 
soy de un grupo que ha trabajado toda la vida y que tiene que trabajar. La 
gente de mi familia eran todos laburantes. Y creo que las banderas de la 
Patria y de todo eso son las banderas de la burguesía. (Interview, 30 May 
1996)
[I am a Marxist and the people do not get involved in these wars, territorial 
wars. I am not a patriot. I am against patriotisms. I see them as small-
minded, deceptive. I am a worker. I am conscious of being from a group 
that has worked all their lives and who have to work. My family were all 
labourers. I believe that the flags of patriotism and all that stuff are the 
flags of the bourgeoisie].
Although in M. D.’s case class identity determined her radical opposition to 
the Malvinas cause and the war, many members of the Argentine Communist 
Party in exile joined the Frente Antiimperialista Latinoamericano [Latin 
American Anti-Imperialist Front], positioning themselves in opposition to 
Britain’s colonial machinations and in favour of the ‘recovery’ of the Malvinas 
archipelago. The divergences in opinion between different sectors of the 
Argentine Left permeated the dynamic of the Comisión de Familiares de Presos 
Políticos, Muertos y Detenidos-Desaparecidos [Commission of Relatives of 
Political Prisoners, Victims and Disappeared Detainees] in Barcelona, the 
organisation in which many militants had been working together since 1976.
In relation to the idea that the occupation of the Malvinas represented 
a ‘fabrication’, ‘invention’, ‘trap’ or ‘manoeuvre’, the Cordobese ex-union 
leader Rafael Flores, then based in Madrid, argued that the occupation of the 
Malvinas was not ‘invented’ by the military, despite its use as a tool to silence 
the popular movement that on 30 May had chanted that ‘¡se va acabar, se va 
acabar, la dictadura militar!’ [the military dictatorship is going to end, it’s going 
to end]. This was not a strategy that appeared out of the blue. The military 
academies taught officers that the Malvinas represented one of the longest-
standing national military operations; and the Malvinas were, moreover, an 
essential component of the Argentine imaginary, actively taught from primary 
school (Flores, 1982, pp. 36–7).
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At the same time, Luis Rodríguez wrote in El Periódico de Catalunya that 
the Malvinas were one of the ‘grandes mitos nacionales’ [great national myths] 
and that Galtieri was exploiting it in order to maintain the status quo.10 
Rodríguez claimed that, beyond the dispute with the UK over sovereignty and 
the economic potential of the Islands, the junta’s decision stemmed from the 
need to achieve ‘una dinámica que unificara al país tras una empresa histórica 
y cuyo rédito sería capitalizado por las FFAA’ [a dynamic that would unite the 
country behind a historic enterprise whose benefits could be capitalised upon 
by the armed forces]. In the same line of argument, but ascribing even less 
depth to the invasion, Eduardo Goligorsky condemned Malvinas as a ‘slogan’ 
used by the military to stimulate ‘la irracionalidad atávica y la credulidad de 
un conglomerado humano que últimamente se mostraba escéptico y remiso 
a dejarse llevar por las narices’ [the atavistic irrationality and the credulity 
of a population who had recently been sceptical and unwilling to fall into 
line] (Goligorsky, 1983, p. 239). A few days after the ‘recovery’, Goligorsky (a 
Radicalist exiled in Barcelona) was in Buenos Aires and stated that Argentina 
was engaged in an ‘irredentist delusion’ led by Galtieri (Goligorsky, 1983, p. 
210). 
In the diaspora, a significant number of voices denounced the military 
actions of 2 April as a desperate manoeuvre seeking to ‘borrar el pasado con 
un sablazo’ [erase the past with a swipe of the sword], bringing to light ‘un 
problema eterno, pero siempre desactualizado, tema de pequeños conciliábulos 
nacionalistas y de almirantes retirados’ [an eternal but outdated problem, 
a topic discussed in small, secretive nationalist gatherings or among retired 
admirals] (Bayer, 1982). But other readings also developed, including those 
of the Peronist Comisión Argentine des Droits d l’Homme (CADHU), the 
Trotskyist Centre Argentin d’Information et de Solidaritè (CAIS) and the 
Comisión de Solidarité des Parents des Prisionniers, Disparus et Túes en 
Argentine (COSOFAM) in France. These organisations recognised that the 
Argentine intervention was intimately bound up with the internal political 
problems experienced by the dictatorship, but they did not cease to support 
the Argentine people’s ‘sovereign rights’ over the Islands (‘En el exterior’, 1982, 
p. 36).
In an announcement published in Le Monde (16 May 1982), the Argentine 
committees in France provided an argument with an important nuance: the 
only sovereignty over the Islands, or legitimate right to lay claim to their 
possession, rested with the Argentine people. The text’s condemnations 
of the Royal Navy’s ‘aventura belicista’ [warmongering enterprise], of the 
Argentine dictatorship and its opportunistic manoeuvre and of the behaviour 
of the European Economic Community11 are mixed with defences of liberty, 
10 Rodríguez (1982).
11 The EEC had placed economic sanctions on Argentina as a result of the invasion.
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human rights, justice, popular sovereignty and territorial sovereignty over the 
archipelago, demonstrating the disorientation of the exile organisations (‘En el 
exterior’, 1982, p. 36).
This plurality of positions and multiple emphases was not restricted to 
differences between associations, but was found at times among people united 
under the same banner who disagreed on how to interpret the conflict. This was 
influential in determining the dynamic of each association, which depended on 
the difficult negotiations taking place within each one, both in terms of the 
possibility of reaching agreements and the ruptures that took place. An example 
can be found in the public declarations of the Swedish and French branches 
of the Association of Relatives of the Victims of Repression (COSOFAM). 
In Sweden, the Association declared itself opposed to the invasion, whilst 
in France it began by condemning the war led by the junta, but eventually 
focused on denouncing the warmongering attitude of Britain and the US and 
reiterating Argentina’s sovereignty over the Islands (Divergencia, 2 July 1982).
For the exiles, it was extremely important to differentiate between the 
legitimacy of the Malvinas ‘cause’, dear to Argentine national sentiment, and 
its political, demagogic exploitation by the military.12 In the same way, the 
exiles considered it essential not to confuse support for military intervention 
in the Malvinas (in some cases even endorsing the war) with a decline in the 
repudiation of the terrorist nature of the junta that had governed the country 
since 1976.13 A member of the Confederación Socialista Argentina de Cataluña 
explained that ‘una cosa era la reivindicación y otra cosa era que los militares se 
montaran sobre esa reivindicación para continuar en el poder’ [the demand for 
sovereignty was one thing, but the military jumping on the back of this demand 
in order to remain in power was another] (Interview with C. R., Barcelona, 13 
December 1996). The same interviewee explained that defending Argentina’s 
sovereignty over the Islands and denouncing British imperialism were not the 
same as supporting whoever made the recovery of the Islands possible.14 Beyond 
12 From the headquarters of the Associació d’Amics de les Nacions Unides in Barcelona, Hugo 
Chumbita, a militant in Nilda Garré and Vicente Saadi’s Intransigencia Peronista, outlined 
a distinction between the justice of the national demand and the temporary context of the 
government that had launched the military action (Testimonio Latinoamericano, 14 May/June 
1982, pp. 11–16). 
13 Andrés Cornelli, a representative of the PCA (Partido Comunista de la Argentina) who 
participated in the debates surrounding the Malvinas in Barcelona, emphasised the need to 
avoid confusing support for the recovery of the Islands with an abandonment of the fight to 
recover democracy.
14 The Madrid branch of the CSA made the same point through the words of Andrés López 
Acotto, one of its members. In a letter published in El País (6 April 1982) he stated: 
‘Independientemente de la opinión que cada uno tenga sobre el actual gobierno de la 
Argentina, de su origen, de su continuidad y de sus móviles – puntos sobre los cuales hemos 
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these positions, the Confederación Socialista Argentina even declared that any 
mention of the Malvinas problem should be preceded by a condemnation of 
the murderous activity of the military junta.
It was necessary to question the supposedly anti-imperialist nature of the 
action of 2 April,15 given the military’s history of both ceding and breaking up 
national territory (CSA – Cataluña Branch. Internal document, 1982).
The Argentine socialists in Mexico summarised their position in a dual 
demand: ‘¡Por la soberanía argentina en las Malvinas! ¡Por la soberanía popular 
en Argentina!’ [For Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas! For popular 
sovereignty in Argentina!]. The Argentine socialists declared that the conflict 
could not be read exclusively through the prism of the internal politics of the 
warring nations. This went against simplistic interpretations that identified 
support for the Malvinas cause with a pardoning of the dictatorship, arguing 
instead that the military dictatorship was no less a dictatorship for merely 
having occupied the Malvinas.16 
Among those who recognised Argentina’s rights over the Malvinas, some 
favoured a peaceful solution through diplomatic routes whilst others, in light 
of the fact that the Islands had been seized, ended up supporting the war. In 
the latter group, some even came to consider it a ‘just war’, the response to 
an initial violent act of colonial ‘theft’ by Britain (which had ‘usurped’ part of 
hecho pública la nuestra, en tanto claros opositores al mismo – hay un hecho muy claro que no 
puede ni debe tergiversarse: Las islas Malvinas han sido, son y serán argentinas’ [Irrespective of 
the opinion that we each hold of the current Argentine government and its origin, continuity 
and motives – upon which we have made public our position of opposition – there is a clear 
fact that cannot and should not be distorted: the Malvinas Islands have been, are and will be 
Argentine] (Resumen de Actualidad Argentina, 55, 1982). 
15 An Argentine exiled in Madrid, Roberto Páez, denounced the apparent anti-imperialist nature 
of the military occupation of the Falklands–Malvinas as false: ‘La dictadura no defendió 
intereses nacionales, sino eventuales negociados de sus personeros con firmas multinacionales, 
así como un esquema geoestratégico en el que se reservaba cierto protagonismo que no excluía 
la ingerencia imperialista norteamericana’ [The dictatorship did not defend national interests, 
but possible deals between their officials and multinationals, as well as a geo-strategic vision 
in which their protagonism did not exclude the imperialist interference of the US] (‘La 
ocupación y la democracia’, Resumen de la Actualidad Argentina, 75, November 1982, pp. 
24–6). 
16 Grupo de Discusión Socialista, ‘Por la soberanía argentina en las Malvinas. Por la soberanía 
popular en Argentina’ (Visión socialista, 1982). 
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Argentina’s territory in 1833),17 an ‘excessive’ but ‘legitimate’ defence,18 or an 
anti-imperialist war of national liberation similar to the cause of third-world 
colonies.
Although the Malvinas cause has a long political history and was a popular 
demand prior to the act of military occupation, it was crucial to evaluate 
the political circumstances of the invasion in order to denounce the junta’s 
‘opportunism’;19 to define the impact of the occupation on the ‘health’ of the 
government; and/or not to miss the opportunity of what some perceived as 
an imminent return to democracy which would include their own return to 
the country.20 As Héctor Borrat explained, those who supported the ‘recovery’ 
17 The Grupo de Discusión Socialista declared in ‘Por la soberanía’ that: ‘La aventura de la Junta 
Militar se corresponde con una posición inglesa anterior, no por disimulada menos violenta. 
Nos referimos a la prolongada e irritante renuncia de Gran Bretaña a cumplir una resolución 
de las Naciones Unidas que tendía a dar solución pacífica al conflicto en torno a la soberanía 
de las Malvinas. Esta disputa había tenido a su vez un comienzo violento que los británicos 
gustan olvidar o justificar con datos históricos muy poco convincentes. En 1833, una corbeta 
inglesa despojó por la fuerza a los argentinos de las islas que habían heredado como resultado 
de su independencia del dominio español’ [The military junta’s operation corresponds to a 
position previously sustained by Britain and is no less violent for being masked. We refer to 
Britain’s prolonged, infuriating refusal to fulfil a United Nations resolution that sought to 
provide a peaceful solution to the conflict over the sovereignty of the Malvinas. This dispute 
had, in turn, begun with violence, which the British prefer to forget or justify with rather 
unconvincing historical facts. In 1833, a British corvette used force to strip Argentines of the 
Islands they had inherited as a result of their independence from Spanish control] (Rozitchner, 
2005, pp. 147–8). This line of argument was common among the revolutionary militants of 
the 1960s and 1970s in debates over who had ‘thrown the first stone’ in Argentine politics.
18 This was the position of the Partido Intransigente member Eduardo Andriotti Rondanin, 
who participated in the round-table discussion on the Malvinas organised by the Centro 
de Cultura Popular in Barcelona on 28 April, a few days before fighting began (Testimonio 
Latinoamericano, 14 (May/June 1982, pp. 11–16). 
19 Separating the recognition that Argentina was experiencing a dictatorship from the 
recognition that the military had fulfilled a long-standing national, popular desire was not 
easy, particularly as no-one could predict the impact that the occupation would have on 
the internal political situation. The Madrid-based Agrupación Eva Perón stated that: ‘Con 
la recuperación de Malvinas, Georgias y Sandwichs del Sur para el patrimonio nacional, la 
Junta militar que hoy gobierno la Argentina ha producido un acontecimiento histórico cuyas 
consecuencias políticas, económicas y militares exceden la intencionalidad de los autores al 
tomar esa decisión’ [With the recovery of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich 
Islands, the military junta currently ruling Argentina has created a historical event whose 
political, economic and military consequences exceed the intentions of those who took this 
decision]. 
20 The disputes surrounding the causal link between the ‘recovery’ of the Islands, the outbreak of 
the Argentine–British conflict and the continuation/end of the dictatorship were very heated. 
In response to some Peronist groups in Catalonia who trusted in the surge which the popular 
mobilisation for democracy in Argentina had achieved in the context of the invasion, the 
Grupo de Exiliados de Barcelona denounced the opportunism of those who had come out in 
favour of the ‘Malvinas cause’ without reflecting on who had brought about the ‘recovery’ of 
the Islands. To this end, they stated: ‘Los principales perjudicados inmediatos de esta aventura 
serán las masas trabajadoras. Haya o no haya guerra. Si hay guerra, el desangre económico 
y humano. Si no hay guerra, la bancarrota nacional por el bloqueo económico y el ahogo 
EXILE, THE MALVINAS WAR AND HUMAN RIGHTS 63
of the archipelago assumed that, regardless of the outcome of the war, the 
consequence at a national level would be the restitution of democratic rule. 
If Argentina suffered military defeat, the junta’s regime would be discredited, 
hastening its downfall. If, however, Argentina retained sovereignty over the 
recovered national territory, the victory would not belong solely to the regime; 
and in any case the conflict would have been important in bringing about the 
mobilisation of parties, unions and movements (Borrat, 1982).
Debating human rights: The Malvinas invasion as a 
humanitarian test
It is no easy task to explain the interpellation of the question of human rights 
in the Argentine–British conflict over the Malvinas. The following pages will 
explore what it meant for the exiles to live with what Flores (1982) termed the 
‘desgraciada paradoja’ (deplorable paradox) of the fact that the military who 
were perpetrating genocide were also responsible for ‘recovering’ the Malvinas, 
and to what extent this ‘paradox’ placed their human rights activism in crisis.
As outlined above, one of the dilemmas experienced by the exiles between 
April and June 1982 was how to wrestle ‘ownership’ of the Malvinas question 
from the military, whilst attempting not to distance themselves too greatly 
from what they perceived as an action that had galvanised popular support in 
Argentina. In this context, the exiles found themselves confronting a double 
challenge: contesting their characterisation by the military – also deeply 
entrenched in civil society – as ‘subversives’, ‘traitors’ and ‘deceivers’; and 
reinforcing their status as human rights activists, even though stressing their 
anti-dictatorship fight risked further alienating parts of the country beyond 
Buenos Aires. In fact, as the philosopher Horacio González noted from his 
exile in São Paulo, during the war Galtieri had employed the familiar strategy of 
dismissing condemnations of human rights violations, but had added the spin 
of declaring them to be another ‘cunning trick’ by the British Foreign Office or 
war ‘propaganda’ from the heart of imperialism that was disseminated by ‘anti-
Argentine’ elements abroad (González, 1982). We must not forget that there 
were groups in exile, such as the Movimiento contra la guerra en el Atlántico 
Sur in Barcelona, which did not hesitate to condemn some of the ‘Malvinas 
heroes’, including the captain Alfredo Astiz, the commander of the South 
Georgia detachment remembered for his participation in kidnappings and 
financiero. Todos aquellos sectores que en nombre de una pretendida brecha democrática 
entran en el juego patriotero compartirán con la Junta Militar la responsabilidad de las 
consecuencias que lleven esa aventura’ [Those who will be worst affected by this operation 
are the working classes, whether or not there is a war. If there is a war, through the economic 
drain. If there is no war, through the national bankruptcy caused by economic blockades 
and financial collapse. All sectors who, in the name of a ‘democratic breach’, enter into this 
jingoistic game will share with the military junta the consequences of this operation] (Resumen 
de la Actualidad Argentina, 55, 1982).
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torture in the ESMA (Navy School of Mechanics) (Manifiesto, 31 May 1982). 
At the same time that this group of exiles drew attention to the perpetrators 
of genocide, now celebrated as Malvinas ‘heroes’ in Madrid, Flores (1982) 
expressed his dismay at this harsh reality: ‘lo retorcido de nuestra suerte, la 
desgraciada paradoja reside en que los asesinos de nuestros hermanos – que no 
hermanos suyos – los más sistemáticos entregadores de la soberanía y dignidad 
argentina, sean los que ejecutaron la ocupación de Malvinas y Georgias del Sur’ 
[The cruel twist of our fate, the deplorable paradox, lies in the fact that those 
who murdered our brothers – and even their own –, those who have most 
systematically dismantled Argentine sovereignty and dignity, are also the ones 
who executed the occupation of the Malvinas and South Georgia Islands].
It is commonly asserted that Peronist and Montonero exiles expressed 
the greatest enthusiasm for the recovery of the Islands and even for the war. 
However, as we have seen above, almost no exile committees or organisations 
escaped visible tensions, whether they represented a union across political 
divides fighting against the dictatorship, a single political party (including the 
non-Peronist and non-armed left) or groups focused on human rights. Although 
many exiles continued to emphasise the condemnation of the dictatorship and 
many opposed the war, there were also many who recognised that Argentina 
had legitimate rights over the archipelago. Even the slogan of the Madres de 
Plaza de Mayo21 – a key reference point for the exiles in the anti-dictatorship 
fight – validated Argentine sovereignty over the Islands, albeit without losing 
a critical perspective.
As a result of this situation, the consensus that had been established in 
defining opposition to the dictatorship in terms of human rights was, if not 
destroyed, at least shaken, becoming a topic of concern, debate, reclamation 
and even revision in terms of form, content and opportunity.
The Malvinas invasion also opened a debate in exile on the use of force 
in the solution of border disputes and international disagreements.22 By 
extension, this debate impacted on the incomplete revision of the past recourse 
to violence as a legitimate method of political action and means of seizing 
power. This revision had led the revolutionary militants of the diaspora to 
evaluate (and critique, repent, ask forgiveness for, re-examine or adapt) their 
participation in the armed struggle that culminated in the military coup of 
1976 with its tragic toll of deaths and disappearances. The conflict over the 
Malvinas therefore re-ignited discussion over types of violence (just, reparative, 
in legitimate defence) and the need to contextualise past judgements and 
21 ‘Las Malvinas son argentinas, los desaparecidos también’ [The Malvinas are Argentine, and the 
disappeared are too]. In the same vein, the Trabajadores y Sindicalistas Argentinos en el Exilio 
(TYSAE) adopted the slogan: ‘Las Malvinas son argentinas, los muertos, presos y desaparecidos 
también’ [The Malvinas are Argentine, and the dead, imprisoned and disappeared are too].
22 The exiles were divided in their categorisation of the events of 2 April, debating whether to 
define them as an ‘occupation’, a ‘recovery’ or a ‘conquest’.
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present evaluations on the recourse to arms as a means of collective action. 
In a text written as an ‘open letter’ to his fellow exiles, Eduardo Goligorsky 
(1983, pp. 217–8) argues that the idea that the use of force is a valid means 
of recovering national sovereignty can be applied in unexpected ways, leading 
even to the paradoxical situation where violence against the British can be 
used to pardon the violence of Argentina’s military governments since 1966. 
Goligorsky’s contribution reflects the extent to which the Malvinas conflict 
reopened the debates among the diaspora community of the existence of ‘one’ 
violence or multiple violences (exercised from above or below; violence dealt or 
received; violence and counter-violence; violence for exploitation; and violence 
for defence, etc.). Goligorsky’s text also demonstrates how some sectors of the 
diaspora demonised others when he concludes that: 
Más aún, se refuerza el desvarío de quienes desearían reanudar la 
experiencia homicida de la guerrilla y el terrorismo, desde esta perspectiva 
ni siquiera se podría descartar la conjetura de que algunos de quienes 
corrieron a reclamar armas y a enrolarse como voluntarios para la guerra 
contra los ingleses, sientan mañana la tentación de encauzar los instintos 
violentos por los carriles de la insurgencia (1983, pp. 217–8). 
[Moreover, it fuels the insanity of those who wish to resume the homicidal 
practices of the guerrilla and terrorism. From this perspective, we could not 
even exclude the possibility that some of those who rushed to take up arms 
and enrol as volunteers for the war against the British might tomorrow feel 
tempted to channel their violent instincts into insurgency.] 
Once British forces arrived in the South Atlantic and hostilities began – 
including the sinking of the Belgrano and the death of 323 people on board 
– the exiles had to adopt a position on whether to support the war or raise 
the flag of peace as an absolute value, regardless of the cause (the patria or 
homeland; sovereignty; liberty; revolution; etc.). The diaspora communities 
debated whether the means (the war) could be justified by the end in ethical, 
political or national terms. Some political groupings considered the fight against 
imperialism, colonialism and in favour of national liberation an absolute value 
that would be sufficient to suspend the respect for the right to life. 
For other exile groups, no life was negotiable.23 Writing in Mexico, the 
dramatist Alberto Adellach described the human costs of the war in terms of 
Galtieri’s penchant for whisky: ‘Si cada botella contiene un litro de whisky y 
cada ser humano adulto seis de sangre, se puede considerar que los 74 días 
de la guerra en las Malvinas, le costaron al país 18.000 litros de sangre joven 
y valiosa y 100 litros de whisky importado. Buen promedio, sin duda. Muy 
buen promedio’ [If each bottle contains a litre of whisky and each adult human 
contains six litres of blood, we can consider that the 74 days of war in the 
23 The Madrid-based Mesa de la Izquierda described the Malvinas war as ‘un crimen más de la 
dictadura’ [another crime of the dictatorship]. However, the group still insisted that it was also 
‘un crimen más del imperialismo’ [another crime of imperialism] (Divergencia, 2, July 1982).
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Malvinas cost the country 18,000 litres of young […] blood and 100 litres of 
imported whisky. An impressive average, without a doubt. Very impressive] 
(1982). In Barcelona, Goligorsky described Malvinas as ‘otra guerra sucia’ 
[another dirty war] (1983, pp. 242–3). Far from a ‘loca aventura militar’ 
[crazy military operation], he believed that the Malvinas conflict had produced 
‘un tendal de muertos, mutilados y desaparecidos, argentinos y británicos, 
auténticos, de carne y hueso, con nombre y apellido’ [a string of deaths, 
injuries and disappearances on both the Argentine and British sides, of real 
people, human beings of flesh and blood, with a name]. The Radical journalist 
accused some of his exiled compatriots of being as inhuman as Galtieri, who 
had dismissed the Malvinas tragedy with the assertion that the war in the South 
Atlantic had caused fewer deaths than were caused by road traffic accidents in 
Argentina.
In his important debate with other members of the diaspora in the Centro 
de Cultura Popular and the Agrupación Peronista in Barcelona, Goligorsky 
criticised his fellow exiled compatriots for their ‘insensibility’ towards the deaths 
that had taken place in the occupation of the Islands. Jaime Naifleish also made 
a similar observation from his exile in Stockholm, highlighting the ‘macabre’ 
nature of the Malvinas operation launched by the ‘macabre’ dictatorship and 
denouncing the casualties suffered by Argentina. It was now ‘las madres de 
los asesinados en las islas’ [the mothers of those killed on the Islands] who 
were grieving for ‘esos otros hijos, que no eran los de las Madres de Plaza de 
Mayo’ [those other children, who did not belong to the Mothers of the Plaza 
de Mayo] (Naifleisch, 1982). Naifleish criticised the lack of attention given to 
these victims, who ‘fueran devueltos sin vida o mutilados desde los páramos 
australes’ [were returned dead or badly injured from the Southern plains]. The 
journalist exiled in Barcelona, Goligorsky, denounced the supposed ‘guerra 
limpia y patriótica’ [clean, patriotic war] which continued to ravage the 
nation’s young. With the wounds of the ‘dirty war’ still open, the military were 
‘enviando al matadero a la camada inmediata posterior, como si se hubiera 
planificado el exterminio sistemático de una generación’ [sending the next-
youngest group to the slaughterhouse, as though they planned systematically 
to exterminate a whole generation] (Goligorsky, 1983, p. 210).
Goligorsky criticised Chumbita and the Peronist militants for rewriting 
the Cuban revolutionary slogan ‘Patria o muerte’ [Homeland or Death] as 
‘Soberanía o muerte’ [Sovereignty or Death] (Goligorsky, 1982a).24
24 ‘Pero lo que termina por descalabrar los frágiles cimientos que sustentaban la credibilidad de la 
adhesión sincera a la causa de los derechos humanos, es la vehemencia acrítica con que muchos 
miembros de la diáspora argentina han reaccionado ante un operativo militar que, como el de 
las Malvinas, lleva implícitas acciones de guerra, con su secuela de muerte y mutilación para 
ambos bandos. Aún quienes han denunciado las especulaciones utilitarias y nada patrióticas 
por las cuales el Gobierno argentino inició esta peligrosa maniobra de distracción, han 
optado por la dialéctica de las armas, anteponiéndola a la de las ideas y las negociaciones, 
y han abjurado de su compromiso con la intangibilidad de la vida humana por miedo a 
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 He also accused the Mexican Grupo de Discusión Socialista25 of abandoning 
their self-critique of the past temptation to engage in violence in the name 
of ‘grand ideas’ such as ‘sovereignty’, the ‘pueblo’ [people] or the ‘patria’ 
[homeland]. In his view, the authors of the pamphlet Por la soberanía argentina 
were repeating ‘su manía de convocar a la lucha popular cada vez que en una 
hecatombe realimentaban sus ilusiones de pescar en río revuelto’ [their habit of 
calling for popular struggle after every incidence of mass bloodshed in the hope 
of bolstering support for their cause] (Goligorsky, 1983, p. 214).
However, the situation did not merely present a simple choice between good 
and evil in order to pass (or fail) a humanitarian test. In describing his response 
to the sinking of the Belgrano, film-maker David Blaustein explains how he 
was able to mourn his compatriots who had been killed ‘porque de repente se 
me juntaron las imágenes de los pibes del Belgrano, hundiéndose, con la figura 
de Augusto Conte (su amigo y compañero de militancia, secuestrado mientras 
hacía el servicio militar)’ [because suddenly the images of the kids sinking in 
the Belgrano fused in my mind with the figure of Augusto Conte (his friend 
and fellow militant, kidnapped whilst undertaking military service)] (Lorenz, 
2006, p. 45), highlighting the dramatic nature of the dilemma posed by the 
Malvinas War for the exiles.
The Malvinas conflict invoked the fight for human rights in exile in a third 
way. Early on, the members of the diaspora had organised themselves in their 
host countries to demand the release of political prisoners, clarification of 
the situation of the disappeared detainees and the recovery of the freedom of 
expression, of association and of work (etc.). In the period prior to 2 April, 
perder el tren de una movilización popular. Reincidiendo en viejos tics, han exhumado la 
consigna “Soberanía o muerte”, como si no hubieran tenido suficientes testimonios de que 
la segunda de las dos alternativas debe ser erradicada, no sólo cuando se está en el bando 
de los perdedores sino, sobre todo, cuando se puede estar en el de los victoriosos. Y aunque 
el territorio reivindicado descanse en un mar de petróleo’ [But what finally destabilises the 
fragile foundations that underpinned the credibility of the sincere support for the human 
rights cause is the acritical vehemence with which many members of the Argentine diaspora 
have greeted a military operation which, like that of the Malvinas, includes actions of war, 
with its trail of death and mutilation by both sides. Even those who have denounced the 
utilitarian, unpatriotic reasons behind the Argentine government’s launch of this dangerous 
strategy of distraction have opted for the dialectic of arms, putting it before that of ideas and 
negotiations, and have turned their back on their commitment to the preservation of human 
life for fear of missing out on a popular mobilisation. Falling back into old habits, they have 
exhumed the slogan ‘Sovereignty or Death’, as though they had not seen sufficient proof 
that the second of those two alternatives should be eradicated, and not only when we are on 
the losing side but, above all, when we might be on the victorious one. Even if the claimed 
territory is floating in a sea of oil] (Goligorsky, 1982a). 
25 Among those who signed the document ‘Por la soberanía argentina en las Malvinas: por la 
soberanía popular en la Argentina’ (10 May 1982) were José Aricó, Sergio Bufano, Ricardo 
Nudelman, Jorge Tula, Emilio de Ípola, Néstor García Canclini, Juan Carlos Portantiero and 
others (Rozitchner, 2005, pp. 139–53).
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references to a probable forthcoming ‘Nuremberg’ for the perpetrators had 
become common. 
Days before the ‘recovery’ of the Islands, the lawyer Gustavo Roca highlighted 
the impossibility of an exit/retreat/’trick’ by the military, despite the frequency 
of this occurrence in the many military governments of Argentina’s recent 
history. Even if the junta were able to provide the military with a significant 
boost – which the Madrid-based CADHU campaigner imagined to be an 
Argentine intervention in Central America alongside the US army under the 
Reagan administration – Roca argued that sooner or later ‘se improndrá el justo 
castigo a los responsables del genocidio de nuestro pueblo y de la depredación 
de nuestro país’ [a just punishment will be imposed on those responsible for 
the genocide of our people and the plundering of our country] (‘A seis años 
vista’, Resumen de la Actualidad Argentina, 62, 1982, pp. 34–5).
In this analysis prior to Malvinas, Gustavo Roca trusted in the increasing 
isolation of the junta and the economic, social and political crisis experienced 
by the regime to bring about its downfall. However, when opinions on the 
enemy began to change, the fear of impunity became palpable and became a 
topic of debate in exile.
The Mexican Grupo de Discusión Socialista stressed that asserting Argentina’s 
‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the Malvinas ‘no implica […] echar un manto 
de olvido sobre su política desde 1976 hasta el presente’ [does not mean […] 
casting a veil of oblivion over the junta’s actions from 1976 to the present] 
(Rozitchner, 2005, p. 149). Writing in Venezuela, León Rozitchner launched 
a criticism of the group, claiming that they had abandoned political ‘ethics’ 
by casting Britain as the principal enemy rather than the dictatorship, thereby 
‘estabilizando una alianza de objetivos comunes con los genocidas’ [coming to 
share the same objectives as the perpetrators of genocide] (Rozitchner, 1996, 
p. 143). In response, the Grupo Socialista claimed that the only legitimate 
position was to support the ‘cause’ of the war because that was the stance of 
political, union and human rights organisations and therefore of the people 
(Rozitchner, 2005, pp. 152–3).
As can be seen from the complex picture described above, the exiles had 
radically different views about the impact which the war could have on the 
regime’s future, with some envisaging the possibility that the military would be 
tried for their participation in systematic human rights violations. The editors 
of Testimonio Latinoamericano and the Agrupación Peronista de Barcelona 
entered into a polemic with Eduardo Goligorsky on this point.26 In the view of 
26 From a different political position, Osvaldo Bayer refused to interpret the behaviour of the 
Argentine people in terms of the demonstrations on 30 March and along the same lines as 
the European media. In his view, these perspectives had missed the most important element: 
‘que en la manifestación realizada con motivo de la llegada de Haig a Buenos Aires, el ministro 
de Reagan, fue estruendosamente silbado por la multitud. El propio dictador Galtieri fue 
abucheado y silbado al automencionarse “Presidente de la Nación” e “intérprete del pueblo 
argentino”’ [In the demonstration held to protest Haig’s arrival in Buenos Aires, Reagan’s 
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Álvaro Abós and Hugo Chumbita, the courageous, hard-fought reconstruction 
of the political and social opposition which had come forward to demand 
‘Bread, Peace and Work’ and democracy on 30 March had not been dismantled 
by the events of 2 April. By contrast, those in the military who were aware of 
the danger posed by this unrest sought to substitute the looming ‘Argentinazo’ 
with a ‘Malvinazo’, which, although instigated by the junta, could lead to the 
destruction of the regime despite support for military victory on the battlefield 
(Testimonio Latinoamericano, 12/13, April 1982, pp. 13–14, 24–5). 
If the outcome were victory for Argentina, the periodical imagined two 
possible scenarios: 1) Galtieri taking advantage of the boost in support to 
launch an electoral campaign, seeking to become a pseudo-Perón; and 2) a more 
probable retreat by the regime, which, through ‘el gesto histórico de rescatar las 
islas’ [the historic feat of recovering the Islands] would manage to diminish their 
record of crimes and corruption (Testimonio Latinoamericano, 12/13 April 1982, 
pp. 3–5, 13–14 and 24–5). The periodical’s editors claimed that ‘la exaltación 
nacionalista no es un sentimiento fácilmente manipulable’ [nationalist passion 
is not a feeling easy to manipulate] (Testimonio Latinoamericano, 12/13, April 
1982, pp. 3–5). In contrast to those who decried the passionate nature of the 
Argentine people, particularly some politicians and union leaders who were 
little more than the regime’s puppets, Abós and Chumbita protested that the 
people’s willingness to support this cause did not mean they had forgotten 
what the regime was and what it represented. Moreover, they argued that this 
people, who, despite responding to the military’s call, were able to distinguish 
between support for a cause and approval of those behind the action would 
obtain important political capital which would force the regime to step down 
(Testimonio Latinoamericano, 12/13, April 1982, pp. 13–14 and 24–5). 
When the outcome was confirmed as defeat, Testimonio Latinoamericano 
declared that although the military had sought to bring to fruition ‘una causa 
que le era ajena’ [a cause that did not belong to them], the junta’s status as a 
reactionary, anti-popular regime had rendered success unlikely. If Argentina’s 
citizens had supported the invasion it was because they knew that democracy 
could not exist without full sovereignty, which could not be achieved without 
the Malvinas. The periodical argued that when it became clear that the talk 
of national dignity and sovereignty was little more than empty words in the 
mouth of dictators, these same citizens returned to the Plaza de Mayo on 
the night of 14 June to demand that Galtieri step down. For the editors of 
Testimonio, this meant that the people had not shown inconsistency. In any 
minister [the Secretary of State] was loudly booed by the crowd. The dictator Galtieri was also 
booed when he referred to himself as the ‘President of the Nation’ and ‘spokesperson for the 
Argentine people’] (Bayer, 1982).
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case, as a Peronist film-maker exiled in Paris observed, the Argentines had by 
no means given carte blanche to the military.27
The Malvinas, so deeply rooted in the Argentine collective imaginary, 
taught as part of the notion of patria, or homeland, from primary school 
onwards, became for many exiles the means of measuring the democratic and 
humanitarian commitment of their fellow Argentines both at home and in the 
diaspora. From his exile in Spain, Eduardo Goligorsky engaged in debate not 
only with the Mexican Grupo de Discusión Socialista and with Peronist groups 
in Barcelona (Testimonio, Agrupación Peronista, Centro de Cultura Popular), but 
also with a man employed in the civil service under the dictatorship, the writer 
and diplomat Abel Posse, who was working for the Argentine Embassy in Paris. 
Posse and Goligorsky exchanged several articles in the pages of La Vanguardia 
in May 1982. The civil servant working for the military government declared 
that the exiles could not continue to interpret all the regime’s acts through 
the framework of anti-dictatorship resistance because the Malvinas invasion 
was part of an anti-imperialist war that had nothing to do with the ‘defensa 
humanista’ [humanist defence] of the dictatorship’s victims. Posse compared 
certain sectors of the diaspora with the liberal, left-wing politicians who in 
1946 had turned their back on the people, allying themselves with their right-
wing enemies. This sector of the left, Posse argued, was ‘bobo, indisciplinado 
y opinativo’ [stupid, undisciplined and opinionated] and their insistence on 
bringing Astiz to trial echoed the mistake of accusing Perón and Evita of being 
Nazis, attempting to ‘conformar un nuevo tribunal de Nüremberg con falsas 
denuncias de torturas y desapariciones’ [establish a new Nuremberg Trial with 
false claims of torture and disappearances].
Posse denounced the ‘stupidity’ of this left as unique in Latin America and 
the wider world, noting that while Cuba, China and the USSR supported 
Argentina in the war, what he termed the ‘izquierda justina’28 was positioning 
itself to become ‘el undécimo miembro del Mercado Común Europeo y 
27 The ‘liberal, left-wing’ component of the diaspora had reservations about this argument. 
When the war ended, Eduardo Goligorsky stated: ‘Quienes la apoyaron para no perder 
el tren de una movilización popular, ¿harán su autocrítica? ¿Adoptarán, finalmente, algún 
principio ético universal que los disuada a alistarse, personalmente o de manera vicaria, en 
todas las conflagraciones que desangran a su país y al mundo? ¿Se sentirán, por esta vez, más o 
menos responsables ante las madres de los nuevos muertos y desaparecidos y mutilados como 
los apologistas de la represión lo son ante las Madres de Plaza de Mayo?’ [Will those who 
supported the war to avoid missing out on a popular mobilisation engage in self-critique? Will 
they eventually adopt an ethical, universal principle that will dissuade them from enlisting 
themselves (directly or indirectly) in all the conflicts that ravage their country and the world? 
This time will they feel some degree of responsibility when faced with the mothers of those 
who have now been killed, injured or disappeared, as the apologists of repression do when 
faced with the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo?] (1982b). 
28 By comparing Justine, the masochist character created by the Marquis de Sade, with this 
branch of the Argentine left, Posse argued that ‘su profesión es poner en evidencia el mal de 
los otros en vez de imponer su bondad’ [their profession is to highlight the evil in others rather 
than impose their own goodness]. 
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hasta anda queriendo quedar bien con los ingleses’ [the 11th member of the 
European Common Market and even hopes to curry favour with the British] 
(Posse, 1982).
For his part, Goligorsky argued that the war was a mistake and lamented the 
shameful spectacle of the Argentine people applauding the junta’s decisions. 
His criticism was directed at all the exiles, however, and their inability to 
maintain unity in their fight against the dictatorship.29 Goligorsky contended 
that the war had revealed the focus on democracy, the rejection of Manichean 
binaries and the critique of irrational frameworks to be nothing more than 
empty words, tactical positions or false guises. For that reason, he called on 
the exiles to engage in self-critique in order to reconsider the place given 
to ‘la reforma pacífica y el cambio gradual, compatibles con un sistema de 
elecciones democráticas con respeto por las minorías y de alternancias en el 
poder’ [peaceful reform and gradual change, compatible with a democratic 
electoral system that respects minorities and allows changes of government] 
(Goligorsky, 1982a). The journalist argued that supporting Galtieri’s decision 
cast the strength of the exiles’ commitment to democracy and human rights 
into doubt. The Malvinas brought the rebirth of slogans, such as ‘Soberanía o 
muerte’ [Sovereignty or Death], that had played a significant role in the armed 
militancy of the 1970s, demonstrating the fragility of the expatriates’ new focus 
on life over heroic death. For Goligorsky, a truly humanist conviction must 
acknowledge that the respect for human rights is not restricted to occasions 
when we find ourselves on the losing side, ‘sino, sobre todo, cuando se puede 
estar en el de los victoriosos. Y aunque el territorio reivindicado descanse sobre 
un mar de petróleo’ [but, above all, when we might be on the victorious one. 
Even if the claimed territory is floating in a sea of oil] (1982a). 
Goligorsky also rejected the strategy of claiming Argentine democratic or 
humanist ‘peculiarities’30 in order to disguise lapses in allegiance to values that 
were absolute, universal and constant. When the ‘irridentists’ supported the 
Malvinas War, he argued, they not only forgot the dictatorship’s crimes, but 
also revealed the fragility of their humanist convictions and the continuation 
of the ideas that had, in the past, been used to justify violence ‘from below’ and 
now seemed to suggest that there were certain situations in which someone’s 
29 From Stockholm, Jaime Naifleish criticised ‘la dispersión del exilio con sus equívocas unidades 
antidictatoriales’ [the dispersion of the exiles with their confused anti-dictatorship groupings]. 
After the end of the war, the PRT member insisted that the political future could not be based 
on ‘el ilusionismo, el “porlomenismo” del mal menor’ [wishful thinking or ‘being content’ 
with the lesser of two evils] and that progress had to be made towards true dialogue (1982). 
30 In response to the editors of Testimonio, who talked of ‘peculiarities’ (for example in the 
Peronist conception of democracy as taking place in the plaza rather than in parliament), 
Goligorsky declared: ‘Los latinoamericanos han de ser, según esta doctrina, “originales”: Sin 
habeas corpus, sin libertad para elegir a sus gobernantes, sin poder ver ni oír ni leer lo que se les 
antoje’ [Latin Americans will, according to this doctrine, be ‘original’: without habeas corpus, 
without the freedom to choose their government, without liberty to see, hear or read what 
they wish] (1983, p. 95). 
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humanity could be ‘violada legítimamente’ [legitimately violated] (Goligorsky, 
1983, p. 216). For someone who considered the crimes of terrorism to be as 
reprehensible as those of a repressive regime, it was not strange to find that 
fellow Argentines who had been persecuted by the dictatorship were now in 
agreement with a diplomat in one of the regime’s most notorious embassies.
For Goligorsky, the Malvinas were ‘un test sobre las virtudes del libre examen 
y del debate racional, contrapuestas a los vicios de la retórica apocalíptica, 
de los estereotipos maximalistas, de las implicaciones dogmáticas y de los 
desafíos tribales’ [a test of the virtues of liberum examen and rational debate 
in opposition to the vices of apocalyptic rhetoric, maximalist stereotypes, 
dogmatic entanglement and the challenges of tribalism] (Goligorsky, 1983, 
p. 227). Framing the war in this way was neither a casual observation nor the 
personal view of one man who had learned ‘la naturaleza sacrosanta de la vida 
humana, propia y ajena’ [the sacred nature of human life, both one’s own and 
that of others] after so much death (Goligorsky, 1983, p. 227). Goligorsky’s 
position exposed an unresolved debate in the diaspora, exacerbated by the 
Malvinas conflict, which centred on the complex transformation of the former 
revolutionary militants into human rights activists in exile – a transformation 
that could be either profound and definitive, or tactical and opportunist. It is 
this same complexity that today demands that researchers undertake a careful 
and detailed purging of the meanings attached to the definition of human 
rights in this troubled recent past.
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3. Attitudes towards the Falklands–Malvinas War: 
European and Latin American left perspectives 
Fernando Pedrosa
This chapter takes a different approach to the issue of the Malvinas–Falklands War, which saw Argentina and England confront each other in 1982. The war has been studied mainly from the military point of 
view or according to the impact it had on the countries engaged in the conflict. 
However, the consequences of the military conflict between two western-block 
countries were broader and have not been properly tackled. The following 
pages will consider, first, the characterisation of the positions adopted by 
European and Latin-American political parties, many of which were members 
of the Socialist International (SI).1 Then this chapter will delve more deeply 
into different visions of the Anglo-Argentine conflict, evaluating the way in 
which it influenced inter-party relations, the social democrats’ transnational 
organisational strategies and regional policy in general. This will allow a 
mapping of the transnational political actions taken which is quite different 
from that usually presented in the specialised literature on the subject, above 
all because of the inclusion of the parties as main characters in the political 
processes of the time on the international stage. Furthermore, this approach 
will allow us to observe more fluid and ambiguous actions taken by the different 
left-wing organisations that were far from being a collective characterised by 
rigid or inflexible strategies. 
The Malvinas war
On 2 April 1982, the infantry forces of the Argentine Navy landed on the 
biggest of the Islands, expelling the British authorities and sending them to 
Uruguay. A day after that, England would break off diplomatic relations and 
decide on the dispatch of troops. Shortly after that, the United Nations Security 
Council passed Resolution 502, which demanded Argentina’s withdrawal from 
1 This research was conducted between 2007 and 2008 in the archives of Socialist International 
located in the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG) in Amsterdam (The 
Netherlands). 
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the Islands and the immediate start of negotiations. This resolution, considered 
a diplomatic defeat for Argentina, was at the core of every discussion and 
negotiation that aimed to avoid, and later stop, the war. A week after the 
conflict started, the US secretary of state, Alexander Haig, arrived in London to 
begin a mediation agreed upon by both parties. However, this US intervention 
would prove to be fruitless due to the participants’ intransigence. In addition, 
there was the dispute within the US government itself with regard to the role it 
should play in the conflict. This US ambiguity enabled the Argentine military 
to maintain the illusion of US abstention from the conflict. On 30 April 
1982, Haig’s mediation was declared officially over. Consequently, President 
Reagan made US support for England official. At the same time, he backed 
the European position of imposing economic sanctions on Argentina. After 
other failed mediation proposals introduced by Fernando Belaunde Terry, then 
President of Peru, and the UN Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the 
conflict moved forward to a military solution (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1997). On 
14 June 1982, the war ended with the return of the Islands to British control 
thanks to military victory by their troops.
Democratic processes of the third wave in Latin America
The conflict between Argentina and England took place in a changing global 
environment. Shortly before the war a time characterised by a significant easing 
of tension between the US and the Soviets had come to an end. An important 
part of this period – known as the détente – occurred during US president 
Jimmy Carter’s administration (1977–81) (Halliday, 1983). The détente had 
allowed other political and social actors who sought, by means of transnational 
actions to avoid becoming trapped in the Cold War polarisation, to have a 
higher profile. It is no coincidence that several revolutions occurred within that 
period: Nicaragua, Iran and Grenada, as well as the radicalisation of the official 
parties in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Guyana. Thus the Permanent 
Conference of Political Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean (COPPPAL) 
was created, as well as the revitalisation of the Non-Aligned Movement and 
the signing of the Treaty for the Panama Canal by Omar Torrijos and Carter 
(Pastor, 1984). That is how, seizing the opportunity created by the lack of 
tension, these non-aligned actors increased their activity in favour of their own 
projects and interests over those of the so-called ‘super powers’. The leaders and 
political parties became key instruments in the process that had transnational 
organisations as the main actors (for example, SI, the Christian Democrat 
International and Liberal International, among others (Grabendorff, 2001)).
Gradually, international tension started to mount again, even under the 
Carter administration. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) and the 
hostage situation at the US Embassy in Iran (1979–81) triggered a change 
during this period. However, it was not before the Republican Ronald 
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Reagan came to office (1981–89) that the conditions that prevailed during 
the détente changed drastically for Latin America (Carleton and Stohl, 
1985). Paradoxically, the increase in geo-political conflict also coincided with 
many democratic openings in Latin America (Sikkink, 2004). The transition 
from dictatorships to democratic governments in southern Europe in 1974 
(Spain, Greece, Portugal) commenced a process of regime change that ended 
with the establishment of democracies in a great number of Latin American 
countries (Huntington, 1994). This enabled new opportunities to arise for 
the transnational actors to continue their political activity beyond the limits 
imposed by this ‘second cold war’ (Pedrosa, 2012; Scott and Walters, 2000).
In this sense, the South Atlantic conflict was a key moment in the process of 
democratisation in the region since the English victory hastened the downfall 
of Argentina’s military government. The rapid return to a democratic system 
was important for speeding up the same process in neighbouring countries 
that were still ruled by dictatorships of different kinds. On the winning side, 
Margaret Thatcher consolidated her political power, since the war would have 
an impact on the electoral process in 1983 (Clarke, Mishler and Whiteley, 
1990). Thatcher’s image became relevant worldwide. Together with Ronald 
Reagan and Pope John Paul II, she became part of the trinity that some years 
later would put an end to the global communist project. 
The recent history and third-wave democratisation
During the last decades, the interest in third-wave democratisation processes 
in Latin America has decreased considerably. Social scientists have been drawn 
to other investigative agendas and new open problems in the changing Latin 
American democratisation processes. However, parallel to this, historians 
have turned their attention to the subject, particularly in a disciplinary field 
calling itself ‘recent history’ (Mira and Pedrosa, 2016). Works on this subject 
– numerous, eclectic and of differing quality – have not continued a dialogue 
with the former literature on the subject (López, Figueroa and Rajland, 2010), 
or, more importantly, with what was published in the fields of political science 
and international relations. The latest literature has focused on politics viewed 
through the prism of democracy (Lesgart, 2002).
Academic developments relating to democratisation in Latin America 
started in the 1980s. These agendas, novel for the time, were put into practice 
by a group of political scientists who, besides pursuing their own academic 
goals, wished to use their work to influence and improve the quality of the 
democracies that were being established (Guilhot and Schmitter, 2000). These 
experts engaged with democracy, with the idea that it provided national political 
leaders – the political elite – with a good chance to build a system capable of 
channelling the conflicts of each society harmoniously. They recommended 
that a minimum version of democracy be introduced which, because of its 
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‘minimalism’, would generate better consensus and avoid the appearance of 
new dictatorships (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1994). 
‘Recent history’ proposed itself as a radical break with these academic 
traditions; interest in democratic regimes, institutions and political elites 
received diminished attention. Besides, this new approach no longer showed 
much interest in the already extant democracies (Oberti and Pittaluga, 2004/5). 
Thus, issues were highlighted which related to the traumatic events that 
characterised the period, such as genocides, dictatorships, social crisis, political 
violence, state terrorism and the different ways society found to offer resistance. 
To this end, it supported itself, sometimes exaggeratedly, with memory and the 
testimonies of the main actors as privileged sources for investigation (Sarlo, 
2003). Thus, interest in the role played by human rights organisations, trade 
unions, armed groups and intellectuals, and the biographical works of the 
victims of state repression, was strengthened. At the same time, the left-wing 
universe reduced itself to those who kept radical and anti-system stances. This 
occurred to the detriment of other left-wing democratic projects that, like 
those of social democrats, were overlooked by specialised literature.2
Nevertheless, in this alleged theoretical and discursive cut, the works framed 
in recent history kept some of the characteristics of the preceding literature and 
of that from which they sought to differentiate themselves. This could be seen, 
for example, in the privileging of national methodologies of historical processes 
(Lvovich et al., 2011). At the same time, academics in recent history ignored 
the actions of politicians and their organisations in the study of democratisation 
processes (Soto, 2004). If regime change towards democracy was no longer a 
subject for investigation, nor could political parties be. 
An earlier version of this discussion was made when historians applied the 
idea of ‘transnational politics’ (Keohane and Nye, 1971) to debates, making 
reference to world interactions in which at least one of the participants was 
non-state in nature, such as political parties or their international party 
organisations. The systematic application of this concept gave way to a prolific 
literature that began to extend to the Latin American case. It was acknowledged 
that processes of democratisation had been strong globally and that, in 
many cases, transnational actors had been important in their development. 
Studying transnational activity enables us, in a less forced fashion, to describe 
political actions of domestic actors outside their countries at the same time as 
acknowledging their national interests (Keck and Sikkink, 2000). However, 
this transnational academic approach failed to integrate the political parties 
and the networks of which they were part, prioritising the role of organisations 
dedicated to human rights, women, indigenous communities or the 
environment (Markarian, 2004). The transnational activity of the European 
social democrat parties and SI in particular, were crucial in the third-wave 
2 Some exceptions are Mujal León (1989) and Pedrosa (2012). 
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democratisation processes in Latin America (Mujal León, 1989). However, it 
is only recently that academic studies have started to account for this (Pedrosa, 
2012). To analyse their action within the processes of democratisation might 
incorporate another perspective that contributes new information and, at the 
same time, stimulates dialogue between the many social disciplines.
Malvinas: the political background of Socialist International
The conflict between two western-block allies not only surprised the US and 
Great Britain, it also blindsided SI. However, the political echoes of the dispute 
had already appeared on the SI agenda in 1976, when there was an increase 
in tension between the governments of Isabel Perón and the Labour prime 
minister James Callaghan (Trías, 1977). An English government mission to the 
Islands territory had been the trigger and resulted in the mutual withdrawal of 
their ambassadors.
During the SI meeting held in 1977 in Madrid, the Argentine socialist leader 
Víctor García Costa intended to incorporate the topic of the Malvinas into the 
discussion. The issue had not been discussed in the meeting held in London 
the previous year, even though it had been formally scheduled. However, 
it was not discussed on the second occasion either due to ‘time issues’. The 
conflict surrounding the Malvinas was something social democrats intended 
to avoid, since it challenged two long-time SI members. The British Labour 
Party (BLP) was a classic exponent of the social democratic family. At the same 
time, Argentine socialism had been the first of its kind within Latin America 
and a historical partner to European social democracy against Marxism since 
the times of the Second International. 
Argentina’s mission to Madrid succeeded in having the issue accepted for 
the next SI meeting, to be held in Rome. For this, it was important that the 
Dominican leader José F. Peña Gómez had rallied to Argentina’s position. 
Peña Gómez had growing influence within the organisation at the time. At 
the end of the meeting, the BLP delegation asked for a bilateral interview with 
Argentina’s socialists.3 Participants in the meeting were Ian Mikardo (Deputy 
and International Secretary for the BLP), Víctor García Costa (Argentina 
People’s Socialist Party [PSP]) and Carlos Parra (Chile Radical Party) as the 
interpreter. Later, Parra’s position was severely criticised by García Costa on the 
grounds of alleged favouritism shown towards the English.4
In spite of their belonging to the same ‘political family’, it was a very 
tense meeting. Deputy Mikardo started it by stating his alienation because 
socialists cared more for the Malvinas issue than they did for human rights. 
The BLP was the most critical of Argentina’s ruling dictatorship and upheld 
3 Letter from Víctor García Costa to Bernt Carlsson, 1 Aug. 1977 (Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 
9–21, IISG). 
4 Personal interview with Víctor García Costa (Buenos Aires, July 6, 2012). 
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that argument until the end of the conflict. García Costa replied cryptically, 
‘Sovereignty does not admit exclusionary considerations’.5 As the meeting 
went on, some common positions appeared and Mikardo was authorised 
publically to announce that the Labour Party’s position was different from that 
of Callaghan’s Labour government. At the same time, he asked the Argentines 
to submit a document that showed commitment to a common position in 
order to avoid ‘a discussion which was not easy to become engaged with’.6 The 
leader of the Argentine PSP agreed to the request and, soon enough, sent a 
document entitled ‘The SI requests the Labour Party’s attention to the most 
urgent acknowledgment of Argentina’s sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands 
and its immediate restitution’.7 The title itself left no place for reaching an 
agreement, not even a common position between both parties. That is why 
Labour made no attempt to answer it.
In the following meeting, held in Rome, SI once again avoided taking a 
position. Thus, the parties passed a resolution that supported UN Resolution 
2065 from 1965, aimed at reaching a negotiated way out of the conflict 
over Malvinas sovereignty. However, SI added a significant point to the text: 
Argentina’s government could not exercise sovereignty since the National 
Congress had sole legal authority on the matter and the Congress had been 
dissolved after the military coup.
The war and the parties of Socialist International 
The conflict took place in a region that was not very important to the SI, which 
was more involved in Central America and the Caribbean where the Cold War 
had one of its main scenarios. However, the war had a direct impact on the 
SI: once the hostilities began in April 1982, the Latin American leaders of the 
SI manifested, publicly, against the European Social Democratic leaders. The 
motives for the conflict were the positions taken towards the Central American 
conflict, especially those in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Latin American parties 
such as Democratic Action from Venezuela (commonly abbreviated as AD), 
the National Liberation Party from Costa Rica (PLN) and the Dominican 
Revolutionary Party (PRD) were openly opposed to the approach to Cuba of 
the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front (FMLN). The Europeans, on the other hand, were 
more sympathetic to those revolutionary movements. The exception was Felipe 
González from the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), who aligned 
himself with the Latin Americans (Blázquez Vilaplana, 2006).
5 Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG. 
6 Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG. 
7 Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG (the original Spanish: ‘La IS solicita al Partido 
Laborista su atención al más urgente reconocimiento de la soberanía argentina en las Islas 
Malvinas y su inmediata restitución’).
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Towards 1982, the situation in the Argentine and English parties affiliated 
to SI was quite different from that of the mid 1970s. Argentina’s socialism 
was divided into several factions competing for SI recognition. All of them 
were minuscule and in continuous conflict among themselves. The official 
party, the PSP, remained suspended on the verge of expulsion. Thus, there 
was no Argentine representation within SI at the time the war broke out. The 
British Labour Party was in no better position. It was distanced from the new 
SI leadership and in the middle of an internal crisis that had led it into division 
and out of government. The crisis had resulted in the creation of the Social 
Democrat Party (26 March 1981) in which were grouped many of the historical 
leaders of Labour’s moderate wing (Crewe and King, 1996). The left-wingers 
were left to the traditional Labour Party (Freeman, 1984). With the Malvinas 
invasion in mind, the British Labour Party’s first statement addressing the 
international scenario left no doubt as to the political characterisation it was 
making. It was based on the anti-democratic attack launched by Argentina’s 
government and on its actions. Finally, it contemplated the Kelpers’ right to 
live under the sovereignty of whomever they chose and the necessity to protect 
them.8
On 22 April 1982, in a telegram addressed to SI and the British Labour 
Party, Argentina answered, claiming that siding with the British government 
would mean committing treason against SI’s fundamental principles.9 At the 
same time, it would mean an attack on Latin America as a whole. The message 
made it clear that the pacifists’ efforts were not enough in themselves, but 
should contain the express recognition of Argentina’s sovereignty. The other 
political parties in the country unanimously supported government action 
(Romero, 2012). The Labour position was to cling to the UN’s position. In 
this way, they found an intermediate position that allowed them to avoid direct 
confrontation with their own government at a time of war. Thus, they claimed 
Thatcher should obey Resolution 502 and call a ceasefire; and they claimed 
that Argentina should abandon the Islands immediately, as the resolution itself 
8 ‘[T]he Labour Party condemns without qualification the actions of the Argentinean military 
fascist government in taking over the Falkland Islands by force. […] It supports the efforts 
being made to resolve the situation by diplomatic means and, in particular, welcomes the 
resolution of the UN Security Council calling for Argentina’s withdrawal from the Falklands 
Islands, and urges that every action should be taken to make this resolution effective’ (BLP 
statement, 4 Apr. 1982, signed by Jenny Little (Secretary of International Relations), IISG, 
Socialist International Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, Box 979, IISG).
9 ‘[The] support and colonialist political defense of the British Conservative Party in the 
Malvinas war ... constitute a total and flagrant violation of the idea that gave rise to the 
SI. Consequently, the armed aggression towards Argentina will also be an attack against the 
Latin American countries. That is why an unforgivable responsibility will also fall on the 
British Labour Party and the SI, if they do not urgently intervene towards a peaceful solution, 
with express recognition or the sovereignty of Argentina’ (telegram to the SI and PLB signed 
by Nestor Martinez Eraso, Secretary of International Relations-PSP, 22 Apr. 1982, Socialist 
International Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, Box 979, IISG).
REVISITING THE FALKLANDS–MALVINAS QUESTION82
demanded. In turn, they rejected the British government’s use of its veto and 
supported the UN Secretary General’s mediating efforts.10 In the uncertain 
climate and confusion to which the war had led, SI seemed not to take any 
position other than to issue an appeal to end the conflict and to state their 
respect for UN. However, things would not be that easy. Without consulting 
SI authorities, the Socialist International Committee for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (SICLAC) issued a statement that placed the Malvinas issue at the 
centre of the social democrats’ agenda.
SICLAC and the war 
The SICLAC was an internal organism of SI that grouped together the region’s 
parties and their main leaders. This organism was led by the Dominican José F. 
Peña Gómez, who had already supported Argentina’s position for some years. 
The communication issued by SICLAC had the immediate effect of introducing 
the problem within SI. This was reinforced by the existence of conflicts between 
Latin American and European Parties on the Central American conflict. The 
war exacerbated the internal SI problem and placed SICLAC in the eye of the 
climate storm.
SICLAC’s communication (enclosed in a letter from Peña Gómez to Bernt 
Carlsson)11 had been a direct reaction to the European Economic Community’s 
decision – with the support of social democrat governments – to apply sanctions 
to Argentina. The document adopted several positions implying support for 
Argentina’s claim. At the same time, no mention was made of its government’s 
non-democratic characteristics: 
SICLAC … expresses complete solidarity with our brothers the Argentine 
people … and their rejection of war as a means to put an end to the 
controversies among the states. […] considers that the UN should 
exercise its mediating function and cease the conflict that has regrettably 
already started since the British fleet took the Georgias’. The Malvinas 
are Argentine. […] We hereby ask European affiliated parties and the SI 
presidium to mediate with European governments so that their mediating 
efforts be united and adopt a considerate attitude towards the Latin 
American people who are unable to understand or accept the drastic and 
precipitate actions adopted by the EEC.12
10 BLP statement on the Falklands signed by Michael Foot and Tony Benn, 28 Apr. 1982 (IISG, 
Socialist International Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, Box 979).
11 ‘We held several phone calls with Carlos A. Pérez and the other members of the Committee 
and we came to the position stated in the annex statement. This document has not been signed 
by our English-speaking fellows Michael Manley (Jamaica) and O’Brien Trotman (Barbados) 
for we could not reach a satisfactory agreement’ (SICLAC Circular 3/82, Santo Domingo, 28 
Apr. 1982, signed by José Francisco Peña Gómez, Socialist International Archives, Falklands–
Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).
12 SICLAC Circular 3/82, Socialist International Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 
1982, box 979, IISG.
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In addition to taking a stand for Argentina, the SICLAC communication used 
the name of ‘SI’. This fact generated broader repercussions and forced the SI 
authorities to include the issue in the organisation’s agenda. Besides this, the 
communication was widely distributed by the secretary general Bernt Carlsson 
himself, who harboured an old resentment towards the Labour movement. 
SICLAC’s statement not only embittered the climate within SI, but also 
seriously complicated the situation of the British Labour Party, which was in 
the middle of a serious electoral dispute. The nationalist climate grew as the 
war progressed until it became one of the main issues of the British electoral 
campaign.
Labour’s response to SICLAC’s statement came swiftly and was widely 
disseminated. Labour’s secretary general, Ron Hayward, telephoned Carlsson 
to ask him whether the statement had been issued by SI’s office. The affirmative 
answer deepened the existing tensions with Carlsson and ended in his resigning 
his post in 1983. In a telephone call to the SI secretary general’s office, a leading 
British Labour MP, Gwyneth Dunwoody13 questioned Latin America’s position 
in harsh terms, threatening to withdraw the British Labour Party from SI.14 
The BLP issued a highly diplomatic, but robust statement through the national 
executive committee (NEC). It started by sharing the concern expressed by 
SICLAC in its own recent statement about the Malvinas crisis but went on 
to demolish the points made by SICLAC one by one. The NEC agreed that 
the Argentine military government was behaving anti-democratically, however, 
and this criticism became central to their argumentation: 
The NEC has emphasised in its statement on the crisis that the British 
Labour Movement has no quarrel with the Argentinian people, who 
are the victims of a vicious, blood-stained dictatorship whose record on 
human rights is a disgrace to the continent of America and the rest of the 
free world. Like the CALCIS, the NEC wishes to express its solidarity with 
the Argentinian people whose interests – in terms of political freedom, 
civil rights and social justice – have most emphatically not been served by 
the decision of the Galtieri junta to abandon negotiation and send armed 
forces to invade the Falklands against the will of the local community and 
against international law … The NEC does not share the Committee’s view 
that the ‘war activity’ was initiated by the British fleet through its invasion 
of South Georgia. It calls the attention of the Committee to the fact that 
13 Gwyneth Dunwoody was a prominent Labour MP and daughter of the first secretary general 
of the SI and former secretary general of the BLP, Morgan Phillips. 
14 ‘With reference to our talk, I write to you to confirm that the statement of April 27, 1982, 
by the Socialist International Committee for the Latin America and the Caribbean, was sent 
to the member parties of the Socialist International for information in the form of a press 
release. Concerning the allegations made by Ms Gwyneth Dunwoody in her phone call to 
our Secretary today that the “SI member parties in Latin America are fascist in character” 
and her threat that the British Labour Party is going to leave the SI, I prefer to consider 
these comments are her private views only’ (confidential letter from Bernt Carlsson to Ron 
Hayward, 6 May 1982 (Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG)). 
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the first act of war took place when the military junta of Argentina, whose 
domestic policies have so often been justly condemned by the SI in the 
past, dispatched forces to overrun the Islands and to subjugate the local 
population. We share the Committee’s view that war must not be used ‘as 
a means to put an end to any dispute between states’. In the past, however, 
such a view has not been shared by fascist dictators. The NEC has made 
it publicly clear that it deplores the mood of chauvinism whipped up by 
right-wing factions in both Argentina and Great Britain. Nationalism – 
even when expressed in the form of ‘continental solidarity’ – is a sterile 
creed, one rejected by all true international socialists, wherever they come 
from … The Committee’s statement refers to the support already received 
in this dispute by Argentina from other Latin America states. The NEC 
notes that supporters of the junta’s position include many sworn enemies 
of democratic socialism, as understood by the SI, and governments 
which, unlike the British labour movement, have been subdued in their 
condemnation of deep-rooted characteristics of life in Argentina under 
the military junta. (BLP statement signed by Ron Hayward (secretary 
general) and submitted to Bernt Carlsson; copied to Jenny Little and J. E. 
Mortimer, 24 May 1982.)15
The war in the political parties’ transnational scenario
Latin American political parties also began to take a position on the war. 
Support for Argentina came from the entire political forum, even from those 
parties which tended to reject its government. In this regard, the conflict was 
exploited to suit each actor’s interests. For example, Argentina received support 
from countries in conflict with the US; and these nations – mainly those closer 
to the Soviet bloc, such as the Communist Party of Cuba and the members of 
the Non-Aligned Movement – thus used the situation to settle the account of 
their own realities. On the other side, English-speaking Caribbean parties with 
a strong English influence supported Britan. Manley and Trotman’s case was 
notorious within SI. 
Numerous Latin American leaders, such as the Uruguayan socialist leader 
José Cardozo, made public statements in favour of Argentina. However, these 
were the first ones explicitly to refer to the democracy issue: ‘Latin America 
awaits some reflection about SI, far from European emotiveness with regard 
to old wounded hegemonies, based on the Argentine people’s right to achieve 
not only the recovery of that territorial space, but also the sovereignty of its 
internal dignity based on social justice and essential democratic freedoms’.16 An 
article published in Barricada, a Nicaraguan Sandinista newspaper, denounced 
US solidarity with British naval aggression, a stance which showed the Inter-
15 SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG.
16 10 May 1982, San José, Costa Rica (on the occasion of the inauguration of Luis A. Monge as 
39th president of Costa Rica), (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, 
IISG).
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American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, a kind of NATO of the Americas, to 
be a farce. The Sandinista National Liberation Front argued that the attack on 
Argentina was an attack on Latin America’s people and urged Great Britain to 
embrace UN and international law. While criticising the US repeatedly, at the 
same time they cryptically stated that Nicaragua was ‘on friendly terms with 
Great Britain’.17
However, within European countries, although not unanimously, the 
position was favourable to Great Britain. The big picture seemed more varied 
than the one which Latin Americans appeared to recognise: in Italy because 
of their historical relationship with Argentina; in Ireland because of their 
historical differences with Great Britain; and also in Spain, related to the 
Gibraltar situation. Argentina reaped support especially from the PSOE18 and 
the Communist Party of Spain.19 European support for Argentina even came 
from the most radical British left wing20 and from international trade union 
organisations.21 The SI youth branch issued a statement as well, which was 
very favourable to Argentina’s position, although it contained strong criticism 
of their government and maintained Labour’s position.22 The German Social 
17 Barricada, official organ of the FSLN, 10 May 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas 
Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).
18 ‘Be aware of the relevance the Gibraltar issue has in Spain … and that in Spain neither the 
right nor the left wing is fond of English people. Curious, isn’t it? This is surely for historical 
reasons, which are centuries-old. In other words, between England and Argentina we are 
always on Argentina’s side. But besides that, a colonial fact much like that of Gibraltar makes 
public opinion side with Argentina and so does the left wing. Besides, there was little time to 
think of what would have happened if the military in Argentina had won …. We experienced 
it knowing there was a contradiction as well, didn’t we? Of course we had no doubts about 
it, not least because of Thatcher being there, for whom we hold a visceral dislike’ (personal 
interview with high-ranking leader of the PSOE, Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo, a regular attender at 
SI meetings, Brussels February 2007).
19 ‘Reaffirming the acknowledgement of Argentina’s sovereignty [The Spanish Communist 
Party] pronounced in favour of ending hostilities by means of a cease fire … Spanish national 
conscience is affected by the uncertainty raised by the fact that a country that wages a war 
miles away, in order to keep a colonial territory, might feel willing to take the ongoing 
negotiations with Spain to a conclusion and thus Gibraltar be returned to Spanish sovereignty’ 
(PCE statement on the Falklands, signed by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the 
PCE, 5 May 1982, IISG (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, Box 979)).
20 ‘We are not pacifists, we detest the Galtieri dictatorship, we dismiss the notion that the 
Argentinian seizure of the Falklands is progressive on anti-colonialist grounds. Nevertheless 
we believe that, in a war between Britain and Argentina, the defeat of British imperialism is 
the lesser evil. The main enemy is at home’ (Hallas, 1982, p. 366). 
21 ‘Act to stop British imperialism’s colonial war adventure in South Atlantic’ (Press communiqué, 
World Federation of Trade Unions, Praga, 27 Apr. 1982. SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas 
Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG). 
22 ‘1- Ask for pacific solution to the Anglo-Argentine conflict within the international 
institutions; 2- Acknowledge Argentina’s claim; 3- Demand withdrawal of troops from the 
South Atlantic; 4- Condemn US government’s Foreign Policy; 5- Urge European Economic 
Community governments to lift the ban imposed on Argentina; 6- Demand Argentina put an 
end to the repression directed by the police against the people, to legalize the political parties, 
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Democrat Party tried to keep a difficult balance between the need to keep 
SI together under Willy Brandt’s leadership and their allegiance to German 
socialist Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who was in charge of supporting the pro-
British policies. Meanwhile, the socialist French president Francois Mitterrand 
gave his firm support to Britain from the start: in NATO, in the UN Security 
Council as well as in his voting on sanctions in the European Community. 
Active French participation on Britain’s side was due to a number of different 
reasons. At the time, their bonds to Latin America were weaker than those 
of the Germans, Swedes and Spanish. Besides, France had been a marginal 
participant in the process led by Brandt in order to renew SI. At the same time, 
French socialism firmly opposed the military government in Argentina. That 
could be seen in the influence of the determined activism by exiles that found 
its high point in the boycott of the football World Cup in 1978. However, the 
French government never stopped providing Argentina with arms. 
There was a perception that the US and Europe had ‘betrayed’ Latin 
America and that Latin America found itself alone in facing developed 
countries’ governments and political parties around the continent, even those 
not related to social democracy or the left.23 As the war progressed and the US’s 
position moved closer to Britain’s, its position in Latin America became more 
complicated and its influence seemed to re-enter a moment of crisis.24 Other 
international and transnational organisations gave their support to Argentina, 
such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Permanent Conference of Political 
Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean (COPPPAL). The Non-Aligned 
Movement gave a strong endorsement of Argentina’s position. Its president 
at the time, who was no other than Fidel Castro, notoriously welcomed the 
Argentine chancellor Nicanor Costa Méndez to the plenary of the organisation 
held in Havana. The same thing happened in the following meeting held in 
New Delhi. The COPPPAL resoundingly supported Argentina. At the same 
and to organize free elections. Finally, the solidarity with Argentine people on its fight towards 
a free, plural, just and egalitarian society; 7- Recognize BLP position on its opposition to 
Thatcher’s Malvinas ‘Policy’ (Bulletin no. 43, International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), 
June 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).
23 ‘Thus, on 5/27/1982, Venezuelan Chancellor, José Alberto Zambrano, criticised the American 
support for London and requested within the XX American Chancellors’ Consultation 
Meeting the creation of an inter-American armed force to join Argentina in its war against 
Great Britain’ (‘Las relaciones con Venezuela’, available at: http://www.argentina-rree.
com/14/14-054.htm (accessed 10 June 2019)). 
24 ‘The Ecuadorian president, Osvaldo Hurtado, thanked [Leopoldo] Calvo-Sotelo for the 
“support that has already been given in the recent crisis in the Malvinas through Spanish 
diplomatic back-up in the Latin American cause”. … Calvo-Sotelo could prove in … Ecuador, 
as he would be able to do in … Colombia and Peru, the disenchantment suffered by the Latin 
American world in regard to US support of British policy on the Malvinas issue, which had 
opened a breach of unpredictable consequences between these countries and their neighbour 
from the North’ (Diario, El País (Spain), 7 Aug. 1982). Available at: https://elpais.com/
diario/1982/08/07/espana/397519203_850215.html (accessed 10 June 2019). 
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time it harshly criticised the US and British positions. Only at the end of the 
statement did it say anything that could be understood as a request to the 
Argentine government to become more democratic.25 
In the absence of an Argentine leader within SI, it was Carlos Andrés Pérez 
who took the main action in favour of the South American country. Given 
the influence of the Venezuelan leader both inside and outside SI, his position 
would certainly increase the pressure exerted on the transnational social 
democrat organisation’s leadership to put the issue on the agenda at the next 
formal meeting of the decision-making body. Pérez consolidated his extended 
international leadership (Gamus, 1990) to prove the strength of his influence 
in Latin America but also vis-à-vis his European partners, with whom, due 
to the differences with Nicaragua and El Salvador, he was not on the best of 
terms at the time. The Venezuelan ex-president immediately understood that 
the Malvinas War was the final blow for the North–South project with which 
Willy Brandt had seduced the national leaders of the then so-called Third 
World.26
The prevailing logic of east versus west in the Cold War had prioritised the 
superpowers while relegating the other countries to secondary roles. On the 
other hand, the imposition of ‘North–South’ logic would include developing 
countries as main actors on the geo-political agenda (Quilligan, 2002). Thus, 
they were incorporated into the centre stage of international politics with 
their own needs and not as mere locations where foreign conflicts took place. 
The conflict in the Malvinas decreed the end of this intention, which could 
25 ‘Argentina is assisted by right and reason in its claim, as has been acknowledged … by the 
progressive thinking of our time. … We reaffirm our solidarity with the just claims of all 
peoples and nations of Latin America and the Caribbean whose countries have suffered 
violation or abuse in their rights through … colonial domination. … We demand that, 
together with an immediate ceasefire, recognition be made of the rights of that people’s 
claim to sovereignty. … Finally, we express our recognition of the value and patriotism of the 
Argentine people in their unequal fight aimed at having their sovereignty respected. We hope 
that as a result of their sacrifice they be granted, henceforth, full exercise of their individual 
and social freedoms as well as a growing democratic participation in national public life’, 
signed by Ricardo Valero (Secretary of International Affairs, Institutional Revolutionary Party, 
Mexico), and sent on behalf of Pedro Ojeda Paullada (President of COPPPAL), 13 June 1982 
(SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).
26 In a speech delivered in Algeria during a meeting on the north–south project, Pérez showed his 
pessimistic view on the future of such projects: ‘Thus it has been proved in the conflict between 
Britain and Argentina with impressive firmness. We do not hesitate to qualify it as a north–
south conflict. […] Beyond the argument used about Argentina’s decision to resort to force in 
order to recover sovereignty … there is the violent and colonialist reaction of Great Britain and 
the EEC, as well as the US, in turning their backs on a nation of the hemispheric community 
… Europe did not even consider the reaction that this aggressive and precipitate conduct 
would cause in our people, or the unexpected consequences of the punitive measures taken 
by the EEC with hurry, ignorance and violation of the UN declaration about the economic 
duties and rights of the states’ (‘North–South economic cooperation and the Falklands War’, 
a speech by Carlos Andrés Pérez (former president of Venezuela), Algeria, 22 May 1982, SI 
Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).
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only be sustained during periods of détente in Carter’s era. As Carlos Andrés 
Pérez cogently pointed out, the war would have political consequences in the 
region, for it would alter relations between countries from Latin America, the 
USA and Europe.27 The situation in Latin America was complex because of 
insurmountable differences on Central America, the economic crisis that started 
to bite (that same year the so-called ‘debt crisis’ was unleashed) and the political 
alienation that Latin American countries suffered from the polarisation of the 
geo-political map. The Malvinas War challenged Latin American politicians to 
address their influence in the world. 
The war within Socialist International
The next I meeting was scheduled for 26 and 27 May in Helsinki. The topic of 
the Malvinas was not originally included on the agenda for the meeting, which 
was to be devoted to the Middle East, Central America and disarmament. The 
meeting had large press coverage but, in order to avoid public repercussions of 
their internal problems, an unprecedented measure was taken: to ban public 
and press presence. The Malvinas issue ‘came in through the back door’, 
generating broad discussion and dominating the meeting’s development. Its 
inclusion on the agenda was suggested by Carlos Andrés Pérez, supported by 
most of the Latin American delegates, and emphasised the terms included in 
the SICLAC’s communication. 
The answer to this was under the charge of the British delegate Alex Kitson, 
who, besides condemning the use of force, proposed to take into consideration 
the Islanders’ right to self-determination, to condemn Argentina’s dictatorship 
and to highlight Great Britain’s anti-colonial tradition in Africa and India.28 
However, it was the French delegate’s intervention that generated a strong 
reaction among the Latin Americans and finally caused the meeting to be 
adjourned.
A participant in that meeting reported in an interview conducted for this 
investigation that ‘There was a moment of disruption; besides, I remember 
that, for France, Lionel Jospin was very hard on the Latin-Americans – very 
hard! Just imagine how he was if Brandt asked, “Please, let us stop for 15 
minutes”’.29 In a further letter delivered by the Argentine socialists, the French 
position was answered with strong criticism:
27 ‘Contadora group, more than a decision seeking to mediate in the Central American conflict, 
is a decision that comes after the Malvinas War seeking to find a solution to our differences 
and problems by ourselves’ (Diario El País (Spain), 18 Aug. 1986). 
28 The magazine of the IS, Socialist Affairs, described the meeting, at which the existence of 
different positions are observed. However, Socialist Affairs makes no mention of the depth of 
the divide between Latin America and Europe (Socialist Affairs, 1982, no, 4, pp. 131, 143). 
29 Personal interview with Elena Flores, former PSOE delegate to Socialist International 
(Madrid, March 2010).
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FALKLANDS–MALVINAS WAR 89
We have received your report … in principle; the information is incorrect: 
the aggressor was Great Britain, which attacked the Islands (in) 1833 
… In 1976 and 1977 we warned SI about the subject. […] Saying that 
Argentina is the aggressor is as absurd as it would have been to say that 
the Nazis, occupants of France, had maintained that the allied invasion to 
liberate it from its usurper was an aggression. Such an attitude places the 
comrade secretary nearer to the wrong position held during the Algeria 
and Indochina conflicts than to the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist 
position that should be the ideological basis of socialist thought. … Yours 
sincerely in SOCIALISM.30
The discussion was postponed until the following day, as requested by the British 
delegation. However, according to information from a personal interview with 
one of the delegates, the climate of division was such that Brandt himself had to 
call the meeting off and ask a PSOE delegate to find a solution to the conflict:
One of the hardest Councils I have attended was held in Helsinki, where 
the break between Europe and Latin America was brutal … From the 
European side, it could be seen that it was a military dictatorship, a 
dictatorship absolutely, and that there were no reasons listened to [as 
to] whether the Malvinas were a decolonisation issue or not: he [Gen. 
Galtieri] was simply a dictator, which was nothing but the truth, catching 
the wave and doing all these things. And, naturally, there were the Latin 
Americans, who only saw Argentina’s sovereignty over the Malvinas. So, at 
some point, there was a discussion going on about a statement and, since 
the fracture was so brutal and no agreement would be reached, Brandt 
called off the meeting. He took some minutes and called me in because I 
was already trying to bridge our differences. He called me in and said: ‘Are 
you able to release a statement that will satisfy both sides?’ I reply: ‘It will 
be an absolute hybrid statement, but I will try’. Thus it took me 15 to 20 
minutes to write a statement and that was what prevented the break from 
occurring at the time. 31 
Finally, a group coordinated by Thorvald Stoltenberg (International 
Committee of the Norwegian Labour Party) was formed; they wrote a 
resolution that contained some of the generic points agreed on by all parties. 
The points included rejection of the use of force (without clarifying which 
side had initially used it) and support of the UN Secretary General’s efforts at 
mediation. 
Given the magnitude of the internal conflict caused by the war, SI decided 
to create a Falklands–Malvinas commission that included everyone interested 
in the issue to avoid repercussions from the conflict striking the whole 
organisation. The commission had eight members: three from Latin American 
political parties, three from European ones, plus Labour and an Argentine 
30 PSP (National Committee) document, Buenos Aires, 31 May 1982, signed by Víctor García 
Costa (secretary general) and Nestor Martinez Eraso (secretary of international relations) (SI 
Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).
31 Personal interview with Elena Flores, former PSOE delegate to SI (Madrid, March 2010). 
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representative. It aimed at supervising the conflict and keeping the SI leadership 
informed.32 Its coordination was under the charge of the Norwegian Labour 
Party and its first meeting was to be held on 21 July 1982 in Paris. However, the 
war developed faster than the SI commission and, according to the forecasts, 
would end before the commission could be brought together. The high level of 
internal conflict and Latin America’s claims forced the meeting to be brought 
forward. Due to the turmoil of the moment, it was not held in Helsinki, as 
would have been most natural (since the delegates were already there), but in 
Portugal,33 with the aim of making progress in organisational matters before 
the subsequent gathering in Paris. 
The meeting was chaotic. It enjoyed the presence of those who were able 
to travel and endured the criticism of those who were not.34 Given important 
absences, the commission abstained from beginning political discussions and 
limited itself strictly to exchanging points of view about the commission’s 
future work programme. Everything developed too slowly. According to those 
present, the commission was right to include debates on the ongoing conflict 
but should have focused mainly on exploring ways to avoid endangering future 
relations between SI members. There were some informal conversations about 
Argentina’s representation within the commission, since SI had no Argentine 
member party. It was agreed that the Argentine representative should be 
accepted by every socialist party and groups in Argentina and inform all these 
groups and parties on the matter.35
From June 1982, Argentina’s position on the military was unsustainable.36 
All that remained to be seen was the time when the final assault by the British 
troops would come. A decision had to be taken on whether to continue with 
the commission and its activities or not. In one of his personal notes, Brandt 
32 Resolution on Falklands Islands–Malvinas (Socialist Affairs, 1982, no. 4, p. 142). 
33 ‘Impossible to understand why the meeting was to be held in Lisbon on 29 May when 
everybody was assembled in Helsinki on 27 May’ (Bernt Carlsson’s notes on a meeting with 
Leonard Larsen, Ivar Leveraas, Reiulf Steen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, 14 June 1982 (Bernt 
Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG)).
34 ‘I express our deepest disappointment at the unacceptable procedure for convening the 
meeting of the eight-member committee of the SI for the Falklands–Malvinas, which has 
prevented us from participating in this first meeting due to an absolute lack of time. The cable 
sent on 28 May was delivered on Saturday 29 at the party’s general address and handed over 
to my office on Monday 31’ (Margherita Boniver, International Secretariat, Italian Socialist 
Party, to Bernt Carlsson, 3 June 1982, copied to the Norwegian Labour Party (Bernt Carlsson 
papers, boxes 9–21, IISG)). 
35 Statement by the Norwegian Labour Party, Oslo, 4 June 1982, signed by Reiulf Steen (SI 
Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).
36 ‘According to Karl L. Hübener, with whom I met this morning, the US and the British 
government had come to an agreement through which the British will delay the final assault 
on Port Stanley until after President Reagan’s visit to England and the end of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Bonn’ (Bernt Carlsson’s notes, Socialist 
International Falklands–Malvinas commission, report from the meeting on 9 June 1982 
(Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG)). 
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Carlsson showed that he was aware of the challenge posed by SI: ‘The moment 
of truth has come for SI. The South Atlantic conflict has opened up a gap 
between most European and Latin American parties. […] The commission 
we created for the Malvinas crisis will probably not do much to solve the 
conflict. However, what we can actually do, at least, is to avoid the conflict 
from extending itself within SI’.37 
On 23 June the commission’s first official meeting was finally held in Paris.38 
At that time, since the war was already over, significant changes were introduced 
to the meeting’s objectives. However, the political conflict among the parties in 
SI continued. In the following meeting of the Falklands–Malvinas commission, 
Argentina’s SPP raised its own political situation within SI, while Labour sent 
a second-line delegation. The few agreements reached were on the basis of 
the repetition of commonplace arguments. Latin American representatives 
were among the most eager to continue this discussion in order to re-position 
themselves and increase their influence, which the war had been shown in 
its true proportions. The contents agreed in the text already openly included 
references to Argentina’s political situation and to the democratic process. 
Latin American parties began to emphasise this subject, leaving aside the 
demands for sovereignty that had characterised the time prior to the surrender 
of Argentina’s troops. 
One of the few agreements reached at this meeting was to hold another 
meeting, this time in Caracas, on 20 and 21 July. By then, gathering the SI 
Falklands–Malvinas commission together once again seemed of no relevance, 
to the extent that it was held without the presence of the British Labour Party. 
The British claimed that they had no funding for the trip. This circumstance 
was exploited by those present to settle an agreement without the British 
present and thus to improve SI relations with the Latin American parties.39 
Taking advantage of the BLP’s absence and a certain European lack of interest 
in continuing with the subject, the Latin Americans reached a consensus with 
the German social democrats, some Nordic parties and the SI secretary general 
on a final statement by the commission. It demanded that negotiations be 
quickly reactivated and, in the meantime, that the Malvinas be under UN 
administration. It did not acknowledge Britain’s presence in the Islands. The 
most remarkable detail of the document was that it decisively moved forward 
in Argentina’s democratisation, a fact that, until then, had only been supported 
37 Bernt Carlsson’s notes, Socialist International Falklands–Malvinas commission report from 
the meeting on 9 June 1982 (Bernt Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG). 
38 The meeting was attended by representatives from Argentina, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, 
Barbados, Norway, Venezuela and Chile (Bernt Carlsson’s notes on the Socialist International 
Falklands–Malvinas commission, report from the meeting on 9 June 1982 (Bernt Carlsson 
papers, boxes 9–21, IISG)). 
39 Notes on the conversation between Leonard Larsen and Bernt Carlsson (9 Aug. 1982, Bernt 
Carlsson papers, boxes 9–21, IISG). 
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by European parties. The end of the conflict and the British victory left no 
place for the insistence on a ceasefire or for Argentina’s claims to sovereignty. 
After the war and General Galtieri’s resignation as president of Argentina, 
Latin American parties changed the focus of their claims tying the conflict’s 
final resolution to the immediate restoration of democracy.40 They insisted 
there was now no reason to delay elections.41 To exert pressure in this regard, 
the commission also called for an international campaign42. The statement 
also upon the SI authorities to embrace the conclusions without waiting for 
November’s SI general meeting.43 The document (agreed unanimously) was 
an attempt by Latin American countries to demonstrate a political triumph, 
something they had been unable to do elsewhere. At the same time, it showed 
the SI leadership’s intention to give its Latin American partners the kind of 
compensation that had been missing during the development of the conflict.44
Labour stated their rejection of the document and issued another statement.45 
Repeating their previous criticism of the need to condemn the actions of the 
40 ‘That the SI declares itself fully in favour of the early restoration of the process of 
democratisation in the republic of Argentina … We consider this objective of paramount 
importance. We feel strongly that this demand by the people of Argentina should be met by 
the military without delay. It would have the advantage of contributing considerably to the 
creation of a favourable atmosphere for the definitive solution to the controversy in the South 
Atlantic’ (report by the SI working group on the Falklands–Malvinas, Caracas, 7 July 1982 (SI 
Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG)).
41 The document also expressed support for ‘Multipartidaria,’ which grouped together the 
different Argentine parties that had sent a delegation to the meeting, even though none of 
them was an SI member.
42 ‘It is for these reasons that we consider the postponement of the electoral process until 1984 
to be an unnecessary delay which could well have unforeseen and adverse consequences for 
the future development of peace and democracy in the Argentine Republic. In view of the 
foregoing, the Commission proposes that the Socialist International and its member parties 
conduct an international campaign, in particular directed to the military government with the 
view to pressuring it to honour its commitment given by President General Reynaldo Bignone 
for the restoration of the democratic process through free and fair elections’ (report of the SI 
working group on the Falklands–Malvinas, Caracas, 7 July 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–
Malvinas Commission, 1982, Box 979, IISG)).
43 ‘To request the president and the general secretary of the Socialist International after consulting 
with its member parties to implement the conclusions proposed above without waiting for 
the bureau meeting in November. This proposal arises from the dynamic and fluid nature 
of the circumstances surrounding this delicate matter’ (report of the SI working group on 
the Falklands–Malvinas, Caracas, 7 July 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 
1982, box 979, IISG)).
44 Report of the Socialist International working group on the Falklands–Malvinas, Caracas, 
21July 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG). 
45 ‘1- The statement makes no specific condemnation of the act of aggression from the Galtieri 
junta which precipitated the conflict. This is regrettable and must be rectified. The Labour 
Party feels it very important that the community of socialist parties loses no opportunity 
to express its extreme disapproval of all attempts to use violence to resolve international 
disputes … 2- The Labour Party associates itself fully with the view that the restoration of 
democracy in Argentina is of “paramount importance” … 4- At this juncture, after deep 
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Argentine military junta, they noted that this matter was not made explicit in 
the commission’s document. The BLP argued that calling for negotiations in 
the short run was not realistic since the wounds were still open and Argentina’s 
political future was unclear. Finally, they asked for their points of view to 
be included in the SI Falklands–Malvinas commission’s final statement. The 
SI secretary general proposed adding such a statement to the commission’s 
official statement as a minority view, but the BLP rejected the proposal. British 
Labour Party leaders wished to incorporate their own arguments into the final 
statement, which is why they asked for another meeting of the commission.46 
Somewhat belatedly, the BLP realised that the final statement was a political 
defeat and that it would be exposed to the whole community of social democrat 
parties. Carlsson answered, once again, that it was impossible to accomplish the 
British demand and, as a possible solution to this (in consensus with Brandt), 
he suggested calling a meeting in 1983 to see if positions could become more 
flexible.47 This never took place, partly because the conflict was already in the 
past and also because Carlos Andrés Pérez rejected such a possibility.48
For SI the Malvinas chapter was closed. Even if the result of the conflict and 
political process did not enjoy great respect from the Latin American parties, 
within SI at least, they succeeded in having some kind of compensation. This 
was shown in the delivery of a final report in the meeting held in Basle in 
November 1982. The SI leadership was more concerned about healing the 
wounds than about the arguments that gave rise to the conflict, even though 
passions have been aroused on both sides of the Atlantic and after the trauma through which 
the Falkland Islanders have been forced to live, it is however unrealistic to call for direct 
negotiations between Britain and Argentina at this stage. Furthermore, the political situation 
inside Argentina is in state of flux, it is impossible to predict how long this government will 
last when elections will finally take place, etc etc. … we do not consider it appropriate for at 
least the immediate future to endorse the policy of direct negotiations’ (BLP statement signed 
by J.E. Mortimer (general secretary) and sent to Bernt Carlsson on 2 Sept. 1982 (SI Archives. 
Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG)).
46 ‘Dear Cofrade: Thank you for your letter of 8 October 1982 enclosing the report of the 
Falklands/Malvinas Commission. I am afraid that it is unacceptable to the Labour Party that 
the report be circulated in the form you suggest. We obviously wish to see the points we raise 
considered and we would hope incorporated in the statement. We would not support the 
report as it now stands. I would like to suggest that either there is a further meeting of the 
commission prior to the Basle meeting or that if the report goes to the Bureau as it now is, 
adequate time is given for debate and so that we can submit amendments’ (letter from J.E. 
Mortimer (general secretary, labour party) to Bernt Carlsson, 20 Oct. 1982 (SI Archives, 
Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG)).
47 Letter from Bernt Carlsson to J.E. Mortimer, London, 28 Oct. 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–
Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG).
48 ‘With regards to another Commission meeting … I disagree, since this Commission put an 
end to its meetings in Caracas on 21 July 1982, as stated in the agreement of the same date 
that was submitted to your consideration and of the president’s, Willy Brandt, as duly clarified 
in the Basle meeting in late November’ (letter from Bernt Carlsson to J.E. Mortimer, London, 
28 Oct. 1982 (SI Archives, Falklands–Malvinas Commission, 1982, box 979, IISG)).
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the relations between some Latin American and European parties seemed a 
one-way street.
Conclusion 
The South Atlantic War was irrefutable proof that the path taken by the US 
under Ronald Reagan’s leadership would not be modified. The main conflict 
was with the USSR, and every effort was to be directed there, even though it 
implied abandoning old allies, such as the Argentine military. On the non-
aligned and transnational actors’ stage, the war was also a warning in that 
sense. The phase of détente was over. The growing polarisation left no space 
for different projects from those led by the world powers. This fact decisively 
affected the transnational relations that had been articulated among several 
left-wing groups of SI and, in particular, under the leadership of the German 
Willy Brandt. The differences between the SI parties were not merely tacit 
and showed a certain lack of concern from the Latin Americans towards 
the problem of democracy and their structural bonds to nationalism. The 
proximity of electoral processes in Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican 
Republic restricted the SI-affiliated parties’ margins for manoeuvre even more, 
since their electorate expressed concern about the communist expansion in 
Central America. To sum up, there was pressure on SI members to prioritise 
their primary interests as national organisations over collective construction. 
This eroded the transnational project that the SI had successfully embodied 
since 1976. Within that framework, to enlarge the focus on the Malvinas War 
– traditionally reduced to its military aspects – may show the broad framework 
of relations and political transnational activities of the parties as well as the 
existing difficulties in consolidating a left-wing democratic space worldwide. 
A comprehensive approach to the history of democratisation requires us to 
deepen our understanding of the interactions in transnational party networks, 
as well as the current debates about left-wing politics in the region. It must build 
a full picture of the actors’ universe on the left, its programmatic traditions and 
the history of its heterogenic strategies and alliances. 
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4. The Falklands–Malvinas War and 
transitions to democracy in Latin America: 
the turning point of 1979–82
Guillermo Mira
The commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Falklands–Malvinas War (April–June 1982) saw the intensification of the polemic surrounding the circumstances and consequences of the war, 
particularly in Argentina: the conflict’s intimate connection with the military 
dictatorship, the place in history of the young conscripts summoned to defend 
the patria and of their military leaders and the link between defeat in this 
conflict and the recovery of democracy in 1983 were all subject to renewed 
discussion. Conducted against the backdrop of Argentina’s vociferous assertion 
of claims to sovereignty and Britain’s pointed silence on the matter, the then 
current positions of the British and Argentine governments were subject to 
intense debate and revealed deep divisions, no longer between the opposing 
nations but within Argentina itself.1 The content of this debate paves the way 
for a reconsideration of the transition to democracy in both Argentina and 
surrounding countries. This article establishes a dialogue between history 
and political science, disputing the homogeneity of the concept of the ‘third 
wave’ of democracy to describe the dissolution of authoritarian regimes in 
Latin America; and instead proposes a distinction between the recuperation of 
democracy prior to and following the period between 1979 and 1982, divided 
precisely by the outbreak of war. Moreover, the revision of the Argentine 
case offers the opportunity to reconsider substantial questions relating to the 
transition which, despite having lost their previously central position and 
urgency over time (and in light of the triumph of the pro-democratic ‘ethos’), 
remain to a large degree unanswered and still represent an underlying influence 
1 Both the British and Argentine media echoed and participated in this debate, although it 
appears that the debates garnered greater public interest in Argentina. See, for example: 
Lorenz, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012a; Veiga, 2011; Palermo, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Tokatlian, 
2012; Romero, 2012a, 2012b; Menem, 2012; Storani, 2012; P. O’Donnell, 2012; Jenkins, 
2012a, 2012b; Carlin, 2012; Milmo, 2012; Herren, 2012; Goñi, 2012.
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on the configuration of these democracies in the present day. These substantial 
questions can be summarised in three areas of enquiry: 
• The reasons behind the return of democracy in Latin America in the 
1980s;
• The effect of the international context and external influences on political 
change within Argentina and other Latin American countries in this 
period;
• The relationship between the type of transition and the subsequent 
development of the emerging democracy in each case; and the potential 
long-term impact of this transition on the present-day form of democracy.
In 1986, David Rock and Suzanne Avellano analysed the return to 
democracy in Argentina as follows:
It is difficult to depict the Argentine elections of 1983 as part of a broader 
transition from authoritarian towards democratic systems throughout 
Latin America. The election has no simple connection to the current 
political transition in Latin America which, as an outgrowth of the 
debt crisis, calls to mind the domino-like spate of political changes that 
occurred between 1930 and 1933 and from 1944 to 1946. Argentina’s 
return to constitutional government in late 1983 was its fourth such 
transition in the previous twenty-five years, the most recent expression 
of a long-established cycle of alternating military regimes and civilian 
representative governments. In general, simplified terms, these shifts 
from one form of government to the other have occurred as a result of 
economic breakdowns arising from balance-of-payments crises. True to 
the pattern, the latest transition in Argentina reflects the failure of the 
economic program of the late 1970s, which led to the economic collapse of 
1981 and the country’s subsequent foreign debt crisis. In 1982 as the crisis 
loomed, the military regime made a final, desperate effort to consolidate 
its dwindling authority by occupying the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. The 
failure of this adventure left the regime with no option but to abdicate and 
schedule elections (Rock and Avellano, 1986, p. 189).
More than thirty years have passed since this text was written, leading us to 
ask what we have learned in the intervening years. We can assess whether Rock 
and Avellano’s judgement is accepted by the majority of scholars today and 
explore what can be said about the link between the Argentine transition and 
the ‘third wave of democracy’ from the viewpoint of the present. We can ask 
whether the time that has passed allows us to produce an interpretation that is 
more informed, better documented and more impartial; or whether, instead, 
the debates over memory and the wide range of versions circulating in the 
public sphere render reconstruction a more complex enterprise and obscure our 
understanding of this nebulous past. Finally, we can interrogate the influence 
of intellectual and academic output on the dismantling of the authoritarian 
regimes and the establishment of the present-day democracies.
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Causes
In order to account for the recuperation of democracy across much of Latin 
America between the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1990s, at least three 
possible explanatory paradigms have been advanced:
1. The theory of agency or ‘interaction’ outlined in Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule, a work complied by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe 
C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, the second part of which 
is dedicated exclusively to the study of Latin America (O’Donnell, 
Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986, pp. 15–329). The influence of this 
work on our conceptualisation of democratic transition has been both 
extraordinary and long lasting; and yet, despite the detailed country-by-
country analysis it contains, its editors do not seek primarily to explain 
the causes of transition, but rather to explore its outcomes (as the text’s 
subtitle attests). The editors centre their theoretical framework on what 
was happening at the time of writing and what could happen in the 
future, leaving aside consideration of the past. This is not due to lack of 
knowledge on the subject but to the fact that the study seemingly does 
not aim to establish causal connections between past and present, seeking 
instead to record and account for the political change taking place at 
the time. Broadly speaking, the interpretative framework of this seminal 
work does not emphasise the ‘why’ but the ‘how’. The international 
context and other external factors are not ignored (in fact Whitehead 
dedicates a chapter to the topic) (Whitehead, 1986, pp. 3–46), but they 
are relegated to a secondary plane. The actors allocated most importance 
are the internal political agents, particularly the elites, who are considered 
as the driving force behind regime change. It is this perspective that 
informs the ‘theory of agency’ which shapes the work’s interpretation, 
including its focus on outcomes and the uncertainty surrounding the 
results of this process of ‘institutional engineering’ (Diamond, Linz and 
Seymour, 1989).2
2. The second interpretative paradigm stems from Huntington’s concept of 
the ‘third wave’ (Huntington, 1991). In essence, this perspective does not 
contradict the suppositions of the previous ‘interactionist’ interpretation, 
but grounds them in the historical process. Employing the concept of 
‘wave’ in order to explain how democracies come into being, this theory 
offers a vision over the long term (with three waves – three historical 
moments – considered in strict chronological terms). This vision 
introduces international factors (which, for Huntington, are crucial 
to understanding the withdrawal of the authoritarian regimes); and its 
2 See also: Pastor, 1989; Karl, 1990; Mainwaring, O’Donnell and Valenzuela, 1992; Haggard 
and Kaufman, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Whitehead, 1996; Agüero and Stark, 1998; 
Garretón, 2003; Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán, 2003; Domínguez and Shifter, 2003.
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focus in some way ‘universalises’ the interactionist theory, endowing it 
with worldwide implications. From its opening pages, The Third Wave 
displays a clear ideological stamp: written in the midst of the collapse 
of communism, it proclaims the superiority of the ‘liberal democracy’ 
embodied by the United States. 
3. The third option stems from an emerging area of study undertaken by 
historians which is slowly beginning to erode some of the conclusions 
so solidly established by the preceding theories. In a revision of Latin 
America’s political traditions, Alan Knight recognises the fundamental 
role played by the national elites in the last wave of democratisation, 
although he nuances this statement by highlighting that these same 
elites and the wealthy were initially in favour of the dictatorships (in 
order to contain the left-wing ‘threat’) and only supported the return of 
democracy in the light of changing circumstances. Knight also provides a 
warning about the type of democracy that was implemented:
Before we get too self-congratulatory, however, we should recall 
that democratization processes have typically been ‘padlocked’. […] 
Indeed, in recent years the ‘padlocks’ have tended to get thicker 
and more unpickable. That is to say, recent military withdrawals 
from rule have been accompanied by policies designed to remove 
the original reasons for military intervention (radicalism, Marxism, 
‘economic populism’, militant unionism, peasant mobilization, 
threats to the army as an institution). Indeed, it has even been 
suggested that recent scholarship on democratization […] both 
embodies and endorses this ‘padlocking’ process. According to Paul 
Cammack (2000, p. 405), ‘O’Donnell and Schmitter […] make 
perfectly clear (as do Linz and Stepan) that they choose to stress 
elite strategy over structure because democracy will only work if the 
capacity of the left and working-class forces to shape it is limited’; 
hence, Cammack concludes, their ‘neutral contribution to political 
science’ is, in fact, ‘a highly ideological intervention in contemporary 
politics’ (Knight, 2001, p. 176 and footnote 60).
In line with these assertions, Knight highlights that ‘bottom-up’ public 
pressure was a negligible factor in the recent Latin American processes of 
democratisation. His analysis also stresses the inconsistencies in the behaviour 
of influential international actors:
The US – the primary external actor – welcomed the Brazilian and Chilean 
coups; but later exerted pressure for a return to democracy. US thinking in 
this sense roughly paralleled that of domestic elites: authoritarian rule was 
preferable to supposed chaos or communism; but a moderate padlocked 
democracy was preferable to either, in terms of both normative values and 
practical politics (Knight, 2001, p. 178). 
More recently, Paul Drake has described the wave of ‘neoliberal democracies’ 
established across Latin America as a democratic ‘tsunami’ (Drake, 2009, pp. 
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201–43). Yet Drake recognises the difficulty of explaining why these neoliberal 
regimes were able to establish themselves so firmly despite the mediocrity of 
their results. His interpretation provides a different configuration of the local 
and international factors highlighted by the theories outlined above. Whilst 
accepting that national actors played a crucial role, Drake emphasises the 
absence of drastic changes (whether cultural, economic or institutional) at the 
heart of Latin American societies which would explain this sudden democratic 
turn. In order to resolve this enigma, Drake underlines two significant 
considerations:
The biggest change in thinking about democracy was the emphasis on its 
intrinsic value as a set of institutions and procedures rather than outcomes. 
Many Latin Americans moved away from popular democracy toward 
protected democracy, or at least closer to the U.S view of democracy as 
essentially a way to organize governance (Drake, 2009, p. 215).
As this judgement suggests, the brutal human rights violations, the errors 
in the management of the economy and other examples of misconduct by 
the military had rendered a more moderate idea of democracy acceptable, 
providing it put an end to the period of dictatorship. Second, and perhaps 
most importantly:
Under the aegis of economic and political neoliberalism, protected 
democracies prevailed over popular democracies in terms of mass 
mobilization and benefits (…) At least up to the 2000s, it seemed that so 
long as civilian and military élites agreed that protected democracies were 
desirable, almost regardless of other variables, those democracies could 
persevere, despite their shortcomings (Drake, 2009, pp. 214–5).3
But it is to international factors that Drake attributes the greatest 
importance, organising these under four subheadings: economics, imperialism, 
ideology and the domino effect. Drake’s insistence on both the impact of the 
economic crisis of the 1980s and the movements of powerful international 
actors (the United States, the Vatican, the European Economic Community 
and the USSR) echoes the argument put forward by Huntington. However, 
Drake’s perspective departs from that of the US political scientist in one crucial 
point: his narrative of the influence of the United States recognises a far more 
complex political landscape:
In this latest period, the Unites Sates played a contradictory role. Until 
the late 1980s, the Cold War kept the United States sympathetic to anti-
communist dictators and leery of less vigilant democrats. After supporting 
military dictatorships in the 1960s and early 1970s, most infamously in 
Brazil and Chile, Washington championed human rights and democracy 
under President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s. The Colossus of the 
North tried to take some credit for the surge of democratization in the 
3 Note that Drake’s idea of ‘protected democracy’ contains an echo of Knight’s ‘padlocked’ 
democracy.
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1980s and 1990s […] However, in most cases, Washington essentially 
played a reactive role (Drake, 2009, pp. 211–2).
In response to this range of interpretations, the section below explores the 
impact of international factors, including the ambiguous actions of the United 
States, on the evolution of the Falklands–Malvinas War and its effects on both 
Argentine politics and the international context.
The influence of external factors: lessons from the Argentine 
case
The circumstances of the Falklands–Malvinas War display substantial differences 
from other types of military intervention or conflict that set in motion processes 
of transition, such as in Greece and Portugal (to take examples from the third 
wave, but the cases of Germany and Japan could be included if we adopt a 
broader focus). In Argentina, the full spectrum of the political classes, from left 
to right, supported the war and gave their enthusiastic approval to the armed 
forces’ action in defence of national sovereignty. Strictly speaking, the Falklands 
debacle not only tarnished the military, but also damaged the credibility of the 
nation’s political leadership as a whole.4
To return to the apparently self-evident but problematic connection between 
‘defeat in the Falklands’ and the ‘recovery of democracy’, it is essential to note 
that the end of the war did not bring about the fall of the dictatorship but 
instead produced a political earthquake that opened a deep crater: crucially, the 
way in which that vacuum would be filled was unresolved. Yet it must also be 
recognised that if the war had occurred three or four years previously, it would 
have taken place within a very different international context. Before discussing 
these changes, it is worth making two observations about the meaning of the 
term ‘international context’ within the perspective outlined in this article:
1. The understanding of this term here departs from the vision that purports 
a clear separation between ‘internal factors’ and ‘external or international 
factors’ (a separation implicit in both the ‘interactionist’ and third-wave 
theories), adopting instead a focus akin to that proposed by Fernando 
Pedrosa in his study of Socialist International in Latin America (Pedrosa, 
2009). Instead of two clearly delineated categories, Pedrosa outlines 
a history of interactions between transnational actors, reflecting a 
patchwork of reciprocal, although unequal, influences.
2. References to the ‘international context’ here allude to at least three 
dimensions: the geo-political situation, the international economic 
4 On the evolution of the Falklands–Malvinas War and its political and cultural repercussions 
at a national and international level, see: Gambini, 1982; Laffin, 1982; The Sunday Times, 
1982; Hastings and Jenkins, 1983; Verbitsky, 1985; Rozitchner, 1985; Adams, 1986; Burns 
Marañón, 1992; Blaustein and Zubieta, 1998; Guber, 2001; Balza, 2003; Novaro and 
Palermo, 2003; Freedman, 2005; McGuirk, 2007; García Quiroga and Seear, 2009; Yofre, 
2011; Lorenz, 2012.
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conditions and status of the financial markets (in the capitalist world) 
and the ‘spirit of the age’, meaning both the principles, ideologies and 
political imaginaries governing international relations and the margins of 
action that are affected by material and symbolic factors.
Following on from the first of these points, this article contends that the events 
of the period 1979–82 profoundly altered, in a very short space of time, several 
key aspects of the international context. The promotion of democracy and 
human rights by the Carter administration (from 1977), the election of Pope 
John Paul II and his crusade against communism, beginning with his native 
Poland (1978), the Nicaraguan Revolution (1979), the Iranian Revolution 
(1979), the election of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (1979), the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the electoral victory of Ronald Reagan 
in the United States (1980), the coup d’état in Poland (1980), the Falklands–
Malvinas conflict (April–June 1982) and the Mexican debt crisis (August 
1982) were defining episodes in the fabric of the period.5 
The impact of this explosion of events in the space of four short years shaped 
profound differences between the transitions that took place before and after 
the date that concludes the period (1982). From this starting point, this article 
questions the homogeneity of Huntington’s third wave: despite the powerful 
nature of this metaphor, the wave did not break at the same time or in the same 
way on different shores. Within Latin America, the transitions to democracy 
in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru and even Bolivia (perhaps the 
most ambiguous case: a ‘transition within a transition’) were not driven by the 
same forces or subject to the same conditions as the return to democracy in 
Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile or Paraguay. The Central American countries 
can be considered a separate group, but one more closely allied with the post-
1982 transitions than those that took place prior to this date.6 
In short, if we consider external influences as dynamic processes in constant 
interaction with other (internal) factors, rather than as fixed circumstances to 
be taken into account, the dynamic of the democratic wave is substantially 
altered. This article proposes the events of the period of 1979–82 as a dividing 
line between two types of transition. Until 1979 the Soviet threat to the 
capitalist system remained a potent force; and, moreover, the crisis of free-
market capitalism in 1973 had boosted the attractiveness and plausibility of 
an alternative to a system that Marxist theorists considered condemned to 
founder. In this context, it seemed logical to imagine and fight for a version 
of the socialist model. In other words, the left (whether armed or not) was 
still synonymous with the idea of revolution (as demonstrated in the cases of 
Nicaragua and El Salvador). However, in the period following the conclusion 
5 Useful sources on these events include Carothers, 1991 and Lowenthal, 1991.
6 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between historical circumstances and 
regional factors in the implementation of Latin American democracies, see Mira Delli-Zotti, 
2010.
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of the Falklands–Malvinas War (June 1982) and the outbreak of the debt crisis 
immediately afterwards (August of the same year), the image of the Soviet 
Union as an imminent threat had faded; Thatcher and Reagan’s ‘conservative 
revolution’ presented itself as an effective and audacious means of both 
reinvigorating capitalism and defeating communism; and the explosion in the 
level of external debt across Latin America was interpreted as sounding the 
death knell of the developmentalist model of import substitution, considered 
to be in urgent need of replacement. As far as revolutionary utopianism was 
concerned, in the wake of the brutal repression of these ideals in the 1970s the 
flourishing of democracy that spread from country to country removed this as 
a realistic political option. 
The typology of transitions: the transitional matrix and its 
conditioning factors
Despite the overwhelming consensus that Argentina’s transition to democracy 
was caused by the collapse of the military dictatorship, brought about in turn 
by defeat in the Falklands, this affirmation appears to rest less on a detailed 
examination of the facts and more on the limited range of options offered 
by the typology of transitions developed by political science. Perhaps the 
most sophisticated classification is that presented by Share and Mainwaring 
(Share and Mainwaring, 1986), who distinguish between three different 
situations: transition through ‘regime defeat’, through ‘transaction’ or through 
‘extrication’. In the first case described by these authors, transition is brought 
about by an external military defeat or a severe internal crisis that shatters the 
regime (such as in Germany and Italy after the Second World War, Greece 
and Portugal in the 1970s, or Argentina after its defeat by the British). Under 
this type of transition, the regime loses all negotiating capacity, unlike in the 
other two cases. In a ‘transition through extrication’ the weakening of the 
authoritarian government forces it to liberalise the regime and move towards 
democracy, retaining some capacity to influence the transition process (such 
as in Uruguay and Bolivia). Finally, in the ‘transition through transaction’ the 
elites of the authoritarian regime retain enough power to guide the change 
towards a ‘tutelary democracy’, such as in Brazil or Chile. Although Share and 
Mainwaring place Argentina in the first of these three categories, it is worth 
reconsidering whether the Argentine transition can truly be considered an 
example of ‘regime defeat’. In a sense, the Argentine case can be placed partially 
in all three categories outlined above and at the same time in none. An expert 
on the topic – a specialist in political communications – provides a careful 
explanation of this hybrid character:
The Argentine transition oscillates between a total rupture with the 
military regime and a certain continuity, in the sense that there was 
no abrupt breach with the regime […] Seen from this perspective, the 
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Argentine transition is a hybrid one, where although there was no legal 
continuation of the military regime, neither was there an abrupt breach 
with it. In fact, in the Armed Forces and the Civil Service, structural 
changes occurred only at the upper echelons of both organisations 
(Catterberg, 1989, pp. 19–20).
To characterise the Argentine transition as an example of ‘regime defeat’ or 
collapse is, therefore, far from satisfactory. In the first place, the concrete 
effects of the war on the dictatorship and the country were irrelevant: It did 
not affect the infrastructure of any government in Latin America and the 
military immediately replaced the weaponry destroyed in the war, bankrolled 
by the public purse. Second, once the mariscales de la derrota (those responsible 
for defeat) had been identified, the army took control of the situation and 
continued to govern alone. The pressure to hand over power to civilians was 
neither immediate nor intense, which explains the time lapse of 505 days 
between the end of the war and the holding of elections. 
The fact that the military did not remain longer in government was due 
to the junta’s inability to manage the economic situation, but they sought to 
prolong their time in power as far as possible in order to leave things ‘tied up 
nice and tight’ (Burns Marañón, 1992, pp. 155–70).7 In short, this represented 
an attempt to establish protection against future accusations of accountability, 
particularly regarding the ‘dirty war’ against subversion (as it was termed by the 
junta), but also in terms of ‘los ilícitos’ (economic and financial operations of 
dubious legality that were undertaken, supported or approved by the military). 
Lastly, it is inadequate to refer to the ‘collapse of the dictatorship’ not only 
in light of the parsimony with which the army managed the transitional 
post-Malvinas period, but also in terms of the role of the armed forces as the 
principal destabilising factor under the first democratic government. It would 
be more accurate, therefore, to speak of the military as having withdrawn to 
the barracks, which would bear a closer resemblance to Share and Mainwaring’s 
concept of ‘transition through extrication’. This categorisation opens a series of 
further questions, including whether it was an orderly or chaotic withdrawal, 
what guarantees about the future political governance of the country were 
demanded by the armed forces and whether those guarantees were fulfilled. 
The military sought to protect all the actions of the ‘proceso’ (particularly 
those relating to the fight against ‘subversion’) from judicial scrutiny, passing 
the Law of National Pacification in 1983, a clear self-amnesty. The acceptance 
of this law would demand some degree of agreement with the ‘democratic 
forces’. All transitions in the Southern Cone occurred through negotiation 
between the military governments and the civil elites who would take their 
7 Ch. 8: ‘Una transición renuente’. See also: Yofre, 2011, Ch. 7 (pp. 489–536): ‘Bignone, el 
último presidente de facto. El destape’. Significantly, the title of the documentary produced 
for television by Tranquilo Producciones on the 25th anniversary of the 1983 elections 
(Buenos Aires, 2008), was 505 días. La Transición argentina [The Argentine Transition].
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place (in the mould of ‘transition through transaction’). All, that is, except the 
case of Argentina. The ‘Malvinas effect’ removed the possibility of a ‘transición 
pactada’, or ‘negotiated transition’, as the political parties refused to negotiate 
the return to constitutional order with a military dictatorship that had been 
completely discredited and widely condemned after defeat in the war. However, 
it is necessary to reflect upon the internal implications of this external setback. 
The armed forces immediately set about hiding, minimising and twisting the 
reasons behind the war and its failure, with a not inconsiderable degree of 
success. Why was an immediate public investigation about what happened 
in Malvinas not launched? Why was the Rattenbach Report not officially 
distributed until thirty years after the war’s conclusion? Why were the Malvinas 
trials brought to a halt? The military had much to hide, and therefore much 
to negotiate (Lorenz, 2012b, pp. 177–98).8 The democratic parties, in turn, 
dissolved the coalition known as the ‘Multipartidaria’, realising that it now 
made little sense to negotiate with the discredited military as a block, and 
instead embarked upon their electoral campaigns as individual parties. 
Despite all the factors discussed above, negotiation did take place, covered up 
to protect the party which had agreed to it in order to avoid the condemnation 
of many supporters and members of the party who had been severely affected 
by repression under the dictatorship. In the Argentine return to democracy, 
an agreement (pacto) – impunity in exchange for governability – was sought 
between the outgoing military junta and the political force best placed to 
achieve an electoral win: the Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista). Despite the 
secrecy, during the transition the leader of the Radical Party (Partido Radical) 
denounced the agreement between unions and the military, although no proof 
was offered. The defeat of Ítalo Luder, the Justicialist presidential candidate 
in the October elections that year, prevented the realisation of the agreement 
and contributed to the sidelining of the accusations aired during the political 
campaign.9 Today, witnesses to the agreement corroborate its existence, which 
adds a crucial element to our revision of the transition and its results.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the surprising turn to democracy in Latin America 
three decades ago and, in the case of Argentina, has provided a closer examination 
of the nature of this change. We can conclude that it was not a transition 
through collapse, as is commonly argued, or through extrication. Instead, 
we could say that the Argentine case was subject to attempts to control or 
condition the transition through negotiation (such as in Chile and Brazil), but 
these plans failed when the party that should have won the elections lost them 
8 Ch. 7: ‘Guerreros de dos guerras. Los militares y Malvinas’; 505 días. La transición argentina 
(2008), DVD 2: ‘La derrota en Malvinas’.
9 505 días. La transición argentina (2008), DVD 3: ‘Comienza la campaña’.
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instead. This fact renders the Argentine transition ultimately unclassifiable and 
unique: neither regime defeat, nor transaction nor extrication. Moreover, the 
chapter has reconsidered the Falklands–Malvinas War through an international 
lens: the war not only affected the future of the Argentine dictatorship, but 
also formed part of a series of events that would change the conditions for the 
processes of change underway in other Latin American countries, which until 
now have been considered primarily in terms of a single, homogenous wave.
Important areas of consideration present themselves for future study. In the 
case of Argentina, the results of the uncontrolled, open transition generate 
worrying questions which are yet to be answered:
1. What happened between 1984 and 1989 to create the conditions for 
Carlos Menem, at the head of the Justicialist Party, to dedicate his first 
electoral term to institutionalising – with popular support – the same 
economic policy and model of society pursued by the widely condemned 
military dictatorship?
2. What were the outcomes of the democratic transition in the short term?
3. Is a political analysis sufficient to determine what type of transition took 
place? 
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5. The Malvinas journey: harsh landscapes, 
rough writing, raw footage
Julieta Vitullo
There is little room for first-person writing in the realm of doctoral dissertations in American academia. As if subjective experience obstructed the flow of intellectual reflections, the two sides of the brain 
of an academic are not supposed to mix. The same is true in scientific discourse, 
but in the world of science, it is all about the experiment. Even in the driest 
and most objective language of a scientist, even if the passive voice disguises the 
presence of an agent, the ‘I’ is integral to the text: I performed this experiment 
and came up with this. Studies in the humanities, despite the name and the 
object they examine, tend to erase any traces of the subject who writes. Reading 
and writing are solitary and silent acts. When cultural and literary critics refer 
to a personal experience that led them to come across a certain book or to 
approach a corpus of works, they do so timidly and almost apologetically, in a 
footnote, a foreword or an epilogue.
I was not the exception when in 2006 I went to the Falkland Islands (or 
Malvinas, for us Argentines) with the intention of writing a travel journal that 
would give closure to my doctoral research. Justifying a request for money 
was only the beginning of the problem. Field studies are not uncommon in 
the humanities, but the request was slightly unorthodox: was there room for a 
first-person narrative in a piece of scholarly research? Why did I need to travel 
to the Islands if all I was studying were the imaginary representations of them, 
the fictional narratives produced around the Malvinas–Falklands War of 1982? 
From then on, I found myself in a sort of limbo, one foot in the library, the 
other on the Islands. The timeline was the five years spanning the 25th and 
30th anniversaries of the war, that is, between the conclusion in 2007 of my 
doctoral dissertation, later published as the book Islas imaginadas: La guerra de 
Malvinas en la literatura y el cine argentinos [Imaginary Islands: The Malvinas 
War in Argentine Fiction and Film] (2012), and the release of La forma exacta de 
las islas [The Exact Shape of the Islands] in 2012, a documentary that I co-wrote 
with the directors of the film, Edgardo Dieleke and Daniel Casabé. 
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This chapter looks at what the journey has been like for me, a researcher into 
the cultural discourses produced around the war who became the protagonist 
in one of those discourses. I discuss what the process of making the film was 
like and how my previous connection to the topic evolved into something else 
as a result of new experiences and new paths of expression. Without going into 
details that readers can find out by watching the film, I explain how I positioned 
myself in regards to the analysis of the relationship between collective and 
individual trauma after having suffered a loss that was inextricably linked to 
my experiences in the Malvinas. I also look at how certain representations 
of the landscape displace the idea of sovereign territory in the narratives of 
Malvinas and, at the same time, become a vehicle for representing individual 
and personal trauma.
The limits of genre
The documentary film The Exact Shape of the Islands came out of the experiences 
of two trips I took to the Islands in 2006 and 2010. The first time, as I explained 
in the research statement I wrote to justify the need for travel funds, I went 
because I wanted to see with my own eyes that place overshadowed by loss 
which I had read so much about, a place that had been written about mostly 
from the imagination. My plan was to be a flâneur in the barren land and, in 
the idle time I would have, to write an epilogue for my thesis, a first-person 
text conceived as either a chronicle, a journal or a travelogue. Once I was there, 
the plan for my trip changed because I met Carlos Enriori and Dacio Agretti, 
two Argentine ex-combatants who were returning to the Islands for the first 
time after 25 years. I took the excursions I had planned, but did not just look 
at things and keep a journal: I watched Carlos and Dacio and, through the 
camera lens, I watched what they were watching. The eight hours of rough 
material I recorded became a sort of voyeuristic insight into their experience. 
That and the notes I took when I was alone made up a portion of what I 
brought back from the Malvinas. 
Upon my return from the Islands, I used my notes and recollections to write 
an ‘Epilogue’ that I described as ‘a journey of the researcher towards her object of 
study’.1 I explained that the ‘Epilogue’ represented a shift or displacement from 
the fictional to the physical: I confronted the space that had been built from 
imagination with a personal and somewhat intimate chronicle written from the 
actual space of the Islands. I used the first person to describe my wanderings 
around Stanley and what locals refer to as ‘the camp’ (the countryside). The 
initial idea of the trip, I said, was to:
contrast the representation of a space that was constructed based on 
scholarly and reference materials, based on testimonial accounts from those 
who were on the islands under the exceptional conditions imposed by the 
1 Vitullo, 2007a, p. 12. Translations are the author’s own.
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war and based on the recent fictional narratives of those who received both 
those materials, with an in situ narrative, one that would enable me to see 
in what way the reconstruction of an unknown space had been operating 
in literature (Vitullo, 2007a, p. 12).
The result reflected in the ‘Epilogue’, as I continued to describe it, was ‘a 
journey to the origin’, one in which those unknown islands revealed themselves 
as a space of nostalgia and longing for something that was missing (Vitullo, 
2007a, p. 12).
I brought back more than just the initial thoughts for my ‘Epilogue’ and 
eight hours of raw footage but, in terms of my research, I was not sure what 
I was supposed to do with what I had gathered. I articulated some partial 
thoughts that did not do justice to the rest of my work, my role as a witness to 
the testimonies that the two ex-combatants offered, my experience as a traveller 
on the Islands or my own personal story. The personal ramifications of my 
life experience on the Islands were too intimate to fit into even a first-person 
narrative. 
An article based on that initial version of the ‘Epilogue’ was published in the 
cultural magazine Ñ for a special edition on the 25th anniversary of the war.2 
The fact that the editor cut the first paragraph of the submitted text, in which 
I made specific mention to those ramifications, is evidence of the problematic 
status of the first-person within certain channels of circulation, even non-
scholarly ones. That text, which the editor described as a travel account and 
entitled ‘La nostalgia del falso terruño’ [Nostalgia for a False Homeland], 
was a chronicle with autobiographical undertones. What could have had an 
interesting impact was not the specific personal information that was provided 
in the text, but the fact that such information was being introduced along with 
other pieces in the special edition of a weekly magazine, an edition that dealt 
with the public, rather than the private, dimensions of the war. ‘La nostalgia 
del falso terruño’ was the chronicle of a researcher who travelled to those islands 
to study the fictions produced around the war. The medium in which the text 
was published was a special edition on the Malvinas which included a dozen 
articles in different genres, from interviews to reviews, and dealt with many 
subjects, including politics, aesthetics, history, cinematography and literature. 
My text presented a personal twist which introduced a link between the 
private and the public in the context of a key chapter in Argentina’s historical 
narrative, bringing an uncomfortably intimate component into the discussion 
of a national, eminently public and often solemn commemoration. The drastic 
cutting of the first paragraph erased that connection but, incidentally, the 
mention of the personal that came in later in the text was left unclear and 
disconnected. That paragraph, which did make it to my dissertation, read:
2 See Vitullo (2007b).
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I am going to the Malvinas to see if being there helps me uncover the 
veil (the ‘misty quilt’) of the national cause that we Argentines have been 
constructing for over a century. I am going to the Malvinas so I can say, 
happier than a little girl with a new toy, that I met the king penguins, 
younger siblings of the emperors in March of the Penguins. I am going 
to the Malvinas so that I can brag about drinking beer with the Kelpers. 
I am going to the Malvinas to bump into two Argentine ex-combatants 
who have very good reasons to go back to the Malvinas. I am going to 
the Malvinas to contrast the scholarly versions and the testimonies from 
those who were there in 1982 with my own critical insight, in situ, and 
also to see how this unknown space was constructed in recent fictional 
representations. I am going to the Malvinas to conceive a son (Vitullo, 
2007a, p. 172). 
A modified version of that opening paragraph made its appearance as a voice-
over in The Exact Shape of the Islands. In that case, the paragraph was modified 
not because the lines between genres had to be kept straight, as in the edited 
version published in Ñ, but for plot purposes, to avoid giving away the full 
story at the beginning of the film:
I am finally on the Malvinas. I’m coming to the Malvinas to finish my 
dissertation. I’m coming to the Malvinas to contrast the school versions 
of the war and to contrast the testimonial versions of those who fought 
it in 1982. I’m coming to see how this space was imagined in Argentine 
literature and film. I’m coming to the Malvinas to meet the Kelpers. I’m 
coming to the Malvinas and I meet Carlos and Dacio, who have very good 
reasons to return (The Exact Shape of the Islands).
By the time I had to give closure to my dissertation and defend it, life had 
gone on and some of the things I had said in the initial version of the ‘Epilogue’ 
and in the Ñ chronicle were no longer valid. If there had existed a gap between 
the actual space of the Islands and the image associated with the fictional and 
non-fictional accounts I had read, there was now a second gap between the 
Islands of that trip and the personal landscape that was starting to be reshaped 
in my head as memories populated with new and unexpected meanings. 
In the end, it was the documentary format and the intervention of a third-
person narration which enabled reflection on the ways in which that landscape 
had been reshaped once and again through the pages of books, right before my 
eyes, through the lens of my camera and from the memory exercises that took 
place in between trips. If the need to go had driven the ‘Epilogue’, the urge to 
return would eventually lead me back to the Islands and become a thread in the 
narrative fabric of the documentary. That urge, which had also been a theme 
of the fictional accounts and testimonies I had studied, was later present in the 
raw footage I collected by filming Carlos and Dacio and would finally be a part 
of my own story within the film.
The status of the first person, the autobiographical, the limits of genre, the 
relationship between the private and the public are, precisely, some of issues 
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with which The Exact Shape of the Islands deals. The gaps mentioned above 
adopt a different form in the film: they are layers which the film juxtaposes by 
using the materials I captured in 2006; those recorded in 2010; third-person 
voice-overs from the film directors; different entries from my diaries recorded 
by an actress; quotations from 19th-century accounts by Charles Darwin; or 
more recent insights from Rodolfo Fogwill and Carlos Gamerro. 
Still, within the context of my academic research, a first-person reflection 
about my experiences on the Islands in 2006 remained partially undercut by 
the very fact that the Islands had become not just a place to witness and record 
the testimonies of others but a stage in my own personal story of loss. The 
time that elapsed between the first trip and the publication of Islas imaginadas 
did not provide enough distance for the present reflection to come into being. 
Only after completing the film, watching it several times, showing it at different 
festivals and going through the exercise of reflecting on the last six years3 of 
this Malvinas journey does it seem possible to express what I have had such a 
hard time writing down and what directors Dieleke and Casabé struggled for 
a whole week of shooting on the Islands to have me say in front of the camera, 
only to hear me say it on the very last day: that during my first trip to the 
Islands I conceived a baby, Eliseo, who died shortly after he was born.
The object, the subject, the witness
Researching the literature and films produced after the war in 1982 between 
Great Britain and Argentina over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands has 
required different kinds of journeys and discoveries. The first is common to 
what most researchers must undergo when they initially come up with an object 
of study. Something in the sphere of personal memories, personal experiences, 
place of origin, a picture kept or seen, a book stored on a shelf, a word spoken 
to us leads us to that object. 
In my case, I was about to turn six when the war happened in 1982 and 
I was in first grade. I remember the chants against Margaret Thatcher that 
our teacher forced us to sing; I remember tears from my mother when the 
ARA General Belgrano Cruiser was sunk by the British Royal Navy. More 
than anything, I remember the feeling of fear and shameful pride every time 
I sang the national anthem and the ‘Malvinas March’. That the feeling of 
pride was tainted by shame speaks to the fact that the Malvinas represent a 
sort of ‘blind spot’ in Argentine history: as I explained in Islas imaginadas, 
the war is an alienated event extirpated from the time frame implied in the 
term ‘dictatorship’ but also estranged from ‘democracy’; it was supported by 
the majority of Argentine society while the regime that was launching it was 
about to collapse; its victims do not have a corpus of legitimised narratives 
and testimonials like the one which the disappeared and the survivors of the 
3 This piece was written in 2011.
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concentration camps have in the Nunca más, the Report of the Argentine 
National Commission of the Disappeared; finally, it is a war that for almost 
two decades was more or less neglected by academics. At my age, my shame 
derived from the fact that my parents had told me that I had to chant against 
the military, not against the British. They were the ‘bad guys’, so instead of 
jumping while chanting ‘If you don’t jump you’re English’, I needed to jump 
and shout, ‘If you don’t jump you’re from the military’. 
The memories that gave rise to the selection of the Malvinas as a research 
topic, shared almost identically by too many Argentines, worked their way 
through in three different ways throughout this intellectual journey. First, 
they inspired me to choose a topic for my doctoral dissertation. The personal 
connection was deep enough on an emotional level to motivate passion, 
interest and enough devotion to spend the next few years dealing with the 
topic at hand. This goes to reinforce the point that pretending that, formally, 
research can be devoid of subjective interventions is an illusion, one that can 
only lead to an unproductive split. 
This recognition explains not just the fact that because of my own personal 
experience I could relate to the emotional roots of the national cause for the 
Malvinas with its patriotic fervour and symbols, but also that nationalism, 
emotional in nature, permeates the idiosyncrasy of entire generations. As 
I discussed in my book, the idea of the ‘just cause’ was hegemonic within 
the testimonial, political, historical and journalistic discourses that followed 
Argentina’s defeat in the war and was rooted in a territorial type of nationalism. 
Whether those accounts were expressed in triumphal registers or mourning 
undertones, they all subscribed to the idea that the war had its origins in a just 
cause. According to the triumphal version, the war of 1982 could be told as 
an epic story, a people’s heroic deed. The testimonies of the soldiers, the letters 
written by their relatives, their friends or just the common citizen, the official 
speeches, the media – all of these manifestations illustrated that triumphal 
version. Imposed by the defeat, the second version, with its mourning 
undertones, did not differ much from the triumphal one. Even though it tried 
to question the celebratory nature of the first account, it participated in the 
same logic of the National Narrative. The elementary national discourse upon 
which both versions were based was not necessarily ideological. It was, rather, 
founded on a type of ‘diffuse’ nationalism, one that, according to Benedict 
Anderson’s well-known idea, is a ‘hegemonic cultural construct’. It is important 
to emphasise that without the national narrative and the epic discourses, there 
would not be texts from authors such as Rodolfo Fogwill, Carlos Gamerro, 
Osvaldo Lamborghini, Rodrigo Fresán or Martín Kohan. Ranging from 
allegory to parody, those texts dismantle the national narrative of heroism, epic 
and lament, leaving behind only their fragments. Without the nationalistic 
and territorial discourses, without the literature that was built upon them, The 
Exact Shape of the Islands would not exist either.
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Second, those memories came up as material for interpretation within 
the fictions I was studying. It is precisely the patriotic feeling, the mix of 
nervousness, pride and shame associated with it, that is at stake for some of the 
characters in the testimonies and fictions of the war. Testimonial accounts by 
ex-combatants reference the rapture triggered by the sounds of those patriotic 
songs. Fictional narratives use the patriotic matrix as an opportunity to mock 
and undo the national discourse. 
Third, and most importantly, those memories ended up turning into points 
within the plot of The Exact Shape of the Islands. In one instance in the film, 
the return of one of the ex-combatants to the Islands 25 years later, someone 
else voices part of my story. Carlos refers to me in the third person while he 
talks to his friend Dacio, looks at the camera that I am holding and addresses 
me, partially to verify some of the facts: I was six when the war happened; I 
had carried that inside me since that time; then the moment came for me to 
decide on a research topic and I chose the narratives surrounding the Malvinas. 
In another instance, the actress who speaks for me reads from one of the entries 
in the diary I wrote during my first trip to the Islands in December of 2006: 
my mother was getting me ready to go to school and we heard on the radio the 
news about the sinking of the light cruiser Belgrano. 
Those individual memories, in which the public and the private overlap, 
traverse the entirety of this Malvinas journey from the initial research stages to 
the completion of the documentary. However, what enabled me to become a 
subject in one of the narratives which now belonged to the same type of object 
I had chosen for my research – that is, the corpus of narratives I had been set 
to write about seven years previously – was bearing witness to somebody else’s 
personal memories.
At first, that role as witness was fortuitous. In the initial version of my 
‘Epilogue’ I explained that I had met Carlos and Dacio in the street and 
recognised them as Argentine by the mate they were drinking as they walked 
by me. This and other anecdotes regarding our interactions, and the story 
around how they managed to travel to the Islands 25 years after the war, 
took up an important part of that 15-page chronicle. Interestingly enough, 
I made no mention of the fact that I had filmed them, that a good number 
of our interactions had happened through the camera lens, or that many of 
my impressions of the Islands came out of the dialogues I had had with them. 
In that narrative, I am neither a witness nor a participant: I am something in 
between, an excited and curious observer who interjects and gets involved and 
shows a relative lack of self-awareness. The life events associated with that trip 
were too intimate and overwhelming to make their way into the narrative of a 
doctoral dissertation. Still, bits and pieces made it in, intrusively but timidly.
When the time came for me to rewrite the ‘Epilogue’ to include it in 
my book, I decided to leave out completely the encounter with the two ex-
combatants because that part of the Malvinas journey exceeded the limits of an 
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‘Epilogue’ and had now become The Exact Shape of the Islands. As if the person 
who travelled to the Malvinas in 2006 had been there completely on her own 
and had finally had time to think, the first-person voice in this final version 
is reflective and collected, in sharp contrast with the verbose and tangential 
tendencies of the voice in the initial version.
As soon as I had returned from my first trip to the Islands, I watched the 
eight mini-DV tapes I had recorded. As I moved through the tapes, I could see 
a shift in my role behind the camera: from a fortuitous event, my encounter 
with the ex-combatants was becoming increasingly purposeful. In the first 
tape, the camera is always pointing at Carlos and Dacio and trying to capture 
everything they say, with little or no attention to the space around them. I had 
no idea at first whether the opportunity to film them was going to come up 
again, so I had to get as much material as I could. Certain segments of this first 
tape happen almost in real time, with very few cuts. The two friends are tracing 
back the steps they had taken 25 years earlier when they had arrived at the old 
Stanley airport and walked eight kilometres to the town. They are walking in 
the opposite direction, we all are and this reverse movement is also a movement 
towards the past. The landscape only matters insofar as it can be checked against 
what Carlos and Dacio can remember of it and can ascertain the passing of 
time. What we see is not what I see. It is not even what they see when they are 
being filmed. Instead, what we see is their way of experiencing the difference 
between what they see now and what they remember from having been there 
25 years previously. Of course, when one watches some of these initial scenes 
at the beginning of The Exact Shape of the Islands the narrative frame switches 
and the audience experience a different kind of shift in time and perspective.
As time goes by and the connection between me as witness and them as my 
subjects develops, things start moving in different directions. On the one hand, 
one can see that I started to stage things, asking them to introduce themselves, 
requesting that they walk in certain places, or inviting them to address specific 
questions. On the other hand, as the relationship deepens, it is easier to catch 
them ‘off guard’, that is, to get spontaneous thoughts and reactions that do 
not fit the parameters of what they are used to saying. As they are both active 
militants in organisations of ex-combatants, their ideas about the war and its 
aftermath are clear and articulate. Dacio’s discourse is seamless, reasoned and 
eloquent; as the hours go by, it becomes clear that his sayings are supported 
by two decades of elaborating and formulating the same thoughts repeatedly. 
Carlos’s discourse is less absolute, more hesitant, more spontaneous, more 
complex and flawed and yet, more forthright. In neither case do I need to ask 
them to talk. However, any illusion of the documentarian as mere observer is 
unsustainable: their presence changes the nature of my trip and mine affects 
theirs. At some point, they start giving me feedback on the movie that I am 
making, a film that does not exist and never will. Not as such.
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Territory, space, landscape
The first time around, the baggage I had brought to the Islands was made up 
of the childhood memories discussed above and of all my readings and my 
research. Even though the focus of my work was on the fictions that managed 
to elude the nationalistic mandates, once I was on the Islands there was no 
distance, no parody, no humour, no literary device that could be interposed 
between me and the landscape in front of me: a barren, desolate land; the hills 
where the battles had taken place and war objects had been left behind as in an 
improvised outdoor museum; a small town overflowing with war monuments 
and memorials; the Argentine cemetery with half its tombstones labelled 
‘Soldado argentino sólo conocido por Dios’ [Argentine soldier known only 
to God]. As I explained in the first version of my ‘Epilogue’, war cemeteries 
attempt to emphasise the homogeneity of the war experience by laying out a 
uniform landscape that equalises all soldiers as brothers-in-arms. The Argentine 
cemetery at Darwin takes that to extremes by accentuating the anonymity of 
so many of the graves, emphasising the abandonment suffered by the citizens 
by a state that neglects them and deserts them. As I also explained, only fiction 
could be an effective diversion from such sadness, a ‘refuge’. I could distract 
myself from the scene in front of me by thinking that the days to come would 
bring me to the places where the fictional characters I had studied had set foot. 
This pointed at a contradiction that I would only be able to understand later: 
if before my trip fiction had been the most valid form of discourse to articulate 
the real – that is, the war – fiction was now a diversion or a refuge from that 
reality. 
Figure 5.1. Dacio Agretti and Carlos Enriori at a beach near Stanley, 2006. Photo by 
Julieta Vitullo.
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Two particular tombstones in Darwin stood out for me now: those belonging 
to Private Ramón Orlando Palavecino and Lieutenant Luis Carlos Martella. 
Private Palavecino had been hit by the expansive wave of a bomb dropped close 
by while he was coming down the mountain to gather some projectiles. He 
had died in Carlos’s arms. The second man, described by Carlos as a coward 
who abused his authority and did nothing but pray as the bombs dropped, 
died during the Battle of Two Sisters, fought from 11 to 12 June 1982, two 
days before the Argentine surrender. Both names were in the glossary that I 
handed to directors Dieleke and Casabé as we entered the first stage of our 
five-year film project. After having read the history of the war while I was 
doing my research, these stories Carlos told me made the war less anonymous 
and more personal. I was now participating in the search for these meaningful 
landmarks and bearing witness to stories I had only read about within the 
context of a testimonial genre about which I had had many reservations. Those 
testimonies I had read before were questionable because they bought into the 
national narrative and were framed within the idea of the just cause. A well-
known example of one of these narratives, which I analyse in my book, is the 
film Iluminados por el fuego [Illuminated by Fire], as comfortable and politically 
correct as a film about the war can be. The testimonies I was now witnessing 
switched my perspective, at least for the duration of my trip. After all, there was 
something to be said about the epic matrix that the fictional narratives mocked 
and dismantled. I knew perfectly well how much abuse the conscripted soldiers 
had suffered at the hands of their superiors. But the undertones were not pitiful 
anymore. I was now being drawn into the epic tones of a story in which the 
conscripted soldiers, loyal and brave, were at odds with cowardly and abusive 
officers. More than this, I was letting myself be seduced by it. Even more: what 
was at play was a life drive coming to odds with a death drive.
As I was starting to discover and would later elaborate further, by meeting 
the two ex-combatants I had found a new set of characters. I could witness 
and record their present adventures, hear their past stories and give a specific 
direction to wanderings that would have otherwise been pathless. The appeal 
for me was in the individuality of the experiences I had in front of me, in the 
fact that they were real and that, despite my previous distance and scepticism 
towards anything that had an epic flavour to it, they were an example of 
bravery, courage and camaraderie. My trip turned into an adventure and 
my movements became deliberate. I was participating in their search for the 
traces of what had been there 25 years before. I was looking for their trenches, 
searching for a place to plant a cross that would signal the death of Private 
Palavecino. There is perhaps one and only one moment of reflection in the 
material which made it into The Exact Shape of the Islands. Carlos found the 
place where his friend had died and turned it into a memorial. He has told me 
the story of his friend’s death and poured out 25 years of painful memories 
in front of the camera. I stop to film him and, for the first time, I move the 
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camera away from the character to pan through the landscape. The slow and 
silent panning is interrupted by Carlos’s request that we find our way back to 
town. In the film, what follows is a pivotal moment for the development of the 
plot and the characters.
Nevertheless, generally speaking, a look at the raw material from that trip 
shows that there was little room for reflection during that week. Contrary to the 
solitary and introspective activity I had imagined when I had pictured myself 
strolling around without a clear direction, observing, reflecting and transferring 
my thoughts into a journal, I could only relate to that space by moving through 
it, going from landmark to landmark, from memory to memory, following the 
footprints of a previous journey. When I returned to the Islands four years later 
with the clear purpose of finishing the film whose seeds had been planted on 
the first trip, I brought a different kind of baggage with me. This time it was 
all about my own personal experiences four years previously. This time I was 
searching for my own footprints and memories. Once again, the Malvinas were 
a space to be walked around in search of an older footprint. 
Again, the journey was conceived as a search. However, now I was not the 
one who controlled the way in which the search was conducted and recorded. 
As The Exact Shape of the Islands proposes in one of the opening scenes, I may 
decide whenever I am ready to talk and be the one who sets the stage and the 
tone of my reflections in front of the camera, but the film can also manipulate 
that, interrupting, intervening and controlling. That entire week of shooting 
was characterised by a productive tension between what the directors wanted 
me to say and what I was ready or willing to share, their request to visit certain 
places and my refusal to go there again, the questions they wanted to ask and 
the ones I wanted to answer. That they were close friends who had been present 
for the four years this journey had taken complicated things even more but 
was, in the end, what made it all possible. How else could two male directors 
have approached a story that is deeply feminine and have done justice to it if 
the relationship had not been grounded in trust? The tension continued as we 
watched the raw footage of that second trip and worked on a timeline and a 
series of voice-overs. I refused to accept the scene in which one of the directors 
interrupts a thought I am starting to articulate in my very first appearance in 
front of the camera, six minutes into the documentary. However, the scene was 
left as it was, the first example of a device often utilised in the film in which the 
directors intervene into my speech, contributing to the creation of a puzzle of 
contradicting and complementing voices. 
Simon Schama reminds us that national identity ‘would lose much of 
its ferocious enchantment without the mystique of a particular landscape 
tradition: its topography mapped, elaborated, and enriched as a homeland’ 
(Schama, 1996, p. 15). The general impression according to the Argentine 
nationalist imaginary has always been that the Malvinas represent a sort of 
missing homeland. However, the Malvinas are a territory alienated from 
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most people’s experience which, due to the oft-repeated but erroneous slogan 
‘The Malvinas are Argentine’, has been ingrained in the collective national 
conscience generation after generation. The pro-war discourse that circulated 
largely through most of Argentine society during the weeks of the conflict 
did nothing but echo a formalised textbook account that, decade after decade, 
had promoted the idea of the unredeemed territory. The popularly accepted 
ideas perpetuated by this literature were not based on a formal survey of this 
land, but on journals by 18th- and 19th-century travellers such as Louise-
Antoine de Bougainville and Charles Darwin whose journeys contributed 
to the mystique of the Malvinas–Falklands landscape. If, prior to 1982, the 
Falklands constituted a mythical space that any Argentine schooled under 
successive authoritarian or military regimes had to be ready to defend with his 
own blood, after the war the Islands gained materiality. Whatever remnant of 
immateriality remained in the image of this landscape, nation and nature were 
now merged through the blood spilled onto the soil of the Islands. 
Those perspectives, the mythical and the material, exist under a nostalgic 
imperative, one by which I felt captured upon my first arrival on the Islands. 
According to Svetlana Boym (2001), the great wars and the great nationalisms 
of the 20th century bear a nostalgic longing for a never-owned homeland. 
During that first trip to the Islands, there was no way to escape that feeling 
of nostalgic longing. Clearly, the Islands were not pure nature: they were a 
landscape, that is, an artefact constructed by humans and loaded with meanings 
that did not have a natural correlation to it. 
In these islands, overbearing forms of harshness and barrenness co-exist with 
exuberant forms of life. The king penguins that I found on my two trips to 
the Malvinas had a way of overemphasising that contrast. Forever subject to 
national claims, the Falkland Islands force us to pose a question. This question, 
under the perfectly calculated forms of the exploitation of natural resources 
that has always been at the core of capitalism, should certainly apply to every 
piece of land on Earth: who should be in charge? 
The unfortunate words of the Argentine commander-in-chief who, on 
2 April 1982, greeted the nation with the news that the Malvinas had been 
recovered – ‘The Malvinas are a feeling. We do not care about the oil or the 
strategic position of the Islands’ – resonate today in the current state of affairs 
between Argentina and Great Britain. Of course, everyone cares about the 
oil. But the potential consequences of an ecological disaster caused by oil 
exploitation would render all questions of national claims rather useless.
The wide variety of the narratives about the Malvinas–Falklands War offers 
an interesting example of how the tragedies of history can return repeatedly 
through cultural artefacts. Often the causes and consequences of war have a 
way of being forgotten. In the case of the war that gave rise to my research, 
fiction provides us with plenty of reminders, interrupting the narrative of the 
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media and the social to become knowledge, a specific knowledge about the war, 
with its own characters and rules. 
In his Voyage of the Beagle (1839), Darwin documented his two visits to the 
Falklands in 1833 and 1834. Among other lessons learnt in what he described 
as these ‘miserable islands’ he found a species of fox-like wolf called the warrah, 
the only native land mammal of the Islands, and later remarked: ‘As far as I am 
aware, there is no other instance in any part of the world of so small a mass 
of broken land, distant from a continent, possessing so large an aboriginal 
quadruped peculiar to itself ’ (Darwin, 2011, p. 194). Darwin predicted that 
this gentle animal would not survive human settlement. In effect, the species 
became extinct in 1876, when the last warrah was killed on West Falkland. 
Perhaps the image of the gentle warrah looking at us from a remote place and 
time is more productive, as a nostalgic turn, than the one which incites us, in 
loud nationalistic tones, to long for a home that we never owned. 
It took me two trips and some life-changing experiences to distance my own 
perception of this place from that nostalgic outlook and find in that image of 
the warrah a productive metaphor for trauma, for loss, for longing, for warning 
against the exploitation of nature by humans. My individual experiences, the 
weight of the personal memories associated with that place, paved the way for 
a new topographic outlook. The nostalgic turns of these islands started to show 
a more personal face, different from those ruling the dilemmas of nationalism. 
Figure 5.2. The warrah wolf in a postcard sent from Stanley, 2010. Photo by Matthew 
Smith.
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Are all the inhabitants of these islands not marooned, after all? ‘Dreaming 
of islands’, Gilles Deleuze says in his article ‘The deserted island’, ‘whether with 
joy or in fear, it doesn’t matter – is dreaming of pulling away, of being already 
separate, far from any continent, of being lost and alone – or it is dreaming of 
starting from scratch, recreating, beginning anew’ (Deleuze, 2004, p. 10). The 
scene of me looking at the sea on a sunny day on the beach outside Stanley was 
in fact based on one of my many dreams about the Islands. I had dreamt about 
the Malvinas before and in between trips. I still dream about the Malvinas. The 
exact shape of each dream is different and indefinable, but the underlying story 
is always the same: these islands continue to be an enigmatic place in which to 
start anew.  
A local man of Dutch origin who had left his country 20 years previously 
and went on board ship as a cook, only to fall in love with a Falkland Islander 
and never to return to Holland, told me during my second trip, ‘I’m a castaway’. 
One of the voice-overs introduced towards the end of the film is an entry from 
my 2009 journal in which I describe one of my recurrent dreams: ‘Sometimes 
I’m in a shipwreck and I get to the coast by raft. Once, the sailing boat I was in 
sank in a whirlpool and I never made it. And the dream ended there’.
Had I not been turned into a castaway as well for all those years, marooned 
between my home and those islands, dreaming of sunny days in the Malvinas, 
white sands and a turquoise sea, sailing treacherous waters never to reach land?
Figure 5.4. Julieta at a beach near Stanley during the filming of La forma exacta de las 
islas in 2010. Photo by Leo Hermo.
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6. Malvinas miscellanea: notes on a diary written 
while shooting a film in these remote islands
Edgardo Dieleke
I was born in 1980 and I have no recollections of the Malvinas War in 1982 or the last Argentine dictatorship. I was never lured by the nationalistic discourses or by the sovereignty claims, though I understand their tactics. 
Maybe it has to do with my generation, born at the end of the dictatorship. 
Maybe it has to do with the fact that when I started to make a film on the 
Malvinas I was living in the United States during George W. Bush’s war on 
terror. My fascination with the Malvinas was a little simpler and perhaps 
childish: what are these islands like? Who lives in such an isolated place? I 
became aware of the origins of this fascination only later; once I had finished 
the documentary I shot there, in 2010. Even if the film is related to the war of 
1982, I learned that what took me there was beyond these reasons. 
As a child and teenager, I used to read stories of travellers and pirates in the 
‘Robin Hood’ collection (a series of books by classic authors targeted at young 
readers and famous for their yellow covers). I used to read the books by Emilio 
Salgari, Jules Verne and Robert Louis Stevenson: stories about treasure islands 
and buccaneers in the Caribbean. There were also books on battles and wars 
but they were distant and exotic to me. Perhaps I was actually longing for that 
when I became interested in the Malvinas; maybe I was just longing for a sort 
of return to the exotic stories of my childhood. Back then, as a child, I used 
to collect maps, postcards and stamps of places I had never visited. When I 
returned from the Malvinas these were the only tangible things I brought with 
me. 
One of the main concerns in the film was how to capture the Islands outside 
of the war. In Argentina, the word Malvinas equals the war. I knew our film 
was going to address this but I wanted to be able to show the Islands as well, 
actually to know what the Islands and their people are like. When approaching 
how to do this I realised that the Argentines do not have an insular tradition. 
Even the sea is strange to us. Domingo Faustino Sarmiento wrote that the 
pampa (or the ‘desert’, as he called it) was in a way our ocean and our cities were 
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the islands (or our oases). In fact, he wrote this without knowing the pampas 
all that much. He described and invented a tradition by reading accounts by 
French and English travellers. But I am neither a rural person nor a man from 
the 19th century. 
Even though my gaze might be, like Sarmiento’s, corrupted by foreign 
books and films, islands remain something of an oddity, alien to ‘our’ tradition 
(I recently learned that in other latitudes there is a relatively new academic 
field: ‘Island Studies’). But like everything that is strange to us, I think that the 
Malvinas provoked me and stirred the possibilities of imagination. The Islands 
I knew might then carry an altered perception, a perception by which a barren 
landscape, the arrival of a new settler, or the visit of a ship might turn into an 
extraordinary event. A peasant from the Malvinas who might resemble Benny 
Hill for a British person of the metropolis could also be the son of a legendary 
runaway, a maroon or an outcast. 
Let us now stick to the facts. It was a documentary that made me travel to 
the Islands in November 2010. I had started this project in 2007 with my close 
friends Julieta Vitullo (also a contributor to this volume) and Daniel Casabé 
(with whom I also directed another film). Initially, Julieta was going to be the 
main character in our documentary. It all started with her trip to the Malvinas 
in 2006, where she went to finish a dissertation and where she shot some 
amazing and very spontaneous material: her encounter with two Argentine ex-
combatants. Many things happened between the project and the film, but we 
ended up shooting on the Islands three years after the beginning of the project. 
We were a crew formed of the producer Alejandro Israel, the cinematographer 
Leonardo Hermo and Lalo Guerra as the sound technician. After an almost 
impossible editing process and after a thousand films were set aside, we finished 
the film by the end of 2012. The way I see it now, our documentary is no longer 
just a film about the war or about Julieta’s experience, but instead a film about 
the Islands. I also think this was reflected in the very process of choosing a title: 
we finally settled for The Exact Shape of the Islands. It might be unnecessary to 
say this, but our Islands are far from being precise. I will leave it up to the film 
itself to explain what our intentions were or what is to be found behind the 
title. All that is true should hold a mystery or a secret, so let us stop right here. 
Let me explain, if you will allow me, what I intend to propose in these pages. 
During the week I spent in the Malvinas, there were many things we shot 
that did not make it into the actual film, characters and stories that exceeded 
our focus but remained in my diary, in my notes or just in my memory. In 
addition, there were things and people we did include in the film that somehow, 
probably due to the very nature of the film-image, were reduced to only one 
or two features. Words sometimes allow for more nuances. Here, then, I 
will attempt the following exercise: to recover the spirit of that diary and to 
expand it. What you will read below is a partial recollection of my Islands. The 
Malvinas became for me the ideal source for infinite stories (and maybe this 
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explains how difficult it was to finish the film). When making a documentary, 
one tries somehow to step outside oneself. In the process I learned that this is 
true for both fiction and documentary, even more so when the film is located 
on an island. The people and places you will get to know below are ‘people of 
this world’ but they are more isolated, they are set aside, they live in a more 
autonomous place, a more fictional one. When making a film you start slightly 
to ‘fictionalise’ in the moment you set aside and select certain features and 
attributes of your subjects. More to my point: remote islands could be places 
for new beginnings where many go in need of fashioning a new identity, to be 
somehow better. Moreover, do we not all want to think this is possible?
The Malvinas in colours 
We already knew these islands in Argentina. The problem was that we had seen 
them too much, to the point that few people were interested in them (many 
people asked me why I had decided to spend so much time on a film on the 
Malvinas War). However, the Islands we have seen are made of a collage of 
TV footage from the war and magazine covers showing pictures of 18-year-
old conscripted soldiers. The other images are those of films attempting to 
re-enact the war and its aftermath (there are very few things I hate more than 
fictional re-enactments: on this see the amazing documentary The Act of Killing 
by Joshua Oppenheimer). In all these visual memories, the Malvinas have a 
dark green tone or the black-and-white memory of newspapers. The word 
Malvinas also provokes in many a sort of automatic embarrassment and sad 
feeling. Others give no reaction at all: few things are less empathetic to the 
contemporary sensibility than the Malvinas anthem or the feelings it would 
seek to inspire. Everything changes once you see the Islands from the plane. 
Before we travelled to the Malvinas, many Argentine friends would ask 
me the same questions. Were we authorised to go? How would we get there? 
Once I finished asserting that there were no obstacles, no one showed any real 
intention of visiting. It is possible to go there, but it is still more expensive 
than a plane ticket to Brazil or Peru. There are two ways to get there from 
Buenos Aires, but for our reduced budget, we had only one. Luckily, it was 
also the shortest one. Every week there is a flight by LAN Airlines that leaves 
from Punta Arenas to the Malvinas, but Punta Arenas is in the south of Chile 
(meaning travel to Santiago de Chile first and from there to Punta Arenas). 
Instead, our option, operated by LAN only once a month, was a flight from 
Rio Gallegos in Santa Cruz. Coming from Buenos Aires, we had our stop in 
Rio Gallegos, where we waited for several hours before boarding the plane. We 
spent some hours chatting in a café in the airport where we spotted a group of 
ex-combatants who were making their traditional pilgrimage to the battlefields. 
We shared some mates and exchanged our travel plans but we decided not to 
record them during our week on the Islands. Julieta had already done that 
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on her previous trip and it formed the basis for our film. Hers was the most 
truthful account of ex-combatants that I have seen. In any case, this group of 
friends we met in the airport surprised us on board the plane. 
They were sitting at the back of the aircraft and we would peek at them 
now and then. Suddenly, we saw them trying to speak English with a man in a 
military uniform. After we approached them with Leo (the cinematographer) 
and helped them with the translation, the Argentine ex-combatant became 
excited and started hugging his former enemy. The man had a friendly face 
and a chest filled with medals from Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Cyprus and the 
Malvinas. The scene had the clichés of many TV documentaries except in this 
case taken to excess. The Argentine ex-combatant kissed his brother-in-arms 
with exaggeration, even attempting a kiss on the mouth (in Argentina we say 
‘piquito’, a small kiss on the mouth). Later in the week we found out that the 
‘Argies’ offered the ‘Brits’ a lamb roasted on a cross, following the tradition of 
the gauchos. When we were finally returning to our seats, the captain made the 
announcement. We were beginning the descent into Mount Pleasant Airport. 
Oddly enough, the Chilean airline only mentioned the name of the airport, 
always avoiding all mention of the names Malvinas or Falkland.
Finally, we saw the Islands in colour. We saw light green hills and white 
sands; we saw a turquoise sea and a virgin landscape. I thought I could also 
be in the Caribbean or the Cyclades. Once in the capital town of Port Stanley, 
the island kept revealing its colours: vivid reds, bright yellows and navy blue 
roofs. I even saw red and orange flowers. The summer was approaching and 
the washed out greens and greys of April, May and June were somehow way 
behind, on TV and in old magazines. The military regime had had the idea of 
retaking the Islands just before the beginning of winter. I could not seem to 
find an argument to support such an idea.
Two very different towns
Mount Pleasant is an airport, but more than an airport, it is a military base. 
When you descend from the plane you can see the other kind of planes in the 
distance, jeeps, hangars and a group of not-so-welcoming blondish soldiers 
guarded by their German Shepherds (where were their terriers and bulldogs?). 
Mount Pleasant (oh, such a peaceful name!) is 50 kilometres away from the 
capital, Port Stanley. They both have around two thousand people but Mount 
Pleasant has a cinema and a cricket field and is populated only by military 
people. This large compound is a sort of void zone: why so many soldiers in 
such an isolated spot? What are they hiding? 
On our last night we met three members of the British Special Forces (those 
in charge of counter-terrorism), right outside one of the pubs in Stanley. It 
was 11 p.m. and the pub had just closed. They were desperate: they wanted 
to get drunk and they could not. They had come from Afghanistan and when 
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they realised we were ‘Argies’ they stressed that no one really cares about the 
Malvinas or Argentina for that matter. ‘You’re just pawns’, one of them told 
us. I did not say it, but I remember thinking that I did not mind keeping it 
that way. When I saw those men I could not help but imagine them screaming 
angrily at night, with their faces painted black, attacking the positions of 
18-year-old conscripts. I think I started to grasp how difficult it actually is to 
understand the fear and the pain of others. Having been through a war, having 
witnessed the death of others, having survived that, I started to think, makes 
you an Island-type of person. You set aside a traumatic experience; you separate 
that fear from your continental part or you invent a new island. There is also 
the possibility of thinking that there is a community of people in pain who 
always return to their own metaphoric island. I believe that we all share a larger 
or smaller personal island. The thing is that the islands of the ex-combatants 
resemble the Malvinas: they are as remote and barren as it gets. 
There is only one weekly flight to the Islands and so you are forced to stay 
an entire week. The visitors who make it here are divided into two large groups: 
war tourism and eco-tourism. That is to say, on one side the soldiers, their 
families and film-makers who travel here to visit the cemeteries and battlefields. 
On the other side, bird-watchers and penguin enthusiasts: the Malvinas have 
royal penguins, the Emperor type can be spotted on their beaches. Of course, 
we spent an entire afternoon with them (before reading Sandokan I used to 
collect a series of pictures of animals with scientific descriptions called ‘Safari 
Club’). The isolation that defines the Malvinas is not just geographical. It 
is intensified by politics. The Argentine government, with the support of 
its regional allies, maintains a blockade. Everything comes from Europe. In 
2010, the price of two tomatoes was around seven dollars. In any case, the 
connections with the mainland persist (‘mainland’ is the word they use to refer 
to Argentina, the unnamable). Anyway, geographical proximity still beats any 
form of nationalism. The first islander with whom I spoke was in the airport, 
working on the luggage carousel. He was in his sixties, planning his retirement. 
His daughter was majoring in tourism in a private university in Córdoba. 
England was too far and too expensive for his salary.
After passing through customs, we board a sort of van and head for Stanley. 
The road consists of 50 kilometres of undulating hills with not even a bush. 
Once in the town we check in at Celia Stewart’s. She owns a small and beautiful 
house that she runs as a bed and breakfast: too many sausages, baked beans and 
eggs for our regular diet but perfect for an intense shooting week. Celia seemed 
very reserved, but Stanley is a very small town. As the days went on, Celia 
started to leave us messages that were passed onto her by different people who 
found out who we were. They wanted to be in the documentary. We started to 
meet some of them as long as our shooting plan allowed us. 
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Oil in the African islands
There is a small, neat office located in Stanley that guides the possible investor 
on oil matters and the curious tourist. On the main street, right across from 
the post office and the red phone booth, you will find the Department of 
Mineral Resources. It seems that the bottom of the ocean around the Malvinas 
has oil. The problem, so far, is that it is very expensive to extract oil from such 
depths. However, according to this department that task is not impossible. We 
decided to find out about this and shot an interview with a person working 
there. A very agreeable blonde woman received us; she was in her fifties. Later 
we discovered she was a schoolteacher. A fellow teacher, I thought. Maybe that 
is why I liked her. Despite this, her information was suspicious. I know almost 
nothing about geology but at that office (as well as in the local museum) they 
presented a pretty absurd theory on the formation of the Islands. According 
to some researchers the Malvinas were part of Gondwana, thus linked to what 
today is South Africa. It is a convenient theory to avoid any Argentine claim 
to sovereignty. According to a different group of researchers, in the event of an 
oil spill Argentine shores would be safe. This is extremely difficult to believe, 
though in any case I liked the teacher. She was living in England when the war 
started and in that moment she decided to return home and work as a teacher. 
How many Argentine teachers are willing to fight Sarmiento’s battle in such 
an isolated town?
Brief notes on ‘war tourism’ 
We needed a proper vehicle to be able to visit the battleground and the positions 
where the main characters of our film had fought. We had hired a guide, Tony, 
who is a native of the Islands and who runs a small tourism company. We went 
with him and his friends on almost all the excursions: Mount Two Sisters, 
Goose Green, as well as the Argentine cemetery. I liked Tony: he was affable 
and he really knew his work. He had done a similar job with larger film and TV 
crews from all over the world. I could not find out much about his life other 
than the fact that he was married to a Brazilian woman and that they often 
travelled to Buenos Aires. 
Our first important excursion with Tony was to Mount Two Sisters. Most of 
the material that Julieta had shot on her first trip had been recorded there. Our 
film combines what we shot on this return visit with the original material from 
Julieta’s recordings in 2006, made with a home-video camera. This Mount is an 
important space in both recordings and I had a sense of odd familiarity when I 
was there on Two Sisters. It felt like a return because we were literally following 
and returning over her footsteps. We somehow knew those steps because of 
the number of times we had seen Julieta’s footage. When we were editing her 
material, Daniel Casabé and I ended up repeating and becoming awkwardly 
MALVINAS MISCELLANEA 133
familiar with all the possible tones in the voices of the subjects of the film. 
Finally being on the Mount was an exciting moment and at the same time felt 
like a repeated experience. Despite this sensation, right when I thought I was 
recognising my steps we got lost. Luckily, Tony was there with us.
After walking for many hours on Two Sisters, we could still see the effects of 
the war. We had seen several crosses honouring Argentine soldiers, pieces of a 
mortar and other weaponry. We also saw several holes in the ground caused by 
the bombings. In any case, I was expecting that and I have seen those images 
before. What caught my attention was the overwhelming presence of shoes 
and cheap boots. They were scattered around the Argentine trenches (actually 
known as fox’s lair). This footwear was relatively new; it was impossible that it 
had belonged to the soldiers. Later, I also saw that many remaining objects of 
the war kept appearing, something particularly odd on such a windy mount. 
I became suspicious and cynical. Was all that planted for visitors to be able to 
experience the war at least partially, even after so many years?
The ‘Flying Dutchman’
I remember the legend of the Flying Dutchman, the story of a ghost ship 
that has haunted sailors since the 17th century. It is a Dutch ship that can 
never make port and is condemned to sail the oceans forever. It announces 
tragedies to those who encounter it at sea. It was a popular legend but also 
an apt metaphor: that of a wanderer, the one who never finds rest. In Stanley 
we met an extraordinary man, a Dutchman, living far away from his native 
Utrecht. We interviewed Rob Yssel towards the end of the week. He was a 
fatalist. He understood fate almost like a character from a Borges short story. 
The day he set foot on the Malvinas was the day he encountered his destiny, the 
day he became who he was.
Rob had lived many lives. He had lived in cities like Amsterdam before 
coming to these shores. He had an indefinite age, a look that revealed the 
excesses of his youth combined with melancholy. He had lost Jane, his lifelong 
partner (his ‘other half ’ were his words), in a car accident in the Argentine 
Patagonia less than a year before. He had arrived on the Islands in 1984, when 
he was a cook working in a merchant ship. We may venture to suggest that 
he was tired of many noisy and crowded ports. The day he landed on the 
Malvinas he met Jane and he became a sort of stranded man, in his own words. 
When we met him he was in pain, anguished by his loss and surrounded by 
Jane’s possessions. She had been the archivist of the Falklands and her books 
were still open in the study, on the sofa, even in the kitchen. Her presence 
was almost asphyxiating; I could not imagine that constant mourning process, 
remembering every second his ‘other half ’. I peered into one of the rooms and I 
could see her tombstone lying on the floor. I think he was not ready to inscribe 
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anything on it, as if that piece of stone would force him to stop mourning, 
would make him focus on the unloving task of forgetting her.  
The Malvinas have many characters like Rob (maybe, again, this is just my 
projection). Many men and women living there had made difficult choices; 
they have learned the power of acceptance. Many have endured hostile winds 
and have chosen isolation. We recorded an interview that lasted almost two 
hours and then we continued talking in Stanley’s only restaurant, the Malvina 
House Hotel. That night all of us felt the need to drink a little more wine 
than we should have. It was getting too late for us but Rob prevented us from 
leaving: we were his new friends on an island with too many repeating faces. 
We had to say goodnight around 2 a.m., only three or four hours of sleep ahead 
of us. He said goodbye with a pessimistic prediction: ‘If they find oil in the 
islands, it is the end. But if not, it’s also the end’.
The children of the war
Today we shot different scenes in the town. We also did an interview not 
knowing if it was going to fit in the editing room (this particular interview we 
finally had to discard, unlike Rob’s, though it was also a powerful interview). 
The man in question in this case was John, who found out about our plans and 
left a message for our producer, Alejandro Israel. Before the interview, we knew 
that he had been ten years old and thus had a unique recollection of the war. 
We had also noticed in him a sort of distant and suspicious look. We finally 
set up a conversation between him and Julieta, first recording them walking in 
the streets of Stanley and then sitting on the bench in a square. The dialogue 
started with ordinary topics. He told us how life in the camp had been (camp 
is a word they use there to refer to the countryside, borrowed from the Spanish 
campo). From the beginning, he wanted the British history of the islands to go 
on record. As in the Argentine version, and as in many nationalist discourses, 
it has many cracks and holes, papered over with anachronistic emphases (small 
lives at the time become heroic ones, thanks to retrospective analysis). John 
defended the argument of ‘the one who saw them first’. According to the 
British, the first to set foot on the islands was Captain John Davis, who was 
stranded in the islands in 1592. However, and very politely, Julieta contrasted 
this with conflicting views. Thus, she mentioned that the first map in which 
the islands appear is from 1522, based on a Portuguese expedition; also, that 
there are claims that the Yaghan people – should we say nation? – had arrived 
before the Europeans. 
In any case, the first settlement was actually French. John was not much 
concerned with historical (or geographical) accuracy. Nationalism is somehow 
a form of belief. John was at the time particularly angry at the Argentine 
government and its policy on the Falklands. At the beginning, we looked 
suspicious to him, just for being Argentines. He needed to say to us how badly 
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the Argentine military had treated them, them being the islanders and the 
Argentine troops. We did not like his extreme nationalism, but soon enough 
we understood he was speaking from a distant place.
When the war began, when the Argentine troops were preparing their 
positions – according to John – a group of children and some women were 
locked in a big barn near the rural town of Darwin. This barn was his experience 
of the war. He spent almost two months locked in there. This barn, John 
continued, was close to Goose Green, the site of an important battle. He could 
hear the planes; he got used to the explosions. He insisted he was poorly fed 
and ill-treated. He also said that the young soldiers were hungry as well. There 
was something he had had to go through during those days which was still 
there, that he could not tell us. Though I could not know exactly what it was, I 
understood he would not be able to name it; most of him remained in the barn. 
As he spoke he started mumbling, getting more and more annoyed. He kept 
repeating, randomly that the Argentine government should stop ‘bullying’ the 
islanders. He took this personally: the exact phrase he would repeat was: ‘Don’t 
bully me. Don’t bully me’.
Then, after we thought the message was maybe too clear, he described the 
end of the war. Once the Argentine troops had lost the battle of Goose Green 
he could leave the barn. Once he was out, he had to see corpses on the ground, 
mutilated soldiers, young men screaming and crying. After that, there was a 
long silence and we continued to shoot only to ease the transition, but that was 
all he had to say. He added, though, that we should not change his testimony. 
He was tired of Argentine journalists changing their versions. We partially 
betrayed him, his scene did not fit into our film, but this is one of the reasons 
for this text.
New settlers
A half-hour pause in the shooting. We had finished some still shots of the town 
and in that break we went with Daniel to take a walk. Then we witnessed an 
ordinary sample of what this island is. We started to see some movement in the 
facilities of the fire fighters. It was like a performance. There were four of them. 
Two of them looked like astronauts; we had never seen a suit like that before. 
The costumes were extremely colourful: pink, violet, something like that. These 
two fire fighters walked like astronauts, practising, getting acquainted with the 
suit. Their colleagues were teasing them. We approached them and talked a 
little. One of them was from Chile and lived there permanently. He told us 
they even had a helicopter at their disposal.
Later that day we went to the supermarket. It was like any other chain 
supermarket. A sort of non-place but a more expensive one. It also had a coffee 
shop, one of the few in town, a sort of meeting place to chat and read the latest 
royal gossip. The hot topic was the wedding of Prince William. The fiction 
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of the royal family seemed more powerful there. The supermarket also had 
a clothing shop. Most of the employees there were dark-skinned, and their 
ethnicity was not familiar to me, not from when I lived in New York or in 
my four months in London in 2000. They were from Saint Helena, another 
remote island in the South Atlantic, another absurd colony. These relocated 
islanders were the descendants of African and Indian slaves (who, in their 
turn, had also been relocated there). As in the Malvinas, Saint Helena had 
no native population. The difference was that at present the Malvinas offered 
better options for employment: Stanley has one of the highest GDP per person 
(and too many subsidies for very few people). Inside the supermarket, in the 
coffee store, we interviewed a young mother (she was in her twenties). She was 
blonde, with pinkish skin, a bit overweight. All her needs were met in Stanley, 
though she seemed bored. I could imagine her living a completely different life 
in a big city.
How to behave in cemeteries 
Today we visited the Argentine cemetery in Darwin, a name that was given 
on account of the closest settlement (actually a group of houses only, several 
barns; John was probably held in one of these). The name was given after the 
visit of Charles Darwin in 1833, right after the British re-occupation (was 
science behind all this mess?). Brief digression: Darwin described during his 
visit a species called the ‘warrah’, a mixture of the fox and the wolf. The name 
was an English version of the Guarani word ‘aguará’, a wolf from the north-
eastern region of Argentina. Darwin noticed that the warrah was too sociable, 
not afraid of men, and thus predicted with success its extinction. I like the 
warrah as a metaphor for the Islands’ status as well as a symbol of the rewriting 
of national traditions. Its name was perhaps given by the implanted gauchos 
(who in their turn were a prior iteration of the St. Helenans: gauchos and 
Charrua Indians were among the first forced settlers). On an infinite turn, 
these gauchos also ran ‘cuadreras’ (horse races from the pampas), still popular 
today in summer celebrations in the Malvinas. This was not a brief digression 
after all. 
Let us return now to the deceased in the name of God and the Nation. 
The Argentine cemetery at Darwin was certainly one of the most important 
locations for our film. However, we ended up using very few images shot there. 
What I registered in my notes after this visit was something that the camera 
was not able to capture. Indeed, the cemetery in itself is overwhelming. On 
a deserted and barren hill you see 237 white crosses. We experienced there 
something difficult to convey. 
We were there for more than two hours. We first took some wide-angle 
shots, then some close shots of the graves and the Virgin, then a sort of scene 
with Julieta that was a complete failure. This scene was a sort of conversation, 
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Julieta speaking about the war and myself and Daniel doing a lousy job with 
our questions. We started to feel a sense of unease; Julieta started to answer in 
a bad tone and I became angry at her, somehow frustrated. We started blaming 
each other. The scene had no truth, no emotion, there was nothing going on. 
In the meantime, Leo, operating the camera, instinctively moved away from 
the dialogue; there was nothing to shoot there. It was a disaster. We were there 
in what was supposed to be one of the more significant places for our film and 
we blew it. 
Then our producer called for a break. We resumed after a while but we were 
too tired, too frustrated. I remember that Tony, our guide, had told us that the 
constant wind made everything more difficult. Later that night we all talked 
about what had happened in the cemetery. We all were somehow angry, though 
we were supposed to be in control. We had been walking in circles over 237 
dead men. Half of them were still unidentified. They only had a carving on 
the tombstone that said ‘Argentine soldier known only to God’. I have never 
seen ghosts or talked to the dead but I guess that being in such a barren and 
windy place is pretty close to that feeling. I understood later that this feeling 
has nothing to do with the fact of being in a cemetery but with the kind of 
cemetery it was. 
On the other hand, Stanley has the most beautiful cemetery I have ever seen 
(I like Recoleta Cemetery at Buenos Aires as well). This is a simple cemetery, 
no luxury or excessive décor. What it does have in excess is the wind. We went 
there on a sunny day, on our very first day. It is slightly elevated and you 
access the place using a staircase that has a military monument to honour the 
43 Islanders killed in the world wars. Once you enter the cemetery, you can 
see ten to 15 rows of graves and crosses with a view facing the bay. In the 
distance you can see the Mounts, even the Two Sisters. The graves reveal the 
origins and antiquity of the settlers: Butler 1885; Clarke 1851; Faulkner 1860; 
Lellman 1889; Pauloni, no date. While we were shooting there (we did include 
these images), we could see three kids shouting and jumping in the yard of a 
neighbouring house. They shared the same view of the bay.
Short scene: how to behave in a pub
The Globe is the name of one of the most popular pubs in Stanley. Then there 
are Deano’s, the Victory Bar and Rose Bar, run down by the wind and the sea. 
Many things may happen in a pub. Of these three pubs, the Globe, starting 
with its name, attempts to be a sort of imperial pub. It looks like a bar from the 
19th century. It is filled with all the possible variations of the British colours. It 
also looks like a theme-bar, like a Hard Rock Café type of bar, though in this 
case the ‘theme’ is nationalism. There were very few customers, not more than 
five or six, and they clearly knew who we were. It was three or four o’clock in 
the afternoon and we were celebrating the end of our shooting. We had our 
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beers and we made a toast. We had no idea what was going to happen in the 
editing room but we were happy. Right after that, the barman or someone in 
charge decided to play a video for us. We started to hear God Save the Queen 
followed by some images of the war. I need to say that overall everyone on the 
Islands was very kind to us, except for that little provocation. Oddly enough 
(or may be not), the man behind the bar was not English.
A friendly farewell with Kelper music
After the scene in the pub we shot some additional scenes, some still shots in 
town taking advantage of the good light. We had few hours left on the Islands. 
I remember during all that week my friend Daniel insisting on visiting the 
lighthouse at Cape Pembroke, near Stanley. Finally, the opportunity presented 
itself in a very friendly manner. 
Rod is Celia Stewart’s neighbour; he lives right across from her bed and 
breakfast and takes care of her wonderful winter garden. We hardly got to 
know him until this last day. He offered us a ride to the lighthouse in his Land 
Rover. Daniel, Alejandro (the producer), Leo and I were fortunate that the rest 
of the crew were too tired to go (or was it like this after some negotiation?). Rod 
gave us the most amazing farewell possible. The sunset was beginning when we 
arrived and we shot some beautiful takes of the shores and the Mounts in the 
distance. Unfortunately, Rod did not fit into our film and we did not know 
how to thank him for all his generosity. 
On the half-hour ride to the lighthouse, we learned that Rob had come to 
the Islands two years after the war. He was working for the government and 
made a life here. He and his late wife would teach dance lessons and were 
happy with the simple life of Stanley. I admired this possibility of living in such 
a place. I did live for some years in a small town but ended up moving. Not 
only had Rod encountered a happy life here but he had also decided to stay. 
He had relatives in England (I think a daughter and a son) but he could not 
imagine himself living anywhere else, even after many years as a widower. After 
talking for a time and telling us a bit about his life, he decided to play a cassette. 
He did not say what it was. We could not believe our ears. 
At first, we heard the sound of a guitar in the style of country music. The 
singer had a British accent though it sounded Irish or even like American 
country music. It was joyful music though the lyrics had some of the rural 
anguish you find in many folk genres. When I started to understand some of the 
places mentioned I was amazed. It was Kelper music. The singer was referring 
to Mount Two Sisters or even his life in the camp as well as his difficulties with 
a beloved woman. We were seeing an amazing sunset accompanied by Kelper 
music. All of us immediately wanted to use that music in our film. We could 
not think of a better way to start capturing the Islands in a different manner 
than using this strange music. 
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The first thing we did once we were back in town was to record this Kelper 
album by Rock Berntsen called White Grass Memories. The week in the Malvinas 
could not have had a better ending. Before returning to the bed and breakfast, 
Rod bought us some beers in a pub. It was a warm night and there was a full 
moon. I think we were all very happy that night. After many attempts, I finally 
managed to get in touch with Rock Berntsen, the Kelper musician. This was 
several months after we had been to the Islands. I told him that we desperately 
wanted to include some of his songs in the film. I explained to him that our 
film was also about the possibility of a dialogue and the idea that there is more 
to show about these islands than their sovereignty. However, he decided not to 
play along, to keep the music only for the locals. This made me sad. However, 
I am glad I heard the songs and that now, some years later, they remain part of 
a diffuse memory of that trip. 
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7. Malvinas, civil society and populism: 
a cinematic perspective*
Joanna Page
Argentine films on the Malvinas War often turn the story of an international conflict into one about human rights. They position themselves within a much larger archive of images depicting the brutality of Argentina’s 
most recent military dictatorship, the regime that ordered the invasion of the 
Islands in 1982. Since the return to democracy, the imperative to uncover and 
denounce the military’s crimes towards civilians – whether committed on the 
Islands or on the continent – has forestalled other ways of remembering the 
war that do not focus on the reckless adventurism and violence of the armed 
forces. Films on the Malvinas draw heavily on the themes and discourses of 
films about the dictatorship, not least in their polarised representation of civil 
society as innocent victim or (more rarely) guilty accomplice of the regime.
This essay discusses two recent documentaries by Julio Cardoso that provide 
an alternative, if no less schematic, perspective. Where post-dictatorship films 
– especially those made by children of the disappeared – express rupture and 
disillusionment with regard to the ideology of left-wing militants in the 1970s 
and particularly their belief in a popular revolution, Cardoso’s films Locos de la 
bandera (2005) and Malvinas: Viajes del bicentenario (2010) trace continuities 
and look for a common denominator. Far from representing civil society as 
victim or accomplice, these films transform it into the pueblo, the bedrock 
of Argentine society, bearer of popular and nationalist values and staunch 
in its defence of freedom against the nation’s elite and its imperial invaders. 
A strategic appeal to discourses of the 1960s and 1970s enables Cardoso to 
construct a revisionist reading of the nation’s history in which the Malvinas 
* This essay was written in 2012 as a reflection on debates surrounding the 30th anniversary 
of the Malvinas War. For this reason, it does not include a discussion of films produced since 
that date, and refers to the political context of the Kirchner government in place at the time 
in Argentina. A Spanish version of this essay was published as ‘Malvinas, sociedad civil y 
populismo’ in María Angélica Semilla Durán, comp., Relatos de Malvinas: Paradojas en la 
representación e imaginario nacional (Villa María, Córdoba, Argentina: Eduvim, 2016), pp. 
301–31.
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War is extricated from the context of the dictatorship’s crimes against its own 
citizens and treated as one more battle in the long and ongoing struggle of the 
pueblo against oppression. This version of history is just as politically determined 
as the other. However, by revealing blind spots in what have now become 
hegemonic representations of the war, these films do make a contribution to 
the important task of bringing greater diversification to post-war memory.
Cinema and desmalvinización 
Many consider that a process of ‘desmalvinización’ (demalvinisation) held sway 
after Argentina’s defeat in the war over the Malvinas in 1982. The term has been 
used to refer to the official silence imposed upon the returning soldiers and the 
state’s reluctance to provide compensation, as well as to a more insidious kind of 
social invisibility with which the war was cloaked as a humiliating misadventure 
conducted by a brutal regime from which society wished to distance itself. 
Vicente Palermo argues, however, that while the Malvinas war was treated in 
this manner, this has allowed the Malvinas cause, the claim to sovereignty, to 
flourish unquestioned, as – in the often-repeated phrase, possibly coined by 
García Márquez – ‘una causa justa en manos bastardas’ [a just cause in the 
hands of bastards] (Palermo, 2007, p. 352). While blame for the war could be 
laid squarely at the door of the dictatorship, the wider cause, and the specific 
version of nationalism underpinning it, have remained impervious to critical 
interrogation (p. 283).
Cinema since the return to democracy in 1983 has certainly colluded in 
reducing the Malvinas War to just another arena for the dictatorship’s brutality. 
Many films of the early post-dictatorship period in particular were primarily 
concerned with bringing to light the extent of the human rights abuses 
perpetrated by the armed forces. The political urgency of this task led in many 
cases to a wholesale demonising of military officers who had subjected terrified 
and demoralised conscripts to torture and abuse on the Islands just as they had 
persecuted dissidents and civilians at home. From the very beginning, however, 
it was clear that the denunciation of military violence in the context of the 
Malvinas War provoked more complex responses from those who had fought in 
the war. The portrayal of the conscripts in Los chicos de la guerra (Bebe Kamín, 
1984) as victims of their military superiors – frightened, inexpert adolescents 
press-ganged into an absurd battle – provoked angry responses from many ex-
combatants. The soldiers’ own personal convictions about the purpose of the 
war entirely disappear in the film’s representation of a conflict that seems only 
to take place between conscripts and officers. As Rosana Guber states, ‘Los 
británicos sólo proveen el escenario donde se despliega el drama argentino’ 
[The British only provide the stage on which the Argentine drama unfolds] 
(Guber, 2004, p. 88).
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This sidelining of the nature of the war as a territorial dispute with Great 
Britain is repeated two decades later in Tristán Bauer’s Iluminados por el 
fuego (2005). What have now become stereotypical images of the war are 
paraded enthusiastically past us. The conscripts are again depicted as terrified, 
demoralised and too caught up in the business of survival to be able to conjure 
up any patriotic sentiments; their sufferings – hunger, frostbite, exhaustion – 
are exacerbated by a lack of proper equipment and clothing, as well as the brutal 
treatment by their officers. While much truth is to be found in these allegations, 
Iluminados por el fuego (like Los chicos de la guerra) simply repackages the war 
as a set of divisions within Argentina to which Britain appears to play the role 
of mere accessory. Full blame is placed on the dictatorship: as Esteban, the 
ex-combatant protagonist reflects, ‘la improvisación, el sadismo y la traición 
de los que habían torturado a su propio pueblo nos habían llevado a la derrota’ 
[improvisation, sadism and the treachery of those who tortured their own 
people had led us to defeat]. The war continues today, but only in the sense 
that in the film’s present (the financial crisis of 2001–2002) citizens face the 
need to fight for their survival again, betrayed once again by the state, this 
time through its failure to provide social and economic protection. This rather 
crude analogy is underlined by Gastón Pauls, the actor who plays Esteban, 
speaking about the film: ‘También habla de la guerra cotidiana en el hoy, de 
una guerra que continúa. Una guerra que todavía tienen los ex combatientes y 
una guerra que tienen los cartoneros, los pibes que están limpiando los vidrios 
en la esquina’ [The film is also about the everyday war of here and now, a war 
that is still going on. A war that the ex-combatants are still involved in, as are 
the rubbish-pickers and the kids washing car windscreens on the street corner] 
(Ranzani, 2005). 
The lyrics of León Gieco’s song ‘La memoria’, which plays in full at the 
end of the film while we see Esteban paying homage to the dead in Darwin 
Cemetery, place the war within a much broader (and over-generalised) history 
of violence and exploitation in Latin America. Both Gieco and Bauer ignore 
the wider significance of the Malvinas claim within the national imaginary, 
reducing the war to a cruel and expensive mistake from which the nation 
should move on as best it can. The discourse of closure in Iluminados por el 
fuego – Esteban returns to the Islands to ‘cerrar la historia’ [bring the story to 
a close] and exorcise the ghosts of the past – ironically announces the film’s 
own role in closing off a number of potentially productive points of conflict 
or tension in memory of the Malvinas. Iluminados por el fuego provides a clear 
example of the way in which reducing the war to an irresponsible adventure on 
the part of the dictatorship effectively erases the ongoing Malvinas cause, the 
historical claim to sovereignty over the Islands that has not yet been resolved. 
I turn now to another film, also released in 2005, which also appropriates 
discourses of memory developed in the post-dictatorship context. However, it 
does so precisely to mark a clear divergence from these and to reintroduce the 
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Malvinas as a national cause that cannot be reduced to the war fought by the 
military regime in 1982. 
Locos de la bandera and the transmission of political thought 
La causa Malvinas es única, porque no sólo es extremadamente significativa 
para todos, sino también y principalmente, porque tiene el poder temible 
de hacernos creer que posee casi los mismos significados para todos 
(Palermo, 2007, p. 22).
[The Malvinas cause is unique, not only because it is extremely significant 
for everyone, but also, and chiefly, because it possesses the fearsome power 
of making us believe that it signifies almost the same for everyone.]
Julio Cardoso’s Locos de la bandera adopts the perspective of the son of a 
soldier killed in action, now grown to be the same age as his father when he 
died. As I shall show, the film establishes a clear dialogue with productions 
since 2000 which have been directed by the children of militants disappeared 
under the military regime, including Papá Iván (María Inés Roqué, 2000), 
Historias cotidianas (Andrés Habegger, 2000), Los rubios (Albertina Carri, 
2003), HIJOS, el alma en dos (Carmen Guarini and Marcelo Céspedes, 2005) 
and M (Nicolás Prividera, 2007). One of the key differences between Locos 
de la bandera and these other films, however, is to be found in the way that it 
imagines and performs inter-generational transmission. If the films made by 
children of the disappeared bear witness to a deep rupture in the transmission 
of political thought between the older generation and the younger, Cardoso’s 
film demonstrates a much greater continuity between them. While Locos de 
la bandera is successful in resituating the war within the broader historical 
framework of the Malvinas cause, it goes to the other extreme by obscuring 
its embedding within the context of the dictatorship. The film makes a 
contribution to contemporary debates about the relationship between the 
Malvinas and a resurgent nationalism by considering what form patriotism 
might take in democracy; however, it reinforces many of the long-standing 
tenets of Argentine nationalism which, for Palermo and others, have remained 
unquestioned as a consequence of the excision of the war from the cause itself.
Locos de la bandera was made in collaboration with the Comisión de 
Familiares de Caídos en Malvinas e Islas del Atlántico Sur [Commission of 
Relatives of the War Dead in the Malvinas and Islands of the South Atlantic]. 
As one might expect, therefore, the film centres on the experience of mourning 
the death of a son, father, husband or brother in the war, and on the importance 
of acts of commemoration. But it moves beyond registering the legacies of loss, 
defeat and silencing to mount a searching investigation of the meaning of the 
war for the present. Neither its propositional form, nor its emotional weight, 
nor its political seriousness would seem to invite comparison with the playful 
Los rubios, released two years earlier, a film that has been criticised for casting 
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both the violence of the dictatorship and 1970s militant activism in a frivolous 
or over-subjective light (Kohan, 2004; Sarlo, 2005, pp. 146–51). However, 
there are surprising points of convergence between the two films. Tracing these 
will throw into relief the very different approach taken in Locos de la bandera 
to the task of memory.
Both films explore the second-generation perspective of someone who was 
a small child during the dictatorship but is now of a similar age to the parents 
who were disappeared (in Carri’s case) or the father who died in combat (in 
the case of Locos de la bandera). Both hover between testimony and fictional 
performance: Carri employs an actress to play her part in many of the scenes; 
and an actor is also used in Locos de la bandera, in this case a composite figure 
given the generic name ‘Juan’ to signify that he stands for many children in a 
similar position: his story is made up of the testimonies and experiences of a 
generation. Echoing some of the distancing devices used in Los rubios, Juan 
is present on screen but always silent: we hear his questions and reflections 
only in the form of a voice-over. Both films contain fictional reconstructions 
of the past, but ones in which the mimetic illusion is deliberately destroyed: 
in Los rubios, the abduction of Carri’s parents is performed by Playmobil 
figures filmed in stop-motion animation and the film includes shots of the 
director telling her protagonist how to play her role; in Locos de la bandera, 
the verisimilitude of the re-enacted war scenes (performed by actors and shot 
in Río Gallegos) is undermined by the chronologically impossible intrusion of 
Juan into these shots.
Both films adopt a highly reflexive approach, insisting on the mediated 
quality of memory. In a voice-over at the beginning of the film, ex-combatants 
in Locos explain that their memories take the form of brief images, not 
‘recuerdos propios’ [memories of their own] or ‘un recuerdo completo’ 
[a complete memory] but ‘pequeñas imágenes sueltas […]. Puedo contar 
anécdotas pero no son mías, yo sé que no son mías’ [brief, disconnected images 
[…]. I can tell anecdotes but they’re not mine, I know they’re not mine]. In 
Los rubios, Carri – through Analía – acknowledges in a very similar way that 
she is unable to distinguish between her own personal memories and those of 
her sisters: ‘Lo único que tengo es mi recuerdo difuso, contaminado por todas 
estas versiones’ [The only thing I have is vague memories, contaminated by all 
these versions]. The films also establish a similar mise-en-scène for the child’s 
detective work. Like Carri’s actress, Juan writes in a notebook surrounded by 
documents, photos and other objects from the past. Recorded testimonies play 
in the background while the camera focuses on the protagonist in the present 
who, like us, is listening, watching and trying to fit everything together. 
For different reasons, these films do not share the denunciatory stance 
adopted by some of the other children of disappeared militants, evident in 
productions such as HIJOS, el alma en dos. Carri’s film is not a manifesto 
against the crimes of the past and the impunity of the present, but a more 
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personal exploration of the impact of loss and absence. Cardoso explicitly 
warns us against the dangers of dividing society too neatly into ‘goodies’ and 
‘baddies’. As images of murky water and foggy landscapes fill the screen, Juan 
reminds us: ‘Hay quienes necesitan inventarse un pasado transparente, donde 
sólo haya buenos y malos’ [There are those who need to invent a transparent 
past for themselves, inhabited only by the good and the evil]. He goes on to 
observe sagely: ‘Por lo general, los que recuerdan así se anotan siempre del 
lado de los buenos’ [In general, those who remember in that way always chalk 
themselves up on the side of the good].
It is evident, too, that Locos positions itself in dialogue with many films 
about the dictatorship in its strategic appeal to the lexicon of human rights 
discourses. One mother interviewed, whose son’s body was not recovered, 
speaks of the difficulty of mourning without a body and claims that her son 
‘es un desaparecido’ [is one of the ‘disappeared’]. On one of the official visits 
family members have been able to make to the Argentine cemetery in the 
Malvinas, one of the mothers tries to comfort another who does not know 
which of the many unidentified crosses marks the spot where her son was 
buried. Consciously or unconsciously, in telling her that ‘todos son nuestros 
hijos’ [they are all our children], she echoes one of the key declarations of the 
Madres de la Plaza de Mayo. These appropriations are fully part of the film’s 
project to construct the Malvinas as an axis for possible national reintegration. 
However, despite the number of discourses it shares with post-dictatorship 
cinema, Locos de la bandera insists that the soldiers who went to the Islands 
were not mere victims of an abusive regime fighting to retain credibility: 
instead, they went as protagonists of a military venture, serving a popular, 
national cause, namely the claim to sovereignty over the Islands. This shift 
belongs to a diversification of discourses that, for Federico Lorenz, became 
evident on the 20th anniversary of the war in 2002, when ‘[l]os hombres que 
habían combatido se transformaron en modelos a imitar’ [the men who had 
fought became models to imitate] (Lorenz, 2012, p. 374). The early 2000s 
saw a similar shift in the representation of 1970s militants, restoring agency 
to figures previously depicted merely as victims of state terror (Jelin, 2007, p. 
337). Films made by the children of disappeared militants, such as Papá Iván, 
M and Historias cotidianas (Andrés Habegger, 2000) have focused precisely on 
their parents’ choice to remain involved in militancy in the face of very likely 
capture and death. In the same way, Locos de la bandera does not present the 
soldiers who went to Malvinas as victims, but as patriots who willingly risked 
their lives for the sake of a national cause.
Here, however, is where an important divide opens up between Locos de 
la bandera and films made by children of the disappeared. Carri, Roqué, 
Habegger and Prividera struggle but largely fail to understand and accept why 
their parents sacrificed so much and left them with an unrecoverable loss. In 
Los rubios, Analía recites: ‘Me cuesta entender la elección de mamá. ¿Por qué 
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no se fue del país? me pregunto una y otra vez’ [I find it hard to understand my 
mother’s decision. Why did she not leave the country? I ask myself again and 
again]. In Historias cotidianas, Habegger struggles to understand the choices 
his father made, doubting that he would be able to give up his own life for 
such a reason. Roqué in Papá Iván explains that she made the film with the 
aim of trying to understand why her father did what he did, but she does not 
fully reach that point and admits that ‘prefería tener un padre vivo antes que 
un héroe muerto’ [I would rather have had a living father than a dead hero]. In 
contrast, the sons and other relatives of the Malvinas combatants in Cardoso’s 
film not only understand their sacrifice but have fully adopted the cause for 
which they died. Carri reflects in Los rubios that she lives in ‘un país lleno de 
fisuras’ [a country full of rifts] and one of these rifts is clearly the discontinuity 
between the ideological orientation of her generation and that of her parents. 
Locos de la bandera posits instead the possibility of generational continuity. 
Leandro de la Colina, the son of a pilot killed in the war, speaks earnestly 
about the example his father has given him of a life sacrificed for others and 
feels a ‘traspaso’, a kind of transferral, from him. Juan, who remembers at the 
start of the film that his father ‘no pensaba en la guerra. Pensaba en lo que la 
Argentina pudiera llegar a ser si estuviera completa’ [didn’t think about the war. 
He thought about what Argentina could become if it were complete], ends up 
taking exactly the same attitude to the material he has collected: he discovers 
that ‘no me importa la guerra ahora’ [the war doesn’t matter to me now] but 
that instead – repeating precisely the words of his father – ‘pensaba en lo que 
la Argentina podría llegar a ser si estuviera completa’ [I thought about what 
Argentina could become if it were complete].
Although both Locos and Los rubios make use of imaginative reconstructions 
and are structured around an investigation, these devices are put to very different 
ends. If in Los rubios the inclusion of fiction announces the impossibility of any 
resolution to the film’s search for identity, in Locos its use does not undermine 
the quest for knowledge but facilitates it. The insertion of Juan as an observing 
presence in fictional reconstructions of the past is certainly a self-consciously 
artificial and anachronistic device and appears to replay Carri’s emphasis on the 
mediated nature of memory. In mocked-up archival footage cast in appropriately 
bleached tones, Juan surveys the intense activity of volunteers packing boxes 
of food and other supplies to send off to the war and watches sailors rush past 
him in the burning passageways of the Belgrano. His presence on screen clearly 
announces the footage to be simulated, as does the conspicuous use of filters 
and lenses to produce sepia tones or a grainy archive effect. Anachronistically, 
he appears to be of the same age in these scenes from 1982 as he is in the film’s 
present in 2006. However, the purpose of such reconstructions in Locos de la 
bandera is not to suggest the elusiveness of the past but the reverse: to dramatise 
the transfer of knowledge and experience from one generation to the next.
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These reconstructions, in which Juan seems to share the same time and 
space as the combatants at war, recall some of the techniques used in the 
photography and visual art produced by children of the disappeared, in which 
montage is often used to simulate an encounter between the child and the 
absent parents.1 Paradigmatic of this approach are the photo collages created 
by Lucila Quieto, suggesting likenesses between a parent and child who would 
never otherwise be able to share the same space.2 Another example would be 
Conversación con Antonio,3 in which Gabriela Bettini photographs herself in 
a stance that suggests that she is conversing with her father, whose portrait 
hangs on the wall beside her.4 As Jordana Blejmar argues, this juxtaposition 
of temporalities ‘breaks with the linearity of history and invites us to read the 
past not only for what it was but for what it should have been’ (Blejmar, 2012, 
p. 114). These patently impossible encounters are also, in the words of Ana 
Amado, an attempt to ‘recuperar lazos entre lo que es y lo que fue’ [recover ties 
between what is and what was] (Amado, 2004, p. 49). 
A similar desire motivates the interpellation of Juan in Locos into scenes 
from the past, but here it is fully realised. The final reconstruction on the 
battlefield marks the culmination of his search, providing a moment of 
complete recognition and identification. With the help of an insert shot at 
the crucial point, when Juan looks down at one of the fallen soldiers, he sees 
himself lying there in uniform. Is he projecting himself into that experience, 
or is he imagining his father lying there, who would have been of the same age 
as Juan is now? Either way, the encounter with the past is complete, marking 
a difference from the photo montages of Quieto and Bettini, which always 
bear witness to absence and rupture. The fictional reconstructions of Locos de 
la bandera therefore perform a function that is entirely opposed to their role 
in Los rubios and in many other films and visual artworks by children of the 
disappeared. If, in Carri’s film, fiction and fantasy are used to demonstrate 
the impossibility of accessing the past, in Cardoso’s, fiction performs an 
encounter with that past and demonstrates the unbroken continuity between 
one generation and the next.
A divergence is also evident in the two films’ treatment of objects of 
memory. When he visits the Malvinas, Juan finds there ‘una forma de mirar. Es 
una mirada que está siempre en contacto con su tierra’ [a way of looking. It’s 
a look that is always in contact with the land]. Locos de la bandera constructs 
a vision that is intimately bound up with a physical relationship with earth 
1 The question of intergenerational transmission in photography, film and other art works by 
children of the disappeared is extensively explored in Blejmar (2012). 
2 Some of these collages are published by the Fondo Nacional de las Artes in a catalogue to 
accompany an exhibition held in 2007 with the title Arqueologías.
3 From Recuerdos inventados (2003).
4 See http://www.gabrielabettini.com/RECUERDOS-INVENTADOS (accessed 16 October 
2018). 
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and material objects. In Carri’s film, photographs and other objects testifying 
to the past are emptied of meaning and eventually discarded in favour of the 
blond wigs donned by the whole film crew, but these – while they echo the 
childlike playfulness of the film or express new forms of companionship – 
remain signifiers of false memories, reminding us of the neighbours’ mistake 
in remembering the Carri family as blond. In Cardoso’s film, objects are 
successful carriers of the past into the present and the future; and they also 
serve to link an individual past with that of the nation. Juan touches everything 
he comes across on the Islands: remnants of clothing and rusting machinery. 
One by one, he handles all medals, photos and rosaries kept by the family 
members of soldiers who died in the war and runs his fingers through sand 
recovered from the sea bed beneath the Belgrano. All the family members who 
have visited the Malvinas since the war have brought back handfuls of earth 
or stones. One woman keeps hers in a flowerpot, while others have displayed 
theirs in little shrines in a corner of their homes. Carri reflects in Los rubios that 
‘cualquier intento que haga para acercarme a la verdad voy a estar alejándome’ 
[any attempt I make to get closer to the truth takes me further away from it]. 
For Juan, in contrast, the past is there; it can be touched; it can be understood.
The film’s emphasis on the material is entirely consonant with a claim that 
is first and foremost one about land, about physical territory. The marble 
monument to the fallen erected in the cemetery is not just significant as a 
permanent reminder of the loss of life, but (as Leandro de la Colina clearly 
states) part of an ongoing sovereignty claim. It is not simply an object of 
memorialisation but the physical presence of Argentina on the Islands. That 
part, at least, is not in dispute, says Leandro. The transfer of stones, earth and 
other objects from the mainland to the Islands and back again is a performative 
action in Locos de la bandera which demonstrates not just the historical 
intermingling of these areas of land but an ongoing campaign for their future 
integration.
If, for Carri, her country is ‘lleno de fisuras’ [full of rifts], for Cardoso, it is 
‘lleno de escombros’ [full of rubble]. Both films depict the nation as divided 
and littered with ghosts from the past that have not been properly put to rest, 
but for Cardoso that rubble is formed of stones from which memories and a 
sense of national identity can be rebuilt. As Juan reflects: ‘Escribo desde un 
país lleno de escombros. Miro el pedregal, y escucho decir que aquí no hay 
nada más que piedras falsas. Los recuerdos son como las piedras. Están ahí. 
Esperan a que vos decidas cómo usarlas. Y acá yo veo piedras. Piedras que según 
cómo las mires, podrían sostener tu casa’ [I write from a country that is full of 
rubble. I look at the rocky ground and I hear people say that there is nothing 
but imitation stones here. Memories are like stones. They are there. They wait 
for you to decide how to use them. And here I see stones. Stones on which, 
depending on how you see them, you could build your house].
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Underlying both Los rubios and Locos de la bandera is a call to remember 
the past differently, or at least to allow space for different memories. But 
Cardoso’s film explicitly acknowledges the relationship between how we 
remember the past and what we build for the future. If it is true, as Juan freely 
acknowledges, that among those who fought the war were ‘cobardes, traidores, 
oportunistas, vendidos, incompetentes’ [cowards, traitors, opportunists, 
colluders, incompetents] it is also true that ‘uno se parece a los recuerdos que 
elige conservar. Y yo quisiera ser mejor. Por eso miro y busco’ [you take on 
the appearance of the memories you choose to preserve. And I want to be 
better. So I look and search]. The way we remember the past in Locos is not 
simply about being faithful to that past; it is also about finding ways to become 
something different, and better, in the future. For that reason alone we should 
remember not just the stories of abuse or incompetence, but also those of 
courage, solidarity and sacrifice. This is the vision that is lacking in many of 
the films made by children of the disappeared, who find little or nothing to 
emulate in either the sacrifices made by their parents or the complicity and 
apathy of society at large. 
Of course, by rejecting portrayals of the combatants as victims, the film is 
certainly guilty at times of recasting them as glorious heroes. Some nuances 
of representation do emerge, however, for example in the depiction of officers 
both as brutal disciplinarians and as courageous protectors of the men in their 
charge; and these moments contribute to the work of adding what Lorenz has 
called ‘densidad histórica’ [historical density] to memory of the war (Lorenz, 
2012a, p. 328). In one of the fictional reconstructions we see an official sentence 
a conscript to an ‘estaqueamiento’, a form of military ‘discipline’ in which a 
soldier is left stretched out between stakes in the ground and which has been 
roundly condemned in many texts as an example of the kind of human rights 
abuses often performed by military officers during the Malvinas War. However, 
the episode – replayed in so many films on the Malvinas – gains complexity 
here as we understand that it is the third time that the soldier in question 
has deserted his post and left his companions in danger and one of these has 
been badly wounded (mortally, we suspect) as a result. Although there is no 
whitewashing here of the brutal or improvised nature of the conduct of the 
war, much is found to praise in the dedication and professionalism of a good 
number of those involved in fighting it and taking many difficult decisions 
along the way, including officers, many of whom were not torturers but showed 
great heroism in protecting the conscripts under their command.
In the context of the 30th anniversary of the war, Lorenz identified the need 
for new approaches to memory that might take us beyond what he calls ‘la 
falsa dicotomía entre patriotismo y democracia’ [the false dichotomy between 
patriotism and democracy] (Lorenz (2012b), p. 58). ‘La democracia va 
acompañada de la patria’ [Democracy goes hand-in-hand with the homeland], 
says one mother in Locos de la bandera. In certain respects, Locos de la bandera 
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opens up a way of thinking about the relationship between patriotism and 
democratic citizenship that would have been unthinkable in the early post-
dictatorship period. Luis Alberto Romero, for example, has signalled the extent 
to which the inculcation of a hatred of the regime, a weight of feeling that 
guaranteed the solid embrace of democracy, came, and continues to come, at 
the expense of a genuine historical understanding of the period (Romero, 2002, 
p. 118). The fact that ‘condenar parece ser más importante que comprender’ [to 
condemn seems to be more important than to understand] ironically threatens 
the basis of democracy itself, as such a Manichean approach has led to a new 
form of intolerance of those who do not fully participate in what has, at points, 
become an unthinking denunciation of the regime and everything it is seen to 
stand for, even erupting in acts of violence.5 
The greatest lesson the war can teach us, the film seems to suggest, has little 
to do with either irresponsible war-mongering or epic heroism and much more 
to do with models of citizenship based on self-sacrifice and mutual support in 
times of crisis. One ex-combatant considers that ‘[d]e todas las enseñanzas que 
me dejó Malvinas, la primera y fundamental es que uno consigue objetivos, 
en grupo, buscando el bien común’ [of all the lessons that the Malvinas has 
taught me, the first and most fundamental is that one achieves one’s aims by 
working as a group, seeking the common good). Picking his way through the 
war-strewn battlefields of the past, Juan realises that the comradeship and the 
sense of striving towards a common goal which many ex-combatants remember 
would be of great value in the here and now: ‘Pienso en lo que podría ser el 
lugar donde vivimos si nosotros pudiéramos mirarnos con ojos tan atentos 
como los que se miraban acá, entre compañeros’ [I think about what the place 
we live in could become if we could regard each other as attentively as they did 
here, as comrades]. Far from viewing it as a particularly nefarious episode in 
the military regime’s campaign of national terror and fragmentation, Locos de la 
bandera elevates the Malvinas cause as a collective project around which a sense 
of nationhood can be rebuilt.
In an essay on ‘desmalvinización’, Cardoso observes: ‘El asunto que nos ocupa 
es cómo se construye un punto de vista común […] en este verdadero campo 
de batalla por el significado de las cosas en el que se ha convertido la postguerra’ 
[The issue that concerns us is how to construct a common viewpoint […] in 
this veritable battlefield for the meaning of things that the post-war period has 
become] (Cardoso, 2011). The quotation neatly articulates the tension at the 
heart of Locos de la bandera. A discursive openness akin to that of Los rubios 
is suggested by the film’s imaginative reconstructions, its use of a questioning 
5 In this respect, Romero argues: ‘Una cosa es mostrarle a los vecinos de un barrio que una 
persona de apariencia normal es fehacientemente un torturador; otra muy distinta es su 
linchamiento’ [It is one thing to demonstrate to those living in a particular neighbourhood 
that an apparently normal person is irrefutably a torturer; it is another thing entirely to lynch 
him] (2002, p. 117).
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child’s perspective and its insistent return to the word ‘eligir’ [to choose]. But 
Cardoso’s phrase here, ‘cómo se construye un punto de vista común’ [how to 
construct a common viewpoint] is telling. How does one construct a common 
viewpoint without closing around a single view of the past or the future? 
In fact, of course, the film does close around a particular version of 
nationalism, based on the notion of territorial integrity. It is evident in the 
reverence shown towards earth, sand and stones carried symbolically between 
the nation’s provinces and between the Argentine mainland and the Islands, 
acts of intermingling which seem to prophesy the eventual reintegration of 
the lands. Territorial integrity is one of the key tenets of Argentine nationalism 
identified by Palermo, powerfully expressed in the Malvinas cause (Palermo, 
2007, pp. 209–10). The film’s insistence on the value of shared goals points us 
to Palermo’s analysis of the importance of the idea of unanimity in Argentine 
nationalism, again exemplified in discourses on the Malvinas: ‘Malvinas 
indica el camino: si los argentinos estuviésemos en todo unidos como lo estamos en 
Malvinas, entonces a la Argentina le iría bien’ [The Malvinas show us the path: 
if we Argentines were as united in everything as we were on the Malvinas, then 
everything would go well for Argentina] (p. 18). Despite its apparent openness 
of form and discourse, and its appeal to the values of democratic citizenship, 
then, the film locates the collective project it proposes within a narrow and 
exclusionary version of nationalism. 
Civil society and populism in Malvinas: Viajes del 
bicentenario
Otro aniversario, uno más de ese episodio con fragor a gesta y entorno de 
cartón pintado como escenografía berreta de película de cuarta.6
[Another anniversary, another, of that event with its clamour of heroic feats 
and its painted cardboard backdrop, like the cheap set design of a third-
rate film.]
There is a sequence that is often repeated in films about the Malvinas: the 
archival footage of the moment at which Galtieri announces the invasion on 2 
April 1982 to an overflowing Plaza de Mayo. The news is met with an ovation 
by the exultant thousands gathered below. How might we explain such a ringing 
endorsement of a bloody regime in a square that had, only three days earlier, 
witnessed a mass demonstration against the dictatorship? In Palermo’s words, 
attempts to account for the widespread support for the war has only resulted in 
‘pseudo-explanations’, such as a collective delirium, which effectively sidestep 
the question of collective responsibility (Palermo, 2007, p. 299). Viewed in the 
post-dictatorship context and with the hindsight of defeat, this sequence from 
the archives becomes charged with a kind of shame, reflected in its compulsive 
6 Oscar Luna, ex-soldier and psychologist (Luna, 1999). 
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repetition in so many films. These are phantasmal images, with all the grainy 
tones and exaggerated melodrama of a cheap and badly directed film, an apt 
metaphor for Oscar Luna (see above) for the war as whole.
The ‘theory of the two demons’, recently revisited by Pilar Calveiro 
(among others), refers to the tendency, especially in the first years of the post-
dictatorship period, to depict civil society as an innocent victim caught up in a 
battle fought between left-wing militants and the authoritarian state (Calveiro, 
2008, pp. 137, 148). Both Palermo and Lorenz observe a change in perspective 
towards the dictatorship and the 1970s that has made it possible to raise the 
question of society’s complicity in that battle and thereby to begin to construct 
a more nuanced understanding of the period. Both maintain, however, that 
while memory of the dictatorship has begun to open up in this way, ‘[n]ada 
semejante ocurrió en el caso de Malvinas’ [nothing like that has taken place in 
the case of the Malvinas] (Palermo, 2007, p. 299). 
This key difference between the politics of memory of the dictatorship on 
the one hand and the Malvinas war on the other is patently visible in cinema. 
In the first films of the post-dictatorship period, such as La historia oficial (Luis 
Puenzo, 1985), the predominant vision is one of a society that knew nothing 
about what was going on. In later films, particularly those documentaries 
directed from 2000 onwards by children of the disappeared, society is instead 
charged with both complicity and complacency. Among the most acerbic 
critiques of civilian society under dictatorship is delivered by M. The director, 
Prividera, strongly suspects that one of his mother’s companions is at least 
partly responsible for her disappearance by collaborating with the armed forces 
to pass them lists of those actively involved with the Montoneros. With a cold 
fury he denounces the present failures of the state and of society as a whole to 
reconstruct what happened to the disappeared and to keep their memory alive. 
Monuments are overgrown by bushes, or in need of restoration; the quest for 
information about his mother sends him bouncing from one agency to another, 
with no centralised data bank in existence ‘en un país donde nadie se hace cargo 
de nada’ [in a country in which no one takes responsibility for anything]. From 
the civilian informants who propped up the regime to those who still respond 
with fear or indifference to the task of remembering the dictatorship’s victims, 
we are all – in Prividera’s film – responsible for their disappearance.
Los rubios also constructs a devastating vision of the fear and indifference 
which supported the regime during the dictatorship and are still rife today. 
When interviewed, one neighbour lets slip that it was she who had collaborated 
with the military in the kidnapping of Carri’s parents, an event that left the 
neighbourhood – she declares, with some satisfaction – much quieter and safer. 
The Carris had moved to the area in accordance with the Montonero policy of 
‘proletarización’ through which militants were supposed to acquire the habits 
and perspectives of the working classes, idealised as the fount of virtues such as 
simplicity, sacrifice, solidarity and altruism. This image of the pueblo for which 
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Carri’s parents and so many other militants were prepared to sacrifice their lives 
is radically undermined in Los rubios.
A parallel shift towards a questioning of the role of civil society has not 
taken place in films about the Malvinas. They consistently offer, instead, a 
depiction of a deceived, helpless society, such as that represented in La deuda 
interna (Miguel Pereira, 1988), in which the war becomes yet another form of 
exploitation of the masses by the elite, highlighting a much broader problem 
of inequality and social division. Compared with films such as La deuda 
interna, Los chicos de la guerra or Iluminados por el fuego, Cardoso’s productions 
have received a much more limited distribution. However, I suggest that 
they merit close attention, particularly with regard to the explanations they 
proffer concerning the massive support of the war and the alternative vision 
they provide of civil society, here transformed into the pueblo, bearers of a 
popular nationalism that transcends the events and the context of the war. 
The difference is remarkable: if in M civil society is thrust into the dock, in 
Cardoso’s film it is promoted to the role of hero.
If post-dictatorship cinema registers rupture and disillusionment with 
the militant ideology of the 1970s, and above all with the idea of a united, 
revolutionary pueblo, Cardoso’s films find continuities. Here we see, revived, 
precisely that image of the pueblo that is destroyed in the films by Carri and 
Prividera. In Locos de la bandera, the oft-repeated scene of jubilation in the 
Plaza de Mayo is inserted into a broader narrative about the masses’ support 
for the war, linking that scene to others showing the donations of clothes, 
food and other goods that surpassed the regime’s capacity to distribute them. 
As the mother of a soldier who died in the war claims: ‘No se puede decir, 
fue todo un manejo de la dictadura’ [You can’t say it was all driven by the 
dictatorship]. For Juan, it is clear that taking responsibility for that support is 
the duty of all: ‘A quién no le gustaría tener una historia tan simple como el 
título de un diario. Pero no hay esas historias. La verdadera tragedia del olvido 
empieza cuando uno pretende tener una historia pero la quiere contar como 
si no hubiera sido parte de ella’ [Who wouldn’t like to have a history that is as 
simple as a newspaper heading? But that kind of history doesn’t exist. The real 
tragedy of forgetting begins when someone claims to have a history, but wants 
to recount it as if they weren’t part of it].
It is a wise observation, although of course it is much easier to assume 
responsibility if the history recounted is one of glory and not of defeat or 
genocidal acts. As Juan continues: ‘El 2 de abril de 1982 no sólo recuperábamos 
Malvinas. También empezábamos a recuperar la libertad. La misma gente que 
dos días antes salió para decirle basta a la dictadura estuvo con todo el país 
diciéndole basta al imperio. No hay nada de raro en esto. La gente reconocía 
su bandera mucho mejor que su gobierno’ [On 2 April 1982 we did not only 
recover the Malvinas. We also began to recover our freedom. The same people 
who two days earlier had taken to the streets to say ‘enough’ to the dictatorship 
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were there with the rest of the country, saying ‘enough’ to imperialism. There 
is nothing strange about that. The people were identifying with their national 
flag much more than their government].
This repositioning of Malvinas as a popular, national cause that transcends 
the war becomes the main thrust of Cardoso’s Malvinas: Viajes del bicentenario. 
The film narrates the battle of the Comisión de los Familiares de Caídos en 
Malvinas e Islas del Atlántico Sur to erect a monument in the Argentine military 
cemetery on the Malvinas. The monument was successfully completed in 2004 
and inaugurated five years later. Between the first film and the second, Cardoso 
took up the directorship of the Observatorio Malvinas, based at the University 
of Lanús, an institute founded in 2009 with the aim of developing pedagogical 
materials on the Malvinas for schools and teacher-training. This new emphasis 
is evident in the much more didactic approach of Viajes del bicentenario. The 
young narrator of Locos de la bandera, who questions what he sees and reflects 
on the difficult task of memory, is replaced in Viajes del bicentenario with an 
anonymous, diligent, and mute primary school pupil.
The film opens in Perdriel, an iconic location chosen for reasons that are made 
clear in the first sequence. Famous as the site of a battle against English troops 
in the first British invasion of the Río de la Plata in 1806, in 1834 Pedriel also 
became the birthplace of José Hernández, author of the celebrated epic poem 
Martín Fierro (1872), identified in the film as ‘la obra más importante de la 
autoafirmación cultural’ [our most important work of cultural self-affirmation]. 
That the same site should have witnessed two events of such national importance 
is not presented as a coincidence in the film. As if expressing an entirely obvious 
connection, one of the presenters recites: ‘José Hernández, Malvinas […] la 
autoafirmación a través de la lucha, la autoafirmación a través de la cultura’ 
[José Hernández, Malvinas […] self-affirmation through battle, self-affirmation 
through culture]. ‘No hay casualidades’ [There are no coincidences], they agree, 
reverently, as if Hernández and the Malvinas were two irrevocably entwined 
threads of some divinely authored narrative rather than two events deliberately 
juxtaposed to produce a specific reading of Argentine history, inscribing them 
both in a popular, nationalist and anti-imperialist genealogy.
As well as interviews with relatives of the war dead, the documentary is 
packed with commentaries from historians allied with the Instituto Nacional 
de Revisionismo Histórico, created by presidential decree in 2011, including 
Pacho O’Donnell (the Institute’s Director), Ana Jaramillo and others whose 
work has received approval as advancing the aims of the Institute, such as 
Francisco Pestanha. Its aim is clearly to install the Malvinas within a popular 
nationalist agenda and thereby to advance both the Malvinas cause and that 
of historical revisionism. The Malvinas War is presented as just one more 
landmark in a long history of conflict between Argentina and Great Britain 
that – Cardoso’s interviewees claim – has played a vital role in Argentina’s self-
definition as a nation.
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The film even provides us with a recommended reading list to accompany its 
revisionist approach. The books shown higgledy-piggledy on a table, as if piled 
randomly, have on closer inspection been carefully placed, both to advertise the 
works of those involved in making the documentary and to canonise a revisionist 
curriculum for the nation’s schools. Here we see, for example, Rául Scalabrini 
Ortiz’s classic of revisionist history Bases para la reconstrucción nacional, as well 
as the complete works of Rodolfo Kusch, whose philosophical reflections were 
very much informed by indigenous thought and popular wisdom. These are 
jumbled up with maps of the Malvinas and works by Pestanha and Jaramillo. 
Prominent in this jumble of texts is an essay originally published by Jose 
Hernández in 1869 with the title ‘Islas Malvinas: Una cuestión urgente’. In it 
he defends the depth of feeling provoked by the loss of the Islands, an assault 
on the territorial integrity of the nation which has caused grave upset, ‘como si 
se arrebatara un pedazo de nuestra carne’ [as if part of our own flesh had been 
wrenched from us]. The powerful image of a mutilated Argentina returns to 
shape the nationalist sentiment of Cardoso’s film.
If, for Palermo, the Malvinas cause unites all the most powerful doctrines 
of Argentine nationalism, the same could certainly be said for Viajes del 
bicentenario. As well as the axioms of the territorial integrity of the nation 
(now mutilated), we also find the nation as the victim of ransacking by imperial 
powers and its own elite classes, together with the doctrine of unity, without 
which the country will not be able to reclaim its glorious destiny (Palermo, 
2007, p. 106). This doctrine presupposes a form of regeneration that will put 
right the ‘descarrilamiento’ [derailment] that the country has experienced, 
casting it from its destiny of greatness (Palermo, 2007, pp. 104–5). In Viajes del 
bicentenario this regeneration is articulated in terms of the ‘patria grande’ [the 
great country, meaning the integrated Latin American continent], a discourse 
formed in the continent’s liberators’ dreams of political unity that went on to 
be highly influential in the armed struggle of the 1970s. There is mention in 
the film of the strategy of ‘sudamericanizar’ [South-Americanising] in relation 
to the Malvinas cause, with reference to the current policy of Argentina of 
seeking the support of other Latin American countries for their claim to 
sovereignty. However, the use of this term also links the Malvinas cause to the 
anti-colonialist discourse of the 1960s and 1970s. It is suggested, for example, 
that Argentines are ‘ciudadanos del sur de la patria grande’ [citizens of the 
south of the great country]. Along these same lines, the monument to the war 
dead in Malvinas becomes ‘un homenaje a la libertad de todos los pueblos 
americanos’ [a homage to the freedom of all [Latin] American peoples]; in 
Darwin Cemetery, the relatives have erected ‘una bandera espiritual y cultural 
americana y argentina’ [a spiritual and cultural flag that is both Argentine and 
[Latin] American]; the construction of the monument is even described as 
‘América recuperándose a si misma’ [[Latin] America recovering itself ]. This 
version of the past, and of the cause that stretches into the future, clearly erases 
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the dictatorship from the Malvinas War. It is as if the pueblo itself had taken up 
arms to confront its old imperialist masters. 
The locating of the Malvinas within a longer history of popular, anti-
imperialist struggles is not new. From 1982 onwards many veterans have 
appealed to this same history when speaking about their comrades’ sacrifice 
(Lorenz, 2012a, pp. 228–9). These voices could not properly be heard in the 
period immediately following the war. As Lorenz observes, at this point ‘el 
rechazo social a la violencia no dejaba margen ni para la reivindicación bélica 
ni para la revolucionaria, ambas asociadas tanto al estado represor como a 
las organizaciones guerrilleras, los “dos demonios” funcionales a la necesidad 
autoexculpatoria y refundacional de la democracia [society’s rejection of 
violence left no room for the justification of war or even revolution, both 
associated with the repressive state or the guerrilla organisations, the ‘two 
demons’ that facilitated the self-exculpation needed for the re-founding of 
democracy] (p. 373). That the war should now be seen as an arena of glory and 
sacrifice, and that Malvinas should be re-established as the keystone of popular 
nationalism, bears witness to the powerful confluence and mutual promotion 
of three recent trends: a revival of popular nationalism, the active appeal to 
1970s discourses on the part of Kirchnerism and the resurgence of historical 
revisionism (sanctioned by the state).
In disconnecting the Malvinas cause from the war started by the military 
in 1982, one might consider that Viajes del bicentenario takes a step towards 
thinking about the forms that patriotism may take under democracy. When 
the mother of a soldier killed in the war says ‘no hay democracia sin patria’ 
[there is no democracy without the motherland], she opens up at least the 
possibility of thinking about patriotism in a way that is not defined by the 
violent repression of the military regime. The only possible path that the film 
contemplates, however, is that of populism. For O’Donnell, speaking in the 
film, ‘siempre han sido los sectores populares los que verdaderamente supieron 
definirle al enemigo y enfrentárselo’ [it has always been the popular classes who 
really knew how to identify and confront the enemy], whether in the English 
invasions of 1806, the Battle of Vuelta de Obligado of 1845, or the more recent 
war of 1982. O’Donnell maintains that, ‘indudablemente han sido los sectores 
populares, los que siempre tienen más conciencia, ¿no es cierto?, del concepto 
de patria’ [it has undoubtedly been the popular classes who have always been 
more conscious, isn’t that right, of the meaning of the motherland]. Suddenly, 
the conflict over Malvinas becomes not a war declared by a military regime in 
which the pueblo plays the role of innocent bystander or guilty accomplice, but 
an expression of the enduring importance of the Malvinas cause in the popular 
imagination. 
In its eagerness to re-invent the Malvinas as a discourse of national unity, the 
film emphasises the fact that the project of erecting the monument was brought 
to completion with the support of all sectors of Argentine society. Among the 
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many references in the film to beginnings and ends, openings and closings, 
one family member urges us to ‘pensar que somos hermanos. Yo creo que ése 
es el capítulo que se abre’ [think of ourselves as brothers and sisters. I believe 
that this is the chapter that is beginning]. However, this discourse of apparent 
inclusivity and integration hides its real character as a principle of exclusion. By 
anchoring Malvinas so firmly in patriotism, a syllogism is set in motion: one 
cannot be patriotic if one does not support the claim for sovereignty.
This popular nationalism is clearly embedded in a Catholic matrix. In 
fact, Viajes del bicentenario is constructed not so much as a documentary-
as-educational-tool as a documentary-as-religious-act. A close relationship is 
established in the film between national unity and the Catholic faith. This can 
be seen, for example, in those sequences that show the statue of the Virgin on 
its journey through every province of the country before arriving to preside 
over the inauguration of the new monument to the war dead on the Malvinas. 
The documentary dedicates a sequence of considerable length to the mass 
that is held as part of that ceremony. We see relatives presenting offerings to 
the Virgin in the name of the fallen; and we watch while they place rosaries, 
photos, prayer cards and other objects of religious and sentimental value in 
a glass box displayed in the cemetery. Indeed, the whole film takes on the 
form of a religious act of worship in which we witness rituals of great symbolic 
significance, we participate in moments of reflection accompanied by music, 
we learn to venerate holy objects and we follow the faithful in their search for 
spiritual comfort. If how to remember the war and how to recover the Islands 
are topics for debate, religious faith invites no such conflict or divergence in 
opinion. The documentary constructs its spectators, and by extension civil 
society as a whole, as members of the flock. We are given two missions: to keep 
a candle burning in the name of the dead; and to unite under the banner of 
restoring Argentina’s sovereignty over the Islands. 
To historicise, perhaps
Cardoso’s documentaries on the Malvinas construct an idea of the pueblo and of 
civil society that is, in comparison to the documentaries produced by children 
of the disappeared, significantly closer to that of the 1970s. It is certainly true 
that the continuity they imagine is rather deceptive: phrases such as ‘la patria 
grande’ and ‘el pueblo’ are taken up again here as if nothing had happened 
during the period that separates us from the 1970s. One might well ask to what 
extent the appeal to these discourses is a genuine attempt to historicise and 
not to invoke, in an ahistorical manner, terms that now float free from their 
temporal anchoring in a very different context.
At the same time, to represent the war as one more episode in a long-held 
claim to sovereignty (dating back to 1833) and an even longer struggle against 
imperialism is to attempt to understand it, not as a sudden and senseless event 
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that came out of the blue, but as an event that can be historicised. Here we may 
appreciate a convergence with recent shifts in post-dictatorship memory, which 
has begun to treat the violence of the military regime not as an inexplicable 
event that arose from nothing but as a continuation and an intensification of 
characteristics already present in society, as suggested by Luis Alberto Romero 
and Hugo Vezzetti among others (Vezzetti, 2002, p. 47; Romero, 2002, p. 
120). In a similar manner, Viajes del bicentenario attempts to explain what for 
other films has remained an isolated and inexplicable event: society’s support 
for a war conducted by the military regime. Instead of sweeping that support 
under the carpet or attributing it to a case of collective hysteria or delusion, 
Cardoso turns it into a key episode in the history of popular nationalism in 
Argentina.
If the valiant, wise and glorious pueblo can arise again as it does in Cardoso’s 
films, blameless and the repository of the nation’s hopes, it is because – unlike 
civil society in films about the dictatorship – it has not spent time in the 
defendants’ dock; and because Cardoso completely severs the noble Malvinas 
cause from the atrocious regime that started the war of 1982. Cardoso’s 
documentaries provide disquieting visions of an uncritical nationalism that 
appears to be gaining force in the present, but in many ways they do not err 
in their reading of the past and particularly of its nationalist and populist 
legacy for the present. If nothing else, these films open up alternative ways of 
remembering the war that are not confined to post-dictatorship denunciations 
of human rights abuses. As Calveiro reminds us: ‘La repetición puntual de 
un mismo relato, sin variación, a lo largo de los años, puede representar no el 
triunfo de la memoria sino su derrota’ [The exact repetition of a single story, 
without variation, over the years may not represent memory’s triumph but its 
defeat] (Calveiro, 2005, p. 8).
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8. Flying the flag: Malvinas and 
questions of patriotism
Catriona McAllister
Galtieri stands on the balcony of the Casa Rosada, flanked by officials and smiling, his hands open in a gesture of victorious welcome. Below, flag-waving, cheering crowds greet him with deafening chants of 
‘Argentina’. The crowd is euphoric, coming together in celebration to affirm a 
shared truth: ‘Las Malvinas son argentinas’.1 Yet by the time the junta launched 
military action in the South Atlantic, denunciations of the regime’s human 
rights were widespread;2 and it has become a truism to state that the invasion 
of the Islands was a last-ditch attempt to shore up the dictatorship’s crumbling 
power. The scenes on 2 April 1982, the military government and the people 
standing as one, attest to the power of the Malvinas cause in the Argentine 
national imaginary. The strength of this ‘guiding fiction’ was such that it led 
to widespread public support for a war waged by a repressive military regime: 
an uncomfortable fact to reconcile with the post-dictatorship discourses of 
memory and justice. 
This chapter will therefore reflect on elements of the complex symbolic 
territory surrounding the Malvinas in discourses of national identity, focusing 
on the relationship between the military and patriotic celebration both before 
the dictatorship and beyond. These questions receive critical treatment in 
Martín Kohan’s novel Ciencias morales (2007), which provides a meditation on 
patriotic education set against the backdrop of the conflict in 1982. By offering 
a reading of this text, I shall highlight a literary treatment of the Malvinas 
question that embraces an understated, allusive narrative mode to dissect the 
patriotic heart of the Malvinas ‘cause’.
1 Argentine television coverage of this event is available online. See TV Pública Argentina 
(1982). 
2 See, for example, Jensen’s article in this volume.
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The military, civil society and the nation
At the time of the invasion of 1982, the armed forces were able to call upon 
existing ideas of what constituted the Argentine nation (and their own place 
within that ‘imagined community’) to mobilise patriotic allegiance. The deeply-
rooted assertion that the Malvinas belonged to Argentina, communicated 
above all through the education system (Lorenz, 2006, p. 17), was transformed 
into action. But beyond the specificity of this powerful cause, the armed forces 
could also invoke their own right (or duty) to protect the fabric of the nation. 
As Luis Alberto Romero (2004, p. 23) highlights, ‘la asociación de la nación 
y de su destino con la institución militar’ emerged as a powerful idea at the 
start of the 20th century, generating the narrative that ‘el Ejército “nació con la 
patria”, es el sostén último de sus valores y el responsable final de su grandeza’. 
By launching a military intervention that aimed to defend Argentina’s borders, 
the junta reasserted their claim to a well-rehearsed role: that of the saviours of 
the nation and protectors of the patria (a claim evoked in every military coup 
in Argentina’s history (Goebel, 2011)).
However, following defeat in the Malvinas and the collapse of the military 
regime, some of these previous patriotic certainties were cast into doubt. 
Federico Lorenz (2006, p. 17) highlights the profound questioning of the role 
of the armed forces in the first years after the return to democracy, including 
‘su relación como protectores de la ciudadanía y de los sagrados valores de la 
Patria’. In this light, the flag-waving scenes of 2 April became a jarring moment 
of alliance between the military and civil society, an expression of a historically 
accepted relationship that no longer held validity. In the post-dictatorial 
context, the 1982 conflict was quickly re-cast as a policy of the regime and 
associated with its human-rights abuses, rather than being perceived as a 
conflict in the name of civil society (Guber, 2004, p. 147). 
Despite this discursive shift, the uncomfortable fact of the public support 
for the invasion remained; and Vicente Palermo notes the significant challenge 
this presented to the powerful emerging narrative that positioned society 
exclusively as a victim of the military regime (2007, p. 282). Lorenz argues 
that as a result of this ambiguity the war ‘fue considerada como un síntoma de 
una sociedad que había militarizado sus formas de relacionarse, y que debía ser 
reeducada’ (2006, p. 192) and cites Alain Rouquié’s verdict that the Malvinas 
(and the public support the conflict received) revealed a ‘militarización muy 
profunda de la vida política y a la vez una politización de los militares que no 
es fácil de eliminar’ (Rouquié, 1983, cited in Lorenz, 2006, p. 191).3 In 1982 
patriotism had triumphed over politics, leaving crucial questions for the post-
dictatorial process of soul-searching.
Rouquié’s observations that the boundaries surrounding the military’s role 
had become unacceptably (and dangerously) blurred do not relate only to the 
3 Rouquié, A. Humor, vol 101, March 1983, p. 45.
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most obviously political arenas. The flag-waving scenes of 2 April 1982 reveal 
an easy slippage between the military and nation that was carefully cultivated 
by the regime, a manipulation of the symbolic that Diana Taylor has described 
as a ‘theatre of operations’ whereby ‘nation-ness was resemanticized’ in line 
with the values of the regime (1997, p. 95).4 In the words of Rosana Guber, 
the dictatorship ‘se arrogó la exclusiva y absoluta representación de la Nación’ 
(2004, p. 229). Similarly, Alejandro Grimson, Mirta Amati and Kaori Kodama 
argue that the military’s use of the state’s performative patriotic symbols had 
altered their potential meaning, creating a problematic association between 
markers of the national and the dictatorship: ‘La dictadura militar produce 
efectos decisivos sobre la idea de nación. En la medida en que sustentaban su 
accionar en una retórica patriótica, consiguieron apoderarse de un conjunto 
de símbolos – como la bandera y la escarapela, el himno y otras canciones 
patrias’ (2007, p. 431). At the point of the return to democracy, the state 
was therefore faced with the task of re-appropriating the nation’s system of 
symbolic production. Lorenz underlines the political urgency of this dilemma 
for the newly instated democratic regime:
¿Cómo disputar a las Fuerzas Armadas o a la derecha reaccionaria 
elementos como los de ‘soberanía’ o ‘patria’? El camino elegido fue el de 
intentar quitarle el monopolio de símbolos [nacionales] a la institución 
militar, reinstalándolos en el altar republicano, lo que a la vez significaba 
subordinar simbólicamente a las Fuerzas Armadas al poder político civil 
(2006, pp. 189–90).
Redefining the concept of patria without its previously essential military 
component therefore represented an indispensable political task that was partly 
enacted through changes in the rituals of national celebration. The military’s 
role in the ritos patrios was minimised, for example, including the notable 
absence of a military parade in the celebrations of 25 May for the decade from 
1989 to 1999 (Grimson, Amati and Kodama, 2007, p. 435; p. 447). Where 
once the armed forces seemed a natural part of patriotic celebration, their 
symbolic role was now uncertain.
Markers of the military were also present in other domains of public life as 
Argentina returned to democratic rule, including the national history taught 
in schools. For much of the 20th century, this relied heavily on tales of military 
glory, particularly surrounding the wars of independence that had led to the 
formation of Argentina as a territorial reality (Romero, 2004). Martín Kohan 
4 Lorenz provides an important reminder that the public support for Malvinas cannot be 
simplistically reduced to a single, shared nationalist response but instead encompassed 
different understandings of the Malvinas cause and the war (2006, pp. 41–2; see also Jensen, 
2017). However, Taylor’s (1997) analysis highlights the difficulty of reflecting any such nuance 
in the performance of support for the war. If the junta was successfully wielding the power of 
national symbolism, the separation between support for the regime, support for the war and 
national pride could not easily be communicated through the familiar framework of patriotic 
performance.
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has referred to this as the ‘culto militarista del sistema escolar argentino’ (2005, 
p. 14), while Rouquié asserts that ‘la mayoría de los ciudadanos argentinos no 
está lejos de pensar que su país es una creación de sus generales. En efecto, es 
lo que enseña la “historia-batalla” de las escuelas, no sin fundamento’ (1981, 
p. 73). In the years following the return to democracy, this school narrative 
underwent significant revision (Romero, 2004); and Lorenz links this shift 
directly to the impact of the dictatorship, stating that ‘una de las consecuencias 
culturales profundas de la dictadura militar ha sido la destrucción del relato 
histórico nacional – total, abarcador, complaciente – como el que millares de 
argentinos se habituaron a recibir, compartir y transmitir en las escuelas’ (2009, 
p. 32). A historical narrative that had remained relatively unchanged for almost 
one hundred years could no longer survive intact in a nation reeling from the 
military’s abuse of power.
The public response to the invasion of the Malvinas in 1982 therefore lies at 
a complex intersection of ideas of patriotism, the unique position occupied by 
the Islands in Argentina’s national imaginary and the military’s self-proclaimed 
right to act as the ‘saviours’ of the patria. Martín Kohan’s work (as both an 
author and an academic) offers a sustained engagement with these questions, 
particularly in relation to the patriotic symbolic apparatus in Argentina and 
the ways in which national identity narratives are produced and sustained. The 
implications of building a nation’s history around a military epic is a theme 
that recurs throughout his writing, perhaps most significantly in Narrar a San 
Martín (2005), an essay charting the process that transformed a general in the 
wars of independence into the padre de la patria. Similarly to Lorenz (2006, 
p. 16), in this work Kohan argues that with defeat in the Malvinas ‘hay todo 
un mundo de certezas que colapsa’ in relation to nationalist discourse (2005, 
p. 30). Kohan’s thesis, however, is that the figure of San Martín is not part of 
this collapse, leaving a military figure safely installed in the rituals of patriotic 
celebration. Despite the climate of change surrounding traditional historical 
narratives in the midst of a deep moment of national reflection and self-
scrutiny, Narrar a San Martín asserts that military glory was not fully purged 
from the commemoration of the nation’s past.
A critique of the public positioning of military endeavours is also the subject 
of Kohan’s more recent essay, El país de la guerra (2014), which narrates a 
history of the presence of war in Argentina’s cultural and political landscape. 
In quoting Alberdi’s assertion that war is ‘una manera de interpretar el mundo 
[…] una manera entera de organizar la sociedad’ (2014, pp. 27–8), Kohan 
synthesises a principle that can be seen as underlying much of his fiction. 
Several of his novels question what it means to base a nation’s ritos patrios 
around a celebration of war and military heroism, particularly following 
dictatorship and the disaster of the Malvinas.
Kohan’s literary work therefore explores key questions surrounding the 
relationship between military and civil life in post-dictatorship Argentina, 
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examining the complex connections between patriotic performance, markers 
of national identity and the military. In Ciencias morales, Kohan explicitly sets 
these identity discourses against the apparent moment of their collapse: the 
conflict of 1982. By focusing on the symbolic structures of patriotic celebration, 
the routines and rituals through which the nation is performed, the text asks 
whether the process of the decoupling of military and civil life perceived as 
such an urgent and fundamental task in the return to democracy has indeed 
taken place; and whether the re-appropriation of the symbolic domain by the 
democratic state has succeeded. 
Ciencias morales and patriotic education
Although Argentina’s post-dictatorship government recognised the need to 
alter the symbolic charge of markers of the national, this did not necessarily 
lead to a complete and permanent overhaul of Argentina’s patriotic liturgy. By 
the end of the 1990s, markers of the national that had seemed ‘contaminated’ 
by the military regime (including the national anthem) were creeping back 
into usage and in 1999 a military parade was reinstated in the celebrations of 
25 May (Grimson, Amati and Kodama, 2007, pp. 446–7). Ciencias morales 
(2007) was therefore published after the immediate reaction against patriotic 
displays (particularly those with an explicit connection to the armed forces) 
appeared to have passed, replaced by a certain degree of ‘patriotic normality’. 
This gradual slide back into familiar representations of the nation provides 
important context for Kohan’s exploration of the crisis point of 1982. By 
returning the reader to a point when the national and the military were still 
explicitly fused together, the novel tests the limits of the ideal of a civil patria 
apparently beyond the reach of its military institutions, exploring whether 
these deep political and symbolic connections can be unravelled.
The novel’s action is played out in one of Argentina’s best-known educational 
institutions: the Colegio Nacional de Buenos Aires (famed for schooling 
generations of Argentina’s elite). The Colegio is positioned as a metonymic 
representation of the country and its past, described at one point as a ‘selecto 
resumen’ of the nation (p. 10). Its connection to nation-building is emphasised 
throughout: the presence of Bartolomé Mitre, the school’s founder and the 
historian who constructed the national narrative surrounding independence, 
looms large; and we are reminded that Manuel Belgrano, a key independence 
hero and creator of the Argentine flag, studied at the school. The text references 
the school’s efforts to ‘pacify’ relations between boys from the north of the 
country and Buenos Aires, tasking the Colegio with the same project of 
national consolidation as the country’s 19th-century statesmen. This emphasis 
on the deliberate, conscious shaping of a nation by political elites reaffirms 
the Republic’s status as a political construction rather than ‘natural’ entity, an 
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‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006) that must be continually maintained 
to preserve its existence.
The need constantly to produce and reproduce the nation underpins 
the rhythm of daily life in the text. Argentina’s educational system has been 
explicitly charged with building patriotic pride and allegiance since its earliest 
days (Bertoni, 2001, p. 47) and the novel’s Colegio bears out this performative 
mission. Static symbols and active performance merge in a patchwork of 
national commemoration: the daily ritual of raising and lowering the Argentine 
flag; the singing of the national anthem in the celebrations for 25 May; the 
rehearsals for the parade in honour of Belgrano (whose bust also adorns the 
school). These routines can be perceived as acts of ‘banal nationalism’ as 
described by Billig (1995): ‘habits’ with an ideological function to reproduce 
the nation-state. Billig’s concept foregrounds the daily practices through which 
we are reminded of our nationality, seeing these as rehearsals for crisis points 
that require our allegiance. In Kohan’s school setting, the next generation are 
learning the patriotic ‘habits’ that will allow them to ‘remember’ their national 
identity.
Crucially, Billig’s thesis identifies an ultimate purpose to these rituals and 
symbols that continually recall the nation: the ability to mobilise support for 
warfare. He differentiates between the ‘waved’ and the ‘unwaved’ flag, with 
the desire to wave the flag in a moment of crisis only made possible through 
the ‘unimaginative repetition’ (p. 10) of ideological habits that reproduce the 
nation. In Ciencias morales it is the unwaved flags that take centre stage. The 
unquestioning daily performance of rituals invoking the nation, supported by 
annual events and commemorations, are there in place of the dramatic moment 
of overt public support for armed conflict seen in 1982. The text’s insistence 
on these habits and routines therefore underscores their crucial function in 
creating a powerful imaginative construct that can be called upon in an hour 
of need and specifically to generate support for an act of war. We do not see 
the crowds filling the streets on 2 April; instead, the text shows us the careful 
reproduction of the nation that makes that moment possible.
The text explicitly references this ultimate purpose, portraying its acceptance 
as a rite of passage on the journey to ‘becoming Argentine’. As the Colegio’s 
pupils prepare for the commemorative act honouring Belgrano, the narrator 
imagines the scene that awaits the school children in this public demonstration 
of their commitment to nationhood:
El acto patrio tendrá su punto culminante con el juramento a la bandera. 
¿Hay acaso un homenaje mejor para Manuel Belgrano, su creador? Los 
chicos argentinos de las nuevas generaciones, y de su mismo colegio, 
jurarán que van a dar la vida por ella. Las madres lloran de emoción casi 
siempre en este momento del acto, mientras los padres gatillan fotos a 
repetición… (p. 205). 
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Through this description, the flag is transformed from a benign marker of 
belonging into an ideological tool. It demands not only support for acts of war 
in its name, but the promise that citizens will be prepared to lay down their 
lives in its defence. This seemingly innocuous patriotic ritual therefore serves to 
make sense of the unthinkable: the call for the ‘ultimate sacrifice’ in the name 
of the nation (Billig, 1995, p. 11). Crucially, the young citizens’ pledge is made 
in front of parents who bear witness to this promise, consenting to lay their 
children on the sacrificial altar of the patria. Every aspect of the participants’ 
behaviour is ritualised, including the gendered behaviour of the parents who 
willingly express their pride. This is a carefully constructed performance with a 
clear ideological purpose at its heart: to teach the next generation their patriotic 
duty.
This idea of an ultimate sacrifice in the name of the patria is not an abstract, 
distant possibility in the novel, but a real and imminent threat. The constant, 
brooding shadow of the Falklands–Malvinas conflict is primarily communicated 
through the private drama of a family who have been called upon to honour 
their pledge to the nation by sacrificing a son. The main character we follow, 
María Teresa, works at the Colegio and has a brother in the army, possibly 
completing national service. Her home life is dominated by the postcards he 
sends and her mother’s increasingly delicate nervous state as his division moves 
ever nearer to the South Atlantic conflict zone. As the family face the reality of 
their patriotic contract, ‘banal’ reminders of nationhood pepper their day-to-
day lives: the image of the Argentine flag on the telephone as the mother waits 
anxiously for her enlisted son to call her back (p. 155); or the flags waved at 
the solidarity concert featured on the news (p. 73). Through interweaving the 
banal and this gut-wrenching threat of grief, the text strips away the familiarity 
of ritual and exposes the reality of a promise to give one’s life for the nation. 
By revealing the ‘ultimate purpose’ of patriotic duty as a commitment to 
support and even contribute to military action, the novel troubles any notion 
of patriotism as a purely civic engagement. This uncomfortable association 
is further highlighted in the school’s nation-flagging routines, which display 
an omnipresent military inflection. The pupils rehearse marching for the 
parade in honour of Belgrano, requiring them to obey associated commands: 
‘quier, deré, quier, deré, fir-més, descan-só’ (p. 191). The daily ceremony of 
raising and lowering the national flag is reminiscent of military parades and 
is accompanied by the patriotic song ‘Aurora’, which (as the novel reminds 
us) references an ‘águila guerrera’ (p. 75). Kohan dissects this lyric’s fusion of 
national origin and war in El país de la guerra (2014, pp. 13–17), imbuing this 
reference in Ciencias morales with increased significance. The education the 
novel’s pupils receive is also streaked with militaristic patriotism: we witness an 
art lesson in which the teacher shows paintings of battle scenes from the War 
of the Triple Alliance (a conflict in which Argentina was on the winning side, 
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as the narrator reminds us in an ironic aside).5 Presented with this complex 
fusion of education, patriotism and military routine, we are left to wonder 
what aspects of nationhood, if any, are purely civic events.
This troubling fusion is given greater political urgency in the text through 
the unspoken but ever-present shadow of the proceso. The school functions 
almost as a miniature police state, patrolled by a team of preceptores who 
enforce cast-iron discipline regulating every aspect of the pupils’ behaviour. 
The text is punctuated by descriptions of the suffocating discipline that governs 
school life: the incessant daily routine of lining up; the ‘toma de distancia’ 
ensuring the pupils are precisely spaced in their lines; the silent filing in and 
out of classrooms. This echoes the political reality of the way the regime made 
its presence felt during the proceso: as Taylor reminds us, the junta issued strict 
national guidelines regarding pupil dress and behaviour as part of the policing 
of citizens’ daily lives (p. 105). This echo is even more distinctly felt through 
the character of señor Biasutto, the jefe de preceptores (the head of discipline) 
in charge of orchestrating this regime of control within the Colegio. We learn 
that Biasutto joined the school in 1975, the year that the real-life Colegio 
gained a new rector: Eduardo Aníbal Rómulo Maniglia, who continued in 
post when the junta came to power, imposing extreme discipline and vigilance 
to eliminate ‘subversion’ (Pertot, 2008). The military hallmarks of the pupils’ 
performance of national identity therefore take on an added significance 
through this context. They are performances not just of ‘being Argentine’, but 
of how the patriotic ideal was constructed under dictatorial rule.6 
Significantly, Kohan chooses to deny his protagonist any internal resistance 
to the politically charged network of symbols and power in which she 
participates. María Teresa is one of the school’s preceptoras and is therefore 
charged with upholding its strict disciplinary code, a role she performs with 
rigorous attention (and blind allegiance). This unthinking acceptance extends 
to her participation in rituals of national commemoration, most notably the 
act to mark 25 May (the day in 1810 considered the start of Argentina’s bid 
for independence from Spain). The novel’s understated description focuses on 
the drizzle and María Teresa’s futile attempts to clear her glasses; her attention 
is only returned to the content of the ceremony by a shout of ‘¡viva la patria!’ 
(p. 97). However, the apparent innocence of the annual celebration is abruptly 
shattered by a rare direct reference to political reality: as the pupils file into 
place, a journalist attempts to ask them their thoughts on the Falklands–
Malvinas War.7 This functions as a potent reminder of the celebration’s 
5 This teaching of military glory is a clear reference to (and criticism of ) what Rouquié describes 
as the ‘historia-batalla’ of the Argentine school system: see discussion above.
6 For analysis of the junta’s imposition of their own patriotic ideal, see Taylor (1997).
7 Significantly, this question is posed in French rather than Spanish, marking it as an outside 
intervention and preserving the non-naming of the conflict in the language of the text (the 
journalist simply refers to it as ‘la guerre’).
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underlying political implication. Grimson, Amati and Kodama highlight that 
in the celebration of 25 May in 1982 ‘se remonta la acción bélica presente y 
la defensa de la patria hasta la gesta de 1810, se recurre a la asociación de la 
guerra de Malvinas con la de Mayo’ (2007, p. 437). By allowing the Falklands–
Malvinas conflict to intrude into the routine performance of nationhood, the 
text destroys the ritual’s apolitical appearance, emphasising instead its potential 
to serve as a legitimising tool. As a result, it reveals the symbolic apparatus 
of patriotism as a powerful force waiting to be mobilised, in this case by a 
repressive regime.
The depiction of patriotic ritual in Kohan’s novel therefore evokes the 
junta’s exploitation of the framework of national allegiance and critiques the 
characters’ passive acceptance of the naturalness of their own participation in 
these acts. Set against this political reality, the novel’s depiction of acts of banal 
nationalism takes on a much more powerful (and sinister) meaning. They 
become unconscious performances of allegiance to this project of ‘national 
reorganisation’, an unthinking transfer of habits that obscures its potentially 
profound implications. Kohan’s text denaturalises these habits, foregrounding 
their military component and exposing the political consequences of blindly 
lending support to the national flag without regard for who is wielding its 
power. The novel insists that patriotism, including the Malvinas cause, does 
not exist ‘beyond’ politics and dismantles the apparent innocence of this form 
of national pride. It therefore demands a deeper consideration of the elements 
that make up a country’s patriotic liturgy, asking whether the traditional 
(military) components of performing Argentine national identity hold validity 
in a 21st-century society, particularly one with a recent experience of military 
dictatorship.
Conclusion
And so to return to that balcony scene of 2 April, absent from Kohan’s novel 
but resonating as a question and a provocation throughout its pages. In place 
of flag-waving crowds, Ciencias morales charts the process by which young 
Argentines are schooled in the practices of performing their national identity. 
It portrays these rituals as both a manifestation of the military government’s 
grasp on civil society during the dictatorship and a seemingly natural part of 
day-to-day citizenship: a jarring combination of meanings that meet in the 
figure of the Malvinas. 
The novel consciously engages with the broader social and political 
context outlined at the start of this chapter: the attempts to wrest control of 
the imaginative construct of the nation from the military, creating a clearer 
separation between the two. Its critique is therefore not restricted to the 
Falklands–Malvinas War (and the public support for the conflict), or to the 
relationship between the dictatorship and civil society, which can both be 
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considered finite historical events. Instead, it confronts an aspect of public life 
which is (as in every nation) ongoing: the performance of national belonging 
and the education of the next generation as citizens. 
By exploring the Malvinas through the prism of patriotism, the novel seems 
to steer away from asking what is unique about this national cause and instead 
focuses on its underpinning structures. This transforms the investigation from 
a historical one to a questioning that directly invokes the present: although 
the militarised routines present in the novel are tinged with the shadow of 
the proceso, the raising and lowering of the flag accompanied by the singing of 
‘Aurora’ are still a routine familiar to thousands of Argentine schoolchildren 
today (as Kohan highlights in El país de la guerra, p. 14). This can be seen as a 
more challenging, unsettling provocation. It offers no comforting reassurance 
that the lessons of the past have been learned, or that the structures that enabled 
the military government to repress civil society have been dismantled. Rather 
than offering a clear resolution, it leaves a potent question mark over the role 
of familiar practices and national symbols. Having revealed the intimate fusion 
of national commemoration and the military, it refuses to offer any indication 
that this underlying relationship has been successfully unravelled, leaving 
the concept of civil nationhood in a seemingly precarious position. Ciencias 
morales can be seen to offer its own explanation for the public support for the 
Malvinas, rooted in this learned association between the military and patria. 
But it also issues a warning: that unless we change these structures, there is no 
guarantee that we have shut the door to the past.
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9. Leaving behind the trenches of nationalism: 
teaching the Malvinas in secondary schools 
in Río Gallegos, Santa Cruz province*
Matthew C. Benwell and Alejandro Gasel
The Malvinas have long featured as an ‘authentic national cause’ (Palermo, 2012, p. 18) in Argentina’s political architecture and as a consequence the territories have been present in the nation’s educational curricula 
and textbooks for just over a century, albeit to varying degrees (Escudé, 1987). 
The intensity of references to ‘territorial nationalism’ and the Malvinas in 
geographical textbooks fluctuated prior to the 1940s, becoming more sustained 
from 1945 onwards due to changes in the prevailing political and cultural 
environment in Argentina and the turn to greater state control of the national 
curriculum (Escudé, 1987, p. 120). While the Malvinas have remained a 
significant issue in Argentine domestic and foreign policy, particularly from 
the middle of the 20th century up to the present-day, the more recent arrival of 
the Kirchners (Néstor and Cristina Fernández) in the Casa Rosada from 2003 
has seen a notable increase in attention placed on the issue by their respective 
administrations (Dodds and Benwell, 2010; Pinkerton and Benwell, 2014). 
Once again, these political developments have repercussions that can be traced 
through to the key themes prioritised by the Argentine Ministry of Education 
and the associated upsurge in the production of textbooks, documentaries, 
cartoons, posters and other educational resources about the Malvinas for use 
in classrooms throughout Argentina (Benwell, 2014). (For example, another 
identified educational theme encompasses memory, human rights and the 
last military dictatorship in Argentina, 1976–83.) Education, then, and more 
particularly curricula and classroom resources become a useful barometer for 
understanding more about the wider political concerns of the government of 
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the day (Bhattacharya, 2009; Escudé, 1987; Pykett, 2009; Ram, 2000; vom 
Hau, 2009). 
Teaching resources and the form of nationalism they evoke in relation to the 
Malvinas have received critical analysis from Escudé (1987, 1988) in particular, 
although his work focuses on geography textbooks from the 20th century 
predominantly. Escudé’s research critiques what he defines as a ‘pathological 
territorial nationalism’, which is projected in Argentine classrooms through 
maps and textbooks, suggesting that ideas about ‘imaginary’ national territories 
like the Malvinas only serve to instil frustration and dogma in young Argentine 
citizens (Escudé, 1987, p. 141). Recently, more general commentaries on 
Argentine nationalism have criticised the overwhelming emphasis placed on 
the Malvinas by the Kirchner administrations, both as a foreign policy objective 
and their positioning as a core aspect of national identity (e.g. Iglesias, 2012; 
Palermo, 2007, 2012). The perspectives of secondary-school history teachers 
drawn upon in this chapter suggest that they, too, have their own critiques of, 
and resistances to, national political discourses in relation to the Malvinas. 
This chapter acknowledges the instructive work of Escudé, which tells us much 
about the ways in which successive governments have presented the Malvinas 
question to young citizens in Argentine classrooms. Notwithstanding the value 
of such insights, we go beyond the content analysis of educational curricula and 
teaching resources by thinking more carefully about how teaching staff actively 
interpret and utilise (or alternatively ignore) discourses on the Malvinas that 
emanate from the Argentine Ministry of Education (Bhattacharya, 2009; vom 
Hau, 2009). Therefore, the research presented here starts to think critically 
about what happens in the space between the national and the local in relation 
to how the Malvinas are taught in Argentine classrooms. The interview extracts 
show that there is considerable scope for history teachers to develop their own 
interpretations of the Malvinas question in the classroom, although the context 
of heightened political tensions over the territories and the implicit pressures 
that prevail in Argentine society regarding this sensitive and impassioned issue 
must also be acknowledged. For example, some of the teachers interviewed 
looked for alternative ways to examine the Malvinas with young people in 
the classroom to those proposed nationally, drawing on local histories of 
connection and co-operation between Santa Cruz and the Islands. We suggest 
that such teaching approaches which emphasise shared histories (Pierini and 
Beecher, 2012) may provide opportunities for a more conciliatory and critical 
framing of an issue that has seen precious little room for mutual understanding 
since the turn of the century. 
The substantive focus of the research was to examine how young people 
attending secondary schools in Río Gallegos were being taught about the 
Malvinas. Interviews were conducted with members of staff responsible for 
teaching history in seven secondary schools in the city, four of which were 
state schools and the three private. Educational officials were interviewed 
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at the provincial (Santa Cruz) and national level; the latter representatives 
coordinated the publication of educational resources related to memory 
and the Malvinas for schools throughout Argentina. Finally, the minister of 
education for the nation, Alberto Sileoni, was interviewed. The chapter begins 
by briefly providing some regional context, emphasising some of the histories 
of social, political, economic and cultural connection in the region. These links 
were significant and require introduction precisely because many teachers were 
intent on presenting them to their students in the classroom. 
Moving beyond the ‘official’ story: the possibilities offered by 
Rio Gallegos
When I ask my students I realise that the historical human links between 
the Malvinas and Santa Cruz are not very well known. So, I think the 
thing that is absent is a strengthening of this, the bonds between Santa 
Cruz and the Malvinas before the war […] but the national government 
continues to insist on focusing on the war and nothing more (History 
teacher, private and state secondary schools, Río Gallegos, 15 March 2013, 
translated from Spanish by the authors). 
These words from a teacher in Río Gallegos hint at the possibility of a 
Malvinas narrative which considers the historical connections between the 
southern regions of Argentina and the Islands, emphasising a shared common 
past between the territories stretching far beyond 1982 (Pierini and Beecher, 
2012). Rather than beginning with partisan, or as some have critiqued, 
pathological (Escudé, 1988) and overtly nationalistic (Iglesias, 2012; Palermo, 
2007) perspectives on the Malvinas question, this teacher offers an alternative 
point of departure. This invites us to explore whether these accounts offer 
the possibility of a fresh reading of the sovereignty dispute in Argentina’s 
classrooms. Can these shared histories and connections reach beyond the 
southern region from which they originate to influence how the Malvinas issue 
is considered throughout the nation? We pose such questions in this chapter 
without necessarily providing all the answers but use the inspiration of teachers 
in Río Gallegos to illustrate the possibilities offered by their interpretations. 
Before turning to these developments within educational settings we consider 
the origins of those discourses which emphasise connection and commonality 
between Patagonia and the Malvinas. 
In particular, the historical influence of British communities in Santa Cruz 
and Río Gallegos through the Club Británico de Río Gallegos has been usefully 
explored by Pierini and Beecher (2011; 2012). Their research explores the 
familial, commercial and cultural links between the province, the UK and 
the Malvinas from the 1880s, brought to an abrupt and traumatic end (most 
especially for those communities with British lineage) with the outbreak of 
the Malvinas War in April 1982. Coronato (2011) similarly sheds further 
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light on these links, focusing on economic interests through sheep farming 
in Patagonia and the Falkland Islands specifically. Babería’s (1995) doctoral 
research refers to the peripheries of the South American continent (comprising 
the southern regions of Chile, the Malvinas and the Argentine provinces 
of Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego) as a self-sufficient or autarkic region, 
supported by the production and exportation of wool and meat to European 
markets from the 1880s onwards. Indeed, Lagmanovich (2005) contends that 
Patagonia remained, for a long time prior to these commercial interests, a 
‘mysterious’ territory which had yet to be significantly explored. Sovereignty 
south of Carmen de Patagones (Buenos Aires Province) was, for successive 
administrations in Buenos Aires, more theoretical than real. The gradual 
work of explorers, missionaries, captains, merchants and scientists expanded 
knowledge, enabling the subsequent settlement and economic development of 
the region. Towards the end of the 19th century the autarkic region identified 
by Barbería shared economic and commercial interests largely controlled by a 
handful of wealthy landowners, establishing its centre in Punta Arenas (Chile). 
These landowners (many of English origin) possessed vast areas of land and had 
autonomous communication systems, banks and hospitals, maintaining only 
distant relations with the capital cities of Buenos Aires and Santiago respectively. 
This ‘self-sufficient’ region declined in importance between 1914 and 1920 due, 
in part, to the opening of the Panama Canal, which diminished the importance 
of the Strait of Magellan for shipping between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. 
Clearly, Barbería’s research into regional autonomy and connection stems 
from the analysis of politico-economic processes predominantly; and its 
broader impact on cultural imaginations across Patagonia demands further 
academic analysis. However, this body of work does begin to point to some 
of the reasons underpinning the level of regional identification evident in 
the southern peripheries of the continent. The legacies of these connections 
are still very apparent today and our interviews and conversations with 
adults in Río Gallegos frequently cited nostalgic accounts of these common 
histories. Some fondly remembered the days of (educational, commercial and 
so on) connection with the Malvinas (i.e. before 1982); whilst others talked 
enthusiastically about family histories and heritages stretching further back in 
time which were bound up with migrations between the Argentine mainland, 
the Malvinas and the UK, for instance (Pierini and Beecher, 2011, 2012). 
The Malvinas War in 1982 is understandably seen as the moment at 
which relations between the Argentine mainland and the Islands were severed 
irreparably. Notwithstanding these ruptures, it is revealing to look at the 
ways in which the local Santa Cruz press reported on events occurring on 
their doorstep. These evoke a different kind of relationship to the unfolding 
situation when compared to other areas of Argentina, most especially Buenos 
Aires. A day after the landing of Argentine troops on the Islands, La Opinión 
Austral (the provincial newspaper for Santa Cruz, LAO), shifted all its attention 
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towards the Malvinas. Its editorial on 3 April 1982 declared, ‘An End to the 
Malvinas Captivity’ and stated: ‘Our province, and particularly Río Gallegos, 
motivated by its geographical proximity to the archipelago as well as historical 
bonds by means of commercial activity and exchange from coast to coast, was 
perhaps more deeply sensitive towards the events that have happened’ (LOA, 
1982, authors’ emphasis and translation). This was an account that drew heavily 
on the histories connecting the province and the Malvinas in ways which are, 
of course, not necessarily geo-politically innocent. Subsequent editorials in the 
newspaper were more cautious and reflected growing tensions regarding the 
proximity of the conflict area, 480 kilometres east of the town. The growing 
militarisation of the town and the preparations for war (the Argentine Red 
Cross started to give talks preparing civilians for war) meant that people in 
Santa Cruz had a very different view of what was taking place when compared 
to the perception of events in central areas of the country. The triumphalist 
discourse read in the newspapers of Buenos Aires and cities situated further 
north differed markedly from these local views of events. These local histories 
of the war and beyond, then, are suggestive of the unique relations the province 
of Santa Cruz has had with the Malvinas, in large part due to their geographical 
proximity. They are histories which many teaching staff drew upon in their 
classes related to the question in secondary schools in Río Gallegos.
Interpreting the Malvinas in Argentine secondary schools
Decisions about what common themes will be taught in educational 
institutions throughout Argentina are determined by the Argentine ministry 
of education, yet provincial education ministries/councils, schools and teachers 
have considerable scope in defining how they will interrogate the chosen issues. 
For instance, Article 92 of the Ley Nacional de Educación (2006) identifies 
the ‘recovery of the Malvinas’ as a common issue which must be present 
on the Argentine national curriculum. This is consistent with Argentina’s 
Constitution (1994), which states that the recovery of territories in the south-
west Atlantic, including the Malvinas, is a permanent and inalienable objective 
of the Argentine people. These legal doctrines have seen an increase in the 
production of educational resources by the Argentine ministry of education for 
use in primary- and secondary-school classrooms. These textbooks (e.g. Pensar 
Malvinas (Flachsland et al., 2010); Malvinas: educación y memoria (Ministerio 
de Educación de la Nación Argentina, 2012)), cartoons, documentaries and 
other multimedia resources typically come with suggestions for activities or 
discussions that might be initiated by the teacher. However, the Argentine 
minister of education, Alberto Sileoni, was realistic about how these teaching 
resources and the Malvinas aspect of the curriculum might be utilised and 
interpreted differently throughout provinces and schools in the nation:
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We try to make sure the message [relating to the Malvinas], the importance 
it is given and the way it is taught are as similar as possible. In a federal 
nation-state there are particularities. I have the conviction that in all the 
provinces the issue is treated with the maximum importance, with the 
maximum dedication. […] It might be that a specific teacher puts more 
emphasis and more passion into the issue than others and for others it 
might be less important and one notices this when it is taught. […] At 
least our obligation from here [the Argentine ministry of education] is to 
make sure that things are taught with truth, with scientific and historical 
rigour (Alberto Sileoni, minister of education for Argentina, Buenos Aires, 
26 March 2013).
Indeed, there was substantial variation in how secondary school history 
teachers in Río Gallegos used the Malvinas materials they received from the 
Argentine ministry of education. The majority used them sparingly alongside 
their own classroom activities and resources while others chose to ignore them 
completely. One teacher at a state secondary school in Río Gallegos pointed 
out: ‘The Malvinas resources that I showed you [textbooks from the Argentine 
ministry], I didn’t work with them. The 24 March [the day of remembrance 
for truth and justice in Argentina], yes. I worked with those quite a lot. We 
did entire courses with those resources’. For this teacher the Malvinas were 
not an issue which she considered significant, especially when compared 
with debates concerning human rights and memory associated with the last 
military dictatorship in Argentina (although most teachers and, indeed, the 
Argentine ministry of education saw the Malvinas and the military dictatorship 
as inextricably linked and often examined the topics together). These personal 
preferences influenced the time she allocated to each topic and meant that the 
Malvinas were given cursory attention in her classes. The teacher continued: 
‘One teaches with one’s personal style. I can’t talk to the students about the 
sovereignty question. Yes, I have to make a speech but I’m not going to say the 
Malvinas are Argentine, which is the national discourse, because I don’t feel 
it. I relate it more to the last step taken by the dictatorship in order to try and 
survive’ (History teacher, state secondary school, Río Gallegos, 7 March 2013).
This quotation draws attention to the fact that teaching staff did not have 
carte blanche to define every topic that they covered in the classroom. There 
were certain formal requirements as a result of the Ley Nacional de Educación, 
as well as informal societal expectations relating to how the Malvinas would 
be discussed in school (i.e. by reaffirming Argentina’s legitimate claim to 
sovereignty over the Islands and repudiating British presence in the territories). 
These were particularly acute in a city like Río Gallegos, which hosts several 
military installations, as many young people attending the schools had family 
members in the military and the teachers interviewed were very aware of these 
sensitivities. In the extract above, the teacher alludes to having to make a 
speech related to the Malvinas, albeit one with which she struggled to identify. 
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Hence, while all teachers were required to refer to the Malvinas in some way, 
some implicitly attempted to diminish their importance by devoting a minimal 
amount of time to the subject or by avoiding nationalist declarations and songs 
related to the Islands. Another teacher from a private secondary school reflected 
on the implications of exploring other sides to the sovereignty dispute in the 
classroom, beyond those expounded by the Argentine state:
I think that it’s still difficult [to examine British/Islander perspectives in the 
sovereignty dispute] but this doesn’t mean that teachers can’t do it. There is 
complete freedom, ‘complete’ between inverted commas, because I imagine 
that if a state supervisor heard you with an opinion of this nature I don’t 
think it would be very well received (History teacher, private secondary 
school, Río Gallegos, 7 March 2013).
It is impossible to analyse the ways in which teachers are able to tackle 
the Malvinas as a subject in Argentine classrooms without wider consideration 
of contemporary geo-political tensions. This research, undertaken in early 
2013, coincided with a marked heating up of diplomatic exchanges between 
the UK, Argentina and the Falkland Islands. Although there were no explicit 
consequences in schools as a result of these geo-political events, teachers 
were very conscious of the increased sensitivity attached to the issue and this 
informed their perceptions of the ‘freedom’ they had in the classroom to explore 
it from diverse angles. Several teachers referred to the inevitable perception by 
others that they would be ‘betraying la patria’ [the homeland] if they decided 
to take any line of argument that deviated from, or challenged, that of the 
Argentine state.
Notwithstanding these pressures, there was evidence that some schools and 
teachers were exploring the Malvinas from different perspectives and injecting 
their own personality in terms of how they tackled the issue. While staff 
responsible for the production of materials on the Malvinas at the ministry 
of education were very keen to point out that the issue encompassed far more 
than the conflict in 1982, some of the teachers interviewed in Río Gallegos 
expressed frustration with how much this dominated state discourses. This 
history teacher who had taught in state and private schools in Río Gallegos 
talked instead about how she preferred to examine the Malvinas in the 
classroom:
So when we look at the Malvinas, there is a topic that’s called ‘migrations’ 
that looks at the malvineros that came to live in the Malvinas. We look at 
foreign relations, obviously the politics of the Malvinas from the colonial 
era. […] So, the economic models, the exploitation of oil and gas in the 
Malvinas. So we explore the Malvinas from other angles, not the war, 
because when I send the programme to the students I say specifically that 
we are not going to deal with the conflict at all. It’s the Malvinas viewed 
from other angles (History teacher, private and state secondary schools, 15 
March 2013).
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This particular teacher had amassed many years of teaching experience and 
perhaps felt more confident defining independently how she would look at the 
Malvinas than would a relatively junior member of the teaching staff. There 
was a sense from her that critical and nuanced debates about the Malvinas 
question were more likely to be had by discussing topics such as the exploitation 
of natural resources, colonial and post-colonial politics as well as regional 
migrations. For this reason she also resisted the common practice (particularly 
in Río Gallegos but also in other parts of Argentina) of inviting ex-combatants 
into the classroom to talk about their experiences in 1982 because, she claimed, 
they presented ‘a view that is very partial, very subjective and not very critical of 
the war’. At a private school in Río Gallegos there was similar concern with the 
lack of critical debate that could be enabled by referring to Argentine teaching 
resources alone. As a result the history teacher looked at multiple perspectives 
when exploring historical arguments regarding the sovereignty question: ‘What 
was the position of the Argentine government, of the British government 
and what happened to the people that lived in the Malvinas? What did they 
think? And the students were able to work on this with a little more empathy, 
trying to get away from their stance a little and putting themselves in different 
places’ (History teacher, private secondary school, 7 March 2013). It should 
be noted that the acknowledgement and exploration of different arguments in 
relation to sovereignty over the Malvinas were specific to this private school in 
Río Gallegos (other schools involved in the research only explored Argentine 
sovereignty claims) and there were lengthy discussions within the institution 
before this project was approved, given its political sensitivities.
More commonplace in the teaching of history in these secondary schools 
was an emphasis on looking at what significance the Malvinas held for the 
local region of Santa Cruz and the city of Río Gallegos. The turn to thinking 
about the Malvinas through the local has been explicitly encouraged by the 
Argentine ministry of education and is most clearly reflected in their poster/
booklet teaching resource for secondary schools entitled Malvinas: una causa 
presente en cada rincón de la patria [Malvinas: a cause present in every corner 
of the homeland]. It depicts the ways in which references to the Malvinas are 
present in the everyday landscapes (e.g. schools, ice cream parlours, stadia 
and monuments) of cities and provinces throughout Argentina, including 
regions in the far north of the nation (Benwell and Dodds, 2011; Billig, 1995; 
Edensor, 2002). This tendency to look at a ‘national cause’ through the local 
is perhaps inevitable in a place like Río Gallegos, which has a long history of 
connection to the Malvinas (e.g. Graham-Yooll, 2007; Pierini and Beecher, 
2011). Once again, there is space for different interpretations, political agendas 
and emphases when presenting the history of Santa Cruz province alongside 
that of the Malvinas. 
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The majority of teachers focused on the conflict in 1982, which was directly 
experienced by communities living in Río Gallegos, possibly because it was 
relatively easy to access objects, newspapers and the testimonies of people who 
lived in the city at this time. It was not unusual for adults and ex-combatants 
to visit schools to talk to students about their experiences during the war or for 
students to visit the Malvinas war museum in the city. Indeed, some staff at 
the provincial educational authority for Santa Cruz were developing an online 
resource for use in classrooms entitled ‘74 days’ (the duration of the Malvinas 
War) which explored how the war was experienced in the province. This social-
memory project looked to present the oral histories and photographs of civilians, 
journalists, the military and others through an interactive webpage that also 
included suggested activities for teachers. Although this represented an attempt 
to think about the war in ways which were not exclusively militaristic, the focus 
here was still on the war of 1982, an event which inevitably emphasises division 
and antagonism between the Argentine mainland and the Islands. In contrast, 
several teachers preferred to place attention on connections that characterised 
relations between the continent and the territories before 1982:
The population of Santa Cruz is a product of the expansion of livestock 
activities of farms located in the Malvinas. So, we can’t avoid the historical 
relationship that the Malvinas had, not only as an important geo-political 
or strategic point for the British Empire at some moment in history. […] 
Rather, in our case we try to see the relationship the Malvinas had with the 
territory of Santa Cruz under British domination because it’s going to be a 
fundamental part of how Santa Cruz was populated. […] So we work with 
a concept called the autarkic region that is to do with the development of 
livestock and sheep activity in this region of Santa Cruz, Tierra del Fuego, 
Malvinas and the south of Chile. So, we look at it as one territory (History 
teacher, state secondary school, Río Gallegos, 5 March 2013).
This teacher identified the importance of students understanding the historical 
context and power relations that marked connections between the south of the 
continent and the Malvinas in the nineteenth and early 20th centuries. While 
there was co-operation and trade at this historical juncture, he made a point in 
his teaching of highlighting the ways in which these were dominated by British 
imperial and business interests in the region. Thus, there were variations in how 
local framings of the Malvinas were transmitted to students in secondary school 
classrooms in Río Gallegos. Some teachers and educational officials chose to 
examine the war of 1982 and its impact on Río Gallegos and Santa Cruz, 
while others considered some of the human and commercial links that existed 
prior to these more recent events. These histories of connection, co-operation, 
migration as well as asymmetric geo-political relations appeared to offer the 
opportunity to explore more peaceful exchanges in relation to the Malvinas, 
especially when compared with those associated with the conflict in 1982. 
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Conclusion
The Malvinas question continued to be the principal foreign policy issue 
for the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, evidenced by the 
creation of a dedicated Malvinas secretary in Argentina’s Cancillería in early 
2014. Reference to the quantity and production quality of educational 
resources for Argentine classrooms in recent years tells a similar story about 
how the issue is being prioritised at the national level. There appears to be an 
imperative to keep on reminding Argentine children and young people of the 
‘incomplete’ nature of their national territory (Escudé, 1987) and the traumas 
the nation (and its young conscripts) suffered as a result of the war in 1982. 
The textbooks, DVDs, webpages and posters for use in institutional spaces 
are useful resources and representations, but analysed alone tell us little about 
how schools and their teaching staff (and, for that matter, children and young 
people) are engaging with them (vom Hau, 2009). The insights of teachers 
in Río Gallegos presented in this chapter both reflect and resist some of the 
initiatives being promoted by the national government in relation to the 
teaching of the Malvinas in secondary schools. They show how the Malvinas 
are being interpreted and sometimes re-worked according to local histories, 
something which the Ministry of Education has actively encouraged. Here, 
the Malvinas, and typically the war in 1982, are (re)produced as a national 
issue/cause which can be remembered in and through local spaces. While Río 
Gallegos and its neighbouring provinces have a unique and intimate history 
of connection to the Malvinas, this ability to frame the Malvinas through a 
local lens is not exclusive to this southern region. For instance, communities 
in the northern provinces of Argentina were profoundly scarred by the loss of 
conscripts in the war and one might assume that these local histories would 
be equally prominent in schools in Corrientes and Chaco (Guber, 2001). Of 
course, further research in different provinces of Argentina would enable firmer 
conclusions to be drawn about the national-local nexus in relation to classroom 
discourses about the Malvinas. This could include, as in the case of the next 
stage of the Río Gallegos research project discussed here, working with young 
people themselves to understand more about how they learn about, receive and 
(re)interpret such national and local narratives.
We have suggested through the interview extracts that the teaching of the 
Malvinas issue was ultimately determined by the institution and teaching 
staff responsible for its delivery. Thus, some teachers (and not all, as we have 
stressed) in Río Gallegos opposed or ignored what they understood to be the 
dominant discourse promoted by the nation through its suggested classroom 
activities. For these individuals there was a nationalistic undertone to how the 
Malvinas were presented which over-emphasised the war of 1982, leaving little 
room for more ‘critical’ and ‘contextualised’ readings of history in relation to 
the sovereignty dispute. These teachers turned to colonial and local histories, 
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as well as eras when relations between the Islands were characterised by co-
operation and peaceful co-existence (albeit relations set in the broader context 
of colonial politico-economic dynamics) as an alternative to emphasising 
conflict and difference. Others decided to analyse the respective sovereignty 
arguments, including the perspective of the Falkland Islanders, something 
that is never acknowledged in ‘official’ educational resources. These are, then, 
attempts to think about Argentina’s relations with the Malvinas in different 
ways which do not simply reproduce the national discourse. They draw on 
perspectives which need not renounce the sovereignty claims of any side, 
yet instead might encourage a more complex and nuanced discussion of the 
historical and contemporary events that characterise the Malvinas dispute.
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10. Chronicle of a referendum foretold: 
what next for the Malvinas–Falklands?*
Cara Levey and Daniel Ozarow
The announcement of the result of the March 2013 referendum on whether the Falklands–Malvinas should remain a British overseas territory came as no surprise in either Britain or Argentina, or on the 
South Atlantic islands themselves. Indeed, perhaps the biggest shock of all 
was the news that three inhabitants actually voted against remaining under 
British rule (Benedictus, 2013). As bewildered Kelpers in the close-knit island 
community speculated on where the voices of dissent had come from, in the 
aftermath of the referendum we consider what has really changed and offer 
insight into what will happen next. In particular, we argue that it is in both 
British and Argentine self-interest to change their stances in order to resolve 
the issue.
The elephant in the room
Before considering the significance of its outcome, it is worth mentioning 
that historically and, in particular, since 1982, media and populace alike, to 
the contingent stances of the respective political leaders at specific junctures, 
often rather disingenuously attribute the re-emergence and heightening of 
the territorial dispute to the respective political leaders in power at the time. 
Most notably with Margaret Thatcher and the third military junta led by 
General Galtieri in 1982 and more recently with the somewhat frosty relations 
between Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and David Cameron at the time of 
the referendum. In both cases, one might be forgiven for thinking that political 
elites pulled the issue out of the hat at critical moments in order to distract an 
easily led populace from the beleaguered economy, low popularity or highly 
mobilised resistance they faced at home. 
* An early version of this chapter was originally published as an op-ed for Al Jazeera in the days 
following the 2013 referendum. It has subsequently been updated significantly to account for 
developments that have taken place since then. The authors would like to thank Uriel Erlich 
for his comments on the draft of this chapter. 
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Yet, although the issue undoubtedly serves as a convenient political football 
and lends itself to political point-scoring, it is worth noting that Argentine 
claims to the ‘Malvinas’ have never been far from the public arena (albeit 
somewhat more muted at times), both before and since the conflict. Indeed, 
intermittent secret discussions took place over sovereignty between the 
Argentine and British governments during the 1950s and right up until the 
war of 1982. A WikiLeaks cable found that the dictator Juan Carlos Onganía 
(1966–70) considered retaking them in 19661 and, more crucially, Argentina’s 
Foreign Ministry documents reportedly reveal that the British secretly offered 
former president Juan Perón (1946–55 and 1973–4) shared control of the 
Islands on 11 June 1974, with a carefully considered proposal and concrete 
plans for making it a reality. The plan only failed to materialise because Perón 
died three weeks later, otherwise the course of history would have been quite 
different (Jastreblansky, 2012).
Perhaps most controversially, and barely featuring in British collective 
memory, Sir Lawrence Freedman, professor of War Studies at King’s College 
London recounts how Margaret Thatcher’s government offered to hand over 
sovereignty of the Islands at a clandestine meeting with a senior member of the 
Argentine military junta in June 1980, less than two years before the conflict 
in the South Atlantic and, unlike in 1974, to a dictatorship rather than a 
democratically elected government (Freedman, 2005, p. 698). In The Official 
History of the Falklands Campaign, Freedman explains how the Foreign Office 
devised a plan to cede sovereignty to Argentina with a leaseback agreement 
to Britain for 99 years. This was agreed at a secret meeting between Foreign 
Secretary, Nicholas Ridley and his opposite number, Comodoro Cavandoli in 
Switzerland. Given that Britain had already enjoyed a cosy relationship with 
the ruling dictatorship, having sold Lynx helicopters and naval missiles (which 
were later used against the British forces in 1982) to the regime, the deal was a 
masterstroke from a business perspective as it would lay the ground for further 
multi-million pound arms sales for as long as the Junta remained in power. The 
deal was only scuppered when Ridley visited the Islands in November 1980 in 
an effort to persuade the Islanders to agree. When Conservative and Labour 
MPs got wind of the proposal, they objected, as much as anything to its lack of 
transparency, and it was soon shelved. 
Meanwhile, two-time President Carlos Menem (1989–99) – the first 
Argentine head of state to visit Britain since the conflict in 1982 – may 
have outwardly promoted more cordial and economic relations between the 
two nations, but one cannot forget how an amendment to the Argentine 
Constitution in 1994 [First Temporary Provision] that remains in place today, 
stipulated that the government can only seek the recovery of the Islands 
1 Urgente 24, 2010. 
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peacefully (in accordance with international law), and also must respect the 
Islanders’ existing way of life:
The Argentine Nation ratifies its legitimate and non-prescribing 
sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur 
Islands and over the corresponding maritime and insular zones, as they are 
an integral part of the National territory. The recovery of said territories 
and the full exercise of sovereignty, respectful of the way of life of their 
inhabitants and according to the principles of international law, are a 
permanent and unrelinquished goal of the Argentine people.2
To this end then, the 1990s represented a period of ‘rapprochement’, defined 
as such by Argentina’s then Vice-Foreign Minister Andrés Cisneros, as much 
towards the Islanders as towards the British government. This policy centred 
around the prioritising of the need for cooperation in (among other things), the 
areas of hydrocarbon extraction, fishing and flights – which in turn required a 
stable political climate without the threat of military conflict. In other words, 
this desire for advances in these areas by Argentina’s government supplanted 
the pushing of the sovereignty question on its political agenda, despite the 
fact that the legal claim persisted. Indeed, the idea that the Malvinas should 
be Argentine was avoided during diplomatic exchanges at the time precisely 
in order to further such advances. Effectively its policy was one in which they 
aimed for discussions around sovereignty to take place at the end of the road 
towards improving practical understandings, not at the beginning (Erlich, 
2015, p. 123).
Although the constitutional clause precludes any possibility of violent 
conflict, it sought to reassert and legally embed a claim that would not 
simply dissipate with military defeat. Moreover, although British–Argentine 
diplomatic relations have fluctuated between moments of tension and affability 
during the 37 years since the end of the 1982 conflict, a resolution – one that 
might provide closure to the issue – remains elusive. 
The following point of departure came with the election of Néstor 
Kirchner in 2003, at which point the fulcrum of the change in the Argentine 
government’s foreign policy centred on its position with respect to the 
Malvinas. The new diagnosis was that, during the 1990s, President Menem’s 
policy that focused on cooperation on a range of issues to initiate a path that, 
in time, would lead to a new discussion around sovereignty, had failed. This 
was attributable to a number of unilateral acts of British policy, which as Erlich 
claims, ‘showed them that the United Kingdom did not wish to conform to the 
spirit of the cooperation agreements’. Therefore, instead, from the inception 
of kirchnerismo, the axis of the relationship with Britain should centre on the 
sovereignty disagreement taking the dispute itself as a point of departure and 
with a series of more agitational tactics employed (Erlich, 2015, pp. 163–4).
2 Constitution of the Argentine Nation, 1994. 
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This explicit reassertion of sovereignty translated into the diplomatic arena 
was manifest from the very first meeting that Néstor had with then British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, just weeks after his inauguration as president. At 
this meeting, which marked a watershed moment, Kirchner reaffirmed to his 
opposite number that the United Kingdom should re-establish a dialogue over 
the Falklands–Malvinas question, even if the resulting friction caused practical 
cooperation over the areas named earlier to be suspended. Thus, the origins 
of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s rather boisterous attempts to expose, in 
public arenas later on, the British government’s anachronistic attitude to the 
Malvinas can be traced back to the approach that was formulated under her 
husband’s presidency. This occurred in 2003.
A pointless referendum? 
With all this in mind, and given the apparent stalemate, where does that leave 
things in the wake of the referendum? Arguably, the result has not told us 
anything that we did not already know. What it has revealed is the need for 
negotiation and the fact that self-determination is not the only issue at stake 
here. However, the referendum has served political interests for all parties 
involved: for the British it has ‘proved’ that the Falklanders are ‘British’; and 
for the Argentines (who rejected the outcome) that the British are settlers and 
illegitimate heirs to the territory. 
The UN refused to recognise the referendum and hope for a resolution 
was not aided by its ambiguous and contradictory position in relation to 
the dispute. Article 1 (paragraph 2) of its Charter of the United Nations 
enshrines the right to ‘self-determination for all people’. This stance, the 
British and Falklands governments claim, was confirmed once and for all by 
the referendum. The Argentines meanwhile claim that article 2 (paragraph 4) 
includes ‘the inviolability of the territory of the State’, and that the Falklands 
form part of its national territorial integrity. The clearest position held by the 
UN is, perhaps, resolution 2065 (passed in 1965), which invites the Argentine 
and British governments to proceed with negotiations ‘with a view to finding 
a peaceful solution’, something that the British government has refused to do 
since 1982. Indeed, the Assembly has not considered the ‘Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas) Question’ nor adopted any resolution on the question since 1988 
when resolution 43/25 reiterated its appeal for the dispute to be resolved 
through negotiations between the two governments. The case currently sits 
with the UN Decolonisation Committee. 
The problem is that the referendum is not a process into which all parties 
entered equally, nor did it reveal whether the Islanders wish to keep the status 
quo as a precursor to full autonomy or to seeking independence from Britain. 
To add to the ambiguity, the most recent census on the Islands in 2013 suggests 
WHAT NEXT FOR THE MALVINAS–FALKLANDS? 189
that only a third of the Islanders identify as British.3 Had a different question 
been asked in the 2013 referendum, there might well have been a different 
outcome. In this sense, the referendum feels like a missed opportunity to 
engage in a profound and meaningful debate. Yet in spite of the seemingly 
polarised stances of their respective governments, the reality is that there is 
much more common ground on which to build than meets the eye. 
For a start, whereas Britain highlights the self-determination of the Falkland 
Islanders as the defining issue and focuses on their ‘British’ identity and way 
of life, Argentina has already promised to respect these entirely, as stated in 
its aforementioned constitutional clause. Argentina’s concern is instead one of 
territorial integrity and sovereignty over the land (and surrounding sea). Such 
declarations make it even more absurd that the two parties cannot sit around 
the negotiating table and talk about cooperation.
The emergence of alternative legal interpretations makes 
prompt dialogue essential
Another consequence of attention once again being drawn to the Falklands 
dispute in the months leading up to the referendum was that it led several 
researchers to forensically examine the plethora of pacts and agreements 
signed by the various imperial powers as part of the decolonisation process 
in the 1800s. Of course, a number of diverse conclusions were reached about 
the legality of control of the Islands. Generally these were less favourable 
for Argentina than previously assumed, but far more serious for Britain. 
Britain’s claim to the Falklands has always relied not on prior discovery (which 
occurred before the first British flag was planted on the Islands), but on a 
small settlement established in 1766 (and abandoned in 1774). When Britain 
recognised Argentine independence in 1825, it did so without any claim to 
the Falklands, which were then under an Argentine governor living there. This 
fact casts doubt over the historic foundation of the legality of the claim, which 
only became live after the (illegal) 1833 invasion, when the Islands reverted to 
British rule.
An alternative interpretation that does not sit well with either side can be 
found in Juan Ackermann y Alfredo Villegas’ 2013 book, which claimed that 
Uruguay is in fact the only legitimate legal owner, due to its 1841 pact with the 
Spanish crown, according to which the latter ceded authority over the Islands 
(Ackerman and Villegas, 2013). The book also provides evidence that both the 
British governments and Argentine senate subsequently recognised the pact. 
While the Uruguayan government is yet to lay official claim to the Falklands–
Malvinas, this may change if the oil deposits under the sea surrounding the 
Islands ever become fully refinable and lucrative. Britain and Argentina should 
3 The Guardian, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/sep/13/falkland-islands-census-
british-identity.
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seek to reach an agreement now while the fate of the Islands is still within their 
control.
Singing from the same hymn sheet
The respective governments’ shared visions (yet differing perspectives), 
combined with the convoluted history of the ownership of the islands, 
demonstrate the need for dialogue. With this in mind, let us consider what 
happened in the days, weeks and months after the referendum in both Britain 
and Argentina, and what might be required of each side in order to break the 
deadlock.
In the aftermath of the referendum vote, Argentina continued its policy 
of diplomacy through building alliances in the global south in order to to 
pressure Britain to return to negotiations, coupled with occasional episodes of 
publicly embarrassing the British government (such as the attempt by former 
president Cristina Fernández to hand British prime minister David Cameron 
a letter marked ‘UN Malvinas’ at the 2012 G20 Summit). It was reported that 
the Argentine government also wanted to persuade the UN Decolonization 
Committee potentially to force a UN General Assembly vote, which would 
pressure the British government into coming to the negotiating table. Given 
that a year after the vote, a ministerial declaration of the 130 nations of the G77 
plus China called upon Britain and Argentina to resume dialogue following a 
manoeuvre by the latter to make this so in June 2014 (MercoPress, 2014). This 
declaration gives a strong indicator of how the Assembly might have voted. 
Indeed, it was arguably only because Argentina was being held to ransom 
by US vulture funds that the Falklands–Malvinas dispute was not brought 
before the UN General Assembly.4 Instead, Argentina was heavily distracted, 
as President Cristina Kirchner sought to focus her UN Assembly business on 
proposing new basic principles on sovereign debt-restructuring processes that 
were eventually approved in 2015.
While this may have been brinkmanship, such is the potency of the Malvinas 
issue and its centrality in Argentina’s national identity, that Argentina’s 
government and entire political class would in fact benefit from having the 
sovereignty question left perpetually unresolved. Indeed La Cuestión de las Islas 
Malvinas remains one of only three obligatory subjects that schoolchildren must 
learn under the National Education Law. Symbols of Argentina’s sovereignty 
claim are omnipresent in street-names, on school buildings, commemorated 
in town squares, are a popular choice of tattoo, a regular theme of street 
demonstrations and a fixture in the school curriculum. If the Falklands were 
ever ‘returned’ to Argentina, it would no doubt bring enormous short-term 
4 These vulture funds were NML and Aurelius Capital, and between 2013 and 2015 they sued 
the government and threatened to ignite a debt default on the scale of 2001 over debts they 
claimed they were owed on prior speculative bond purchases.
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popularity for the government in power at the time. Nevertheless, the evidence 
suggests that Argentines are becoming increasingly cynical about their claim to 
the Malvinas, especially young people. Some 45% of the Argentine population 
have little or no interest in the Malvinas, with 18 to 29 year-olds being the 
most indifferent of all age groups.5 Although the recognisable outline of the 
Islands and accompanying rallying cry remain omnipresent, just how long the 
claim will remain potent and carry political sway, remains to be seen. With this 
in mind, the Argentine government is effectively facing a race against time to 
reach a negotiated compromise agreement.
Curiously, while the claim to sovereignty proved a source of distraction from 
domestic political problems for both Galtieri’s Junta and Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative government in 1982, the Falklands–Malvinas issue has never 
become one that possesses electoral potency in either country. Indeed, in 
Argentina the Malvinas claim is instead arguably a ‘policy of the state’ that 
transcends party affiliation. This position is illustrated by former president 
Macri’s (2015–19) perceived ‘weak’ position vis-à-vis reasserting Argentina’s 
sovereignty claim. Yet although his popularity was damaged by several years of 
austerity and corruption allegations against his government, the same cannot 
be said of his return to 1990s-style rapprochement in relation to the Islands. 
His political opponents struggled to convince the population that he genuinely 
wanted to forfeit Argentina’s historical demand for control of the disputed 
territory that dates back to 1833. Further, the Malvinas question barely featured 
in Alberto Fernandez’ successful presidential election campaign in late 2019. In 
other words, the issue seems to be one less of electoral significance and more 
one that is so embedded in the national imaginary for much of the population 
that to play politics with it domestically is largely symbolic. Meanwhile in the 
United Kingdom, while the 1982 war is commemorated annually, it barely 
features in daily political discourse, much less at election time.
However, in terms of how winning over the Islanders might be achieved, 
Argentina needs seriously to reappraise its perceived hostile approach, because 
its reference to them as an ‘implanted’ population, as well as its refusal to 
negotiate with them face-to-face, is not winning them any allies in the South 
Atlantic. The Argentine government has repeatedly stated that it is ‘committed 
to respecting the identity and way of life of the inhabitants of the Malvinas, 
as we do with the 250,000 British descendants living in mainland Argentina’ 
in spite of the fact that the ‘territory belongs to Argentina’ (Castro, 2013). Yet 
they need to work on building fraternal relations with the Islanders themselves, 
or at the very least to adopt a less bellicose discourse towards them. It is naïve 
of any government to think they can lay claim to an inhabited territory without 
considering relations with existing residents. This argument has been put 
5 ‘Varied views towards the Falkland Islands dispute’, University of Liverpool Press Release, 7 
March 2012, available at: https://news.liverpool.ac.uk/2012/03/07/varied-views-towards-the-
falkland-islands-dispute/ (accessed 27 April 2020).
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forward by a number of Argentine scholars and intellectuals, such as Osvaldo 
Bayer, who argued that Argentina needs to offer grants for university study in 
Argentina and organise cultural events to encourage trust-building exchanges 
between the Islanders and Argentine citizens (Bayer, 2012). Small gestures like 
these are surely necessary before any meaningful negotiations can take place. 
In the battle for the hearts and minds of the Falkland Islanders, the British, for 
now, hold all the cards. 
The British government’s position has not changed substantially. The 
successive Conservative administrations that have been in power since 2010 
make negotiation with the Argentines very unlikely, arguably in part because 
of post-1982 party leaderships not wanting to renege on Margaret Thatcher’s 
‘victory’, or the memory of the fallen armed forces personnel. The referendum 
result served to reinforce its view that the Falkland Islanders have now 
decided their own fate. Appearing to respect their wishes certainly disguises 
the government’s rabid enthusiasm for exploiting the hydrocarbons that lie 
under the seabed. However, like Argentina’s stance, Britain’s position is looking 
increasingly unsustainable in the face of mounting global opposition. Not even 
the United States, its closest global ally, was willing to support Britain’s claim 
(Foster, 2014).
Like the Argentines, the British also need to realise that negotiation is 
crucial and that the issue will not dissipate, regardless of which president is 
in power in their southern relation. The government should reflect on the 
absurdity of clinging onto such a colonial outpost in the 21st century and 
the reality that it merely serves to buttress a false sense of national pride, years 
after the sun set on the Empire. Unlike in the 1980s, there is now significant 
Latin American unity and some form of coherent consensus over the Malvinas 
question as well as a revival of anti-imperialist discourse that made up part 
of the pink tide (the election of leftist governments throughout the region). 
For example, in 2011 the members of Mercosur, the organisation for South 
American regional cooperation, agreed to close their ports to ships flying 
the Falklands–Malvinas flag and in 2015, the 18 nations of the Union of 
South American Nations (UNASUR) repeated its call for Britain to return 
to dialogue, with the presidency (albeit Venezuelan) of the same organisation 
condemning British military exercises in the seas surrounding the Islands in a 
statement that was strongly supportive of Argentina’s 2016 sovereignty claim 
(UNASUR, 2016). Given the post-Brexit scenario, in which Britain’s trading 
and investment relationship may well come under significant strain (the EU 
accounts for £236bn or 43% of all the UK’s exports of goods and services and 
£318bn or 54% of all imports (ONS, 2018)), developing stronger commercial 
ties with the region looks vital. Key to the new diplomatic charm offensive 
will be a softer tone on the Falklands, as the military presence of an imperialist 
power in Latin American waters continues to prove a source of irritation not 
just in Argentina, but also from Havana all the way down to Santiago de Chile. 
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Ironically, Britain’s stubborn refusal to adopt a more flexible approach on 
the sovereignty question may be entirely self-defeating in terms of both the 
national self-interest and the Islands’ economy. This is because being able to 
exploit the recently discovered Islands’ hydrocarbon deposits on a significant 
scale would depend on access to the Argentine mainland, a condition that 
Argentina can use as leverage to encourage talks (Milne, 2013). There are surely 
few stronger incentives for Britain to return to dialogue than that.
Finally, amid the ongoing tension, it is worth briefly speculating on the 
prospects of a re-run of the conflict of 1982. This scenario seems somewhat 
unlikely. Britain’s various ill-fated military invasions and occupations in the 
Middle East, such as of Iraq (2003–11) and Afghanistan (2002–14), mean 
that overseas wars are increasingly difficult to justify to a sceptical public. 
Furthermore, British defence spending was slashed following the 2010 Budget 
review, making another war impossible to afford. Crucially, in 2016 the Royal 
Navy withdrew from the South Atlantic after 34 years and currently has no 
aircraft carriers (Axe, 2016). While two new carriers will be deployed from 
2021, neither are planned to have a semi-permanent presence in the South 
Atlantic, so an aerial battle (key to the victory in 1982) appears unlikely. On the 
Argentine side, army numbers have been drastically reduced since the 1980s; 
its defence budget has also been exhausted in army pensions; and it is untrained 
to fight wars against an external enemy. Military solutions, both in terms of 
possible invasions and defences of the Islands are completely implausible.
The current scenario: temporary détente or decisive 
breakthrough?
The referendum result itself may not have revealed any hidden or unknown 
truths, but it showed that dialogue is sorely needed because positions on both 
sides remain untenable. It also set in motion many of the above events that 
have seen a softening not only of rhetoric on both sides, but also of genuine 
bilateral negotiations on a range of questions relating to the Islands and the 
wellbeing of the Islanders. However, the red line for the British government has 
been that negotiation of mutual issues does not extend to sovereignty. 
Certainly, the abrupt political change marked by the election of Mauricio 
Macri in late 2015 had a significant impact. In its enthusiasm to deliver on its 
election pledge to ‘return to the world’, to attract foreign investment as a key 
tenet of its neoliberal economic programme and establish closer ties with the 
world’s leading powers in order to enhance its legitimacy internationally (of 
which Britain has become a prime target), the Cambiemos government led 
by Macri faced accusations that it has in fact sacrificed Argentina’s claim to 
sovereignty at the altar of investment opportunities and profit. For instance, the 
2016 agreement signed between Argentina’s foreign minister Susana Malcorra 
and the UK’s secretary of state for the Americas, Sir Alan Duncan, proved 
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highly controversial. While on the one hand, Buenos Aires and London agreed 
to establish a direct flight between the Falklands and Argentina, explore the 
possibility of joint hydrocarbon exploration in the South Atlantic and speed up 
the DNA identification process for unknown fallen soldiers in the 1982 war, 
many politicians, journalists and civil society groups have been fiercely critical 
of a series of subsequent actions by the Argentine state.
First, Malcorra’s claim that ‘the Malvinas is no longer the main issue’ for 
the British–Argentine relationship and also a clause in the agreement that 
stipulated that appropriate measures would be taken ‘to remove all obstacles 
limiting the economic growth and sustainable development of the Falkland 
Islands, including in trade, fishing, shipping and hydrocarbons’, prompted 
indignation. Not only was this statement interpreted as capitulation to British 
demands to refrain from any future attempt to assert economic pressure in 
support of its sovereignty claim, but also the latter was not mentioned in the 
text at all (Anon, 2016). Second, President Macri did not raise the sovereignty 
question in any of the meetings that he conducted with the then British prime 
minister Theresa May. Third, at the time of writing the Argentine ambassador in 
London, Carlos Sersale, enraged many by doing the unthinkable, and allegedly 
recognising British authority over the Malvinas by referring to members of 
the Falkland Islands’ government as the Islands’ ‘top authorities’ in a tweet in 
December 2018. In an unprecedented act, Argentina’s congress has summoned 
him to appear before it to explain his actions (Anon, 2018).
There has been an increase in diplomatic activity between the two countries 
since 2018. In May 2018 Boris Johnson (later Theresa May’s successor as prime 
minister) became the first British foreign secretary since 1993 to visit Argentina, 
and numerous senior Argentine government ministers including Chief of 
Cabinet Marcos Peña, Trade Secretary Miguel Braun, Argentine Central Bank 
President, Guido Sandleris and Buenos Aires City Governor Horacio Rodrigo 
Larreta and others have all travelled to London to meet British government 
officials in an effort to strengthen commercial and political ties. A £1 billion 
export trade initiative was signed to support British–Argentine trade.6 However, 
for all the rapprochement, only interrupted by the UN Decolonization 
Committee’s June 2017 Draft Resolution calling once again upon the two 
nations to resume talks over the dispute,7 the retreat from diplomatic pressure 
on Britain by Argentina has left its north Atlantic nemesis feeling emboldened 
in its insistence that the 2013 referendum result has resolved the sovereignty 
question once and for all. The parallels with the Peronist government’s policy 
during the 1990s and that of Cambiemos since 2016 are striking; the latter’s 
strategy was overtly to forego the sovereignty question in favour of political 
6 British Embassy, Buenos Aires, 2017.
7 United Nations, 2017.
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manoeuvring (even though the legal route persists) so as to advance economic 
cooperation.
The reality is that the dispute remains wide open. It will possibly reignite at a 
diplomatic level following the victory of President Alberto Fernandez’ Peronist 
government in October 2019 (especially if, as anticipated, it is strongly 
National–Popular at the level of discourse). And while the wounds of 1982 
are still too raw for an outright handover of possession of the Islands to be 
palatable to the British public, softening inter-generational public opinion as 
the collective memories fade may make a solution like a Hong Kong style long-
term lease back agreement a real possibility at some point in the next decade. 
One thing is certain, a lasting solution will only be found through negotiation. 
The 2013 referendum may have done more to facilitate such a possibility than 
it did to end it.
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11. The limits of negotiation
Andrew Graham-Yooll
For a few people in Argentina, and some further afield, the G20 conference on 30 November 2018, seemed to hint at a door opening when Theresa May, British prime minister, arrived for a rushed photo 
opportunity with a collection of world leaders in Buenos Aires. There was little 
time for anything more, and back home, Brexit beckoned. Soon afterwards, on 
10 December, came the news that Argentina and Britain would co-chair the 
UN’s Equal Rights Coalition to monitor and counter gender discrimination. 
Previous to both events, in November 2018, when the Humanitarian Project 
Plan signed by Argentina and Britain in 2016, reported that 105 bodies of 
Argentine soldiers killed in 1982 and buried at Darwin Cemetery had so far 
been identified out of a total of 114. The remains of 105 people now had 
names and families and ceased to be known only as ‘soldier known unto God’. 
It was positive and welcome news, although Argentine officials had provided 
scant help.
The Malvinas–Falkland Islands (the UN denomination agreed in the mid 
1960s), belong to Argentina, or should belong to Argentina. Historically and 
geographically, that assertion seems reasonable.
In any case, that is the cliché imposed on Argentines as from elementary 
school eight or nine decades ago. The truth is that we do not know how to 
find a solution of any kind beyond the cliché. Even so, it is worth noting 
that, recently in Argentina, there are from time to time different voices 
expressing greater moderation without the imposition of political passion. 
They are quieter, more reasoned voices, counselling against the shallowness 
and stridency of national populism. This new discourse, seen in articles, some 
interviews and in the paragraphs of some books, can vary, upholding different 
arguments; and in each case, there is the need for a specific focus on a wider 
horizon in tune with the times.
There must be a solution, of course, in the long run; one that will be 
constructive for two different societies and that might even put behind us 
the short-termism that we have suffered, and which is our Argentine style. 
Such a solution will require learning a new form of diplomatic negotiation, in 
diplomatic circumstances.
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For the present case, it will be interesting to take the 30th anniversary in 
2012 of the South Atlantic conflict, which produced a substantial volume of 
articles and media commentary of all kinds. Some of the views showed new 
elements; others were simply repetitious and brought little novelty. One 
example, too-often forgotten, is the case of 17 intellectuals who tried to publicise 
a document that recommended taking into account the different factors in the 
dispute over the Islands. Equally interesting was the reaction produced by the 
text from that group of 17 intellectuals and journalists, including writer Beatriz 
Sarlo, philosopher Santiago Kovadloff and journalist Jorge Lanata, among 
others, in the last week of February 2012. The date chosen was a little over a 
month before the anniversary of the Argentine landing at Port Stanley/Puerto 
Argentino three decades previously. Those signing advocated the need for a 
more relaxed approach to the Islands and their inhabitants and included the 
argument that the Islanders’ rights should be respected. The statement, which 
had been hinted at in two columns by Lanata who also suggested the need for 
scholarships and exchanges, sparked a wave of threats and insults which were 
out of all proportion to what had been written. The stridency of the objections 
grew to a point where the signatories were unable to find a venue from which 
to make their opinions public. One site was made available, but the owners of 
two or three other venues refused, arguing that they feared reprisals. Finally, 
the manifesto was not made public because the date chosen for publication 
coincided with the tragedy at the Once railway terminal of the Sarmiento 
Line in Buenos Aires on 23 February 2012, when 52 commuters were killed.1 
Besides that terrible incident which was later found to be the product in part of 
existing corruption, the refusal of possible venues for launching and debating a 
moderate statement was clear evidence that there was public fear in Argentina. 
We lived in a fearful society, with a varied list of causes for fear. It should not 
be denied. And if there was fear of hearing an opinion different from that of a 
government that claimed to represent the majority, could a society or a country 
be seen as reliable when government and population deny the existence of fear 
and play down the evidence? This is just one of several circumstances regarded 
as minor. But the fact is that wide-ranging negotiation is complicated if there 
is the presence of fear in that society. Fear can be a poor counsellor (even if in 
some specific circumstances it can be admitted as an acceptable argument).
Another small contribution to a new form of argument was an article by 
the historian Luis Alberto Romero, who asked if Argentina really wanted the 
Islands, given that they constitute such a useful distraction from situations 
which happen accidentally or from sensitive decisions taken at the centre of 
power (La Nación, 1 April 2012). And on 21 March 2012, the same newspaper 
published an article by the author and journalist Claudio Negrete, who asked 
himself whether we (Argentines) deserved to own the Islands with so much else 
1 The tragedy drew little concern from President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s government.
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to be sorted out on the mainland. On 26 March, a former cabinet minister and 
former senator for the Radical Party, lawyer and historian Rodolfo Terragno, 
issued a little-noted circular encouraging the idea that new forms of negotiation 
with Britain should be sought. To be regretted is the fact that politicians from 
government and opposition parties did not use the anniversary to try to offer 
fresh ideas for possible ways forward, a few of them being still trapped in the 
attitudes that in a previous generation led to the support of the landing ordered 
by General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri in 1982.
Mention of Galtieri is played down, very much down, nowadays, and the role 
of the badly armed and badly dressed soldiers is enhanced at every anniversary. 
But if history should ever be pushed to make people think that Galtieri was a 
leader with a wild ambition to do something great for his country, it will be 
important that ‘history’ should remind us that he was a murderer, a cheat, an 
incompetent leader and, of lesser consequence, a drunk.
The above events, which now feel like the distant past, draw attention to the 
repetitious nature of the claims and counter-claims. The fact is that there has 
been no firm move by a country (Argentina) that believes itself to be in search 
of a solution of substance, even if it is one having to bear the political weight of 
a defeated army – a painful experience to live with. Still, in contemporary terms 
and with many ‘newer’ palliatives available in modern diplomacy, Argentina 
has not been able to look for fresh ways of negotiating, or genuine diplomatic 
approaches that might allow facilitate change. 
Even more regrettable in the political classes is that they were, perhaps still 
are, the country’s spokespeople and representatives who collectively do not 
look reliable. What is worse, they ensure that the whole of Argentine society 
fails to appear trustworthy to the world. In fact, the political community’s 
behaviour allows the conclusion that we are very good company individually 
but a disaster as a society. The absence of the political or diplomatic ability to 
offer renewed and moderate opinion leads us into a series of dead ends. On a 
personal basis, we are quick to demand respect for our rights (in this case the 
territorial claim) but in no hurry to show equal respect for those of others (note 
the diplomatic contortions and low respect for the Islanders). The anarchic-
need-for-talks front we offer, to be repetitive, is confusing and does not make 
us reliable.
One of the keys to the argument is how to contemplate the Malvinas–
Falklands as a subject in the context of a normal relationship with the United 
Kingdom. We were taught that the Islands are Argentine. Physically they are 
not, even if it can be argued that they are sitting on the continental platform. 
We believe they should be part of the national territory, but for now they 
belong to the Islanders and the penguins. Based on those leading facts, claim 
and possession, we should be able to contemplate all the other elements that 
hamper us in moving on to good dialogue and negotiation. Anything else will 
mean we cannot be taken seriously.
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The favourable vote at the United Nations General Assembly each year is 
a mere nod at Argentina. No more: a great number of diplomatic missions 
installed in New York will continue to vote for Buenos Aires as many times 
as needed in exchange for some other concession or arrangement (these issues 
can be expensive, although they are of only minor significance in domestic 
elections) in the hope that friendly nations will rise up as bastions against 
colonialism. But even that will mean little. This brings to mind action in 
Venezuela in 1982, when it was announced that there would be a lights-out 
protest in solidarity with Argentina. It was all the Venezuelans were prepared 
to grant a regime about which their government, at that time led by President 
Carlos Andrés Pérez, had been severely critical on more than one occasion.
It is not reasonable at this point to think that the Malvinas–Falklands issue 
can be broken up into little packets of topics which we would like to discuss 
(history, territorial rights, Islander rights, weekly flights, fishery rights, etc.) 
and another set containing the less attractive matters (combat, the veterans, 
the dead, Argentina’s international image, disorderly street demonstrations 
or individual statements, sometimes encouraged by government quarters, 
etc.). There have been some promising events, such as in the aforementioned 
identification of dead soldiers, some cooperation on fisheries, and connecting 
flights, etc. But the eventual transfer of government of the Malvinas–Falklands, 
the negotiated run-up to a shared administration for an effective transition or 
change of administration, the drafting of a constitution for a territory different 
from the other 23 Argentine provinces and which might consider preferential 
treatment for a variety of reasons, must incorporate all these matters, big and 
small. The war in 1982 delayed any possibility of a transfer or change for a 
generation – and we are going for a second generation – and imposed a failure 
to move on from the policies of door-slamming and vituperation that could 
well see a third generation come and go.
It would be advisable not to play down the fact that the two most important 
steps towards the eventual possibility of a solution between Buenos Aires and 
London were taken at the United Nations. First, both sides submitted to the 
recommendations of the Decolonisation Committee (the Labour government 
in Britain in the 1960s saw it as a good idea, if difficult to apply without 
offending part of the electorate). Second, talks were held more recently by the 
late ambassador Lucio García del Solar (1922–2010) towards the resumption 
of diplomatic relations.2 
Thus it is that within another generation or a little more, we might hope to 
see one positive action with a long-term view, one with a thought to the years 
ahead and not just to the immediate months: the resolution (2065) secured 
during the government of Dr Arturo Illia at the United Nations in 1965. This 
2 The first talks were held during the three-year government of Arturo U. Illia (1900–83) and 
the second during the government of Carlos Menem (1989–99), two governments that, for 
one reason or another, Argentina does not want to remember nowadays.
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resolution imposed on both sides the need to negotiate an arrangement that 
might put an end to the colonial status of the Islands (which from then on had 
to be identified formally as the Malvinas–Falklands). Argentina went ahead 
with plans to improve the landing strip in the Islands; the British Hospital in 
Buenos Aires made available ‘beds for Islanders’ in case of emergencies; and the 
former Argentine domestic gas utility company, Gas del Estado, introduced 
a supply system.3 The postal system, via mainland Argentina, was improved. 
That resolution, reached by a government to which, in Argentina, little value 
or notice is given, was the accord which has been much quoted by one and all 
five decades later but which in essence, was rubbished by a military expedition 
staged nearly four decades ago. 
Seen at a distance, the ploy by foreign minister Guido Di Tella (1931–2001) 
– whom, again, repetitiously and emphatically few wish to remember – of 
sending Islanders Christmas presents in the early nineties in the form of VHS 
cassettes of the Pingu character created by the BBC and, some time later a 
consignment of woolly bears (paid for out of Guido Di Tella’s own pocket), may 
now seem a decision (or a form of gaining access) far more enlightened than 
what followed a decade later. That involved asking or ordering local political 
representatives to search for adjectives with which to rubbish the government 
of David Cameron and his successors as ‘piratical and colonialist’. This latter 
seemed childish, while the toy ploy had elements of charm.
In Argentina we had a government that announced, on 1 March 2012, in 
an address aimed more at the cheering crowds than the diplomatic process, 
that there would be three flights a week to the Islands from the mainland. But 
months and years passed and no flight took off. This came from a president 
whose husband, in a statement also aimed at the crowd, told the British to ‘fly 
off’. That was when new ways to be taken seriously should have been found. 
The lessons of diplomatic failure are varied and abundant, but it must be clear 
now, in 2020, that nothing done before this date will be of much use.
The age before failure is now distant. My father, who farmed in Río Negro, 
and others of his generation further south, remembered the ’thirties when 
farmers in small craft (and good weather) crossed the water between the Santa 
Cruz mainland and the Islands to visit family and friends.
Argentina has tested theoretical ways of blockading the Islands. Little real 
effect arises from such thinking. That may be because there are people in the 
corridors of power who know well that boycotts lead to no more than bad 
tempers and remonstration. If the flag of the Falkland Islands cannot enter 
Mercosur ports, does it mean much? The suggested boycott of imports of 
British products is also theoretical. The TamLan (Chilean/Brazilian) flights are 
always under official scrutiny. Cruise ships at times do not reach Antarctica 
because they cannot take on provisions in Ushuaia, Tierra del Fuego. None of 
3 This was a well-intentioned move, if not perfectly implemented. 
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this will force Whitehall to negotiate. London will be portrayed as the victim of 
a belligerent nation which, in 1982, went to war and is now a nuisance. 
Politics and diplomacy in both Britain and Argentina will have to put aside 
short–term action and concentrate on the medium term. This should take place 
within a generation, the next preferably, and no more time should be wasted on 
vacuous statements or accusations which achieve nothing. Self-determination 
has to secure international acceptance or be put aside. In this sense, Argentina’s 
diplomatic body has to convince the world that self-determination is not a 
sovereign solution. The British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act of 1982 was 
a parliamentary reform in an emergency which did not substantially change 
the nationality and residence act of 1981. Now (and since then) the Islanders 
are part of Great Britain, with passports almost identical to those of any British 
citizen or subject. But if that is the case, the Islanders cannot be the arbiters in 
a conflict between their own country and Argentina.
And in the reckoning, Argentines cannot cheat themselves into arguing that 
opinion surveys are real indicators of voters’ intention. In 2012, one of those 
opinion surveys, commissioned by the conservative Daily Telegraph, showed that 
many Britons see the Malvinas as an Argentine territory. In the circumstances, 
this is an attractive fantasy that decides nothing. Neither did it influence the 
then prime minister David Cameron, who knew that the Conservative vote 
would not back the survey results, mainly because the British voter would be of 
the opinion that abandoning the Islanders in the present circumstances would 
be an act of treason. The survey in fact informed us that the British voter cares 
little for the Islands or to whom they belong, and that Argentina should use 
that fact seriously to seek negotiations from other angles. For Argentines, there 
is a need to appear confident, reliable and to be trusted.
Argentina (2003–15) was ruled by a family regime which considered it was 
reasonable to pursue negotiation by means of threats and harsh language. It is 
not clear how that language could be used to negotiate any form of treaty. For 
example, the same regime as that led by Néstor Kirchner cancelled landing 
rights on the continent for flights to the Islands. That policy has not changed, 
even with the weekly flights suggested by President Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner. More helpful might have been the implementation of a moderate, 
convincing tone aimed at establishing the genuinely desired and useful 
frequency of flights. It is not reasonable to assume that weekly flights could be 
established when at the same time a head of state was planning to visit London 
for a summit meeting at which she might have ticked off the prime minister of 
the host country. Of course, this could be applauded back home, but beyond 
the immediate effect of the stunt, not much would be secured on the Malvinas.
The debate in Argentina over the Malvinas–Falklands, where the discourse 
on all sides begins (as in the case of this article) with the affirmation that the 
Islands should belong to Argentina, could improve if a few minor circumstances 
were taken into account.
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First, the dispute over the Islands should not be seen as an issue that could 
be overcome in a single term of government. This was in evidence during the 
government (1989–99) of Carlos Menem. It is best to start thinking in terms 
of a more distant future, which is what international politics advises. Sturdy 
trees are planted for the benefit of our grandchildren, without thinking that we 
could be sitting in their shade by the end of the summer vacation.
Second, the Islanders have to be convinced that we could be good, or at 
least amiable neighbours, and that we could be good citizens beyond the fact 
of being bad invaders, offensive and authoritarian. Even if we have decided 
that we do not like the ‘Kelpers’ (a name the Islanders dislike because it refers 
to an alga, healthy in terms of nutrition, but not one anybody would want to 
be named after, given that it is a weed), the Islanders are there, a few with an 
ancestry running back through three or four generations, and many would 
remain even if Britain were to transfer administration to Argentina. And the 
rights and wishes of those people will have to be taken into account, just as we 
claim to respect any community on Argentine soil.
Third, there is a need to be selective with texts that can be quoted or 
are to be used for reference; there are too many and they are too repetitive. 
However, an example of what should be avoided is described by the author and 
journalist Carlos Gabetta (former editor of the Argentine edition of Le Monde 
Diplomatique). In an article first published in Argentina in the newspaper Perfil 
(10 March 2012),4 Gabetta remembers signing a statement with well-known 
writers such as Julio Cortázar (1914–84) and Osvaldo Soriano (1943–97), 
among others. The writers said that, a) the Malvinas belonged to Argentina, 
b) this fact is acknowledged throughout the world, c) the military dictatorship 
had staged an invasion because of issues in domestic politics, d) British action 
and US support appeared to have been planned well ahead and e) Argentina 
ran the risk of seeing its rights postponed. 
 The full statement is reduced to telegraphic length here but is, even now, 
valid in part. The materialisation of rights has been postponed. However, the 
fact of this being stated in a ‘communiqué’ – with a number of similar partisan 
statements – had the strange effect of turning readers who were opponents of 
the regime into patriotic defenders of the national cause (after June 1982 it was 
hard to find any defenders of the cause), and assured the Parisian signatories a 
catalogue of threats. Argentines abroad reflected their fellow nationals at home: 
any person who disagreed was a traitor. And the threats were not isolated. 
It was common practice throughout the country and could not be ignored. 
Trying to be indifferent to these far-off incidents makes us less reliable. Where 
Gabetta and colleagues may have failed is on the fourth point. There is no 
evidence to date that shows the United Kingdom wanted or needed the Islands 
in March 1982, before the landing. 
4 Originally printed in Le Monde, May 1982.
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What did exist after 2 April, if not before – and Argentina’s officials did not 
want to see it – was the agreement of support between Ronald Reagan, president 
of the USA, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, allegedly based in part on 
the US leader’s admiration for his British counterpart’s style of government. A 
historical ‘special relationship’ existed between the two countries too. At that 
time, there was little care about the risk of the UK turning its back on the 
European Community: Thatcher wanted the trade that Europe, and later the 
Soviet Union, could build with Britain. For such a purpose (trade) Thatcher 
wanted an efficient and modern nation without the weight of old colonies, 
even if her political discourse often referred to the imperial progress of old. 
Patriotism on the right is always superior to that on the left, and the pragmatism 
of the right allows it to ignore often the patriotic side of a political equation if 
circumstances so require. In 1981, Thatcher had reduced the Islanders’ status 
as British subjects. That was part of the new nationality law. Also, we can 
believe or reject the reports in the months just before the conflict that, in 1982, 
spokesmen for the Foreign Office in London or other sources had approached 
Argentina’s ambassador to Britain, Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, right up to the last 
moment, asking for or offering an arrangement concerning the Islands. There 
are those who believe no such offers existed, or that if contact was made, it was 
simply a form of distraction and delay or even a hoax. The messages did exist 
on paper, but could have been forged, hence the mention of offers of shared 
administration might have been nonsense. However, years later, Ambassador 
Ortiz de Rozas went on record as saying that had there been no war the Islands 
would have been governed by Argentina within a short time.
However, a more recent envoy at the Argentine embassy in London, 
Ambassador Federico Mirré, wrote a series of articles in the newspaper Perfil 
at the time of the 30th anniversary tracing the history of the Argentine claim 
and playing down the war. It does not seem reasonable to invoke 200 years of 
history and claims if in more recent times guns were fired in anger. There is the 
enormous political weight of men killed in combat, of the wounded and of the 
fighting itself (even if in Argentina the veterans have often been treated with 
indifference because the wider public could not stand the shame of defeat).
Turning history on its head and asking ‘what if ’ – a line that Argentine 
political analyst Rosendo Fraga likes taking – what if the plan attributed to 
general Galtieri and admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya to land, raise a flag, salute and 
withdraw, with full naval support in open sea, had worked? It would have been 
a remarkable strike: it would have shown the world how easy it was to seize 
claimed territory; it would have shown great military and political cunning; 
and would have given credit to Galtieri and friends. Perhaps for the future 
benefit of Argentina, the plan did not happen and the venture failed. When the 
landing took place, every Argentine general ran to share Galtieri’s Black Label 
scotch and share in the game, while it seemed to be successful.
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And when the Malvinas–Falklands become Argentine, what will happen? 
Will the package tours rush in on three flights a week? Will the estate agents 
and developers see wealth overnight and ruin nature’s beauty, just because the 
Islands ‘are ours’? That too, can be seen as a minor issue, but it carries weight 
in international negotiations at a time of greater concern for the environment. 
Argentina will have to bear in mind that such issues are important to a large 
part of the European electorate. The fear of neglect and damage does influence 
decisions. For a start, negotiators have to look no further than the disgusting 
urban coastline on the Atlantic coast of southern Buenos Aires province. It is 
not unreasonable that everything said here be dismissed on the agenda of a 
foreign ministry that has failed at diplomacy because it is felt that international 
politics only deals in major issues. It is no longer that way in many parts of the 
world, and should not be in this particular case. Of course, there are claims 
that go back 180 years or more. They would also have to include the attempt 
by Buenos Aires governor Juan Manuel de Rosas to exchange administration of 
the Islands for the outstanding debt to Barings in 1837, and the many speeches 
at the United Nations general assembly. But we cannot forget that there was a 
war; and the dead, the heroes, the veterans from both countries cannot simply 
be pushed aside. The Malvinas dispute needs a new form of negotiation.
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12. It breaks two to tangle:  
constructing and deconstructing bridges 
Bernard McGuirk
Ever-unfinished business
Books can be the blocks of bridge-building. As for the mortar and the steel, the design and the engineering, metaphors might not suffice. As a result of Falklands–Malvinas: An Unfinished Business, which was 
published on 2 April 2007 and launched on the 25th anniversary of the conflict 
in the South Atlantic, I have been invited consistently to reach beyond the role 
of commentator on the literary and cultural reactions to and consequences 
of that sad war to assume a role not unfamiliar in the climes of my ostensible 
expertise in the Castilian- and Portuguese-speaking countries of Europe and 
Latin America. Quite commonly there it is expected that an author or speaker 
on however esoteric a topic might step beyond an announced remit and express 
opinions thence to be (mis)quoted in press and sound media, whether out of 
respect, local interest or, it must be said, for manipulative political purposes. Yet 
caveat emptor can work both ways. For I have often gained, be it in knowledge, 
from weighing differing views and opinions, via introductions to other 
specialists from a variety of disciplines and perspectives, or through privileged 
access to informed sectors on both sides of the Atlantic, more than I have lost 
through calculated or accidental misrepresentation. At the time of researching 
for and writing the book, I had little idea that I was pioneering an approach to 
‘unfinished business’, the terms of a subtitle that have grown ever-more relevant 
to Anglo-Argentine and other relations in the intervening decade.
The arrival at the London Embassy of the Argentine Republic in early 2012 
of Ambassador Alicia Castro, after a nearly four-year hiatus, inspired a notable 
dimension of dialogue and influence in the area and perspective from which I 
have written in my capacity as president of the then International Consortium 
for the Study of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation (ICSP-
CRR), since 2015 the International Consortium for the Study of Post-Conflict 
Societies (ICSP-CS). It is my purpose here to meditate somewhat less, and 
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predictably, on pertinent developments in the political and diplomatic relations 
between Argentina and the United Kingdom, but rather more on intellectual 
and cultural issues and challenges in a rapidly changing climate of international 
communications strategies and cross-disciplinary discourses and debates. In the 
aftermath of the November 2015 elections that brought to power the coalition, 
led by Mauricio Macri, called Cambiemos [Let’s Change] and the first non-
Peronist government for twelve years, the very term ‘reconciliation’ has been 
thrown further into, and will no doubt be used pragmatically or dubiously in, 
a different light. But one instance of the shifting discourses that will challenge, 
if not invalidate, some of my reflections, pursued as they were initially at a 
juncture of resonant transition from the presidency of Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner, is the very word ‘reconciliation’, which already and predictably had 
been re-appropriated:
Another possible area of confrontation is the future of human rights 
trials dating back to the murderous 1976–83 military dictatorship. While 
Kirchnerist supporters say justice must be done, many middle- and 
upper-class Macri supporters want the trials to end. They prefer to speak 
of ‘reconciliation’, a catchword for amnesty, now that hundreds of former 
officers have been convicted – many of so advanced an age that about 
300 are estimated to have died so far in jail, either serving their sentences 
or pending trial. ‘No more revenge’ was the headline in the conservative 
daily La Nación in an editorial on Monday, calling for the prosecution of 
military officers to be stopped. ‘One day after the citizenship voted for 
a new government, the hunger for revenge must be buried forever,’ the 
article read. Macri has yet to make his position clear on this emotive issue. 
In his victory speech [on] Sunday night, he spoke out against ‘vengeance’ 
and ‘the settling of accounts’. In his first press conference [on] Monday 
morning, however, he stressed the need for a more independent judiciary 
and continued investigations of human rights offenders and corruption 
cases (Watts and Goñi, 23 November 2015). 
To such issues I shall return in a now necessary updating of a no less unfinished, 
unfinishing, coda.
The neat, and often conveniently separate, corridors of power and non-
power wherein and whereby entities such as political parties, governments, 
embassies, the military, the judiciary or other legal authorities conduct 
their respective affairs have been paced and populated, perforce though not 
consistently, by specialists astute enough to look and consult beyond their 
discrete and ordered realms. Today, such professionals must also be not least 
attentive to unalleviated media power and the ever-less-controllable internet 
and its unmanageable social media off-shoots, whether within or, increasingly, 
beyond the rule and reach of laws national and international.
Alert, it may be presumed, to the plurality of interests, points of view, 
approaches and expertise across a broad range of disciplines and specialists, 
Ambassador Castro soon made her mark not only in the time-honoured 
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manner of testing the waters of diplomacy but also by dipping the toe into 
the often-unfathomed currents of academe and its tributaries. As author of 
Falklands–Malvinas: An Unfinished Business, I found myself not only invited 
to meet with academics, journalists, trade unionists as well as politicians and 
diplomats with a long-standing interest in and commitment to the affairs, 
history, politics, literature and culture of Argentina but also, reciprocally, 
hosting the ambassador at one of the annual colloquia of the International 
Consortium. Here, participants could observe from the outset, was a listening 
as well as an articulate presence, more than able to explain and defend her own 
and her government’s stance. At the ICSP-CRR colloquium Anglo-Argentine 
Relations 1982–2012 in May 2012, ex-military veterans from both Argentina 
and the United Kingdom, international lawyers, media specialists, historians, 
cultural critics and psychiatrists from the fields of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) and trauma treatment spent several days together in the spirit of 
looking beyond respected differences towards necessary and inevitable pressures 
for reconciliation and negotiation. The 2012 colloquium, far from being the 
first coming together of Argentine and British colleagues, in the company of, 
variously, specialist professionals from Norway and Denmark, France, Spain, 
Italy, Portugal, the USA, Canada, Australia, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, was a 
successor to the momentous meeting of November 2006 when, for the first 
time, ex-combatant veterans from both sides and representatives of universities 
and research institutions worldwide had met in what was to culminate in Hors 
de Combat: The Falklands–Malvinas Conflict Twenty-Five Years On (2007) and 
in a second, extended, edition Hors de Combat The Falklands–Malvinas Conflict 
in Retrospect (2009), jointly edited by Commander (ret.) Diego García Quiroga 
and Major (ret.) Mike Seear. On a yearly basis ever since, the International 
Consortium has sponsored the participation of its members in international 
colloquia throughout the United Kingdom or elsewhere, for example in 
Amsterdam, Bologna, Madrid, Lisbon, Coimbra, Paris, Lyon, Lille, Rio de 
Janeiro, Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires, Córdoba, addressing various aspects 
of post-conflict studies with particular reference to the period since the 1982 
South Atlantic conflict.
 Under the auspices of Ambassador Castro and her colleagues at the 
London embassy, what had been previously the sometimes isolated activities 
of academic-led initiatives regularly involved open, frank and healthily 
uncensored encounters whereby opinions were exchanged, debated and 
measured to the benefit of all interests, vested or otherwise, at the very heart 
of Argentine representation. Uniquely, the enterprise of the embassy extended 
also to an overture whereby I was invited, in March 2013, to visit the Instituto 
del Servicio Exterior de la Nación of the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y 
Culto de la República Argentina and to conduct in Buenos Aires a day school 
for the 2012 and 2013 intakes of graduate trainee diplomats. The visit to ISEN, 
following indispensable orientation offered by embassy specialist advisors, was 
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supplemented by consultations involving Ambassador Juan Valle Raleigh, 
Professors Franco Castiglioni and Diego Lawler and Counsellor Javier Binaghi 
with a six-strong ICSP-CRR deputation of academics, veterans and a BBC 
journalist in what was to be but a first step in such international exchanges. 
The ISEN experience was replicated in March 2015 by day schools conducted 
by the historian of the Spanish Civil War and the contemporary legacies of 
the Franco regime, including the controversies over current exhumations and 
the work of Judge Baltasar Garzón, Dr Gareth Stockey, Director of the ICSP-
CS, and myself, for the 2014 and 2015 intakes of trainee diplomats. In the 
United Kingdom, a similar initiative took the form of an invitation for me to 
address, in May 2015, in the House of Lords, members of the South Atlantic 
Council, a body including academics, former diplomats, parliamentarians, 
and others with expertise in legal, commercial and business matters. These 
and other overtures, including invitations to the Copenhagen meeting of 
the NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) Veteran Conference in 
April 2014 and the Maison de l’Amérique Latine and Argentine embassy in 
Paris in October 2014 and April 2015 to debate with the recently appointed 
Minister Daniel Filmus (as ‘Secretario de Asuntos Relativos a las Islas Malvinas, 
Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur’) and internationally concerned parties 
on the legacies of the 1982 war, are prominent instances of urgent encounters 
and exchanges organised mutually and via the good graces of a diplomacy 
imaginative enough to delve into the niceties and complexities not always or 
easily evinced in the often cliché-ridden media reporting of relations between 
Argentina and Britain. Alas, there remain stubborn if unexpected pockets of 
resistance to any reading, let alone analysis, of the past and the status quo, 
even when no hint of threat to respectively entrenched, albeit thoroughly re-
examined, positions is proffered. An egregious instance deserves airing, in the 
form of a communication received 48 hours after the following press release 
on a film-screening and a debate in the Argentine embassy in London on 4 
November 2015: 
According to an official release from the Argentine embassy, the film, 
‘Enlightened by Fire’ was preceded by a brief introduction from Edgardo 
Esteban, a Malvinas veteran author of the book ‘Enlightened by Fire: 
confessions of a soldier who fought in the Malvinas’. Directed by Tristán 
Bauer and based on Edgardo Esteban’s book, the film offers a profound 
reflection on the bravery of the Argentine soldiers and the sacrifices they 
made, whilst also denouncing the human rights violations that they 
suffered during the South Atlantic conflict at the hands of their officers. In 
a groundbreaking event, the film was screened besides a group of British 
veterans to film makers, students and members of the public from both 
communities. Following the film, a panel of academics from Cambridge 
University and the University of London shared their thoughts. The 
panel was chaired by Professor Bernard McGuirk, head of Nottingham 
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University’s International Consortium for the Study of Post-Conflict 
Societies. Members of the large audience also participated, and expressed 
how moved they were to witness this moment of union, fraternity and 
reconciliation. ‘Former enemies, now brothers in arms’, the British veterans 
observed, thanking the Embassy of Argentina for offering ‘A unique 
opportunity to meet other veterans, helping to heal the wounds of the 
past. A great number of us have suffered as a result of the conflict, many 
sadly taking their own lives’. ‘If those soldiers who faced each other on the 
battlefield are today able to shake hands, it is inconceivable that politicians 
are incapable of engaging in dialogue’, Ambassador Castro pointed out.
Texts in contexts
Deserves? … Nay. Demands: for the understanding of the right to self-
expression of all, and of any text … in context: 
Results of the referendum on the Political Status of the Falkland Islands 
On Monday 11th March 2013, Keith Padgett, Chief Referendum Officer 
gave notice that the result of the referendum on the Political Status of the 
Falkland Islands are as follows:
The number of ballot papers issued was 1,522
The number of votes cast at the referendum was 1,518
The total number of rejected ballot papers was 1
The total number of votes validly cast at the referendum was 1,517
The percentage of turnout at the referendum was 92%
The number of ‘Yes’ votes cast was 1,513 (99.8%)
The number of ‘No’ votes cast was 3 (0.2%)
1 vote was unaccounted for
(falkadmin in press release, 11 March 2013)
Sicut locutus est: 6 November 2015
Professor
Fraternising with the enemy used to be a hanging offence – and Argentina 
is most definitely the enemy. 
You are being used for political purposes – 
That said, Nottingham University has a poor reputation when it comes to 
recognising the human rights of the Falkland Islanders. 
Perhaps I may assist by ensuring at least that you are fully informed about 
the history – which does not support Argentina’s spurious claims in any 
way.
Sad to see the Veterans being used so shabbily.
Roger Lorton
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Ipse dixi: 9 November 2015
Dear Mr Lorton
 Thank you for contacting me. Your views have been noted and I am happy 
to invite you to express them at any forthcoming event of the International 
Consortium for the Study of Post-Conflict Societies at which related issues 
will be discussed. As for veterans, I prefer not to speak or write on their 
behalf but to ensure that they have a forum in which their voices may be 
heard. This then is a further such opportunity. 
Best wishes 
Bernard McGuirk
Et seq: 9 November
Dear Prof McGuirk 
Thank you for responding, particularly as I see that you have had a busy 
week at the Argentine Embassy; first the veterans and then with Argentina’s 
master propagandist Daniel Filmus. It is fortunate that the future of the 
Falklands now so clearly lies in the hands of the Islanders themselves and 
does not fall to you or your friends. Fortunate that self-determination is 
now the only factor recognised by the UN. Fortunate that Argentina’s 
spurious claim is now irrelevant. As for your offer, I am rarely in the UK 
these days but would be happy to attend one of your events if my presence 
coincides. The Islands host a post-conflict society – perhaps you have 




Having been the principal agent of friendship with Edgardo Esteban, and 
the mover behind the attendance of fellow-commando ex-combatants at the 
Embassy event, David ‘Charlie’ Brown, Regional Co-ordinator (North) of 
SAMA (South Atlantic Medal Association), duly received and curtly responded 
to the copy of the message and correspondence:
Arma virumque…: Mon, 9 Nov 2015
Hi Bernard
I have E Mailed him back, waiting for a response to him calling me a 
traitor as well. 
To be continued? Meanwhile; … cano
Et canam: I record and shall record again that my role has been and will 
continue to be the bringing together not of ‘[my] friends’ but, for example, of 
British and other specialists not only on the perennially urgent issue for veteran 
ex-combatants of the conflict in 1982 and its legacies but also on the shifting 
preoccupations of Argentine society of the last forty years. Thus, the film 
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maker Stuart Urban (An Ungentlemanly Act (1992)), Jeremy McTeague (former 
Platoon Commander, D Company, 1st Batallion, 7th Duke of Edinburgh’s 
Own Gurkha Rifles), Tessa Morrison (University of London), reflecting on 
the deleteriously gendered discourses of a machismo both military and civilian, 
and Niall Geraghty (then of the University of Cambridge), addressing the 
structural underpinnings of the ethical and moral issues arising from the state’s 
treatment of PTSD victims, joined me at the said event. None mentioned either 
sovereignty or self-determination. They were not ‘used for political purposes’.
Wherein lies the difference in the various open and closed stances taken? Let 
but a few examples stand for the kind of attitudes that, albeit with difficulty, 
will have to be recognised, confronted and overcome; for plus ça a changé. Mike 
Seear, Operations and Training Officer seconded to the 1st Battalion, 7th Duke 
of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles and who served with them throughout the 
war, author of With the Gurkhas in the Falklands: A War Journal (2003), in his 
book, Return to Tumbledown: The Falklands–Malvinas War Revisited (2012), 
reports tellingly, in respect of Falklands–Malvinas: an Unfinished Business, as 
follows:
Published on 2 April 2007, the book’s rear jacket carried my enthusiastic 
endorsement, ‘I do believe that this is one of the most remarkable books 
I have ever read on the War. […[ It is a blockbuster and a remarkable 
piece of literature. Every veteran should read it’. Clarín, Argentina’s largest 
daily newspaper, was more precise in its praise and described the work 
as ‘imposing’ and ‘the most complete and all-encompassing study of the 
impact of the War in the South Atlantic on the Argentine, British and 
world-wide cultural production, including narrative prose, poetry, theatre, 
cinema, graphic humour and television’. However, it did not appeal to the 
library management in the Falkland Islands capital of Stanley. They refused 
to hold a copy because its title contained the taboo name ‘Malvinas’ 
and their local myopic view that the ‘business was finished’ stubbornly 
contradicted Bernard’s realism. 
Of his most recent visit to the Islands, Seear continues:
Business was good for the POD Gift Shop. I had a few more copies of 
my book to give him, and also some of Hors de Combat: The Falklands–
Malvinas Conflict Twenty-Five Years On. ‘Would you be interested in selling 
it?’ I asked [the owner] hopefully. [He] took the book and looked seriously 
at the front cover for five seconds. He shook his head. ‘Sorry, but I can’t’, 
he replied. ‘If I sold that book in my shop with the name ‘Malvinas’ in 
the title, then people would object’. My writing therefore suffered the 
same fate as Bernard’s in Stanley. It also impressed me as to the extent 
this vulnerable community’s post-conflict culture was still affected by the 
war. Disappointed, I said goodbye and hurried along […] The Capstan 
Gift Shop (or any other bookshop in Stanley) also does not hold copies of 
Return to Tumbledown: The Falklands–Malvinas War Revisited. I was tipped 
off about this by [a friend] a few months ago. The reason is probably the 
same: ‘Malvinas’ is in the sub-title! (Seear, 2012, p. 37). 
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The de facto censorship called fear – fear of words, of hyphens, of bridge building 
– prompts the question: can entrenched positions change? The news of the 
appointment in the Islands to the post of the government’s public relations 
media manager of Krysteen Ormond was strikingly relevant. She could be 
expected to carry out her duties with a high degree of professionalism, yet with 
a singular advantage. As an ICSP-CRR member, at the 2012 colloquium and 
subsequently, as the author of an original and impressively objective study of 
the sometimes surprising reactions of the Islanders to the respective occupation 
and re-occupation of their place and space between April and June 1982, she 
was able to meet, exchange views or share a platform with Ambassador Castro 
and her colleagues. Informed knowledge and mutual respect, deriving from 
such encounters as those inspired by the International Consortium, must be the 
keynote of any and all successful representation and negotiation. By the same 
token, it cannot be sufficient, intellectually, let alone politically, for such as an 
Argentine foreign secretary (Héctor Timerman) visiting the United Kingdom 
with the expressed intention of pursuing negotiations over ‘Las Malvinas’ to 
strike poses of the variety that there is no such thing as a Falkland Islander in 
the same breath as refusing to meet with a deputation on the grounds that the 
so-called non-existent party was present.
On goals and own goals
Whenever populism conspicuously rises to ‘nod home’, in football parlance, 
one might as well draw on the love-hate discourses of soccer fans since it is long 
established that the English admire Argentine football and footballers, never more 
so than now when the Premier League benefits from imported talents and the 
unprecedented effects of having the all-time lowest percentage of home-grown 
players available to represent the national team. Sic transit the uncontrollable 
economy of neoliberal open-market thinking: but to the diminishing power 
and influence of publically reluctant whilst privately compliant sovereignties 
one must return in respect of current Anglo-Argentine relations and the need 
to penetrate intrusive posturing in order to confront realpolitik. Thus, and 
reinforcing the challenge to any and all sovereign governments attempting 
to control events that can suddenly undermine the best efforts of politicians, 
diplomats and others in respect of reconstruction, communication and 
negotiation, two recent cases spring to mind. In retrospect, after the BBC’s 
eventual sacking of Jeremy Clarkson for the insulting of and physical attack 
on a producer colleague, it might be too easy to forget or underestimate the 
offence and hurt caused by Top Gear’s prank in Patagonia. Most attention 
revolved around the intentionality or otherwise of the H982FKL number 
plate: to be or not to be 1982 Falklands … that is the question. Whether ’tis 
(ig)nobler in behind to suffer the open boot of mud slings and the arrows of 
outrageous (mis)fortune – a pair, one white, one yellow, of registration plates 
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bearing (baring?) BE11 END? read by some as a second Clarkson cock-up 
enhanced by the Daily Mirror’s prolonged treatment on 8 October 2014: ‘We 
know bellend doesn’t mean the end of the bell and is a word used instead to 
describe the head of the penis which is often employed as an insult in England’. 
Was I stretching the point too far to detect and opine on an obscene reference 
to the END of the BEl grano? Fanciful; an absurdly semiotic over-reading … 
with one ‘l’ of a différance (it must be all that over-exposure to the world of 
post-structuralist French letters, they will have thought).
Anything goes when it comes to populist mud-slinging, whether it be 
the Sun’s sensationalist coverage on 4 May 2012 of what the Buenos Aires 
media described as a high-impact publicity stunt which showed Argentine 
hockey captain Fernando Zylberberg in different captions running past iconic 
Falklands–Malvinas landmarks and ended with the slogan: ‘To compete on 
English soil, training on Argentine soil’ (the video went viral); or the Daily 
Mail’s question on 20 November 2014, ‘Haven’t you got anything more urgent 
to deal with?’, as, scornfully, it reported: ‘Argentina has passed a new law stating 
that all public transport and stations must display the inflammatory words: 
“The Falklands are Argentina’s”’. Instances abound, but an underlying problem 
here is the irreconcilability – a form of the cliché ‘Lost in Translation’ – of 
national discourses (and I emphasise national as distinct from linguistic: the 
use of castellano rather than español in Argentina is an early lesson for the first-
time visitor). 
Overarching considerations 
A sad alternative to constructive approaches to the business of imbalance in 
international affairs is to claim as un-negotiable a given position amidst the 
clamour and in the knowledge that important obtruding factors continue to 
be raised, bruited, exaggerated – or ignored. One lamentably unresolved issue 
has arisen as much from ignorance as from obduracy on both sides: the plight 
of veteran ex-combatants, many suffering from PTSD. Whether as principal 
investigator of the European Union-funded project A Lesson for Europe: 
Memory, Trauma and Reconciliation in Chile and Argentina (2014–17) or 
from discussions and debates in many an ICSP-CRR forum with members 
of the South Atlantic Medal Association 82, Combat Stress, Ex-Services 
Mental Welfare Society, meetings with ex-combatants from both the UK and 
Argentina, with Dr Eduardo Gerding, Medical Coordinator of the Malvinas 
War Veterans, and Esteban Vilgré La Madrid, Director General of the Centro 
de Salud ‘Veteranos de Malvinas’, I have encountered broad agreement and 
indignation over the neglect of those who have never recovered from the trauma 
of the ten-and-a-half-week war, not least in respect of the high incidence of 
suicides. 
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In encounters with numerous agencies and individuals such as Lars Weisaeth 
MD, world authority on the psycho-traumatology and psycho-social support 
aspects of war and major civil disasters, Cliff Caswell, former editor of the 
British Army’s Soldier magazine with its circulation of 90,000, and invitations 
to debate with Edgardo Esteban, a Malvinas veteran and author of the book and 
screenplay of Tristan Bauer’s Iluminados por el fuego, controversial enough to 
have incurred the wrath of certain Argentine military precisely because it deals 
with, for many of them, the taboo reality of ‘trastorno por estrés postraumático’ 
(TEPT) and the effects of depression and suicide on families and loved ones in 
an imposed post-conflict omertà culture of ‘Don’t talk about it’, I have become 
ever more aware of the still-unfathomed depths of the unfinished business of 
my initial concern. In Argentina, in radio and television interviews including 
a recent broadcast with Malvinas veteran and radio journalist Darío Squeff 
(‘el Turco’), or in discussions with Nora Hochbaum, Director of the Buenos 
Aires Parque de la Memoria, and a harrowing visit to the Córdoba Museo de 
la Memoria with ex-detainee Elena Pacheco Quiroga, who had sat through 
the juicios of such as Luciano Benjamín Menéndez (‘la Hiena’ of ‘I’d do it all 
again’ notoriety), one signal fact stands out. The keynote has ever been and is 
the urgent demand for the lifting of impunity for the torturers and murderers 
of a criminal regime and compensation for the victims of tortures suffered at 
the hands of their own military, not least in the light of President Cristina 
Kirchner’s final congressional address on March 2015, which reiterated public 
support for the veterans and their appeal to the Court of Latin American 
States. De eso no se habla is a metaphysics of absence that, because of present 
vociferations, is, however, slowly being erased.
And deconstructing? ... post-
A future – however unpredictable – is gleaned each and every time, for 
example, the refuting or lampooning of an untenable stance, a xenophobic 
posture, a populist claim, occurs. It is on such a note that I ‘un-finish’; for 
there cannot be an end-note. Of the many slants and topics that I have been 
invited to take up with regard to Anglo-Argentine relations, it has habitually 
been the gently tongue-in-cheek projection of political cartoons – also the 
subject of my forthcoming book It Breaks Two to Tangle: Political Cartoons of 
the Falklands–Malvinas War – that has brought smiles of (mutual) recognition 
on either side of the Atlantic. I thus revisit the selection deployed in October 
2014 at the Maison d’Amérique Latine at the invitation of María del Carmen 
Squeff, Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to France. 
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Cartographies 1989 – annus mirabilis? Imaginary islands or 
‘unas islas demasiado famosas’?
In the United Kingdom rhetoric, official or parodic, had produced, before the 
decade of the war was out, a re-mapping of The Known World of Broadcast News 
(Fig. 12.1). In the cover illustration of Roger Wallis and Stanley Baran’s 1989 
analysis of the media representation of the political and cultural imaginary of 
the 1980s, the hilarious cartography of British neo-Weltanschauung reflected 
many a spacious conviction. Anglo-centric and nostalgic post-colonial 
consciousness of newsworthiness situated the power-blocks and the debris of 
ideological walls breached or still-to-be-stormed. Amidst the perceived threats 
of the inherited prejudices of an all-too unknown world – Brussels ever at the 
Figure 12.1. © Wallis and Baron 1989.
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explosive epicentre of potential loss of sovereignty – were the floating islands 
of real and virtual danger. The ‘Malvinas’ remained in their proper place; 
the ‘Falklands’ had been invented only to be displaced; to occupy a notional 
space and preponderant role in the Atlantic-laden imagination of a nation still 
struggling with its reality as a post-imperial power. There where Empire was 
will figment be; epigraph to last-gasp colonialism.
A cartography including the South Atlantic with its UK crown dependencies 
highlights the prescience of what might have been easily dismissed at the time 
as mere caricature in the depiction of the virtual floating islands of international 
news and electronic media analysis by Wallis and Baran (Fig. 12.1). What has 
shifted in the interim is a form of riposte, a move onto the strategic real, not 
the imaginary, qua the perception – like it or not – of now solidarity-driven 
South (even Latin) American and West (even South) African nations voicing 
aspirations to a demilitarised South Atlantic upon which their coastlines, their 
borders and their political interests touch. The point is too easily masked by 
such slanging matches as that prompted by the visit to London and the Canning 
House presentation in April 2015 by Argentine minister Daniel Filmus, his 
condemning of the UK’s decision to increase its military presence in the area 
and his outlining of the criminal lawsuit against oil companies he claimed 
to be illegally operating in the Malvinas and warning of the environmental 
risks implied; to which UK foreign secretary Philip Hammond responded by 
accusing Argentina of an outrageous piece of bullying in starting legal action 
against companies drilling for oil and gas near the Falkland Islands. Similarly 
obfuscating had been the immediately preceding (pre-election) tit-for-tat 
Figure 12.2. United Kingdom overseas and crown dependencies, administrative divisions. 
© widespread open map scheme.
 CONSTRUCTING AND DECONSTRUCTING BRIDGES 221
summoning of respective ambassadors to account for their nations’ stances in a 
Cold War style of heated demonstrations of indignation and counter-reaction. 
The underlying tensions cannot simply be indulged as if the period since the 
1982 conflict had not changed the stakes and the relative uncontrollability of 
supra-sovereign interests. However, before updating the insights and impact of 
more recent political cartooning of UK and Argentine stances and war dances, 
it is instructive to recall ever-urgent shared or comparable preoccupations 
amidst a seemingly frozen scenario of conflicting interests.
Aporia … a robot and the clones.
What, for instance, of the treatment, on both sides, in the post-official conflict 
era, of ex-combatants? By way of illustration of the theme of the veteran as 
a political embarrassment, I recall one of Steve Bell’s most celebrated, and 
controversial, early cartoons depicting the London Victory Parade of 12 
October 1982 (Fig. 12.3).
The march-past of the navy, army and Special Air Service (SAS) and the 
salute from the Union Jack-bedecked rostrum of Margaret Thatcher and her 
entourage of husband Denis, defence secretary John Nott and a Blimpish 
retired officer (with incongruously ‘Latin-length’ moustache) are the staple 
ingredients of Bell’s lampoon. The killer touch comes in the last panel when, 
after the parading clones of a steel-jawed, neck-bepearled Thatcher herself, 
and of her then and since notorious hard-line cabinet ministers of (un-)
employment and (3Rs) education, respectively, Norman Tebbit (shouldered 
Figure 12.3. © Steve Bell 1982 first published in The Guardian.
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bicycle pump with limp connector in place of cocked rifle) and Rhodes 
Boyson (nail-pierced educator’s cane erect and at the ready) have trooped by, 
an uninvited and unexpected ambulance with bandaged driver and passenger 
joins the procession. The reaction of the PM is to cover with her left hand the 
gaze of the diminutive onlooker immediately to her right and, with her right 
hand, her own unblinking stare. Her trio of acolyte grandees follow suit. ‘¿Qué 
pasa?’ [What’s going on?], the uninvited Argentine might have asked. Lawrence 
Freedman’s account, in the ‘Thanksgiving’ chapter of his Official History of the 
Falklands Campaign, of the background to the victory parade in October 1982 
offers the outsider looking in a clue: ‘A small pacifist demonstration made 
little impact: more upset was caused by an initial reluctance to allow wounded 
servicemen in their wheelchairs to have a prominent position’ (Freedman 
2005, p. 664).
What was ‘going on’, whether for semiotically inclined Argentine analysts or 
exo[ce]tically cross-channel post-structuralist French neighbours, and, simply, 
in the common parlance much-vaunted by pragmatically empiricist Brits, is 
as explicable now as it was then clear. The little attendant – the omnipresent 
infernal machine of state – is a configuration of humanoid camera and gun: 
‘The Panopticon of Bentham is the architectural figure of this composition. We 
know the principle on which it was based. […] All that was needed, then, is to 
place a supervisor in a central tower. [...] Visibility is a trap’ (Foucault, 1977, 
p. 200). Bell had introduced Margaret and Denis to ‘Robot’ but recently, on 
a ‘Far Eastern jaunt’. Impressed, she had had it imported, her ‘Think Tank’ 
tasked to come up with the year’s ‘catchphrase’ for the 1982 Conservative 
Party conference. It spewed out two possibilities: ‘either “Crawl, you scum” or 
“Next Stop, Oblivion”’. The prime minister had opted for the latter. Potential, 
however, in the crossing of the prime minister’s hands – blinding and self-
blinding simultaneously – was an erasure of both the all-seeing panopticon and 
(wilfully) of its self-benighted supervisor; Bell’s prolepsis to post-Foucauldian 
critiques of the device’s effectiveness. More alarming, however, is the less 
embryonic prefiguration in the (herself ever-under-surveillance) orchestrator’s 
double-armed gesture of a malformed swastika, a sign to be read in consonance 
with the accompanying iconography of cloned, look-alike, storm-troopers, 
unapologetically visible as they march past, in contrast with the facially invisible 
but powerfully influential SAS.
Shifting attention across the Atlantic to the Argentine military dictatorship’s 
self-entrapment in emergency powers and the supposed need and efficacy 
of placing ‘a supervisor in a central tower’, during the ‘process of national 
reorganization’ period of 1976 to 1982, we might judge that, pace Michel 
Foucault, and supplementarily, ‘[in]visibility is a trap’:
Facially, indeed, brazenly visible and more than powerfully influential in 
turning its nation’s military apparatus on its own perceived ‘enemy within’ 
was the Argentine dictatorship of the proceso years. To cartoon the however 
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recognisable perpetrators of state-authorised crime, however, was not a luxury 
left to victims, morituri …
Penguin plaza
Amidst the apparently unyielding post-conflict plethora of political, drum-
beating, commemorative, nostalgic or vituperative re-evocations of the conflict 
in the South Atlantic in 1982, to revisit the imaginative representations of war 
has continued to foster an understanding of other predicaments, other needs 
and different cultures. Thus, for example, a British social imaginary suffused 
for more than two decades with the penguins and politicians of Steve Bell’s 
cartoons in The Guardian both sought and found its Argentine counterpart in 
Figure 12.4. © Montag Humor 1982.
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the exterminated bravery of the censored and eventually shut-down satirical 
review Humor. In bringing to the fore caricatural depictions of and in conflict, 
to adopt an international comparative approach to cartoonists who later, 
and elsewhere, whether in the Gulf War, the Iraq or Afghanistan conflicts, 
analysts have begun, at least, to come to terms with a ‘radically foreign’ self-
in-other/other-in-self, so that we, too, confronting Jacques Derrida’s animots, 
are tempted ‘to envisage the existence of “living creatures” whose plurality 
cannot be assembled within the single figure of an animality that is simply 
opposed to humanity’ (Derrida, 2002, p. 409). The pages of Humor, in the 
immediate post-conflict phase of mid-to-late 1982, abounded with released 
animo(t)sity. The demons of a repressed national psyche, however, as was soon 
to become clear, often bore an uncanny resemblance to those of the adversary. 
From the many striking cartoon representations of the Argentine magazine’s 
take on the recently ended conflict and on a continuing struggle with the still-
sullied mind-cast of a far-from-finished dirty war, the cartoonist Montag’s 
transmogrification of a populace’s plight is chosen because of its adjacency to 
what was to become, in the UK and in The Guardian newspaper, Steve Bell’s 
foundational configuration of his more than a quarter-of-a-century critique of 
Thatcherism and its aftermath, ‘The Penguin’ and his matelot matey ‘Kipling’. 
As contemporary Argentina has been obliged to demand international 
recognition of the unending pain of the citizen-victims long ago evoked by the 
cartoonist and to come to terms with a ‘radically foreign’ self-in-other/other-
in-self, we, too, and currently, d’après Derrida, are re-invited to assess the ‘figure 
of an animality that is simply opposed to humanity’. 
Montag’s mock epigraph to his cartoon ‘Viva la vida’ [Long live life] reads: 
‘“Las penas son de nosotros, los pingüinos son ajenos” (Cantito folklórico 
japonés)’ [‘The pains are our own, the penguins someone else’s’ (little Japanese 
folksong)] (Fig. 12.4). It lays the path for a distancing effect that, to the 
uninformed observer, might do little to contextualise, let alone explain, the 
ostensible disparity between the depiction of the military figure, a hardly 
disguised and ever-perplexed head of state, à la General Leopoldo Galtieri, 
ensconced in the Casa Rosada, initially disturbed, irritated and eventually 
uncomprehending in the face of the mass protest of an identifiably caricatured 
Plaza de Mayo. The banners and placards glimpsed through the window of 
the presidential office carry the familiar demands of a nation’s urgent need for 
survival, for legality and for a future freed from the fear of the disappearances 
either of loved ones or, even, of the selves of an abject body politic. What 
the dictator sees, however, when he can be bothered to look, is a population 
transfigured … for his is an exclusively Malvinas-coloured perspective on the 
relationship between government diktat and civil society. The dye, the dying 
and the many dead were cast by Montag’s imaginative vision of what is seen 
and yet not seen of the body politic, whether by yet another in a long line of 
self-blinding military presidents or by an on-guard common soldier blithely 
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off-guard (perhaps because of over-familiarity) to the repression on which he 
turns his back but, at the same time, serves to enforce, reinforce and perpetuate. 
Without a blush himself, he vacuously underpins the governmentality of the 
Casa Rosada.
The cartoonist drew on a classic trope of delay: seen from inside the 
presidential palace, the windows frame and disclose ‘QUE’; then ‘QUEREMO’, 
‘DESAPAREC’ and ‘NO HA DERECH’ … less than prevaricating, more 
than provocative. The reader-viewer, proleptically more knowing than the 
superannuated misreader of the signs and sighs of a stutteringly anguished 
nation, namely el Señor Presidente, invests in decoding the metonymic populace’s 
ever-attenuated and too-often strangled cry. So persuaded is the dictator that 
the vox populi can be controlled and redirected by the slogan of the nation’s 
collective obsession that ‘Las Malvinas son argentinas’ [The Malvinas are 
Argentina’s] that he overlooks its inevitable inversion. For, in Montag’s ‘Viva la 
vida’ [Long live life] and in the transmogrified animot imaginary, ‘las argentinas 
son las Malvinas’ – the ‘Madres de la Plaza de Mayo’ [The mothers of the Plaza 
de Mayo], en masse, demand and achieve the completion of their plea, the 
full articulation of their and the nation’s sovereign right to self-expression and 
freedom of speech: ‘Queremos vivir’, ‘Futuros a desaparecer’, ‘No hay derecho’ 
[We want to live; Disappearing futures; You’ve no right]. Specters of Ma---s? Or 
The State of the [Argentine] Debt, the Work of Mourning, though hardly, as yet, 
for Argentina’s mothers and grandmothers, The New International.
For the penguin animot remains the abject oppressed; the nation is as yet 
protected, albeit preposterously, by the anachronistic man-at-arms of a haughty, 
oblivious, uncaring military against the overdue fall of the abject oppressor. In the 
state of siege of 1982, Montag’s depiction juxtaposed, brutally, a gender-marked 
confrontation of pregnant female protest and sterile male power. Clustered 
around the statue of a spear-holding warrior-maiden figure – ‘Liberty leading 
the penguins’ – the animots mothers-to-be, mothers nursing, or mothers bereft, 
beaks tight shut, conducted with improvised banners and placards their silent 
vigil cum demonstration. The solid edifice of bureaucratic institutionalism that 
sheltered the military dictator can be the better understood in the light of what 
Claire Johnston has defined as that dangerous iconography that ‘places man as 
inside history and therefore changing and woman as outside of it and eternal’ 
(Johnston, 2000, p. 23). Montag’s cartoon, however, inverted and subverted 
such a staged relationship by having the radical change engendered by female 
animosity towards the unchanging sovereign power of Argentine fascism outed 
as a uniform male preserve. Thus, both in the Plaza de Mayo and throughout 
the nation, ‘the time is out of joint’ in the rotten den marked ‘state’. Pace 
Johnston and her otherwise reasonable claim regarding ‘man as inside history 
and therefore changing’, many an Argentine male has had cause to resent the 
ostensibly eternal role of falling outside the official history of the Guerra de 
Malvinas and into the pit of neglect and despair. Little doubt can there be that 
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Cristina Kirchner’s final congressional address was tapping in to that legacy 
of a shared victim status of resentment on the part of both women and men, 
veterans all, at the unchanging script of a history to be re-written. Being re-
written, however, embrionically, against the grain of still power-driven forces 
resistant to … change.
Plus ça change
Too late? Take your partners, please, for the next (war) dance? But wait… ipsa 
dixit: ‘There is no such thing as society; there are only men and women and 
their families’ (Margaret Thatcher, 31 October 1987). No meeting half-way?
The risk-taking response of the poster detects the chimera, the unreality 
effect of the easy passing of the spurious mantle of power; for so long as the 
silent image performs the farce – the fabula – of national delusion. The two 
shall not be one in the marriage of convenience made in hellish coupling; 
the third term – Il n’y a pas de hors-texte – is neither one nor the other. It 
is, inseparably in the genre of the cartoon, both animage and animot. If it is 
thus that the world moves on – sic(k) transit gloria (im)mundi – what chance 
does a present-day Argentina have of engaging the attention and interest of the 
UK government and public when subsequent further war engagements ever 
preoccupy the British voters … for better or worse, for richer or poorer, in sic – 
ness or in wealth? It may well prove forever difficult, if not impossible, for ‘the 
British Establishment’ to ‘piss on victory’ (Jenkins, 2003, pp. 35–6), especially 
after so many ostensible or perceived defeats since 1982, by no means limited 
to the poster’s reference to Tony Blair’s intentions with regard to Iraq (Fig. 
12.5).
Figure 12.5. Anonymously distributed poster, March 2003.
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Requiescat … (in pace?) 
A British populace justifiably alert to tragic consequences of adventurisms, the 
fatalities of which were mourned never more publically than in Royal Wootton 
Bassett (granted royal patronage in March 2011 in recognition of its role in 
the early 21st-century military funeral repatriations which passed through the 
town), might hardly have paused to meditate on the unusual intervention of 
a government ministry in the statistics of supposed post-Falklands, directly 
related suicides. The assertion made by the South Atlantic Medal Association, 
representing veterans, that the number of suicides almost certainly exceeded 
the conflict toll of the 255 UK personnel who died in action, placing the blame 
primarily on a lack of care for those suffering post-traumatic stress disorder, is 
not borne out by statistics, according to a ministry of defence study from 2013. 
Whilst the MoD said that every suicide was a tragedy and urged veterans of 
any conflict needing support to seek help, it found 95 deaths were recorded 
as suicides or open verdicts. Disagreements over numbers – or dates – are 
undoubtedly inevitable yet rarely more capable of capturing the imagination 
than a single telling perception:
Whilst Argentines constantly stress the suffering of the nation’s citizens at 
the murderous hands of a criminal regime up to 1982, and whilst there may 
never be a fixed toll regarding the estimated thirty thousand desaparecidos of the 
period of el proceso, the ‘Galtieri’ factor retains a fixed image in the UK national 
Figure 12.6. © Austin 2003; first published in The Guardian.
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imaginary, possibly one unlikely to undergo change (à la Hitler, à la Franco) 
(Fig. 12.6). Even at the level of popular culture, the British admiration for an 
Argentine national hero may, alas, be tainted with an epitaph of monumentally 
stone-like fixity: ‘Maradona’ qua ‘great genius and … cheat’. Yet, more 
encouragingly, Argentine insistence on ‘Nunca más’ and the harrowingly 
moving experience, for any and all, of visiting, for instance, the River Plate-side 
Parque de la Memoria, of reading the names and the often shockingly young 
ages of the dead inscribed on the seemingly interminable memorial walls, stress 
the emergence of a newly educated generation of ‘Never again’ … Who, in 
the UK, might have anticipated that the ‘no’, ‘never’ and ‘not an inch’ man, 
Protestant extremist of the 1960s and of the ensuing so-called ‘troubles’, Ian 
Paisley, as Northern Ireland’s First Minister, would end up leading a power-
sharing executive at the Stormont parliament in Belfast, 40 years on, sitting 
down with Gerry Adams – his former bitter enemy, the leader of militant 
republicanism – as the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein decided to 
work together in a power-sharing executive, going on to enjoy such a cosy 
relationship with his deputy first minister, Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness, 
that they became known as the ‘Chuckle Brothers’. As the BBC news reported 
to a disbelieving world, the seemingly impossible had happened; yet unlikely 
bed-mates can find each other across borders, seas … and oceans.
Apocalypse Now … and again 
Pinochet takes Thatcher for a ride … or for cucumber sandwiches? 
Figure 12.7. © Steve Bell 2006; first published in The Guardian.
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Even after the British public – habitually blithe in respect of affairs trans-
Atlantic – had had explained or spelled out the Bell-cartoon reference to the 
Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón’s role in having the former Chilean dictator, 
Augusto Pinochet, detained, albeit temporarily, in London, with the attendant 
if unintended consequence of a traditional English afternoon-tea hospitality, it 
is still pertinent to ask whether and how many of them were or are prepared 
to address or confront Margaret Thatcher’s support for and attitude towards a 
mass murderer (Fig. 12.7). ‘Shy’ apologists to this day will still elect to ‘remind’ 
the enquirer of the role of extreme-left guerrilleros in the 1960s and 1970s in 
the ‘creation’ of the criminal military right … as if it did not a priori exist. 
Distorted causalism, hardly disinterested, from fellow-travelling apologists? 
‘He was a dictator, yes, but at least he was ours’, parroted the former diplomat.
Things appeared to be getting better by 2012 when the UK’s then 
ambassador to Chile, Jon Benjamin, was obliged to apologise for a Twitter 
teasing of Argentina over its defeat in the Falklands war: ‘¿Cuáles son las 
islas que te quitaron a quien por ser qué cosa?’ [Which islands did they take 
off whom and for being what?], in a most un-diplomatic echo of a Chilean 
football taunt: ‘Argentines, faggots, you lost the Malvinas because you are 
idiots’ [Argentinos, maricones. ¡Les quitaron las Malvinas por huevones!]. The 
self-styled ‘Hammers fan, Londoner at heart, Jewish atheist’, bombarded by 
threats of violence and anti-Semitic responses, deleted his offending tweet and 
apologised, saying it had been a private tweet and that he had ‘great affection 
for my Argentine friends and respect for their team’. ‘The Argentine sports 
daily Olé said that was no excuse. The Foreign Office said: ‘Our ambassador to 
Chile appears to have inadvertently caused some controversy in a tweet. He has 
deleted it’. Benjamin was tweeting as usual on Tuesday, but on safer ground: 
re-tweeting the Foreign Secretary William Hague’ (The Guardian, 16 October 
2012). 
Foreign Office sensitivity may be relied upon … but to foreign secretaries, 
their prime minister and the cabinet – Her Majesty permitting – in fine we 
shall return. Meanwhile, the perennial role of soccer in the popular imaginary 
and in populist manipulation has since been turned to different effect … 
with a gender twist. A visit today to the museum of memory that was the 
headquarters of the former Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada and notorious 
site of imprisonment, torture, murder and disappearance bears witness to a 
strategy adopted by the Abuelas [Grandmothers] de la Plaza de Mayo, notably 
expressed in that section of ESMA devoted to their recent engagement with 
modern science and, in particular, the resonance and revelations of DNA and 
related advances:
In recruiting such internationally recognised, and youthful, profiles as that 
of Lionel Messi, bearer of national aspirations, hopes and, here, the slogan 
‘RESOLVÉ TU IDENTIDAD’ AHORA’, they refer to the lost children 
sequestered from disappeared or murdered mothers and clandestinely adopted 
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by sometimes witting, sometimes unwitting, members or associates of the 
discredited criminal military. Thereby they render potentially illegitimate 
a whole generation of their fellow citizens in order to regain and restore a 
legitimacy for a nation, a state, a besmirched sovereignty in need of their more-
penetrating-even-than-surgical intervention. 
‘Resolve’ … ‘identity’ … ‘now’? ‘you/r’? Already, in response to the notion 
that the State could ‘disappear’ victims but not their genes, caveats have been 
raised to the effect that recourse to would-be solutions via DNA ‘evidence’ 
will have to take into account how many identified victims did not, do not, or 
will not want to know and might say (culturally) ‘No’. ‘I am not yours’. Are 
we to be further locked into dualist thinking, feeling? I think (therefore) I am 
to move away – now – from the notion of being and not being the other one 
and to suggest that here, indubitably, is an entrenched Cartesian binary: you 
and me; the self and the other. Momentarily, I want to mind-sweep aside – 
implausible task – one of the weighty legacies of our western (post-)conflictive 
thinking and to broach the Spinozarian alternative, namely the concept of 
becoming. And when I act thus I am (again) thinking, particularly, of the 
near-contemporary philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas. For Lévinas was saying 
– amongst many poetic insights – something very political, namely, that the 
self is in the other and the other is in the self. ‘You’/ ‘I’ can see why and how 
this proposition is a calmative subverting of confrontational Greco-Roman 
(donc – post-Hegel – transatlantic) binaries. The insight helps us also to address 
the oft-bruited notion that victimisation denies agency and, consequently, 
the possibility that, as a therapeutic response to victimisation denying agency, 
we might even concede that ‘recovery is impossible’. Yet what of healing? I 
would further suggest that reconstitution rather than recovery is what might 
be developed in the post-traumatic phase; and it is the Lévinasian and the 
Figure 12.8. © Fútbol Rebelde, June 2014.
 CONSTRUCTING AND DECONSTRUCTING BRIDGES 231
Spinozarian notions of becoming that allow us thus to operate. Because, if I 
obliterate you, I have obliterated me; if, indeed, ‘self ’ is in ‘other’ and ‘other’ 
is in ‘self ’.
Alison Landsberg, in 2004, coined the term ‘prosthetic memory’ to describe 
the way mass cultural technologies of memory enable individuals to experience, 
as if they were memories, events through which they themselves did not live. 
Whereas the prosthetic operates after the body (politic) has been operated on, 
my proposed shift from damaged or incomplete, still-to-be-completed, being is 
not supplement but complement. Complemented by the becoming procedure 
of the graft – itself not on but of a reconstituted self which coincides with a 
former other ‘memory’ – post-memory promises that ‘il n’y a pas de hors-corps’ 
… For I wish to consider winning and losing, as I proceed. What is a winner, 
what is a loser? In a Spinozarian world, the winner is in the loser and the loser 
is in the winner, in the process of becoming a reconstituted alternative identity 
thereafter. Not in the ‘post-’ conceived of only chronologically, but in the space 
of the ‘post-’. Time is in space and space is in time in such a conceptualisation as 
I have outlined it, deriving not from a different but from a parallel philosophical 
tradition (that is, not in difference; ever in différance). Of course, I am speaking 
about constructs, about ‘meaning effects’; and I have already made the point 
that the burden of our sovereignties, of our responsibilities, of our citizenships 
propels us always to remember that the ‘post-’, as well as the past, are in the 
present. Here is what we can do about it, responsibly. Take up the challenge: to 
express and distribute memories – on such vehicles as might come to hand or to 
mind – as effects of meaning but, politically, too, as meanings turned to effect. 
Contemplate, even concede, that recovery is impossible in the post-traumatic 
phase; yet the talking cure may go on, never completing; ever reconstituting. 
‘You’/‘I’ … ‘I’/ ‘You’.
And you, do you know who you are? Again, ‘Ecce animot’? – ‘assuming 
the title of an auto [biological] animal, in the form of a risky […] [chemical] 
response to the question “But me, who am I?”’… pace Jacques (à suivre).
Les animots
Animal: I was tempted ... to forge another word in the singular, at the 
same time close but radically foreign, a chimerical word that sounded as 
though it contravened the laws of the French language, l’animot … Ecce 
animot … We have to envisage the existence of ‘living creatures’ whose 
plurality cannot be assembled within the single figure of an animality that 
is simply opposed to humanity … Ecce animot … assuming the title of an 
autobiographical animal, in the form of a risky, fabulous, or chimerical 
response to the question ‘But me, who am I?’ (Derrida, 2002, p. 409; p. 
416).
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It might now be the moment to apply instrumentally, in focussed targeting, 
Derrida’s prior and broader interrogation to a familiar rivalry, with its attendant 
insults and expletives, to which the cartoon genre draws attention; evoked 
again by Steve Bell but with calculated echo of the philosopher’s reminder 
of the perhaps insurmountable difficulty of coming to terms with a ‘radically 
foreign’ self-in-other/other-in-self. Playing up, and on, a stereotyping and the 
puncturing of it that has been his iconography since his first cartoons appeared 
in The Guardian in the early phase of the South Atlantic conflict in 1982, Bell 
has latterly depicted his Union of Jack penguins as overfed (not noticeably 
oversexed despite their expletive-deleted ‘fucking’ chant) but assertively over 
there (pace the British civilians and their originally WWII cliché re United 
States troops stationed in Blighty).
Animo(t)sities. ‘Stop the drilling, penguin bastardos!’
In Animal Farm fashion, to assert one’s power by mere reiteration requires the 
subjection of an abject ‘other’, here as ever the plumage-and-power stripped 
albatross of Southern Cone climes. What at once conjures up a military cadence 
call at the same time draws on the classic double meaning of the word ‘drilling’. 
Hardly necessary for the exegete to explain the overt references to militarisation; 
so up pops a rare bird – uninvited, unwelcome, defeated intruder – to remind 
the cartoon’s reader-viewer of the (pre-)occupying protected interests of not 
‘unas islas demasiado famosas’, à la Jorge Luis Borges, but resources, fisheries, 
minerals, hydrocarbons, tourism (‘penguins, ah!’) … oil.
Figure 12.9. © Steve Bell 2010; first published in The Guardian.
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Coda… decoder; and Scotland’s long-prior to the 2014 
referendum cry: ‘It’s oor oil’
Re-arrange the following into a well-known phrase or saying
shell
   exon
      mobil
  jet
q8
   gulf
 bp
      total
 Amoco
Cherchez Saddam…
Figure 12.10. The Daily 
Mirror, 6 January 2003.
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 Update: Sky News, April 2015
Daniel Filmus, Buenos Aires’ Minister for the Malvinas, as it [sic] 
refers to the British Overseas Territory, threatened legal moves over 
the drilling earlier this month and is reported to have confirmed today 
that Argentinian judicial authorities will take on the case. Three British 
firms, Premier Oil, Rockhopper Exploration and Falkland Oil & Gas, 
are reported to be among the five firms targeted by the action. Philip 
Hammond [since William Hague’s demotion in July 2014, Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs] criticised Argentina’s stance. 
Mr Hammond told Sky News: ‘It is an outrageous piece of bullying 
and threatening against the Falkland Islanders’ perfect right to develop 
their own economic resources and Argentina needs to stop this kind of 
behaviour and start acting like a responsible member of the International 
community’.
Gulf? Of Mexico? Ummm. BP? A drilling catastrophe… Ring a Bell? If so, 
then re-arrange the following into another well-known phrase or saying: 
Which
 transnational insurance company
      will cover
the risk of a Gulf-style spill
  off the coast
      of the country
the emergency services of which
   would have to be called upon? 
Get real. 
Note to the reader:
The task has been rendered the easier as the first steps of the re-ordering have 
been taken. 
Caveat emptor: 
Subsequent intelligence (London markets consulted): ‘Not a problem. Insurance 
premiums will rocket … and multinational financing will ride roughshod over 
national (sovereign?) stances. It’s an economic risk worth taking’. Take over ... 
and Argentina over a barrel? Which empty barrels make most sound? Falkland 
Sound … Sound investment?
Such presumptuousness cannot operate in a void; for in the echo chamber 
of transatlantic stridencies Argentine ears are pricked, Argentine voices, such 
as that of Carlos Escudé, cast into play, increasingly, less belligerent if still 
challenging ripostes: 
Curiously, such systematic underestimating of Argentine power has led 
us, out of frustration, to suppose that we have no power at all. One of 
the scant areas of foreign policies in which we do have effective power, 
 CONSTRUCTING AND DECONSTRUCTING BRIDGES 235
Figure 12.11. 
The Queen greeted ministers shortly after 10am and became the first 
monarch to attend a cabinet meeting in more than 200 years. The 
monarch, wearing a royal blue wool dress and a sapphire and diamond 
broach, sat beside the Prime Minister and William Hague, the Foreign 
Secretary, for the weekly discussion of Government business. 
Mr Cameron congratulated her on her ‘fantastic’ Diamond Jubilee year 
and said the last monarch to visit the Cabinet was believed to have been 
George III in 1781 (Rowena Mason, The Daily Telegraph, 18 Dec 2012).
manifesting itself as the power of veto, is that of investments in the 
maritime floor of the south Atlantic. This power stems from the fact 
that for a capitalist to venture the anchoring of hundreds of millions of 
dollars at the bottom of the sea, the operational risk must be minimised. 
The natural risks of all sea-bed investments are inherently high. If to this 
is added the political risk of an unsuitably disposed Argentina there will 
be no investments. Thus we have the power to avoid the extraction of 
hydrocarbons from the south Atlantic. Although not even remotely do we 
have the power to re-conquer the Islands, multi-million investments in the 
ocean bed can be destroyed in a moment of madness, and no investor is 
going to put in its money if such a risk has not been minimised. Naturally, 
the Argentine veto must not be used obstructively and destructively, 
therefore blocking investments, but in a manner ensuring for all concerned 
a significant participation in the operations, including the levying of taxes 
on companies in charge of exploring in any part of the territorial seas of 
the Malvinas Islands […] the proposed solution [is] to share equitably the 
resources of the ocean, only then apply fiercely our power of veto, in order 
to render impossible, high-risk maritime investments (Escudé, 2015, pp. 
49–51, my translation). 
Cherchez … la femme. Entente?
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Figure 12.13. 
In a further gift, the Foreign Office declared that a tract of frozen land 
about twice the size of the UK in Antarctica was to be named after her 
as Queen Elizabeth Land. The land in the British Antarctic Territory had 
been previously unnamed. The prime minister’s spokesman was unable to 
say whether it had any flowers, fauna or people. She otherwise remained 
silent apart from wishing the rest of the cabinet a merry Christmas on her 
departure (The Guardian, 18 December 2012).
One … is not amused
[‘Queen Elizabeth Land’]
Figure 12.12. © Jeremy Selwyn Evening Standard PA.
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… cordiale? 
Cordiality one does not do; stony-faced dignity amidst Cabinet Bullingdon-
boys’ riotous guffaws and arriviste pleb giggles of obsequious tie-touchers, hair-
smoothers, knee-jerkers inter alia … all in a day’s (or sixty years’) ‘work’. Job 
done; public engagement; Cabinet assuaged.
Entente? Contente? The transition from photo opportunism self-control to 
caricatured grimace reflects what, in private, the British populace readily spots 
(diamonds are forever). Bondage to the slavery of duty above all as Her Majesty 
saves face amidst that mixture of respect and domestic pride, self-containment 
and smug insularity, of those with much to gain, politically, from the celebrating 
of her Commonwealth and post-Empire reign. ‘There Are Powers At Work’ 
[rictus] ‘… Of Which We Know Nothing’ echoes the revelations made at the 
inquest into the death of Princess Diana by Paul Burrell who ‘had joined the 
Royal Household at Buckingham Palace in 1976 and served the Queen for ten 
years as her personal footman […] Mr Burrell said he did not ask the Queen 
what she meant when she told him “to be careful” at the infamous “dark forces” 
meeting, the inquest heard’ (The Daily Mail, 15 January 2008). In dangerous 
waters, Ship of State QE2 is all-too-aware of supra-sovereign powers and the 
need to be careful of uncontrollable transnational politico-economic interests. 
Britannia waives the rules no more? Shhh … Keep it in the family. One is not 
to be embarrassed. One is not to be used. Understood?
At times, the press is at a loss to decide how to differentiate between the 
uncontrollable and the calculated political manoeuvre or, alas, gaffe. What 
could be wrong with the renaming of a piece of Antarctica as ‘Queen Elizabeth 
Land’, a gift to go with sixty decorative place mats as Prime Minister Cameron 
congratulated her on her ‘fantastic’ Diamond Jubilee year? Entirely innocent 
and perhaps, even, appreciated: as many a true-Brit would recognise: or would 
‘one’? 
Figure 12.14. © Steve Bell 2012.
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Would ‘one’, indeed?
Misunderstood … Misunderstandings give rise to jokes; jokes quickly turn 
into insults. ‘UP YOURS ARGENTINA’ besmirches the Union Jack in front 
of which the monarch is faux pas marooned; the twelve fat penguins (born of 
the Thatchery) look on in dumb obedience … unaware, or in 98.8% approval, 
of the re-evocation of the Sun’s notorious out-of-Europe headline ‘UP YOURS 
DELORS’ from 1 November 1990. The sun ever sets on the British Empire … 
as Her Majesty knows best. 
Lèse majesté … Slips of the tongue are inevitable; diplomats learn – or are 
taught – to avoid them. Their role is to cover up for their governments, for 
their prime ministers or presidents and, in extremis, for their foreign secretaries; 
whether, proleptically, at The Guardian’s Steve Bell end-of-the-telescope view 
of William Hague’s champagne-bottle de-launching, or at the finis terrae of the 
trademark Zimmer-frame stumbling of an Argentine career politician: 








Figure 12.15. © 
Steve Bell; first 
published in The 
Guardian, 19 
December 2012.
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Please police me, oh yeah … Tonight the Super [Blooper] lights are gonna 
find me, feeling like a number [two] (pace Abba … A blah blah). Timerman-
zimmerman, zimmerman-Timerman … Either … neither? ‘Let’s call the whole 
thing off.’ The same old songs, whether in London or Buenos Aires: ‘Miró fijo 
al periodista de la BBC Mundo, en Londres, y se embaló: “Dentro del fin del 
colonialismo va a estar el fin del colonialismo en las Islas Británicas … eh, en las 
Islas Malvinas, y la Argentina va a recuperar los 5.000 kilómetros cuadrados 
de mar y tierra que hoy … eh, que le han sido arrebatadas en 1833”’ [He 
looked the BBC World reporter in London straight in the face and blurted out: 
‘Within the ending of colonialism will be the ending of colonialism in the British 
Isles … er, in the Malvinas Islands, and Argentina is going to recover the 5,000 
square kilometres of land and sea that today … er, that were snatched from it 
in 1833’] (Mayol, 2013).
His ‘K gag’ removed whilst playing away from home, a Héctor(ing) foreign 
minister, momentarily left to represent Argentine affairs in one capital, no 
doubt had to face the music, and the challenge, in the other, on his return to 
within clawing distance of Cristina. The gaffe, however, was blown: ‘“I’ll be the 
judge, I’ll be the jury”, said the cunning old Fury’…
‘I meant “there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!”’
Looking Glass … or Wonderland? Alas. When would he be through? Twenty 
days, 20 weeks, 20 months … ‘“There’s glory for you!” “I don’t know what you 
mean by ‘glory”, [Cristina] said’. Glory? Sick transit. 
Figure 12.17. 
‘I don’t think it will take another 20 years. I think that the world is going 
through a process of understanding more and more that this is a colonial 
issue, an issue of colonialism’ (Héctor Timerman, The Guardian, 5 
February 2013).
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Figure 12.18.  Anonymous.
Imagine…
It’s easy if you try… 
Nothing to kill or die for… 
Imagine no possessions 
I wonder if you can… 
You, you may say  
I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one. © John Lennon 1971
Coda …
When, at an early juncture, I was asked by Alicia Castro whether I wished to 
join a pro-negotiation grouping, she understood at once and accepted without 
demur my response: namely, that the academic freedom without affiliation 
which I and others have enjoyed because it must be taken for granted was the 
very status that would allow me to continue to bring together individuals and 
views of the most plural, varied and often unexpected, at all levels, and without 
shifting my critical stance. These undertakings have been achieved in the most 
cordial and respectful frame of thinking, speaking and, above all, listening. 
In a future when multi-national enterprises will often compete with the very 
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national governments upon which they albeit decreasingly also depend, not 
least, for instance, in the exploitation of energy and mineral resources, novel 
and imaginative approaches will be seen, in hindsight, to have anticipated 
the powerful discourses of threatening eras, approaches concomitant with, I 
stress, and therefore the less controllable by, the ever-challenging international 
communications strategies mentioned at the outset. The term ‘post-’ by no 
means suggests that conflicts are over and done with; on the contrary, it is 
lessons learned and deepened that will aid, though never guarantee, the 
courageous conjoining of the discourses of reconstruction and reconstitution 
through effective and inevitable negotiations of both mind and will. Consider 
the following texts:
There is a growing body of opinion 
that nation-states are declining. 
Nationalism, or so it is said, is no 
longer a major force: globalization is 
the order of the day. But a reminder 
is necessary. Nationhood is still 
being reproduced: it can still call 
for ultimate sacrifices; and, daily, its 
symbols and assumptions are flagged 
(Billig, 1995, p. 9).
We can pronounce not a single 
destructive proposition which has 
not already had to slip into the 
form, the logic, and the implicit 
postulations of precisely what it 
seeks to contest (Derrida, 1978, p. 
280).
The Sun has claimed that the UK 
Defence Ministry will request more 
troops to be sent to the disputed 
Malvinas Islands, due to an alleged 
threat of an Argentine invasion 
bankrolled by Russia. Using the 
title ‘We’ve gotcha backs’ – a clear 
reference to the infamous ‘Gotcha’ 
headline which announced the 
deadly sinking of the General 
Belgrano cruiser during the 1982 
Malvinas War […] Defence 
Secretary Michael Fallon will ‘tell 
MPs that he is ordering a significant 
increase to the South Atlantic 
islands’ garrison’. The front page 
cites an ‘increased invasion threat 
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from Argentina’ […] ‘Unstable 
Argentina is said to be rearming 33 
years after the Falklands [Malvinas] 
war, helped by Russia’s Vladimir 
Putin’, the tabloid claims. The […] 
head of the Russian parliament’s 
foreign affairs committee, Alexei 
Pushkov, referred to the Malvinas 
conflict in response to UK criticism 
over the Crimea affair. ‘Attention 
London: Crimea has far more reason 
to be in Russia than the Falklands 
have to be part of Great Britain’ 
(Buenos Aires Herald, 23 March 
2015).
‘... and that shows that there are 
three hundred and sixty-four days 
when you get un-birthday presents.’ 
‘Certainly’, said Alice. ‘And only 
one for birthday presents, you 
know, there’s glory for you!’ ‘I don’t 
know what you mean by “glory”’, 
Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled 
contemptuously. ‘Of course you 
don’t – till I tell you. I meant “there’s 
a nice knock-down argument for 
you!”’ ‘But “glory” doesn’t mean 
“a nice knock-down argument”’, 
Alice objected. ‘When I use a word’, 
Humpty Dumpty said in a rather 
a scornful tone, ‘it means just what 
I choose it to mean – neither more 
nor less’. ‘The question is’, said 
Alice, ‘whether you can make words 
mean different things’. ‘The question 
is’, said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which 
is to be master – that’s all’ (Carroll, 
1871, p. 134).
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Dialogue (open)? Negotiating regime change in 2015
Cameron and Macri agree to ‘strengthen relations’” and ‘to pursue a 
path of open dialogue’.
Britain’s David Cameron and Argentina’s president-elect Mauricio Macri 
agreed to ‘strengthen relations’ and ‘to pursue a path of open dialogue’ 
between their countries after a phone call Thursday, Downing Street said. 
‘Acknowledging differences, both leaders agreed the need to pursue a path 
of open dialogue and work towards a stronger partnership’, said the release. 
Cameron’s office said the PM had called Macri to congratulate him, and 
also pledged support for Argentina’s economic reform program (MercoPress, 
South Atlantic News Agency, Friday 27 November 2015).
... dialogue (closed)
Monologue (and markets) open: Davos, 21 January 2016. ‘Absolutely 
clear…’
Figure 12.19. © MercoPress, Friday 27 November 2015.
Figure 12.20. © Reuters, 21 January 
2016
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LONDON (Reuters) – Old foes Britain and Argentina said on Thursday 
there was an opportunity to open a new chapter in diplomatic relations 
after a meeting between British Prime Minister David Cameron and newly 
elected Argentine President Mauricio Macri. […] Finally on the Falklands 
the Prime Minister was clear that our position remained the same and that 
the recent referendum was absolutely clear on the Islanders’ wish to remain 
British […] ‘And to British people I would say, there is the prospect of the 
best of both worlds’. 
Ipse dixit David, pre-Brexit …
Stop press: ‘Blooper’ pooper … a fouler howler 
‘The finest statesman Britain ever produced’. Ipse scribit Boris, post-Brexit, 
latter-day Goliath: 
Author of The Churchill Factor: How One Man Made History, Boris Johnson 
was, until 9 July 2018, Foreign Secretary, charged to represent United 
Kingdom affairs in one capital, Buenos Aires, no doubt not to ‘face the music’, 
but perhaps to challenge Cameron’s successor, in the other, London, his former 
mayoral domain, on his return to within ‘at-heel’ distance of Teresa May. 
Whose heel? His gaffe never blown, for ‘He’ll be the judge, He’ll be the jury…’, 
ever Boorishly, ‘the cake and eat it’, ‘best of both worlds’ envoy, in the lens, 
again, of Steve Bell:
Figure 12.21. © BBC.
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Hell-bent on evoking many a ‘cunning old Fury’, inter alia, Winston, he yet 
‘doth [not] bestride the narrow world/Like a colossus’ for, ‘under his huge legs’ 
walk not ‘petty men’ but just one mere ‘underling’, his erstwhile rival as would-
be Prime Minister, Michael Gove, bespectacled, shat upon and semi-crushed, 
painted out of the dog-eat-dog political scenario not by canned Dulux but by 
uncanny Bolux-spieler Boris, already with trans-Atlantic ambitions in a post-
Brexit free-trading, free-wheeling and free-loading adventurism: 
So why not include Argentina?
Figure 12.22. © Steve Bell.
Figure 12.23. © Steve Bell first published in The Guardian, 1 July 2016 and 15 July 
2016
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No less ‘blooperista’ than a Héctor Timerman, the proleptic counterpart 
of a (dis)United Kingdom’s own foreign secretary, Boorish, the notoriously 
unpoliceable clanger-dropper, was soon to appear – the Argentine but not the 
international press excluded, no doubt in order to avoid the posing of awkward 
questions – on the red carpet of previously ‘alien’ territory, hosted by Macri 
ministers Jorge Faurie, Oscar Aguad and Patricia Bullrich. The first such British 
incumbent was there to pay respect to the Argentine fallen of 1982. Ostensibly; 
though, ever alert to the implications of this, as of any, G-20 gathering, that of 
20–21 May 2018, Steve Bell’s take on, and advice to, Boris put a different face 
on matters. In the diplomatic domain of De eso no se habla/That is not spoken 
about, it took the cartoonist little time to find a cultural parallel closer to home:
Just two days before the G-20 summit, a transatlantic noise that could 
no longer be muzzled had been borne, in the same newspaper, by the simple 
headline ‘Argentina forced to seek IMF aid over fears for economy’ (The 
Guardian, 18 May 2018).
Figure 12.25. © Steve Bell; first published in The Guardian, 7 June 2017.
Figure 12.24.© Télam, 20 May 2018
 CONSTRUCTING AND DECONSTRUCTING BRIDGES 247
At the time of writing and no less alert to the ever ‘unfinished business’ 
of Falkland-Malvinas affairs, and though the then UK Foreign Secretary had 
other matters on his mind, one noted that what emerged from under the 
thatch – when it comes to international negotiations – remained, on 6 July 
2018, substantially unchanged and predictably fecal; in his own words, those 
in disagreement with him are ‘polishing turds’. It might still break two to tangle 
but all the more so if the surface is that slippery.
Post-scriptum: 10 October 2020
Icy contempt… and now one is amused. Recalling, dare it be said, the 2012 
gift to Her Majesty proffered by the then-smiling Cameron cabinet of a newly 
named ‘tract of frozen land about twice the size of the UK in Antarctica […] 
named after her as Queen Elizabeth Land’ (supra) – and of Steve Bell’s instant 
lampooning of the vapid gesture – a further slippery surface of signification has 
been more recently projected:
The Isle of Wight has got nothing on this; Guile of the White…? Last word 
then to – hardly a bastion of revolutionary British political thinking – The 
Economist?
Figure 12.26. © The Economist from 
CLCS; COPLA; Flanders Marine 
Institute 10 Oct. 2020.
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ARGENTINA’S PRESIDENT, Alberto Fernández, has plenty to worry 
about: a soaring covid-19 caseload and a depressed economy. So it 
must have been delightful for the government to change the subject on 
September 21st by issuing a map showing that the country’s territory is 
nearly double its former size. It illustrates the effect of a law Mr Fernández 
signed in August, which expands Argentina by 1.7m square km (650,000 
square miles), an area three times the size of metropolitan France. 
Argentina now bestrides South America and Antarctica, from the Tropic 
of Capricorn to the South Pole. Its territory includes some of the world’s 
richest fishing grounds and possibly oil and gas. The Falkland Islands, 
which Argentines call the Malvinas, lie within it.
‘Lie…’? Whatever will Roger Lorton Esquire have to say about this one? Will 
it be deemed just another ploy of ‘Argentina’s master propagandist Daniel 
Filmus’? Qui vivra verra … (translation available on request, post-Brexit, for 
those ‘rarely in the UK these days’):
This is not entirely based on fantasy. In 2016 the UN’s Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) issued a ruling, based on the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, that fixes the edge of the vast shelf 
that juts out from Argentina’s coast. There the seabed is shallow enough 
– less than 2,500 metres deep – to count as an extension of Argentina’s 
mainland. The effect of the ruling is to extend Argentina’s territorial waters 
beyond the normal 200 nautical miles (370km). The new official map 
shows South Georgia and the South Sandwich islands (also British), as part 
of Argentina, too, and adds areas that had it not claimed in law before. The 
British are mainly interested in the water’s riches, Argentina’s government 
thinks. That explains the ‘stubbornness of British colonialism’, suggested 
Daniel Filmus, the government’s secretary for the Malvinas, Antarctica and 
South Atlantic. The map asserts Argentine sovereignty over the Antarctic 
peninsula, an ice-cream cone poking into the Weddell sea, which is also 
claimed by Chile and Britain. In fact, the UN commission avoided taking 
a position ‘in a case where a land or maritime dispute exists’. The areas it 
awarded Argentina are a fraction of the country’s claim. 
Argentina does not plan to try to reconquer the islands, but it does hope 
to use its interpretation of the commission’s ruling to press Britain to 
negotiate. ‘The UN is saying that the Malvinas is a matter of dispute’, 
contends an adviser to the president. ‘The British always try to say there is 
no dispute over the islands’. Argentina’s foreign ministry put out a video 
calling for ‘dialogue’ under UN auspices. Britain is unlikely to agree.
Argentine oceanographers are now in demand from other countries.1
Il n’y a pas de dernier mot … Whence, again, Falklands-Malvinas: an Unfinished 
Business.
1 This article appeared in the The Americas section of the print edition under the 
headline ‘Alberto of the Antarctic’ (The Economist, online edition, 10 October 
2020).
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Information resources on the 
Falklands–Malvinas conflict
Christine Anderson and María R. Osuna Alarcón 
The aim of the present chapter is to make public knowledge all the existing 
documents about the Falklands–Malvinas War preserved in the institutions 
of all involved governments and in other institutions with contemporary 
sources. In order to carry out this task we follow the well-known protocol of 
the University of Chicago’s Sources for History (2010). 
The Falklands–Malvinas War remains an open conflict. The press in 
both countries recently published the heated debate that emerged during 
the negotiations between Theresa May and Mauricio Macri (The Guardian, 
2016 and La Nación, 2016) as well as their different demands: for instance, 
an increase in commercial flights to the Islands, which would represent good 
news for their inhabitants. It would seem that as long as the debate, heated as 
it seems, remains circumscribed within the diplomatic arena, it will benefit 
the inhabitants of the Islands; and that theirs will be the decision about the 
Falkland–Malvinas future. We consider that in this task it would be of great 
benefit to have access to the historical sources about the Islands’ recent past. 
We would like to point out that the present chapter remains an open document 
which is still subject to permanent review and that further sources will be added 
as they become available.




 1.2 United Kingdom
2. Institutional repositories, libraries and museums with 
specialised collections on the subject
 2.1 Argentina
 2.2 United Kingdom
3. International Organisations Repositories
4. Media, ‘raw resources’, audio, images and videos
 4.1 Argentina
 4.2 United Kingdom
Introduction
After more than thirty years, the Falklands–Malvinas War remains a polemical 
conflict, generating intense disputes between the governments of the involved 
countries. While a large number of the documents listed here have been 
traced from the two countries directly involved, it is true that the war affected 
other interests. Inhabitants of the Islands have been left out of the debate. 
The sources presented here are organised using the protocol proposed by the 
University of Chicago (Chicago Manual of Style, 2010, pp. 1–2). This work has 
been undertaken with the idea of collaboration and service and to facilitate 
general public access to the sources. We have focused on primary sources and 
therefore left out fiction and art in general ‘created at the time an historical 
event occurred’ (Chicago Manual of Style, 2010, pp. 1–2) and focused on 
those direct primary sources that the University of Chicago calls ‘raw material’ 
(Chicago Manual of Style, 2010, pp. 1–2).
On 2 April 1982, under the chairmanship of Lt. facto. Gral. Leopoldo 
F. Galtieri, Argentine troops landed on the Falkland-Malvinas Islands in an 
attempt to recover this part of the territory that had been held by Britain since 
1833. It was an attempt to win popular support by the military government, 
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increasingly discredited by the consequences of economic policy and complaints 
of human rights violations. Large sectors of the Argentine population reacted 
favourably to the recovery of the Islands with demonstrations across the 
country. The support was, however, differently nuanced: those who considered 
the ‘Malvinas’ an anti-imperialist cause; those who openly supported the actions 
of the armed forces; and those who sympathised with the young fighters. ‘The 
Malvinas are Argentine, the missing too’, said the Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo.
Press information during the war, as during the entire dictatorship, was 
subject to strict control. Added to this, the triumphalist tone that drove the 
military government, which controlled the media, ensured people were unaware 
of actual developments. Thus when the surrender came on 14 June 1982, 
Argentine bewilderment and then indignation were very deep and contributed 
to the final discrediting of the military. The war left 649 Argentine soldiers 
dead and over a thousand injured in the Islands and has to-date caused the 
suicide of hundreds of former fighters returning to the continent. The young 
soldiers who survived were instructed to maintain absolute silence about the 
events of the war. Even today, many demand, appearing as plaintiffs in court, 
that the abuse and torture of soldiers at the hands of their superiors should be 
investigated. There are at least one hundred complaints filed in various courts 
for humiliation, torture and even the murder of a soldier and the death of 
another by starvation.
The Falklands–Malvinas War (also known as the Falklands Conflict/
Falklands Crisis/Guerra de las Malvinas/Guerra del Atlántico Sur) lasted for 
74 days, between 2 April and 14 June 1982. It cost the lives of 255 British 
military personnel and three Falkland-Malvinas Islanders and left 777 British 
wounded. Official documents and files are now being made available. On the 
British side, it was reported in December 2012 that the British government 
had so far released over 3,500 official documents from 1982 related to the 
Falklands War. These papers were released under the 30-year rule, which states 
that official documents must be declassified after 30 years, that is, unless the 
information contained within those papers could put Britain’s national security 
at risk. Examples of the documents released include testimonials by then British 
prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, given behind closed doors to the Falkland-
Malvinas Islands Review Committee in October 1982; and material from The 
Franks Report (also known as the Falkland Islands Review). The Franks Report 
(1981–3), was a government report produced by the Franks Committee in 
1983. It reported on decisions taken by the British government in the run-up 
to the landing of Argentine troops on the Falkland-Malvinas Islands in 1982: 
The Falklands War of 1982 was one of the defining events of recent British 
history, a sudden and almost revolutionary shock to the national psyche 
which transformed the domestic political scene, and much else besides.
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There are thousands upon thousands of secret documents on the war, 
as one might expect, and their release on 28 December 2012 marks the 
beginning of analysis rather than its conclusion. We will return to them 
many times on this site, but here is the first bite, an upload of all of MT’s 
1982 files on the topic, filmed by us in preview at the National Archives in 
Kew.
Much more will follow, from the archives of the Foreign Office and 
Ministry of Defence especially (The Franks Report, 1983).
On the Argentine side, speaking on the 33rd anniversary of the start of the 
conflict on 2 April 2015, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina 
ordered the declassification of all secret documents on the Falklands–Malvinas 
War with Britain, giving the Argentine defence ministry 30 days to make all files 
on the conflict public (Argentina. Ministerio de Defensa. Archivos Abiertos).
Lieutenant Benjamín Rattenbach had chaired a commission looking into 
the failings of the war from an Argentine perspective. The resulting Rattenbach 
Report, written in December 1982, was declassified on 22 March 2012. 
A documentary on the Rattenbach Report was produced by Canal 
Encuentro (2 April 2012) and includes exclusive material on the declassification 
of the report, as well as the testimonies of Defence Minister Arturo Puricelli, 
Rattenbach’s son Augusto, veterans Ernesto Alonso and Rodolfo Carrizo, US 
Ambassador Jorge Arguello and others. 
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1. Institutional archives 
1.1 Argentina
Casa Rosada. Archivo oral de las memorias de Malvinas 
‘The project consists in the construction of a biographical archive of oral 
history about the South Atlantic conflict known as the Falklands–Malvinas 
War. The purpose is to let the protagonists tell their own history through their 
voices, allowing their families and future generations a first-hand account of 




Website for the Argentine Ministry of Defence Malvinas Archive. It provides 
access to the Informe Rattenbach, to the Veteranos de Guerra de Malvinas and to 
legislation on the conflict:
http://www.mindef.gov.ar/malvinas.php.
Servicio Histórico del Ejército (SHE)
Archives: The Archive contains documents produced by the Argentine army 
that are considered of historical value, instruments of description, guides and 
publications. The inventory is relatively shallow.
Institutional History: Its origins date back to the creation of the Registro 
Marcial on 20 August 1813. In its more contemporary form, it dates back 
to 1884, when the División III ‘Historia’ del Estado Mayor Permanente was 
formed. Throughout the 20th century it experienced different changes in its 
name and organisation, successively becoming División VII – Historia del 
Estado Mayor General del Ejército (1924); División Histórica y Geográfica 
del Ejército (1959); Dirección de Estudios Históricos (1961). At first it was 
under the administration of the war ministry (Secretaría de Guerra); and then 
the army commander-in-chief (Comando en Jefe del Ejército); and, finally, 
the army historical service (Servicio Histórico del Ejército) in 1983. In 2000, 
it became part of the recently created Directive for Army Historical Affairs 
(Dirección de Asuntos Históricos del Ejército).
Cultural and geographical context: the SHE is located in San Telmo quarter, 
Buenos Aires. The building belonged to the former Casa de Moneda (The 
National Mint) and was declared ‘national patrimony’. It shares the building 
with the Archivo General del Ejército, the Comisión Evaluadora del Ejército, 
the Instituto de Estudios Históricos del Ejército and the Jardín de Infantes del 
Ministerio de Defensa.
Address: Defensa 628 / 630 PB. Ciudad CABA. Buenos Aires
Url: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/buscar/malvinas
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Departamento de Estudios Históricos Navales y Archivo Histórico de 
la Armada Argentina: Departamento de Estudios Históricos Navales de la 
Armada Argentina (1 January 1961–today).
Since its origins as the División Historia Naval (1957) the archive has 
contributed to the cultural development of the country through continuous 
research into and revelation of Argentina’s naval and maritime history and a 
specialised library on naval subjects. It keeps and preserves historical objects 
and documents. The Departamento de Estudios Navales rests in la Casa 
Amarilla (a replica of Admiral Guillermo Brown), built in the neighbourhood 
of de La Boca in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires.
Ministerio de Defensa. Archivos Abiertos. Malvinas 
‘Through the decree 503/15, the President of the Nation de-classified all 
documentation linked to the Armed Conflict of the South Atlantic from the 
Archivos de las Fuerzas Armadas (the Armed Forces Archive) and instructed 
the Ministry of Defence to make all documents and registers publicly accessible 
within thirty days. The following link gives you access to the necessary 
information about the requirements of each branch of the Historical Archives 
for consultation of the de-classified documents, as well as downloading the full 
indexes of all available documents and other descriptive tools of the Archives. It 
is recommended to read carefully the Consultation Conditions for Documents 
of the Armed Conflict of the South Atlantic.’
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/malvinas-1
Archive Norms and Regulations: 
http://www.mindef.gov.ar/archivosAbiertos/downloads/malvinas/ejercito/
descripcion_institucional.pdf.
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto. Secretaría de Asuntos 
Relativos a las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur, Sandwich del Sur y los 
Espacios Marítimos Circundantes 
http://eespa.mrecic.gov.ar/es/content/la-cuesti%C3%B3n-de-las-islas-
malvinas-0
La cuestión de las Islas Malvinas 
www.mrecic.gov.ar/es/la-cuestion-de-las-islas-malvinas.
Comunicados de Prensa sobre La Cuestión de las Islas Malvinas www.
mrecic.gov.ar/es/la-cuestion-de-las-islas-malvinas.









Archivo General de la Nación de la República Argentina
Mission: ‘To gather, preserve and keep for public consultation all the written, 
photographic, filmed, video and sound-recorded material of interest to the 
country as a testimonial for its past, present and identity, independently of 
the origins of the material, official records, donations or purchases. To track 
public documentation in general, its preservation and destiny in permanent 
collaboration with the Nation’s Institutions’ (author’s translation).
It keeps historical documents such as:
• Decreto de creación de la Comandancia Civil y Militar, Buenos Aires, 10 
de junio de 1829 (A.G.N. Fondo Luis Vernet, Sala VII 2-3-3t)
• Proclama de Luis Vernet en el momento de tomar posesión de su cargo, 




AIM25 Archives in London and the M25 Area
http://www.aim25.ac.uk/index.stm
Examples of repositories containing archival material on the Falklands–
Malvinas included within AIM25.
King’s College London Archives (King’s College London Department of 
War Studies Records)
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/library/collections/archivespec/index.aspx.
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/library/collections/archivespec/collections/lhcma.aspx
Address: King’s College London Archives, S3.02 Strand Building, Strand, 
London WC2R 2LS
Tel. +44 (0)20 7848 2015




The National Maritime Museum’s Archive catalogue:
http://collections.rmg.co.uk/archive.html#!asearch
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Address: The Caird Library, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London 
SE10 9NF
Tel: +44 (0)20 8312 6516
Email: library@rmg.co.uk.
The Institute of Commonwealth Studies
Archives and Special Collections at Senate House Library include material 
relating to the Falklands Islands conflict in 1982, official statements, press 
releases, press cuttings, and printed books.
The Institute of Latin American Studies
Archives at Senate House Library include a donation of Falkland-Malvinas 
Islands press cuttings, consisting of newspaper cuttings and whole issues of 
newspapers relating to the Falkland-Malvinas Islands conflict. These are dated 
between 1978 and 1985 and include a set of cuttings relating to the impact on 
British libraries of the war.
Archon – The National Archives
www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/archon/
This is a portal to an electronic directory of repositories holding manuscript 
sources for British history and web-based information on archival resources. To 
find an archive in the UK and beyond:
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/find-an-archive.
Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs
http://www.chathamhouse.org/about/library/archive-and-catalogue
Address: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House 10 St 
James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LE
Tel: +44 (0)20 7957 5700






Address: Commonwealth Secretariat, Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London 
SW1Y 5HX
All visits by the public must be arranged in advance by appointment. 






Address: Imperial War Museum London, Lambeth Road, London SE1 6HZ
Tel: +44 (0)20 7416 5000
Email: contact@iwm.org.uk.
The National Archives (UK)
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk
‘Discovery’, the catalogue of The National Archives, holds (as of April 2015) 
more than 32,000,000 descriptions of records held by The National Archives 
and more than 2,500 archives across the country. Over nine million records are 
available for download.
To search Discovery: http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
Results will include: material held within The National Archives, material 
within The National Archives that is available for download only and material 
held within other archives.
National Maritime Museum
http://www.rmg.co.uk
The Caird Library, National Maritime Museum, Romney Road, Greenwich, 
London SE10 9NF
Library / general enquiries: tel: +44 (0)20 8312 6516 
Email: library@rmg.co.uk
Manuscripts, charts, atlases: email manuscripts@rmg.co.uk.
Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers (IBG)). 
http://www.rgs.org
Address: 1 Kensington Gore, London, SW7 2AR
Tel: +44 (0)20 7591 3000 




A range of reports, research publications, briefings, statements etc. are available 
to download.
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2. Institutional repositories, libraries and museums with 
specialised collections on the subject
Oral sources, biographical sources, university collections, non-profit institutions 
and foundations, collections, etc.
2.1 Argentina
Biblioteca Nacional Mariano Moreno de la República Argentina
Address: (Calle) Agüero 2502. CP C1425EID Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos 
Aires consultas@bn.gov.ar
http://www.bn.gov.ar
Memoria abierta. Selección de revistas de la época
Address: Av. Libertador 8151, (C1429BNB) CABA
Email: memoria@memoriaabierta.org.ar
http://www.memoriaabierta.org.ar/materiales/serper_malvinas.php
Red de Archivos orales de la Argentina contemporánea 
The Network of Oral Archives of Contemporary Argentina (Red de Archivos 
Orales, RAO) is an inter-university project aimed at the generation and 
publishing of the testimony of the protagonists in Argentina’s recent history. 
The research groups that constitute the RAO constantly conduct interviews that 
become part of the diverse collections of the repository and give researchers, 
teachers and students access to such sources. Currently it contains over two 
hundred testimonies.
http://www.archivooral.org/busqueda_palabra.php
Museo Malvinas e Islas del Atlántico Sur 
Created in June 2014 by the Argentine government in Buenos Aires. The 
museum depends on the Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and 
Technology. Through Decree 809/2014, published in the Official Gazette 
of the Argentine Republic on June 6, 2014, one of its principal objectives 
is to disseminate, communicate, exhibit and raise awareness among all the 
inhabitants of the nation about the Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas 
Islands and the South Atlantic Islands, particularly the South Georgia and the 
South Sandwich Islands. The Museum opened in February 2015 under the 
Ministry of Culture of the Argentine government. The building is on three 
levels and has differently themed rooms, including audio-visual displays with 
support of technology and tactile LCD, historical objects, literary texts, images, 
paintings, letters and historical documents, ambient sound, photographs, maps 
and plans. 
Address: Av. del Libertador 8151, Ciudad de Buenos Aires




Museo de la Memoria. Archivo Oral de veteranos de la Guerra de Malvinas 
del sur de Santa Fe
“The oral archive of the Malvinas War is a record of the testimonies of veterans 
about their experience of participating in the South Atlantic Conflict in 1982, 
which includes aspects of their own life before and after the event. This task 
is framed in general way in the presidential decree 1245/2015, of creation of 
the National Oral File of Malvinas and is a task proposed and organised by the 
Area of Veterans of War of the UGL IX of the Pami, the Center of ex-Soldiers 
Fighters in Malvinas de Rosario and the Rosario Memorial Museum”. http://
www.museodelamemoria.gob.ar/page/noticias/id/2146/title/Archivo-Oral-de-
veteranos-de-la-Guerra-de-Malvinas-del-sur-de-Santa-Fe
Portal de datos del Sistema Nacional de Repositorios Digitales (SNRD) 
Under the aegis of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 
(Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Productiva; Mincyt) its aim is 




Birmingham: Birmingham University Library 
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/libraries/search.aspx
Address: Main Library, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham 
B15 2TT 
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Address: 96 Euston Road, London NW1 2DB




The British Library Sound Archive
http://www.bl.uk/soundarchive
This has a number of recordings relating to the Falklands War of 1982, including 
Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the House of Commons on the Argentine 
invasion: http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/onlineex/voiceshist/thatcher/.
Humanities Reference Service and Sound & Vision Reference Service
Tel: +44 (0)20 7412 7831
BL telephone and email contacts list: http://www.bl.uk/aboutus/contact/list-
of-contacts/.
British Library of Political and Economic Science (LSE)
http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/home.aspx
BLPES Library, 10 Portugal Street, London WC2A 2HD
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7229
Email: library.enquiries@lse.ac.uk. 
Consortium of Online Public Access Catalogues (COPAC)
COPAC is a free, online, merged library catalogue which enables researchers 
and information professionals to search the catalogues of approximately ninety 
libraries at once. These libraries include the UK national libraries, many 
university libraries and specialist libraries such as the Wellcome Trust and the 
National Art Library at the V&A. COPAC lists materials in all different formats: 
e.g. books, journals, conference proceedings, theses, electronic resources, music 
and multi-media materials such as DVDs. You can also find rare and unique 
materials such as early manuscripts and archive materials. You can use COPAC 
as a resource discovery tool to search for resources not available in your local 





Address: The London Library, 14 St James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LG
Main switchboard: +44 (0) 20 7930 7705
Email: reception@londonlibrary.co.uk
enquiries@londonlibrary.co.uk




Search25 helps you discover library resources across London and the South 
East; providing one-stop access to the library catalogues of nearly sixty world-
renowned institutions and specialist collections within the M25 Consortium 





Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU
Tel: +44 (0)20 7862 8500 (general enquiries) or 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7862 8456 (subject librarian)
Email: senatehouselibrary@london.ac.uk.
Southampton: University of Southampton 
https://www.southampton.ac.uk/library/
Address: University Library, University of Southampton, Highfield, 
Southampton SO17 1BJ
Tel.: +44 (0)23 8059 2180 (general enquiries)
Email: libenqs@soton.ac.uk (general enquiries)
Archives & Special Collections:




Address: Main Library, Wilkins Building, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT
Tel: +44 (0)20 7679 7792
Enquiries: library@ucl.ac.uk
3. International Organisations Repositories
Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja. CICR. Conflicto de las islas 
Falkland-Malvinas: la acción del CICR en favor de los prisioneros de guerra = 
International Committee of the Red Cross. ICRC. Conflict of the Falkland 
Islands-Malvinas: the ICRC action in favour of the prisoners of war https://
www.icrc.org/en/resource-centre/result?t=falkland+malvinas
Naciones Unidas. Sistema de Documentos Oficiales (ODS).  United 
Nations. Official Document System (ODS). Searching=Búsqueda: 
Falkland–Malvinas: 11,135 Documents for Falkland-Malvinas search. 
Resolución 502 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas de 1982.
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http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=S/RES/502%20(1982)
Resolución 505 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas
http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=S/RES/505%20(1982).
Global Security Organisations
‘The Argentine Seizure of The Malvinas [Falkland] Islands: History and 
Diplomacy’. American report from 1987 by Richard D. Chenette, Lieutenant 
Commander, United States Navy, laying out the history and background of the 
disputed claims. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1987/
CRD.htm.
4. Media, ‘raw resources’, images and videos
RadioTapes.com. Coverage of the Falklands–Malvinas War (1982). 
http://radiotapes.com/specialpostings.html#Falklands.
4.1 Argentina
Canal encuentro. Gobierno Argentino. 
Programación especial a 33 años de la Guerra de Malvinas.
http://www.encuentro.gob.ar/sitios/encuentro/Noticias/getDetalle?rec_
id=125767
La Nación. Search Engine: results 1–10 of 15,779 with the following keywords 
Malvinas + Between 17 February 1995 and 21 September 2016. The search 
engine does not go further back in time. Filter options include author, places, 
topics etc. (accessed September 2016). 
http://buscar.lanacion.com.ar/malvinas/date-19950217,20160921/sort-old.
Clarín. Search Engine: approximately 132,000 results. Filter options include 
web page, images and dates (accessed September 2016). 
http://www.clarin.com/buscador/?q=malvinas
4.2 United Kingdom
BBC. On this day. 1982: Argentina invades Falklands http://news.bbc.
co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/2/newsid_2520000/2520879.stm.
The Guardian: Falkland Islands 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/falklands
About 533 results for Falkland Islands from today (19 August 2018) to 1982 
with two news items from 1833: from The Guardian archive: ‘Observer: 
Buenos Aires protests the British occupation of the Falklands. South American 





Finally, we would like to point out that the preservation, accessibility and 
dissemination of the Falklands–Malvinas Conflict Documents is a task under 
construction. 
The will for transparency of the governments that guard the documentary 
collections, expressed sometimes in a theoretical way in the national legislations, 
must be fulfilled and be effective, allowing this accessibility to the citizens. 
Efforts have been made by both parties, by the professionals responsible for 
the archives and official documents, for opening, preserving and making them 
accessible.
The Minister of Education of Argentina, Arberto Sileoni (2009–15), during 
his period in the ministry, was involved in the preservation and dissemination 
of historical sources in general and sources from Malvinas especially. He created 
the Museum Malvinas e Islas del Atlántico Sur, and inspired documentation of 
compiled sources for the History of Malvinas (Flachsland, C., Adamoli, M.C., 
Farias, M. 2014). The current government, through the different departments, 
perseveres, giving continuity to these projects which are being developed in the 
Malvinas Museum and other institutions.
In the United Kingdom we can mention the creation of the National 
Archives Repositories with the digitalisation and accessibility of the documents 
that are preserved there, ‘We collect and secure the future of the government 
record, from Shakespeare’s will to tweets from Downing Street, to preserve 
them for generations to come, making it as accessible and available as possible’. 
(The National Archives, 2018).
The creation of Heritage Repositories, (Osuna and Rodríguez, 2018) has 
proven to be the most effective tool to make this accessibility of documents 
possible. The digitisation programmes are a fine investment for the best 
preservation and accessibility of the official collections. The preservation and 
dissemination of the documentary collections should be protected, conserved 
and disseminated to all administrative levels seeking the digital integration 
of the collections, now possible thanks to the OAI-PMH protocols. The 
documentary collections are also protected by several international programs 
such as Unesco Memory of the World which is truly inspiring: “Building peace 
in the minds of men and women” (Unesco, 1992–present).
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The conflict over possession of 
the Falklands–Malvinas Islands 
was waged in an area remote both 
geographically and geo-politically 
in an era of cold war and also 
of tensions within and between 
sovereign states of the supposed 
western bloc. It has been broadly 
perceived as an absurd confrontation, 
the echoes of which, despite the 
brevity of its duration, and some 
four decades on, resonate still not 
least in the lasting wounds that 
bear testimony yet to its underlying 
causes. 
This book probes the reasons behind 
the conflict’s tragic occurrence and 
the processing of its consequences 
in and beyond the sovereign states 
that suffered and suffer still from the 
exacerbating of nationalist identities 
in the resolution of their differences 
and the consequent challenges to be 
addressed. Drawing on perspectives 
that bring together contributors from 
markedly differing backgrounds, 
whether national or disciplinary, 
this collection reinforces the spirit 
of critical questioning that historical 
and sociological research must ever 
value and pursue. Prejudices and 
preconceptions are acknowledged 
and confronted yet contextualised 
and revised through filters of new 
questions and answers which 
are not always anticipated or, for 
the stubbornly partisan, readily 
embraced.
